Whether Sexual Intercourse based on promise to marry is Rape?

"Marriage is the beginning- the beginning of the family- and is a life-long commitment. It also provides an opportunity to grow in selflessness as you serve your husband and children. Marriage is more than a physical union; it is also a spiritual and emotional union. This union mirrors the one between God and His Temple."

Hindu marriage joins two individuals for life, so that they can pursue dharma (duty), artha (possessions), and kama (physical desires). It is a union of two individuals as husband and wife, and is recognized by law. In Hinduism, marriage is followed by traditional rituals for consummation.

The consent for sexual intercourse obtained by a person by giving false promise of marriage would not excuse him from rape charges. Whenever the accused gives promise to the victim to marry her, never had any intention to marry and the victim gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the Indian Panel Code, and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Section 375 of the Indian Panel Code, and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.
Section 375 and Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and on the consent/consensual sex are required to be referred to and considered:

Section 375 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860

1[375. Rape.- A man is said to commit 'rape' if he -

(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do with him or any other person; or

(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do with him or any other person; or

(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or

(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:-

First- Against her will.

Secondly - Without her consent.

Thirdly - With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.

Fourthly - With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be law­fully married.

Fifthly - With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupe­fying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.

Sixthly - With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age.

Seventhly - When she is unable to communicate consent.

Explanation 1.- For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora.

Explanation 2. - Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act;

Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity,

Exception 1 - A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.

Exception 2 - Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.]

Section 90 in The Indian Penal Code 1860

90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.- A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.- if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.- unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.

In the case of 'Kaini Rajan Vs. State of Kerala', (2013) 9 SCC 113, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India explained the essentials and parameters of the offence of rape in Para 12 as under:

'12. Section 375 IPC defines the expression 'rape', which indicates that the first clause operates, where the woman is in possession of her senses, and therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will; and second, where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth, when there is consent, but it is not such a consent as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her on any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. The expression 'against her will' means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. 'Consent' is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of an act complained of. Section 90 IPC refers to the expression 'consent'. Section 90, though, does not define 'consent', but describes what is not consent. 'Consent', for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. (See State of H.P. v. Mango Ram (2000) 7 SCC 224'

In the case of 'Deepak Gulati Vs State of Haryana', (2013) 7 SCC 675, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in Paras 21 &d 24 as under:

'21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention, whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The 'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term 'misconception of fact', the fact must have an immediate relevance'. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.'

In the case of 'Yedla Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of A. P', (2006) 11 SCC 615, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the amendment made in the Indian Evidence Act – Section 114A of the Evidence Act. In that case, the sexual intercourse was committed with the prosecutrix by the accused. As per the prosecutrix, the accused used to come to her sister's house in between 11 a.m. and 12 noon daily and asked her for sexual intercourse with him. She refused to participate in the said act but the accused kept on persisting and persuading her. She resisted for about 3 months. On one day, the accused came to her sister's house at about 12 noon and closed the doors and had sexual intercourse forcibly, without her consent and against her will. When she asked the accused as to why he spoiled her life, he gave assurance that he would marry her and asked her not to cry, though his parents were not agreeing for the marriage. It was found that on the basis of the assurance given by the accused this process of sexual intercourse continued and he kept on assuring that he would marry her. When she became pregnant, she informed about the pregnancy to the accused. He got certain tablets for abortion but they did not work. When she was in the third month of pregnancy, she again insisted for the marriage and the accused answered that his parents are not agreeable. She deposed that had he not promised, she would not have allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. The question was raised before the Panchayat of elders and the prosecutrix was present in the Panchayat along with her sister and brother-in-law. The accused and his father both attended the Panchayat and the accused admitted about the illegal contacts with the prosecutrix and causing pregnancy. The accused asked for two days' time for marrying the prosecutrix and the Panchayat accordingly granted time. But after the Panchayat meeting the accused absconded from the village and when the accused did not fulfil his promise which was made before the Panchayat, the prosecutrix lodged the

complaint. Considering the aforesaid facts and after considering Section 90 of the IPC, this Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. While convicting the accused, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paras 9, 10,15 & 16 observed and held as under:

'9. The question in the present case is whether this conduct of the accused apparently falls under any of the six descriptions of Section 375 IPC as mentioned above. It is clear that the prosecutrix had sexual

intercourse with the accused on the representation made by the accused that he would marry her. This was a false promise held out by the accused. Had this promise not been given perhaps, she would not have permitted the accused to have sexual intercourse. Therefore, whether this amounts to a consent or the accused obtained a consent by playing fraud on her. Section 90 of the Penal Code says that if the consent has been given under fear of injury or a misconception of fact, such consent obtained, cannot e construed to be a valid consent. Section 90 reads as under:

'90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.- A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or [Consent of insane person] if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or [Consent of child] unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.'

10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent. …….

15. In this connection reference may be made to the amendment made in the Evidence Act. Section 114A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114A reads as under:

'114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.- In a prosecution for rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) of subsection (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.'

16. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutrix and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the instant case as per the statement of PW 1, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry her.'

In the case of 'State of U.P. Vs. Naushad', (2013) 16 SCC 651, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the acquittal by the High Court and convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC observing as under:

'17. Section 376 IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of rape. Section 375 IPC defines the offence of rape, and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The description 'secondly' speaks of rape 'without her consent'. Thus, sexual intercourse by a man with a woman without her consent will constitute the offence of rape. We have to examine as to whether in the present case, the accused is guilty of the act of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix 'against her consent'. The prosecutrix in this case has deposed on record that the accused promised marriage with her and had sexual intercourse with her on this pretext and when she got pregnant, his family refused to marry him with her on the ground that she is of 'bad character'.

18. How is 'consent' defined? Section 90 IPC defines consent known to be given under 'fear or misconception' which reads as under:

'90.Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.- A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception;'

(emphasis supplied)

Thus, if consent is given by the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact, it is vitiated.

Having sexual intercourse by giving false assurance to marry the lady and thereafter refusing to enter the wedlock is evident that he never intended to marry her and procured her consent only for the reason of having sexual relations with her, which act of the accused falls squarely under the definition of rape as he had sexual intercourse with her consent which was consent obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 IPC. Thus, the alleged consent said to have been obtained by the accused was not voluntary consent and this Court is of the view that the accused indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by misconstruing to her his true intentions. It is apparent from the evidence that the accused only wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and was under no intention of actually marrying the prosecutrix. .........'

The High Court of Delhi in 'Sujit Ranjan Vs. State' [Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2011 decided on 27.01.2011], after referring to and considering several decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, ultimately in Paragraph 16, observed and held as under:

'16. Legal position which can be culled out from the judicial pronouncements referred above is that the consent given by the prosecutrix to have sexual intercourse with whom she is in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be considered as given under "misconception of fact".

Whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary or whether it is given under "misconception of fact" depends on the facts of each case. While considering the question of consent, the Court must consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances before reaching a conclusion. Evidence adduced by the prosecution has to be weighed keeping in mind that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence. Prosecution must lead positive evidence to give rise to inference beyond reasonable doubt that accused had no intention to marry prosecutrix at all from inception and that promise made was false to his knowledge. The failure to keep the promise on a future uncertain date may be on account of variety of reasons and could not always amount to "misconception of fact" right from the inception.'

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a recent decision in 'Anurag Soni Vs State of Chhatisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 629 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 618/2019 DOD 09.04.2019 held as under;

"14. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the prosecution has been successful in proving the case that from the very beginning the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix; he gave false promises/promise to the prosecutrix to marry her and on such false promise he had a physical relation with the prosecutrix; the prosecutrix initially resisted, however, gave the consent relying upon the false promise of the accused that he will marry her and, therefore, her consent can be said to be a consent on misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and such a consent shall not excuse the accused from the charge of rape and offence under Section 375 of the IPC. Though, in Section 313 statement, the accused came up with a case that the prosecutrix and his family members were in knowledge that his marriage was already fixed with Priyanka Soni, even then, the prosecutrix and her family members continued to pressurise the accused to marry the prosecutrix, it is required to be noted that first of all the same is not proved by the accused. Even otherwise, considering the circumstances and evidence on record, referred to hereinabove, such a story is not believable. The prosecutrix, in the present case, was an educated girl studying in B. Pharmacy. Therefore, it is not believable that despite having knowledge that that appellant’s marriage is fixed with another lady – Priyanka Soni, she and her family members would continue to pressurise the accused to marry and the prosecutrix will give the consent for physical relation. In the deposition, the prosecutrix specifically stated that initially she did not give her consent for physical relationship, however, on the appellant’s

promise that he would marry her and relying upon such promise, she consented for physical relationship with the appellant accused. Even considering Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, which has been inserted subsequently, there is a presumption and the court shall presume that she gave the consent for the physical relationship with the accused relying upon the promise by the accused that he will marry her. As observed hereinabove, from the very inception, the promise given by the accused to marry the prosecutrix was a false promise and from the very beginning there was no intention of the accused to marry the prosecutrix as his marriage with Priyanka Soni was already fixed long back and, despite the same, he continued to give promise/false promise and alluded the prosecutrix to give her consent for the physical relationship. Therefore, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and considering the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have rightly held that the consent given by the prosecutrix was on misconception of fact and, therefore, the same cannot be said to be a consent so as to excuse the accused for the charge of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC. Both the Courts below have rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC."

Wherever, the from the very inception the accused had no intention to marry the victim and that he had mala fide motives and had made false promise only to satisfy the lust. But for the false promise by the accused to marry the victim, the victim would not have given the consent to have the physical relationship. It is a clear case of cheating and deception. The consent given by the victim on misconception of fact. Such incidents are on increase nowadays. Such offences are against the society. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim.

As observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a catena of decisions, while a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim. Rape is a crime against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim. Being the most hated crime, the rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman, and offends both her esteem and dignity.

Rape has an enduring effect on the lives of the victims. However, in most cases, it is not just the victim that experiences the calamitous consequences of sexual violence but family also suffers the same. In a patriarchal society like India where the women have very low status, the people closely connected to the victim, especially the family members are also affected as a result of the negative social reactions. Victims of sexual violence experience a wide range of physical and psychological problems. Rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim and her family members. Therefore, merely because the accused had married with another lady and/or even the victim has subsequently married, is no ground not to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. The accused must face the consequences of the crime committed by him.