CONSTRUCTION OF LABOUR STATUTE

CONSTRUCTION OF LABOUR STATUTE

By

  Achuth Kylas

                                           School of Legal Studies

                CUSAT

INTRODUCTION

                                                A statute is to be expounded according to its obvious meaning.   If the words of the statute are unambiguous it is necessary to expound them in their natural and ordinary sense. The rules of construction cannot be pressed if the terms used by the legislature are clear and free from ambiguity.  It is a settled rule of construction that the language of a provision should not be construed in a manner which   would do  violence to the phraseology used therein. The construction which will facilitate the object of statute should be made.  The construction should not be against the express provision of the statute or the express will of the statute. The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to construe it according to the plain, literal and grammatical meanings.  This rule is subject to an exception that the grammatical construction would lead to some absurdity or to some repugnancy or inconsistency with the other provisions of that statute.  If two constructions are possible it is equally well established that the construction which advances the intention of the legislation, remedies the mischief to thwart with which it is enacted should be accepted.  There is no duty laid down on the court to yield to absurd construction of a statute.  If such a construction can be avoided, the court will do so and no rule of interpretation can forbid it.  The most firmly established rules construing obscure enactments are those laid down by the Barons of the Exchequer in  Heydon’s case[1] .

                        Besides this rule there is a general rule of construction                                                                                                         applicable to all statutes alike which is known as construction                               ex viscerilous actus -  within the  four corners of the statute.  The construction should be made of all parts of the statute together and not of only one part by itself.  It is well settled that the words of the statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they  best harmonise with the subject of enactment and the object of the legislature.  It is a settled rule of interpretation that when legislature uses certain words which have acquired a definite meaning over a period of time it must be assumed that those words have been used by the legislature in the same sense.  The relevant provisions are to be construed in the context in which they appear and having due regards to the objects which are sought to be served by the Act.           

           SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL OR WELFARE  STATUTE

                    All legislations in a welfare state are enacted with the object of promoting general welfare. 

                   In J. G. Vakharia v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner[2]   the C. J.  Chagla of Bombay High Court took the view that in construing a social legislation the court must even if necessary strain the language of the Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation in the Statute book.  In Prakash Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay[3]  it was held that no labour or social legislation can be considered by a court without applying principles of social justice in interpreting its provisions.

                  Later in Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. State Industrial Court[4]  relying upon the observations of S.C.  In Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Jute Mill Mazdoor Union[5]  took the view that the conception of social justice ought not to be imported while interpreting the provisions of the Act or other similar Acts.

                   The Mysore High Court in Pamadi Subbarama Chetti v. Mirza Zawar Ali[6] expressed itself in still stronger terms against importing the concept of social justice in interpreting statutes and observed that courts should not in guise of liberal construction assume the role of legislature.  In J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal[7]  the S. C. observed that the argument that the considerations of social justice are irrelevant and untenable in dealing with industrial disputes has to be rejected without any hesitation.  In the Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop v. Vishwanath[8]  the Court said that this enactment demanded an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose, without doing violence to the language.

                    In Magor & St. Milton Rural District Council v. New Port Corporation[9] Lord Simonds disapproved the view of the court in Seaford Court Estate Ltd. v. Asher[10] and held that the general proposition that the duty of the court is to find out the intention of Parliament cannot be supported by any means.  The duty of the court is to interpret the words the legislature has used.

                    If two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on a provision the construction which facilitates the  policy and object oflegislation and is more beneficial to the employees  has to be preferred.  

PREAMBLE

                       The preamble of a statute is  “a key to the understanding of it” and it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the  Act within its real scope, whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt.  In Tribunal Parkash  Nayayar v. Union of India[11]   it was pointed out that though a preamble is a key to open the mind of the legislature it cannot be used to control or qualify the  precise and unambiguous language of the enactment.  The preamble may assist in ascertaining the meaning but it does not affect clear words in a statute. 

CONCLUSION                                                                                                                                                                

                   Thus it can be concluded that the rule of construction can be applied  only if the words used in the statute are ambiguous.  If the words are unambiguous they can be expanded in their natural and ordinary sense.  The rules of construction should not be against the provisions of the statute