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In landmark a judgment delivered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs United Yarn Tex. Pvt Ltd & Ors {2007} 137 Comp Case63 (SC), the following issues came for consideration;

 

[a] Whether DRT Act applies to debts due to co-operative banks constituted under the MCS Act, 1960; the MSCS Act, 2002 and the APCS Act, 1964?

 

[b]   Whether the State Legislature is competent to enact legislation in respect of co-operative societies incidentally transacting business of banking in the light of Entry 32, List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution?

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Facts : -   Matter arose out various batch of appeals/SLPs involving the issue regarding right of recovery of debts by the co-operative banks constituted under the Co-operative Societies Acts of the States of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh in the context of enactment of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Under the Co-operative Societies Acts, there is a mechanism for recovery of debts by the Banks constituted under those Acts, which are also called Co-operative Banks. After the enactment of the 1993 Act, question arose as to whether such Co-operative Banks would have right of recovery under the respective Co-operatives Societies Acts or they will have to proceed under the 1993 Act. These aspects and some other issues, including the issue of legislative competence of the States to enact the provisions relating to Co-operative Banks, came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. Both the High Courts have pronounced judgments on the issues and these judgments were decided in this case by a Full Bench.

 

Held :-           

Issue (a): No. “Co-operative banks" established under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 [MCS Act, 1960]; the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 [APCS Act, 1964]; and the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 [MSCS Act, 2002] transacting the business of banking, do not fall within the meaning of "banking company" as defined in Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 [BR Act]. Therefore, the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [RDB Act] by invoking the Doctrine of Incorporation are not applicable to the recovery of dues by the co-operatives from their members.

 

Issue (b): Yes. The express exclusion of co-operative societies in Entry 43 of List I and the express inclusion of co-operative societies in Entry 32 of List II separately and apart from but along with corporations other than those specified in List I and universities, clearly indicated that the constitutional scheme was designed to treat co-operative societies as institutions distinct from corporations.

 

Reasons :- Issue No. (a): The dues of co-operatives and recovery proceedings in connection therewith are covered by specific Acts, such as the MCS Act, 1960 and the APCS Act, 1964, which are comprehensive and self-contained legislations. Similarly, for Multi-State Co-operatives there is a specific enactment in the form of the MSCS Act, 2002 comprehensively providing the legal framework in respect to issues pertaining to such co-operatives. Therefore, when there is an admittedly existing legal framework specifically dealing with issues pertaining to co-operatives and especially when the co-operative banks are, in any case, not covered by the provisions of the RDB Act specifically, there is no justification of covering the co-operative banks under the provisions of the RDB Act by invoking the Doctrine of Incorporation. The distinction between peoples' co-operative banks serving their members and corporate banks doing commercial transactions is fundamental to the constitutional dispensation and understanding co-operative banking generally and in the context of cooperative banking not coming under the ambit of the BR Act. Thus, even if the co-operatives are involved in the activity of banking which involves lending and borrowing, this is purely incidental to their main co-operative activity which is a function in public domain.

 

The RDB Act was passed in 1993 when Parliament had before it the provisions of the BR Act as amended by Act No. 23 of 1965 by addition of some more clauses in Section 56 of the Act. The Parliament was fully aware that the provisions of the BR Act apply to co-operative societies as they apply to banking companies. The Parliament was also aware that the definition of 'banking company' in Section 5 (c) had not been altered by Act No. 23 of 1965 and it was kept intact, and in fact additional definitions were added by Section 56(c). "Co-operative bank" was separately defined by the newly inserted clause (cci) and "primary co-operative bank" was similarly separately defined by clause (ccv). The Parliament was simply assigning a meaning to words; it was not incorporating or even referring to the substantive provisions of the BR Act. The meaning of 'banking company' must, therefore, necessarily be strictly confined to the words used in Section 5(c) of the BR Act. It would have been the easiest thing for Parliament to say that 'banking company' shall mean 'banking company' as defined in Section 5 (c) and shall include 'co-operative bank' as defined in Section 5 (cci) and 'primary co-operative bank' as defined in Section 5 (ccv). However, the Parliament did not do so. There was thus a conscious exclusion and deliberate commission of co-operative banks from the purview of the RDB Act. The reason for excluding co-operative banks seems to be that co-operative banks have comprehensive, self-contained and less expensive remedies available to them under the State Co-operative Societies Acts of the States concerned, while other banks and financial institutions did not have such speedy remedies and they had to file suits in civil courts. The Court further observed that merely because they (co-operative societies) do banking business such Cooperative Societies do not cease to be Cooperative Societies, when otherwise they are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act and are subject to the duties, liabilities and control of the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act. Section 31 of the RDB Act clearly refers to transfer of 'every suit or other proceeding pending before any court'. The word 'court', in the context of the RDB Act, signifies 'civil court'. It is clear that the Registrar, or an officer designated by him or an arbitrator under Sections 61, 62, 70 and 71 of the APCS Act, 1964 and under Section 91 and other provisions of Chapter IX of the MCS Act, 1960 are not 'civil courts'. In Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam [1962 (2) SCR 339], this Court held: "By 'courts' is meant courts of civil judicature and by 'tribunals' those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the power of the State is the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State". In Ram Rao & Anr. v. Narayan & Anr. [AIR 1969 SC 724], it was held that the nominee of Registrar appointed under Section 95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 is not a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 195, Cr.P.C..

 

As already pointed out, the RDB Act is consistent with the general banks and their creditors/loanees while the MCS Act, 1960; the APCS Act, 1964 and the MSCS Act, 2002 are concerned with the regulation of societies only. The language of the Sections in these enactments defining 'banking company' is plain, clear and explicit. It does not admit any doubtful interpretation as the intention of the legislature is clear as afore-said. It is well-settled that the language of the Statutes is to be properly understood. The usual presumption is that the Legislature does not waste its words and it does not commit a mistake. It is presumed to know the law, judicial decisions and general principles of law. The elementary rule of interpretation of the Statute is that the words used in the Section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. Therefore, we cannot afford to add any words to read something into the Section, which the Legislature had not intended.

 

Issue No. (b) : The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds, viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. In State of A. P. & Ors. v. McDowell & Co. & Ors. [(1996) 3 SCC 709], this Court has opined that except the above two grounds, there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the afore-mentioned two grounds. The legislative field in constitutional terms has to be determined in terms of Articles 245 and 246 and Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I and Entry 32 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.

 

Entry 43 of List I of the Seventh Schedule is as follows:- "43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations, but not including co-operative societies."

Entry 44 is as follows:- "Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities."

Entry 45 is as follows:- "Banking."

Entry 32 of List II is as follows:-  "32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literacy, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; co-operative societies."

 

The Supreme court while deciding the issue relied upon various judgments to bring home the point that in considering the validity of a Statute the presumption is always in favour of constitutionality and the burden is upon the person who attacks it to show that there has been transgression of constitutional principles. In State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. & Ors. [(1997) 2 SCC 453], the Court had observed that "The approach of the court, while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of constitutionality. The court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ignored out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. The same approach holds good while ascertaining the intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and application." "The Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as the legislature and the executive are expected to show due regard and deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our Constitution recognizes and gives effect to the concept of equality between the three wings of the State and the concept of "checks and balances" inherent in such scheme."

 

As regards the overlapping between the legislation enacted by State & Centre the court quoted the observation of the Federal Court in Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan [AIR 1941 FC 47] as follows:- "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also upon a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determine whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or that."

           

The court also relied upon the observation in the case of A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras [1957 SCR 399 at page 410], where the principle were applied and the case of State of Rajasthan v. Chawala [1959 (Suppl.1) SCR 904 at 909]  where the principles of pith and substance was laid down and held that Entry 43 List of I speaks of banking, insurance and financial corporations etc. but expressly excludes co-operative societies from its ambit. The constitutional intendment seems to be that the co-operative movement was to be left to the States to promote and legislate upon and the banking activities of co-operative societies were also not to be touched unless Parliament considered it imperative. The BR Act deals with the regulation of the banking business. There is no provision whatsoever relating to proceedings for recovery by any bank of its dues. Recovery was initially governed by the Code of Civil Procedure by way of civil suits and after the RDB Act came into force, the recovery of the dues of the banks and financial institutions was by filing applications to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has been established with the sole object to provide speedy remedy for recovery of debts of the banks and financial institutions since there has been considerable difficulties experienced therefore from normal remedy of Civil Court. In R. C. Cooper, etc. v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 248], this Court observed that power to legislate for setting up corporations to carry on banking and other business and to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to provide for administration of the corporations is conferred upon the Parliament by Entries 43, 44 and 45 of the Constitution. Therefore, the express exclusion of co-operative societies in Entry 43 of List I and the express inclusion of co-operative societies in Entry 32 of List II separately and apart from but along with corporations other than those specified in List I and universities, clearly indicated that the constitutional scheme was designed to treat co-operative societies as institutions distinct from corporations. Co-operative Societies, incorporation, regulation and winding up are State subjects in the ambit of Entry 32 of List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Co-operatives form a specie of genus 'corporation' and as such co-operative societies with objects not confined to one State read in with the Union as provided in Entry 44 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, MSCS Act, 2002 governs such multi-state co-operatives. Hence, the co-operative banks performing functions for the public with a limited commercial function as opposed to corporate banks cannot be covered by Entry 45 of List I dealing with "banking". The subject of co-operative societies is not included in the Union List rather it covers under Entry 32 of List II of Seventh Schedule appended to the Constitution.

           

The Court held that for the reasons stated above and adopting pervasive and meaningful interpretation of the provisions of the relevant Statutes and Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I and Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, we answer the Reference as under:- 

 

"Co-operative banks" established under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 [MCS Act, 1960]; the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 [APCS Act, 1964]; and the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 [MSCS Act, 2002] transacting the business of banking, do not fall within the meaning of "banking company" as defined in Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 [BR Act]. Therefore, the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [RDB Act] by invoking the Doctrine of Incorporation are not applicable to the recovery of dues by the co-operatives from their members.

 


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