Court : PANJAB & HARYANA
Brief : MM CANGRANT BAIL IN CASES PUNISHABLE WITH LIFE ALSO.
Citation : MANU/PH/0150/2001
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Cr. M. Nos. 41711/41712 of 2000 in Cr. M. No. 41125 of 2000
Decided On: 29.11.2000
Appellants: Ramji
Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab
Hon'ble Judge:
Amar Dutt, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mr. M.S. Sidhu, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: Mr. R.P.S. Athwal, DAG, Punjab
Subject: Criminal
Catch Words
Mentioned IN
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 29 and 437; Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120-B, 121, 132, 302, 303, 305, 307, 325, 326, 363-A, 377, 389, 394, 396, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472, 474 and 477
Cases Referred:
Mohammed Eusoof v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Rang 51; Tularam v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Nag 53; Satyan v. State, 1981 Crl. L.J. 1313; Sudarsan Bose v. State of West Bengal, 1997(4) All India Criminal L.R. 154; Ashireddygari Narasimhareddy v. State of A.P., 2000(3) RCR (Crl.) 573; State v. Sajjan Singh, AIR 1953 Pepsu 146
JUDGMENT
Amar Dutt, J.
1. The petitioners filed Crl. Misc. No. 41125-M of 2000 seeking anticipatory bail incase F.I.R.No. 223 dated 7.10.2000 registered at Police Station, Division No. 5, Ludhiana under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B with a direction that if petitioners surrender before the trial Court on or before 15.11.2000 at 10.00 A.M..the said Court will dispose of the bail application that may be filed by them together with any request for remand that may be made by the police as expeditiously as possible preferably on the same date.
2. The petitioners did not comply with the above order because according to them the offence under Section 467 IPC is punishable with life imprisonment and as such the trial Court, which in this case would be the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, would not be empowered to grant bail in view of the provisions of Section 437 Cr.P.C and had instead on 30.11.2000 filed Crl. Misc. No. 41711 of 2000 seeking modification of the order dated 9.11.2000 on the ground that the petitioners in fact would not be entitled to avail the limited relief given by this Court while disposing of Crl. Misc. No. 41125-M of 2000.
3. Ordinarily, this application would have been disposed of by merely modifying the order dated 9.11.2000 and directing the petitioners to surrender before the Sessions Judge on any other date but since the question as to whether the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class is entitled to grant bail in cases punishable with imprisonment for life, though it is the trial Court, would arise in a large number of cases, notice of this application was given to Advocate General, Punjab and arguments have been heard in detail.
4. The issue which is raised in the present case is that though the offences punishable with imprisonment for life are triable by the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, the difficulty which is being faced by the Courts, according to the counsel forthe petitioners, arises out of the interpretation that they are placing on the provisions of Section 437 Cr.P.C. which spells out the power of Court other than the High Court or the Court of Sessions to admit a person accused of committing non-bailable offence on bail. The relevant portion of Section 437 Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"437(1)- When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but -
(i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life."
5. A perusal of this Section indicates that the restriction on the power of the Court is in relation to the application of bail filed by a person in whose case there appears to be a reasonable ground for believing that he is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. While analysing the scope of the words 'death' or 'life imprisonment' in Mohammed Eusoof v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Rang 51, the Court had held that the prohibition against granting bail is confined to cases where the sentence is either death or alternatively transportation for life and did not extend to offences punishable with transportation for life only. Their Lordships while coming to this conclusion had observed :
"It is difficult to see what principle, other than pure empiricism, should distinguish offences punishable with transportation for life from offences punishable with long terms of imprisonment; why, for instance, the detenu accused of lurking house trespass with a view to commit theft, for which the punishment is fourteen years' imprisonment should be specially favoured as against the individual who has dishonestly received stolen property, knowing that it was obtained by dacoity, for which the punishment happens to be transportation for life."
6. The above decision was cited with approval in Tularam v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Nag 53
7. In Satyan v. Stale, 1981 Crl.L.J. 1313, the Kerala High Court after analysing the aforesaid Section observed that :
"A scrutiny of the several Sections of the Indian Penal Code will reveal that there is only an offence viz., the one under Section 303 for which death alone is the punishment. There are three offences for which the sentence is death or imprisonment for life and fine (See Sections 121 and 302). The offences mentioned in Sections 132, 305, 307 and 396 are punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. All these offences are to be tried only by the Court of Session. There are other offences wherein the punishment is either imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term and fine. Incidentally it is noted that under Section 363A for the offence of maiming a minor for being employed or used for purposes of begging the punishment is imprisonment for life with liability to fine also. Section 389 provides for imprisonment for life where the offence punishable is under Section 377, Indian Penal Code. It is significant to note that while most of the offences for which imprisonment for life is provided as a punishment are triable by the Court of Session, there are some where the trial is to be by a Magistrate of the First Class (See Sections 326, 389, 394, 409, 467, 472, 474 and 477 IPC). A Magistrate of the First Class is not competent to pass a sentence of imprisonment exceeding three years. In case the Magistrate feels that an accused ought to receive a more severe punishment he may submit the proceedings to the Chief Judicial Magistrate as provided in Section 325 Cr.P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate is not competent to sentence an accused for imprisonment exceeding seven years. (See Section 29, Cr.P.C.). It follows that in cases where the offences are to be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class or the Chief Judicial Magistrate, even if the maximum punishment is imprisonment for life the legislature does not ordinarily except the imposition of the sentence."
and after noticing the aforesaid judgments concluded that :
"The reasoning applies with equal force in interpreting the phrase "offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life." So long as an offence under Section 326 is triable by a Magistrate of First Class, there is no reason why it should be viewed differently in the matter of granting bail from an offence under Section 420 IPC for which the punishment extends to imprisonment for 7 years or any other non-baitable offence for which the punishment is a term of imprisonment."
8. This judgment was relied upon by the Calcutta High Court in Sudarsan Base v. State of West Bengal, 1997(4) All India Criminal L.R. 154 and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ashireddygari Narasimhareddy v. State of A.P., 2000(3) RCR (Crl.) 573 which had taken the same view.
9. During the course of arguments, the judgment State v. Sayan Singh, AIR 1953 Pepsu 146 was also cited in support of the submission that the Court which is competent to try the matter would impliedly also be empowered to grant bail in the case, which interpretation, to my mind will have to be accepted in view of the fact that none of the cases which are punishable alternatively with death or life imprisonment are triable by any other Court than the Court of Sessions.
10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it has to be held that the bar contained in Section 437(1)(i) of the Code will have to be restricted to only those cases where the offence which the accused is alleged to have committed is punishable alternatively with 'death' or 'life imprisonment' and not in cases in which the offence is punishable with life imprisonment.
11. For the reasons recorded above, the apprehension evinced by the petitioners that this Court had passed an order on 9.11.2000 which was not implemented because of the fact that the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class would not be able to grant bail is wrong and has got to be rejected. In view of the fact that there appears to be some doubt about the ju- risdiction of the Magistrate to entertain an application for bail in relation to an offence which is punishable with life imprisonment, the order passed by this Court on 9.11.2000 is modified to the extent that in case the petitioners surrender before the trial Court on or before 20.12.2000 at 10.00 A.M., the said Court will dispose of the bail application that may be filed by them together with any request for remand that may be made by the police as expeditiously as possible and preferably on the same date.
12. Order accordingly.
