Court : Supreme Court
Brief : 498A creulty not proved, a detail judgement from the Apex Court
Citation : not yet available
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. OF 2008
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5689 of 2007]
Narayanamurthy ..... Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka & Anr. ..... Respondents
JUDGMENT
Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant-Narayanamurthy (A-1) has filed this appeal
against the judgment and order dated 05.12.2006 passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at
Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.903/2000, whereby and
whereunder appeal filed by the State against the judgment
2
and order dated 19.04.2000 passed by the III Additional
Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, in S.C. No.178/1995
acquitting the appellant and Shivabhushanamma (A-3), for
the offences under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian
Penal Code [for short `IPC] and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, has been allowed in part and A-1
has been convicted and sentenced under Section 498A and
Section 304B, IPC.
3. In all, three accused persons, namely, Narayanamurthy
(A-1), his father Kannappa (A-2) and mother
Shivabhushanamma (A-3), were tried by the learned III
Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, under Sections
498A and 304B of IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 [for short `DP Act]. During the
pendency of trial, A-2 died. The learned trial Judge found the
evidence of prosecution witnesses insufficient and lacking for
holding A-1 and A-3 guilty of the offences alleged against them
and, accordingly, they were acquitted of the charges.
4. On appeal by the State, the Division Bench of the High
Court convicted A-1 for offences under Sections 498A and
3
304B of IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for a period of seven years under Section 304B,
IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section
498A, IPC, and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, to undergo imprisonment for three months.
The amount of fine, if realised from A-1, has been ordered to
be paid to Smt. Pavanamma (PW-1), mother of the deceased
Jagadeshwari. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
The High Court, however, acquitted A-1 for offence under
Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the DP Act, 1961, whereas the
judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge in
favour of A-3 has been upheld.
5. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution was that on
03.09.1989 the marriage of Jagadeshwari, daughter of B.V.D
Mani-complainant and Pavanamma (PW-1) was celebrated
with A-1 in DRDO Community Hall, Bangalore. An amount of
Rs.4,000/- in cash and five sovereign gold ornaments
allegedly were given to A-1 in dowry at the time of the
marriage. After the marriage, Jagadeshwari started living with
A-1, A-2 and A-3 in their house at Yellamma Temple Road
4
Cross, Nagarapalya, Bangalore. It was alleged that after
marriage, A-1 to A-3 started harassing Jagadeshwari for not
bringing sufficient dowry and were compelling her to bring
more dowry from her parental house. Jagadeshwari during
her pregnancy period stayed at the house of her parents for
about five months. She gave birth to a female child. It was
alleged that on the day fixed by the parents of Jagadeshwari
for performing the customary thread changing ceremony of the
child, A-1 refused to participate in the said ceremony and he
made demand of a gold ring, silver plate and silver
panchapatre as dowry. Since B.V.D Mani, father of
Jagadeshwari, was not financially sound to fulfill the
demanded articles, he gifted a steel panchapatre and steel
plate to A-1. A-1 expressed his displeasure and went back to
his house. After few days, Ravichandra (PW-2) took his
sister Jagadeshwari and her child to the house of A-1, A-2 and
A-3 at Nagarapalya and told them that his parents would try
to meet their demand of dowry articles within a short time,
but still they continued to ill-treat and harass Jagadeshwari.
5
6. On or about 7-8 days before 11.11.1990, Jagadeshwari
had gone to her parents house and informed them that she
was being harassed and assaulted by her husband, father-in-
law and mother-in-law for not satisfying their dowry demand.
The parents of Jagadeshwari persuaded her to go back to her
in-laws house and she, accordingly, returned to her husband.
On 11.11.1990 around 2:00 p.m., Jagadeshwari alleged to
have bolted the door of the kitchen from inside and poured
kerosene oil on her body and then set herself on fire.
Chikkathayappa (PW-15) and Mariappa (PW-16), neighbours
of the accused, having noticed smoke emanating from the
kitchen of the house of the accused, broke open the door and
removed dead body of Jagadeshwari from there. A-1, at the
relevant time, was not present at his house. Parents of the
deceased, on receipt of the information of the death of their
daughter through one of the relatives of PW-1, rushed to the
house of the accused and on visual inspection they noticed
extensive burn injuries on the dead body of Jagadeshwari. On
the following day, i.e. on 12.11.1990 at 2:30 p.m., B.V.D Mani,
father of the deceased, lodged a complaint (Ex. P-1) with
6
Byappanahalli Police Station, on the basis of which, a case in
Crime No.263/1990 was registered against accused persons
for an offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC.
Thereafter, on 12.11.1990 after receipt of the requisition, B.
Nagaraj (PW-12), who at the relevant time was working as
Tehsildar, Bangalore South Taluk, visited the place of
occurrence and conducted IP on the dead body of
Jagadeshwari in the presence of Panchas and her close
relatives. He recorded the statements of the parents, brother
of the deceased and their neighbours who were present at the
spot. He sent original inquest papers to S.D.M., Bangalore
and furnished the copy thereof duly signed by him to the
concerned police. S.E.D. Dsouza (PW-13), who at the relevant
time was working as PI in COD (ADC) Bangalore, conducted
the investigation of the case and recorded the statements of
B.V.D. Mani - complainant, Ravichandra (PW-2), Rathanamma
(PW-4) and Adhilakshmi (PW-6) and visited the place of
occurrence where he drew rough sketch (Ex. P-12). Post
mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased was
conducted by Dr. Thirunavakkarasu (PW-7). On 18.04.1991,
7
the Investigating Officer collected a copy of the post mortem
report (Ex. P-5) of the deceased. On 22.04.1991, he recorded
the statement of Anthony Mary (PW-5). On 25.04.1991, the
Investigating Officer examined and recorded the statements of
PW-1, mother of the deceased, and Kumar @ Armugam (PW-
10).
7. After completion of the investigation and after receipt of
the post mortem report, charge sheet was filed against
accused persons for the commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC and
Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the DP Act. As already stated above,
Kannappa (A-2) died during the pendency of the trial. The
prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 16
witnesses. In their statements recorded under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, A-1 and his mother A-3
denied the allegations of the prosecution and pleaded false
implication on suspicion and claimed to be innocent. They,
however, led no evidence in defence. After considering the
entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge held that the
prosecution has failed to prove the alleged offences against A-
8
1 and A-3 beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly,
acquitted them. On appeal being preferred by the State, the
High Court has convicted and sentenced A-1 as aforesaid.
Now, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave
against the judgment of the High Court.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties who have
taken us through the material evidence placed on record.
9. In support of the appeal, Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty,
learned senior counsel appearing for A-1, submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove that A-1 at any point of time
has made demand of dowry or the deceased was subjected to
cruelty or harassment or that the harassment was for or in
connection with the demand of dowry immediately before the
death of Jagadeshwari and therefore, in the absence of any
believable and reliable evidence led by the prosecution, the
conviction of A-1 by the High Court is wholly wrong and
unjustified. He contended that the interference of the High
Court in the context of reversal of acquittal is against the well-
established principles laid down by this Court in series of
9
decisions, therefore, on this ground as well the judgment of
the High Court has to be set aside.
10. Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel for the
respondent-State, on the other hand, submitted that Section
304B, IPC, has to be read in the context of Section 113B of
the Evidence Act, 1872. The Court could presume the death
of the deceased to be dowry death and it was open to the
Court to presume further that the appellant, being husband of
the deceased, was responsible for the dowry death of the
deceased. He submitted that the High Court has re-appraised
the entire evidence on record and found the appellant guilty of
the charged offences and this Court normally should not be
obliged to interfere with the well-merited and well-reasoned
judgment of the High Court, which, in no circumstances, can
be termed as perverse or illegal.
11. In the backdrop of the above-said contentions of the
learned counsel for the parties, before dealing with the
evidence coming on record we may refer to a few decisions of
this Court in regard to the jurisdiction and limitations of the
appellate court while considering appeal against an order of
10
acquittal. In the case of Tota Singh v. State of Punja [1987 (2)
SCC 529], this Court held: (SCC p.532 para 6)
6. ... The jurisdiction of the appellate
court in dealing with an appeal against
an order of acquittal is circumscribed by
the limitation that no interference is to be
made with the order of acquittal unless
the approach made by the lower court to
the consideration of the evidence in the
case is vitiated by some manifest illegality
or the conclusion recorded by the court
below is such which could not have been
possibly arrived at by any court acting
reasonably and judiciously and is,
therefore, liable to be characterised as
perverse. Where two views are possible
on an appraisal of the evidence adduced
in the case and the court below has
taken a view which is a plausible one, the
appellate court cannot legally interfere
with an order of acquittal even if it is of
the opinion that the view taken by the
court below on its consideration of the
evidence is erroneous.
12. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram ((2003) 8 SCC 180), it
was held that the golden thread which runs through the web
of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one
pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
11
innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should
be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to
ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage
of justice, which may arise from acquittal of the guilty, is no
less than the conviction of an innocent. Further, it is held
that in a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is
cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in
a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose
of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
any offence or not. The principle to be followed by the
appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment
of acquittal is to interfere only where there are compelling and
substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is
clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for
interference. These aspects were again highlighted by this
Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
[(1973) 2 SCC 793]; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat
[(1996) 9 SCC 225] and Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana
[(2000) 4 SCC 484] and same parameters were reiterated in
12
the latest judgment of this Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay
Thakran & Anr. ((2007) 3 SCC 755).
13. In Surajpal Singh v. State [AIR 1952 SC 52], a two-Judge
Bench observed that it was well-established that in an appeal
under Section 417 of the Cr.P.C. (old), the High Court had full
power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal
was founded. But it was equally well-settled that the
presumption of innocence of the accused was further
reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings
of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the
witnesses and hearing their evidence could be reversed only
for very substantial and compelling reasons
(emphasis supplied).
14. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra [AIR 1956 SC
217], the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and
447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted by
the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court
against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the
majority (2:1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1)
13
It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is
not enough for the High Court to take a
different view of the evidence; there must
also be substantial and compelling
reasons for holding that the trial court was
wrong. (emphasis supplied)
15. Section 304B, IPC, deals with `dowry death, which
reads as follows:-
304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the
death of a woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is
shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be
called dowry death, and such husband
or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this
sub-section, dowry shall have the same
meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall
be punished with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.
14
16. The legislature has also introduced Section 113B of the
Evidence Act alongside insertion of Section 304B, IPC.
113B. Presumption as to dowry
death.--When the question is whether a
person has committed the dowry death of
a woman and it is shown that soon before
her death such woman had been
subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with
any demand for dowry, the Court shall
presume that such person had caused
the dowry death.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this
Section dowry death shall have the
same meaning as in Section 304B of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
17. The basic ingredients to attract the provisions of Section
304B, IPC, are as follows:-
(1) That the death of the woman was caused by any
burns or bodily injury or in some circumstances which
were not normal;
(2) such death occurs within 7 years from the date of
her marriage;
(3) that the victim was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband;
(4) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
connection with the demand of dowry; and
(5) it is established that such cruelty and harassment
was made soon before her death.
15
18. In the case of unnatural death of a married woman as
in a case of this nature, the husband could be prosecuted
under Sections 302, 304-B and 306 of the Penal Code. The
distinction as regards commission of an offence under one or
the other provisions as mentioned hereinbefore came up for
consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Satvir
Singh v. State of Punjab [(2001) 8 SCC 633] wherein it was
held: (SCC p. 643, paras 21-22)
21. Thus, there are three occasions
related to dowry. One is before the
marriage, second is at the time of
marriage and the third is `at any time
after the marriage. The third occasion
may appear to be an unending period.
But the crucial words are `in connection
with the marriage of the said parties.
This means that giving or agreeing to give
any property or valuable security on any
of the above three stages should have
been in connection with the marriage of
the parties. There can be many other
instances for payment of money or giving
property as between the spouses. For
example, some customary payments in
connection with birth of a child or other
ceremonies are prevalent in different
societies. Such payments are not
enveloped within the ambit of `dowry.
Hence the dowry mentioned in Section
304-B should be any property or valuable
security given or agreed to be given in
connection with the marriage.
16
22. It is not enough that harassment
or cruelty was caused to the woman with
a demand for dowry at some time, if
Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it
should have happened `soon before her
death. The said phrase, no doubt, is an
elastic expression and can refer to a
period either immediately before her
death or within a few days or even a few
weeks before it. But the proximity to her
death is the pivot indicated by that
expression. The legislative object in
providing such a radius of time by
employing the words `soon before her
death is to emphasise the idea that her
death should, in all probabilities, have
been the aftermath of such cruelty or
harassment. In other words, there should
be a perceptible nexus between her death
and the dowry-related harassment or
cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval
which elapsed between the infliction of
such harassment or cruelty and her
death is wide the court would be in a
position to gauge that in all probabilities
the harassment or cruelty would not have
been the immediate cause of her death. It
is hence for the court to decide, on the
facts and circumstances of each case,
whether the said interval in that
particular case was sufficient to snuff its
cord from the concept `soon before her
death.
19. In Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi [(2003) 8 SCC
80], this Court observed that: (SCC pp. 86-87, para 9]
The expression soon before her death
used in the substantive S. 304-B, I.P.C.
and S.113-B of the Evidence Act is
present with the idea of proximity test.
17
No definite period has been indicated and
the expression soon before is not
defined. A reference to expression soon
before used in S. 114. Illustration (a) of
the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down
that a Court may presume that a man
who is in the possession of goods soon
after the theft, is either the thief has
received the goods knowing them to be
stolen, unless he can account for his
possession. The determination of the
period which can come within the term
soon before is left to be determined by
the Courts, depending upon facts and
circumstances of each case. Suffice,
however, to indicate that the expression
soon before would normally imply that
the interval should not be much between
the concerned cruelty or harassment and
the death in question. There must be
existence of a proximate and live link
between the effect of cruelty based on
dowry demand and the concerned death.
If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in
time and has become stale enough not to
disturb mental equilibrium of the woman
concerned, it would be of no
consequence.
20. The same opinion was expressed by this Court in
Kaliyaperumal v. State of T. N. [(2004) 9 SCC 157] (SCC para
4); Kamesh Panjiyar Alias Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar
[(2005) 2 SCC 388] (SCC para 10); State of A. P. v. Raj Gopal
18
Asawa [(2004) 4 SCC 470] (SCC paras 10 and 11); Harjit Singh
v. State of Punjab [(2006) 1 SCC 463] and Biswajit Halder Alias
Babu Halder & Ors. v. State of W. B. [(2008) 1 SCC 202].
21. In the present case, we have independently analysed
and scrutinized the evidence of the material witnesses and
found that there is practically no evidence to show that there
was any cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the
demand of dowry.
22. PW-1, mother of the deceased, deposed that after about
11 months of the marriage, her daughter delivered a female
child and after staying in her house for about 5 months, she
sent her daughter and the child along with her son PW-2 to
the house of A-1. Jagadeshwari on 2 or 3 occasions came to
her parental house and disclosed that her husband, parents-
in-law and sister-in-law had been quarrelling with her for
having not brought silver plate, cot, almirah and silver
panchpathere at the time of thread changing ceremony of the
newly born child. She stated that she gave gold ring to the
child of the deceased. A complaint (Ex. P-1) was lodged by her
husband B.V.D. Mani in the Police Station in regard to the
19
commission of the alleged offences against the husband
Narayanmurthy (A-1), father-in-law Kannappa (A-2) and
mother-in-law Shivabhushanamma (A-3) of the deceased. The
complainant-father of the deceased could not be examined as
witness in the Court because by that time he had died. The
testimony of PW-1 does not support the allegations of demand
for dowry by A-1 and his parents. This witness has not
deposed that her daughter committed suicide because she
was subjected to cruelty and harassment by A-1 in connection
with the demand for dowry.
23. PW-2, the brother of the deceased, stated that his sister
delivered a female child at their house and he along with his
sister and her child went to the house of A-1. It is his
testimony that A-1 and his sister used to quarrel with each
other on some small and petty matters and her husband and
parent-in-laws were demanding an Almirah, cot, silver plate,
etc. from his parents. The testimony of this witness is totally
contrary to the version of PW-1 and secondly he has not
corroborated the allegations made in complaint (Ex. P-1)
lodged at the first point of time by his late father, on the basis
20
of which a case was registered against A-1 and his parents in
the Police Station. The evidence of this witness does not
reveal that the deceased was ever ill-treated or harassed by A-
1 for not satisfying dowry demand or there was any demand of
dowry soon before her death so as to drive the deceased
Jagadeshwari to take extreme steps of committing suicide.
24. Saradhamma (PW-3) - maternal aunt of deceased
Jagadeshwari, deposed that after the marriage of
Jagadeshwari with A-1, she came to her house and informed
that she was being tortured by her parents-in-law as she
could not give silver plate to them. This portion of the
statement of the witness is totally inconsistent with and
contrary to the versions of PWs-1 and 2, who have not
deposed that after marriage Jagadeshwari had ever
complained to them that she was given beatings by her
parents-in-law or was ever maltreated or harassed by them.
This witness admitted in cross-examination that she did not
make statement before the Police Officer; that before her
death, Jagadeshwari came to her house and made complaint
that her husband and in-laws had harassed for having not
21
brought a silver plate from the house of her parents. Thus,
PW-3 herself has contradicted her statement recorded by the
Investigating Officer under Section 161, Cr.P.C. therefore, the
evidence of this witness is of no help to the prosecution to
hold A-1 responsible for committing the alleged crime. The
learned trial Judge has appreciated the evidence of PWs.-1, 2
and 3 in its right perspective and concluded that the evidence
of these star witnesses has not established that the deceased
Jagadeshwari was being ever harassed or ill-treated by the
accused for bringing inadequate and insufficient dowry at the
time of her marriage with A-1 or that the accused ever
demanded dowry articles from the parents of the deceased
before she committed suicide. PW-1 denied having made
statement (Ex.D-1) to the Investigating Officer that her
husband gave Rs.4,000/- to A-1 towards marriage expenses.
It is the categorical evidence of PWs-1 and 2 that the accused
had borne the entire expenses of the marriage and paid rent of
Kalyanamantap and also expenses of the food and other items.
The complaint (Ex. P-1) does not reveal that the accused had
22
raised demand of dowry either in cash or in kind at the time of
the marriage.
25. Dr. Thirunavakkarasu, (PW-7), Professor of Forensic
Medicine, Victoria Hospital, conducted post mortem on the
dead body of Jagadeshwari on 12.11.1990 and found first,
second and third degree burns present all over the body
except both feet, cuticle over the burnt areas blackened,
charred and peeled off at places, areas of redness here and
there over chest, on the front and over limbs, scalp hairs
burnt and partially singed, burnt cloth sticking over the arms,
chest and abdomen. Eye brows, eye lashes, axicially and
pubic hairs were singed. Doctor deposed that the burns were
ante mortem in nature to the extent of 95% and opined that
the death was due to shock as a result of burns sustained.
The record reveals that the original post mortem report was
not placed before the court besides of notices, but true copy
thereof was produced and marked as Ext.P-5. It is not in
dispute that the deceased Jagadeshwari had sustained burn
injuries to the extent of 95% and as a result thereof she died.
23
26. Rathanamma (PW-4) and Mariappa (PW-16), the wife
and husband respectively, are the owners of the house in
which the accused and his parents along with deceased
Jagadeshwari were residing. PW-4 deposed that A-1 and his
wife during their stay in the house were living happily and on
two occasions, Jagadeshwari disclosed her that as she
(Jagadeshwari) was not keeping good health, therefore, she
wanted to go to her parents house and stay there for some
time. She deposed that on the day of occurrence of the
incident, at about 3:00 p.m. while she was in her house, she
noticed smoke emanating from the house in occupation of A-1
and when she went there, she found the door of the house
locked from inside and after breaking open the door, she went
inside and saw the dead body of the wife of A-1 with burn
injuries all over her body and the child of A-1 was also lying in
the kitchen at a short distance who also sustained minor
burns on her leg. Despite cross-examination by the learned
Public Prosecutor, nothing substantial in support of the
prosecution case could be elicited from her statement
indicating that Jagadeshwari committed suicide because of ill-
24
treatment or harassment meted out to her at the hands of her
husband or his parents.
27. Anthony Mary (PW-5), Adhilakshmi (PW-6) and Kumar
@ Armugam (PW-10), the other neighbours, examined by the
prosecution in support of the allegations of ill-treatment or
harassment of the deceased by A-1 or his parents for the
demand of dowry, have not supported the prosecution case.
The evidence of these witnesses would show that they have
denied having made statements before the Police that the
deceased Jagadeshwari committed suicide because of being
maltreatment and harassed by A-1 or his parents.
28. It is proved on record that deceased B.V.D. Mani, father
of deceased Jagadeshwari, gifted a silver Panchapatre and
silver plate to A-1 at the time of performing customary thread
changing ceremony in connection with birth of girl child and
such ceremony is prevalent in their society. Such gifts are not
enveloped within the ambit of `dowry. It is also to be noticed
that the High Court on the same set of evidence has chosen to
acquit A-3 (the mother of A-1), whose case is no better than
that of A-1. Even the unproved allegations of ill-treatment,
25
harassment and demand for dowry and the evidence led by
the prosecution are similar to that led against A-3. We agree
with the High Court that the evidence against mother (A-3) is
insufficient and inconsistent to convict her and, in our view, it
is the same against A-1. This deficiency in the evidence
proves fatal to the prosecution case. Even otherwise, mere
evidence of cruelty and harassment is not sufficient to being
in application of Section 304B, IPC. It is to be established
that `soon before death, deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband for, or `in connection with
demand for dowry. In the afore-mentioned situation, the
provisions of Section 304B, IPC, and Section 113B of the
Evidence Act could not be attracted to hold A-1 guilty of the
offence of dowry death and/or cruelty in terms of Section
498A, IPC. The prosecution, therefore, must be held to have
failed to establish any case against A-1 herein.
29. Having given our careful consideration to the above-
stated submissions made by the learned counsel for the
parties and in the backdrop of the evidence discussed
hereinabove and tested in the light of the principles of law
26
highlighted above, it must be held that the evaluation of the
findings recorded by the High Court suffer from manifest error
and improper appreciation of the evidence on record.
Therefore, the judgment of the High Court setting aside the
order of acquittal of A-1 cannot be sustained.
30. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered
opinion that the evidence led by the prosecution in regard to
the involvement of A-1 in the death of Jagadeshwari is not
proved beyond reasonable doubts by the prosecution, hence,
the High Court was in error in basing conviction of A-1 on
weak and slender evidence appearing against him.
31. In the result, this appeal succeeds and the same is
allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated 05.12.2006
passed in Criminal Appeal No.903/2000 is set aside and the
order of acquittal of A-1 recorded by the learned trial Judge
shall stand restored. The amount of fine imposed by the High
Court upon A-1, if paid, shall be remitted to him.
Narayanamurthy shall be set at liberty by the Jail authorities
if his detention is not required in any other case.
27
........................................J.
(S. B. Sinha)
........................................J.
(Lokeshwar Singh Panta)
New Delhi,
May 13, 2008.
