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ARE U HAVING ANY CASE LAW THAT ARBITRATOR PASSED AWARD AFTER THE TIME SPECIFIED IN AGREEMENT FOR ARBITRATION. AND THAT AWARD IS NOT INVALID AND IT HAS SAME POWER AS IT WAS PASSED IN TIME SPECIFIED
gitish (advocate) 11 April 2009
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ARE U HAVING ANY CASE LAW THAT ARBITRATOR PASSED AWARD AFTER THE TIME SPECIFIED IN AGREEMENT FOR ARBITRATION. AND THAT AWARD IS NOT INVALID AND IT HAS SAME POWER AS IT WAS PASSED IN TIME SPECIFIED
ravidevaraj (Legal) 13 April 2009
Shyam Telecom Ltd. vs Arm Ltd. on 17/9/2004
JUDGMENT
R.C. Jain, J.
1. A short but important question--'whether the mandate of an
Arbitrator terminates on the expiry of the stipulated period for making
the Award within the meaning of Section 14 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 ?' has arisen for determination in this case.
2. M/s. Shyam Telecom Ltd./petitioner has filed this petition under
Section 14(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (to be
called as the Act) for declaring that the mandate of the sole
Arbitrator has terminated on 14.11.2000 on the expiry of six months
period for making the Award mentioned in Clause 3 of Article IV of
Divestment agreement and consequently the Arbitration proceedings and
the mandate of the Arbitrator had come to an end.
3. The relevant facts, in brief, are that the parties had entered into
a Divestment agreement in 1997. Clause 3 of Article IV of the
Divestment agreement inter alia contains an Arbitration agreement for
reference of the disputes between the parties through Arbitration. The
said clause reads as under :
"In the event of any dispute, difference of claim arising out of or
in connection with or in relation to this agreement then as such
disputes shall be referable to the sole Arbitration of a mutually
agreed Arbitrator. The Arbitrator shall conduct the Arbitration in
accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 or any statutory modification thereof. The Arbitrator
shall make and pronounce a reasoned Award. The Arbitrator shall
render his Award within a period of 6 months from the date of
entering upon reference. The Arbitrator shall be entitled to Award
interest during the pendency of the Arbitration and pendente lite
any proceedings arising there from. The Arbitrator shall file his
Award in the Courts at Delhi. The agreement shall be specifically
enforceable, by an injunction, or a claim in damages, or both."
4. The respondent herein had filed an application (AA No. 145/2001)
under Section 11 of the Act besides an application (OMP No. 178/2001)
under Section 9 of the Act. Vide an order dated 01.05.2002, this Court
disposed of the said applications and appointed Mr. Justice S.C.
Agarwal (Retd.) Judge of Supreme Court of India, as the Sole Arbitrator
and referred the disputes arising between the parties for adjudication
and decision. The order also directed that the Arbitrator shall enter
upon the reference and decide all the issues including those which are
raised by the parties in the said application in accordance with law
and shall give his Award as expeditiously as possible, preferably
within a period of four months from the date of entering upon the
reference.
5. The sole Arbitrator entered upon the reference on 14.05.2002 and
granted six weeks time to the claimant for filing the statement of
claims, three weeks time thereafter for filing the statement of defense
and rejoinder within two weeks thereafter and adjourned the matter to
03.08.2002. The statement of claim was, however, filed only on
27.07.2002. On 03.08.2002 the Arbitrator condoned the delay in filing
the claim and granted time to the petitioner to file the statement of
defense before 19.08.2002 and rejoinder before 03.09.2002 and documents
by 06.09.2002 and adjourned the matter to 09.09.2002. Rejoinder and
reply to counter claim was filed by the claimant on 08.10.2002 and on
10.10.2002. The Arbitrator granted 10 days time to the respondent for
filing rejoinder to the reply and counter claim. On 18.11.2002 the
petitioner herein filed an application for dismissal of the claim on
the ground of non-production of original MOU and the matter was
adjourned to 21.12.2002. On 04.01.2003, two applications one by the
petitioner for dismissal of the claim and other by the respondent for
production of copy of MOU were decided and the matter was adjourned to
20.01.2003 for finalising points for determination. On 20.01.2003
points for determination were finalised and proceedings adjourned to
15.03.2003 for oral submissions. No substantive hearing took place on
17.03.2003 and the matter was adjourned to 26.04.2003 when some part
arguments were heard and the matter was adjourned to 17.05.2003.
6. On 17.05.2003, the Arbitrator noticed that the period of six months
prescribed in Clause 3 of Article IV of the agreement for making the
Award had expired and, therefore, called upon the parties to express
their willingness or otherwise to continue with the Arbitral
proceedings. It will be helpful to reproduce the extract of the order
dated 17.05.2003 passed by the sole Arbitrator which reads as under :
"These Arbitration proceedings arise out of a reference made under
Clause 3 of Article IV of the Divestment agreement entered into
between the parties. In the said clause of the agreement, it is
stipulated that the Arbitrator shall render his Award within a
period of six months from the date of entering upon reference. As
per order dated May 14, 2002, I entered upon the reference on that
date. The period of six months, as prescribed in Article IV(3) of
the Divestment agreement has already expired. This fact was not
noticed and the proceedings have continued even after the expiry of
the said period of six months. Today when this provision in Article
IV(3) of the Divestment agreement was noticed, I asked the learned
counsel for the parties as to whether the parties are agreeable to
continue these Arbitration proceedings even though the period of six
months prescribed under Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement
has expired and in case they wish that the proceedings be continued,
they should jointly submit a letter indicating their willingness to
dispense with the requirement of six months for making the Award.
Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the claimant, states
that the claimant would like the proceedings to continue. Mr.
Satinder Kapur, learned counsel for the respondent, states that he
has talked to one of the Directors of the respondent company but he
wanted some time to consult the Board of Directors. Mr. Kapur,
however, states that the proceedings fixed for today may be
continued and that the decision as to whether these proceedings
should be continued will be taken before the next date. In the
circumstances, the proceedings have been continued today."
After making the above order, the learned Arbitrator fixed 21st and
22nd July, 2003 as the next dates of hearing.
7. The petitioner herein submitted an application dated 15.07.2003
stating that since the period of six months, as prescribed under
Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement had expired and the
petitioner was unwilling to dispense with the said requirement of six
months, the Arbitration proceedings cannot and should not continue. On
behalf of the respondent it was urged that the stipulation in regard to
rendering of Award within a period of six months as contained in
Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement was void being in violation
of Section 32 of the Act and none of the situation mentioned in Clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of Subsection (2) of Section 32 of the Act existed
and, therefore, there was no question of the termination of the
Arbitration proceedings. Other submission made on behalf of the
respondent herein was that after the expiry of a period of six months
prescribed under Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement on
14.11.2002, the respondent continued to participate in the Arbitral
proceedings without raising any objection about the continuance of the
proceedings and, therefore, the respondent should be deemed to have
waived the said objection. Yet another ground pressed for by the
respondent was that the petitioner was estopped from taking shelter
under Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement as it has acquiesced to
the continuation of the Arbitral proceedings after the expiry of the
prescribed period. The submissions were controverter on behalf of the
present petitioner.
8. On 21.07.2003, the Arbitrator passed the following order :
"In accordance with the direction contained in the order dated May
17, 2003, a letter dated July 15, 2003 has been addressed by the
respondent wherein it has been indicated that since the six months
period for Award as prescribed under Article IV(3) of the Divestment
agreement has expired the mandate of the Arbitration clause had
expired. The respondent have further stated that the respondent is
unwilling to dispense with the said requirement of six months. Mr.
Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the claimant, states that
a written response to the said letter of the respondent shall be
filed on behalf of the claimant within one week.
In the meantime, both the learned counsel have made their
submissions on the question as to whether the proceedings can
continue. Order reserved. A copy of the order shall be sent to the
parties after it is finalized. Further directions will be given
thereafter.
The sitting fixed for tomorrow is cancelled."
9. The learned Arbitrator after considering the respective submissions
dismissed the application dated 15.07.2003 filed by the petitioner
herein mainly on the ground that the petitioner must be deemed to have
waived his right to raise the objection in regard to the expiry of six
months period for making the Award. The concluding observations are as
under :
"In the present case, the respondent, being fully aware of the
stipulation in Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement fixing a
time limit of six months for making the Award proceeded with the
Arbitral proceedings after the expiry of the six months period on
November 14, 2002 without raising any objection to such continuance
of the proceedings till July 15, 2003. In the meanwhile, a number of
steps were taken in the Arbitral proceedings, namely, consideration
of the application filed by the respondent for dismissing the claim
of the claimant and the application submitted by the claimant for
production of the original MOU, drawing up of points for
determination and hearing of oral submissions of the learned counsel
for the claimant. It is only at the stage of the hearing of oral
submissions of the respondent that the object regarding
non-continuation of the proceedings in view of expiry of the period
of six months fixed under Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement
was raised by the respondent by filing the application dated July
15, 2003. Since the respondent participated in the Arbitral
proceedings after November 14, 2002 without raising an objection
that the proceedings could not continue, the respondent must be
deemed to have waived his right to raise this objection in view of
Section 4 of the 1996 Act."
10. I have heard Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel representing
the petitioner and Mr. Rajiv Nayar, learned senior counsel representing
the respondent at length and have given my thoughtful consideration to
their respective submissions.
11. Before I proceed to examine the merits of the petition it seems to
be necessary to consider the question of very maintainability of the
present petition under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 14
of the Act. Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
which reads as under:
"14. Failure or Impossibility to act--
(1) The mandate of an Arbitrator shall terminate if :
(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions
or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay ; and
(b) he withdraws from his office or the parties agree to the
termination of his mandate.
(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred
to in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, apply to the Court to decide on the
termination of the mandate.
(3) If, under this section or Sub-section (3) of Section 13, an
Arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the
termination of the mandate of an Arbitrator, it shall not imply
acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this section
or Sub-section (3) of Section 12."
12. What is the object, intent and scope of the above provision of law
would decide the question of maintainability of the present petition.
This section postulates the circumstances under which the mandate of
the Arbitrator can be terminated. The Arbitrator's mandate can be
terminated under the following situations :
(i) Automatic termination,
(ii) By the Arbitrator himself,
(iii) By the parties,
(iv) By tribunal order,
(v) By Court's order.
The mandate of an Arbitrator automatically terminates at the death of
the Arbitrator or his physical incapacity to proceed with the mandate.
This provision sets following three grounds that constitutes an
Arbitrator's inability ; (i) his de jure, or (ii) his de facto
inability to perform his functions, or (iii) his failure to act without
undue delay for other reasons. The first situation refers to an
Arbitrator's legal incapacity to perform his functions under the law
and relates to circumstances under which the Arbitrator by law is
barred from continuing in office, for instance, incapacity, bankruptcy
conviction for a criminal offence, etc. The second incapacity relates
to factual inability, which includes factual situation, in which the
Arbitrator is physically unable to perform his functions for instance,
such as continuous ill-health, etc. The last situation "failure to act
without undue delay" is an expiry provision according to which the
mandate of the Arbitrator shall terminate if for other reasons he fails
to act without undue delay.
13. The de jure impossibility referred to in Clause (a) of Sub-section
(1) of Section 14 is the impossibility which occurs due to factor
personal to Arbitrator and de facto occurs due to factors beyond the
control of the Arbitrator. The judicial intervention of the Court is
provided in Sub-section (2) only if a controversy remains concerning
any of the grounds referred to in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of
Section 14 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 empowers the Court
to decide the question of termination of the mandate if a controversy
arises concerning the termination of the Arbitrator's mandate on one or
the other grounds.
14. The moot question which falls for consideration, therefore, is
whether an Arbitrator becomes unable to perform his functions on his
failure to render the Award within the time limit prescribed by the
Arbitration agreement. Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel representing the
petitioner has not disputed that not making the Award within the
prescribed period will not visit the Arbitrator with any de facto
inability (incapacity) to continue with the mandate but his submission
is that this would make the Arbitrator de jure unable to act legally
whenever he is visited with any such legal disability. The expression
"de jure" means the 'legal right' or 'authority' or 'according to law'.
The Blacks Legal Dictionary defines "de jure" to be "existing by right
or according to law". P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Second Edition,
1997 defines "de jure" as "of right ; legitimate ; lawful ; by right
and just title".
15. In the opinion of this Court, the expression "de jure" is amply
wide so as to cover a situation like the case in hand. This view is
based on the settled legal position that Arbitration agreement is the
fountain head of the Arbitrator's power and authority and the parties
as well as the Arbitrator are governed and controlled by the terms of
the said Arbitration agreement. Unless parties agree to the contrary,
the terms of Arbitration agreement must operate in full. The
consequence of the Arbitrator not concluding the proceedings and
rendering the Award within the period prescribed under the Arbitration
agreement as in the present case would uncloth the Arbitrator of his
legal authority to continue with the proceedings unless the parties
agree to extend the period of making the Award or a party waives his
right to such an objection. It must, therefore, be held that expiry of
the prescribed period for making the Award, would render the Arbitrator
'de jure' unable to continue with the proceedings and has the effect of
termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator within the meaning of
Section 14 of the Act.
16. Yet another important question which arises in the case is whether
in absence of any provision in regard to the time limit for making the
Award by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Act of 1996, any prescription of
time in an Arbitration agreement is of no consequence. In other words,
whether the provisions of the Act would override the terms of the
agreement. Mr. Rajiv Nayar, learned senior counsel for the respondent
has vehemently urged that when the Act itself is silent and does not
envisage any time limit for making the Award, no contrary
circumscription can be made indirectly through an Arbitration
agreement. According to him the legislature enacting the said law has
consciously abandoned the fixing of any time frame either for the
culmination of Arbitration proceedings or making the Award as was
provided in the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is urged that since there
exists no provision akin to Section 28 of the 1940 Act in the Act of
1996, there is no question of any time limit, or extension of time for
making the Award. In this connection he has sought support from a
Supreme Court decision in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Ltd. v. SAW Pipes Ltd., 2003 (4) SCALE 92=2003(2) Arb. LR 5 (SC). In
para 31 (Para 30 of Arb. LR) of the said judgment the Apex Court ruled
as under :
"It is true that under the Act, there is no provision similar to
Sections 23 and 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which specifically
provided that the Arbitrator shall pass Award within reasonable time
as fixed by the Court. It is also true that on occasions,
Arbitration proceedings are delayed for one or other reason, but it
is for the parties to take appropriate action of selecting proper
Arbitrator(s) who could dispose of the matter within reasonable time
fixed by them. It is for them to indicate the time limit for
disposal of the Arbitral proceedings. It is for them to decide
whether they should continue with the Arbitrator(s) who cannot
dispose of the matter within the reasonable time. However,
non-providing of time limit for deciding the dispute by the
Arbitrators could have no bearing on interpretation of Section 34.
Further, for achieving the object of speedier disposal of dispute,
justice in accordance with law cannot be sacrificed. In our view,
giving limited jurisdiction to the Court for having finality to the
Award and resolving the dispute by speedier method would be much
more frustrated by permitting patently illegal Award to operate.
Patently illegal Award is required to be set at naught, otherwise it
would promote injustice."
17. In the opinion of this Court the above observations do not answer
the query with which we are faced. It is true that 1996 Act does not
prescribe any time limit for making and publishing the Award but that
does not mean that parties cannot by mutual agreement provide for a
time limit for making the Award by the Arbitrator and if so prescribed
it would run contra to the provisions of the Act. This view appears to
be more plausible and acceptable having regard to the object of having
Arbitration as the alternate mode for settlement of
disputes/differences between the parties. The method of Arbitration to
resolve the disputes/differences between the parties certainly aims at
expeditious resolution of/the disputes because it is considered that
the time taken by the Courts established by the State for resolution of
the disputes is unduly long and cumbersome. It must, therefore, be held
that the provision of time limit for rendering Award by the Arbitrator
in an Arbitration agreement is not hit by the provisions of the Act and
is to be given effect unless the parties agreed to modify or extend the
same by mutual consent. The learned sole Arbitrator while disposing of
the application of the petitioner by the impugned order has not
adverted to this argument and rightly so because had the provision in
regard to time limit for rendering the Award in the agreement been
redundant or overridden by the provision of the Act, there was no need
for the Arbitrator to record a finding about waiver of right to object
by the petitioner.
18. Now the last question which remains to be considered is as to
whether on the face of the facts and circumstances obtaining on record
can it be said that the petitioner has had waived its objections to the
continuance of the Arbitral proceedings after the expiry of the
prescribed period of six months as envisaged by Article IV(3) of the
Divestment agreement. It is the admitted position on record that the
Arbitrator entered upon the reference on 14.05.2002 and the period of
six months for making the Award had expired on 14.11.2002 within the
meaning of Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement. It is also borne
out from the Arbitral proceedings that the petitioner continued to
participate in the Arbitral proceedings even after the expiry of the
said period and no objection was raised by the petitioner about the
termination of the mandate at any time uptill July 2003 despite full
knowledge of the prescription of time limit in Article IV(3) of the
Divestment agreement as far back as in May 2002 when it opposed the
petition of the respondent under Section 11 of the Act. Not only that,
the petitioner did not protest or raise any objection in regard to the
continuance of the proceedings after 14.11.2002, the petitioner herein
participated in substantive proceedings before the Arbitrator in as
much as the petitioner had itself filed substantive applications before
the Arbitrator inviting his adjudication in relation to the disputes
referred to the Arbitrator. One such application was filed on
18.11.2002 by the petitioner for dismissal of the claim on the ground
of non-production of the original MOU and thereafter participated in
the proceedings held on 20.01.2003 when the Arbitrator took up the
question of finalization of the points of determination and on
26.04.2003 when the hearing in the matter was finally commenced.
19. Mr. Rajiv Nayar in support of his contention that the petitioner
will be deemed to have waived its right to object within the meaning of
Section 4 of the Act, has sought support from the Supreme Court
decision in the case of Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia and
Ors., (SO ; Inder Sain Mittal v. Housing Board,
; and a Karnataka decision in the case of K.S.R.T.C.
v. M. Keshava Raju, . In Narayan Prasad Lohia's case
(supra), the Court considered the question of waiver of a right to
object by a party in relation to the constitution of an arbitral
tribunal and held that a conjoint reading of Sections 10 and 16 shows
that an objection to the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal is a
matter which is derogable. The Court further ruled that it is derogable
because a party is free not to object within time prescribed in Section
16(2) of the Act and if a party chooses not to so object, there will be
a deemed waiver under Section 4. The Court repelled the submission that
Section 10 is a non-derogable provision.
20. Inder Sain Mittal's case (supra), was considered under the
provisions of the 1940 Act and, therefore, is not of much help in
deciding the question. In the case of K.S.R.T.C's case (supra), the
Karnataka High Court considered the question of waiver morefully in
relation to the right to object the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and
has held as under :
"Thirdly, the appellant should be deemed to have waived his right to
object to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to pass the impugned
Award in terms of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Section 4
is based on general principles such as "estoppel" or "venire contra
factum proprium". It is intended to help the arbitral process
function efficiently and in good faith. If there is non-compliance
of any non-mandatory provision of Part I or of any requirement of
the Arbitration agreement by a party to an Arbitration agreement of
which the other party to the agreement though has the knowledge of
such non-compliance but does not object without undue delay, or if a
time limit is provided for stating that objection and no objection
is taken within that period of time, such a party later on can
neither raise objection about that non-compliance of any provision
of Part I nor any requirement of the Arbitration agreement since
such party shall be deemed to have waived its objection. Though, in
order to apply the doctrine of waiver by invoking Section 4, the
first condition is that the non-compliance must be of non-mandatory
provision of Part I or of any requirement under the Arbitration
agreement, certain mandatory provisions of the Act also provide for
a grant of waiver in the event of failure to object. For example,
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 are one of such mandatory
provisions. Section 16(2) of the Act provides that a plea that the
Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not
later than the submission of the statement of defense. Section 16(3)
of the Act provides that a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal shall be
raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its
authority is raised during the Arbitral proceedings."
21. Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel representing the petitioner
has emphatically urged that in the case in hand the doctrine of waiver
cannot be applied as to constitute a waiver. According to him, waiver
should be with full knowledge and conscious abandonment of an existing
right. He submitted that the petitioner had no conscious knowledge of
his right to object the continuation of the proceedings in terms of
Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement and the parties as well as
the Arbitrator became aware or acquired conscious knowledge of the same
only on 17.05.2003. In this connection he has referred to the meaning
of the word "notice" or "knowledge" as defined in the dictionary of
Modern Legal Usage , which is to the following effect :
"Knowledge; notice. As a general matter, knowledge requires
awareness of a fact or condition, while notice requires merely a
reason to know of a fact or condition. Knowledge is subsumed within
notice because actual awareness is well above the threshold
requirement of a reason to be aware. Senior Advocate Restatement
(Second) of Agency & 9 (1958) E.g., "Notice" and 'knowledge' are not
synonyms; when one says of a person that he was 'on notice' of a
fact, one may mean just that he should have known, not that he did
know." Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc. 841 F2d 166, 170 (7th Or.
1988). The phrase constructive knowledge is equivalent to-and
inferior to-notice."
According to him, the expression "knows" cannot be interpreted as
meaning "ought to have known". In this connection he also referred to
the order of the proceedings dated 17.05.2003 which expressed the
tentative view of the Arbitrator in regard to the termination of his
mandate consequent upon the expiry of the period of six months.
22. In the opinion of this Court, these arguments of the learned
counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted ; firstly, because having
regard to the totality of the facts by no stretch it can be said that
the Article IV(3) of the Divestment agreement was not to the knowledge
of the petitioner and, therefore, they could not object to the
continuation of the proceedings after the expiry of the stipulated
period. Not only that, no objection was raised about the continuation
of the Arbitral proceedings but the petitioner continued to participate
in substantive proceedings before the Arbitrator up till the final
stage of the proceedings. In the opinion of this Court, these facts and
circumstances are so glaring so as to attract the doctrine of waiver
within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act. It is a settled legal
position that waiver will be deemed to have taken place when a party
knowing that an irregularity has been committed, did not object to the
same but participated in the Arbitration proceedings without protest.
Section 4 of the 1996 Act corresponds to Article IV of 'UNCITRAL Modern
Law'. The principle of waiver is not new in the Arbitration law as it
was so far contained in the case law and has been codified in the
statute. Besides, in the opinion of the Court the right to object the
continuance of the proceedings on the ground of expiry of the
stipulated period is one which falls in Part-I of the Act and which is
derogable. The object of providing time limit for rendering an Award by
the Arbitrator is aimed at expeditious resolution of the disputes
rather than to leave the disputes unsettled or inconclusive on the
expiry of the stipulated period. -Thus, looking at the matter from any
angle, this Court is of the opinion that having regard to the entirety
of the facts and circumstances, the petitioner will be deemed to have
waived its right to object about the continuation of the proceedings or
alleging the termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator simply on the
ground that the time prescribed under Article IV(3) of the Divestment
agreement for making the Award had expired.
23. In the result, this petition being devoid of any merits, is hereby
dismissed. Parties are directed to appear before the learned Arbitrator
on 1st October, 2004 at 4.00 P.M. for further proceedings in accordance
with law. As sufficient time has been consumed in these proceedings,
learned Arbitrator is requested to conclude the proceedings and make
his Award expeditiously.
gitish (advocate) 14 April 2009
Thanks for your kind reply
The case you sent me in reply is against my contentions in the case
Kindly send me any case which favours my contentions
gitish (advocate) 14 April 2009
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