HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
A.F.R.
Reserved
Criminal Revision No. 2178 of 2008
Mahipal.............................. .......................... Revisionist.
Versus
State of U.P and others................................... Opposite Parties.
Hon'ble Vijay Kumar Verma, J.
The following three cardinal questions fall for consideration in this revision, which has been preferred under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, "the Cr.P.C.") against the order dated 13.05.2008 passed by Sri S. N. H. Zaidi, the then Special Judge/Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar in criminal misc. case no. 5 of 2008 (Mahipal Vs. Suresh Chand Badhautiya and another), whereby the application moved by the revisionist (herein-after to be referred as 'the applicant') under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected:-
"(i) Whether the Special Judge can order for registration of FIR and its investigation on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. containing the allegations of committing the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short, "the P.C. Act").
(ii) Whether the Special Judge under the P.C. Act can take cognizance of the offences under this Act on private complaint.
(iii) Whether the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of cognizable offence can be rejected on the ground that "sanction" of appropriate government or authority would be required at the time of taking cognizance."
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts emerging from the record leading to the filing of this revision, in brief, are that the applicant Mahipal (revisionist herein) had moved an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the Court of Special Judge/Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar impleading S.I. Suresh Chand Badhautiya and Station Officer Gyanendra Kumar Singh of P.S. Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar as opposite parties. It was prayed in the said application that S.O. P.S. Kasna be directed to register the F.I.R. under Section 161, 166, 167, 218, 221, 222, 524, 506 of Indian Penal Code (in short 'the I.P.C.') and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and investigate the same. It was alleged in the said application that the applicant had lodged an F.I.R. on 05.01.2008 at P.S. Kasna, where a case under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 307, 506 I.P.C. was registered at crime No. 9 of 2008 against the accused Subhash and others. The investigation of that case was entrusted to S.I. Suresh Chand Badhautiya (O.P. No. 2 herein). It was alleged that the said Sub-Inspector along-with Police Constables and the applicant had arrested the accused Subhash on 08.01.2008 from his residence E 422, West, Karawal Nagar, P.S. Khajuri, New Delhi and he was brought to P.S. Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar and was locked in the lock-up, where he remained in the intervening night of 8/9-01-2008 and when the applicant asked the opposite parties to send the accused to Court, they demanded Rs.50,000/- as bribery, but when the applicant declined to oblige the opposite parties and refused to give them money, they released the accused from the lock-up and also fabricated the record. The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was moved in the Court of Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar in the capacity as Special Judge under the P.C. Act. A report was called for from P.S. Kasna about the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. On receipt of the police report, after hearing the counsel of applicant, the learned Special Judge declined to pass order for registration of the F.I.R. and rejected the said application by the impugned order. Hence, this revision.
3.I have heard Sri Uma Nath Pandey, learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
4.It was vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the grounds on which the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected by the learned Special Judge are untenable and hence the impugned order being wholly illegal should be set-aside. It was also contended that if the cognizable offence of serious nature requiring investigation by the police is disclosed from the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., then the Magistrate/ Judge is bound to order for registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation by the police and in such case the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as complaint. It was further submitted that cognizable offences of very serious nature requiring police investigation are disclosed in present case on the basis of the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. moved by the applicant in the Court of Special Judge/ Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar, hence the learned Judge was under obligation to pass order of registration of the FIR and its investigation.
5.The learned A.G.A. on the other hand submitted that the Magistrate or Judge is not bound to direct registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on each and every application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., even if the cognizable offences are disclosed from the allegations made in the application and in appropriate cases the said application can be treated as complaint. For this submission, the learned AGA has placed reliance on the case of Sukhwasi Vs. State of U.P. 2007 (59) ACC 739.
6.Having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the parties counsel, I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected by the learned Special Judge on wholly untenable grounds. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the application moved by the applicant-revisionist under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected by the learned Special Judge on three grounds, which are enumerated in para 8 of the order, which is reproduced below:-.
Þ/kkjk 156 na0iz0la0 ds v/khu iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa dks laKs; ekeyksa esa foospuk djus dk vf/kdkj fn;k x;k gS vkSj mi/kkjk ¼3½ ds v/khu eftLVªsV dks Hkh ,slh foospuk ds fy, vkns'k nsus dh 'kfDr nh x;h gSA esjs fopkj esa] mDr izkfo/kku ds v/khu dsoy eftLVªsV }kjk gh ekeys dh foospuk dk vkns'k fn;k tk ldrk gS vkSj mDr izkfo/kku] Hkz"Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e ds v/khu fu;qDr fo'ks"k U;k;/kh'k ds laca/k esa ykxw ugha gksrk gSA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dh [k.MihB }kjk lq[koklh izfr jkT;] 2008 fdzeuy yk¡ tujy] 472ß ds ekeys esa] /kkjk 156 ¼3½ na0iz0la0 ds v/khu izLrqr izkFkZuk&i= dks ifjokn ds :i esa xzká fd;s tkus dh 'kfDr Hkh eftLVªsV dks gksuk crkbZ xbZ gSA /kkjk 190 na0iz0la0 ds v/khu eftLVªsV }kjk laKku ysus ds i'pkr~ gh dfFkr vijk/k ds laca/k esa vxzsrj tkap dh tk ldrh gSA vr% bl izdkj eftLVsªV }kjk laKku ysus ds i'pkr~ gh /kkjk 200 na0iz0la0 ds v/khu fdlh ifjokn dks tkap ds fy, Lohdkj fd;k tk ldrk gSA Hkz"Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&19 dh O;oLFkk vuqlkj mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 7] 10] 11] 13] o 15 esa of.kZr vijk/kksa dk fdlh yksd lsod ds fo:) laKku dsoy lacaf/kr ljdkj@izkf/kdkjh nh xbZ iwoZ Lohd`fr ij gh fy;k tk ldrk gSA izkFkhZ dh vksj ls fopkjk/khu izkFkZuk&i= foi{khx.k ds fo:) Hkz"Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&7 ds v/khu izzLrqr fd;k x;k gS] ftlds vuqlkj yksd lsod }kjk vius oS/kkfud ifjJfed ls fHkUu ifjrks"k.k dk ysuk ,d vijk/k gS rFkk mDr vijk/k ds fy, U;k;ky; dsoy jkT; ljdkj }kjk nh xbZ iwoZ Lohd`fr ij gh laKku ys ldrk gSA vr% mDr fof/kd ifjfLFkfr dks ns[krs gq,] esjs fopkj esa] ;g ekeyk /kkjk&156 ¼3½ na0iz0la0 ds v/khu foospuk gsrq iqfyl vf/kdkjh dks vknsf'kr fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gSSAß
7.The first ground on which the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected by the learned Special Judge is that the provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. are not applicable on the Special Judges constituted under the P.C. Act and only the Magistrate can pass order for investigation under this Section. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the revisionist on this point that while acting as Special Judge under the P.C. Act, the Sessions Judge exercises the powers of Magistrate for certain purposes and hence, there is no legal bar for the Special Judge to entertain the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. containing allegations about the commission of the offences under the P.C. Act and order for registration of FIR and its investigation by the police can be passed by the Special Judge on such application. For this contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. Ram Das Sriniwas Nayak and another 1984 Cri L.J. 647 : AIR 1984 Supreme Court 718. Having carefully gone through the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in A. R. Antulay case (supra), I entirely agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of offences under the P.C. Act can be entertained by the Special Judge constituted under this Act. It is not disputed that all the Sessions Judges in Uttar Pradesh have been empowered to act as Special Judge under the P.C. Act. From the impugned order, it is revealed that by virtue of U.P. Govt Notification no. 444/CHH-Pu-9-2008-31(8)/2008 dated 19.02.2008 all the Addl. Sessions Judges also have been empowered to act as Special Judge under the P.C. Act.
8.Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads thus:-
"156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case: (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned."
As would appear from sub-section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C., any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 Cr.P.C. may order such investigation as above-mentioned.
Section 190 Cr.P.C. reads thus:-
"190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence-
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed."
9.On a combined reading of sub-section (3) of Section 156 and Section 190 Cr.P.C., this fact is borne out that any Magistrate, who is empowered to take cognizance of any offence is authorized to pass order for investigation of the case. It is settled principle of law by a catena of decisions that the Magistrate exercising the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can pass order for registration of the F.I.R. Section 5 of the P.C. Act 1988 gives power to the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offences under this Act without the accused being committed for trial and in trying the accused persons, the Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate. Sub-Section (3) of Section 5 lays down that save as provided in sub-Section (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. Although according to sub Section (3) of Section 5 of the P.C. Act, 1988, the Court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session, but the Hon'ble Apex Court in A. R. Antulay case (supra) has observed that Special Judge is empowered to exercise powers of the Magistrate also for certain purposes. The power to take cognizance of the offences under the P.C. Act has been conferred on the Special Judge by virtue of Section 5 of this Act. Hence, in my considered opinion, the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of the offences under the P.C. Act can be entertained by the Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of this Act, because only that Magistrate or Judge can pass order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., who is empowered to take cognizance of the offences by any Special Act or Code of Criminal Procedure. Although there is no specific provision in the P.C. Act conferring the power on the Special Judge to act under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., but since the Special Judge by virtue of Section 5 of the P.C. Act is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under this Act, hence the order for registration of the FIR and its investigation on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of the offences under this Act can only be made by the Special Judge.
10. Reference may be made to the case of Suresh Prakash Tiwari and others Vs. State of U.P. 1994 (suppl.) 121, in which order for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was made by the Special Judge under U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act. In that Act also, the power to take cognizance of scheduled offences has been conferred on the Special Court under Section 7. The order for investigation passed by the Special Judge under U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act was held legal by this Court. Therefore, on the analogy of the law laid down in aforesaid case, the Special Judge under the P.C. Act is fully empowered to pass order on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
11.In present case, prima facie offence punishable under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, 1988 is disclosed from the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. moved by the applicant in the Court of Special Judge/Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar. It is alleged in that application that S.I. Suresh Chand Badhautiya and S. I. Ganendra Kumar Singh had demanded Rs.50,000/- as illegal gratifications for making challan of accused Subhash in case crime no. 9 of 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 347, 506 IPC, which was got registered by the applicant on 05.01.2008, during investigation whereof the accused Subhash was arrested on 08.01.2008 and was kept in lock-up of P.S. Kasna, but when the applicant did not oblige the aforesaid police officers, they released the accused Subhash from the lock-up without taking any action against him and forgery was also made by them in General Diary of the Police station and other papers. On the basis of these allegations, prima facie cognizable offences of serious nature requiring investigation by the police are disclosed. Hence, the learned Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar acting as Special Judge under the P.C. Act could pass order for registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation by the police on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. moved by the applicant-revisionist.
12.The second point on which the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected is that according to the Court below, the Special Judge is not empowered to take cognizance of the offences under the P.C. Act on the complaint of private person and by virtue of the law laid down by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State 2004 Cri L. J 472, only the Magistrate can pass order to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint. This view of the Court below is also not legally sound, as there is no legal bar for the Special Judge under the P.C. Act to take cognizance of the offences under this Act on the basis of complaint of private persons. This point has been considered in detail by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A. R. Antulay (supra), in which it is held that the Special Judge under the P. C. Act is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under this Act on the complaint of private persons also. A.R. Antulay case (supra) pertains to the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947. After having considered the various provisions of the P. C. Act and other statutes, it is specifically held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that a private complaint can be entertained by the Special Judge in respect of the offences committed by the public servant under this Act and cognizance of the same by Special Judge is legal.
13. It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicate to the contrary. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to the criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision.
14. The general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (See Section 2(n), Cr.P.C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm, but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant, unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straight-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception. There is nothing in the P. C. Act, 1988 that private person can not file complaint regarding the commission of the offences under this Act. Therefore, having regard to the law laid down in A. R. Antulay case (supra), in present case also, the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. could not be rejected on the ground that only the Magistrate can treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint, as there is no legal bar for the Special Judge under the P.C. Act to take cognizance of the offences under this Act on the complaint of private persons.
15. The third point on which the learned Special Judge declined to get the FIR registered and order investigation on the basis of the application under Section 156(3) Cr,P.C. as revealed from para 8 of the impugned order, is that according to the learned Special Judge, cognizance of the offence under Section 7 of the P. C. Act can be taken by the Court only after granting the "sanction" by the appropriate government or authority. There is no dispute about this proposition of law, but no 'sanction' is required at the time of registration of FIR.
16. As would appear from sub-Section (i) of Section 19 of the P.C. Act, 1988, "sanction" of appropriate government or authority is required at the time of taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have committed by the public servant and not at the time of passing the order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration of the FIR, or lodging the FIR about such offences directly at the police station. Therefore, the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can not be rejected on the ground that "sanction" of appropriate government or authority would be required at the time of taking the cognizance.
17. For the reasons mentioned herein-above, the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar acting as Special Judge under the P.C. Act can not be sustained.
18.Although, in view of law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. 2007 (59) ACC 739, in which Full Bench decision of the case of Ram Babu Gupta & others vs.State of U.P. 2001 (43) ACC 50 has been relied upon, application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. can be treated as complaint, but on the basis of the allegations made in the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in present case, prima facie cognizable offences of very serious nature requiring police investigation are disclosed. Certain documents of police station Kasna have to be scrutinized with a view to ascertain as to whether any forgery in the general diary or in other papers as alleged by the applicant in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been made or not. This can not be done by treating the said application as complaint. Hence, treating the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as complaint in present case would be illegal and unjustied. While passing order for treating the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as complaint, the following observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Babu Gupta (supra) must be kept in mind by the Magistrates/Judges:-
"However, it is always to be kept in mind that it is the primary duty of the police to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences and aggrieved person cannot be forced to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XV and to produce his witnesses at his cost to bring home the charge to the accused. It is the duty of the state to provide safeguards to the life and property of a citizen. If any intrusion is made by an offender, it is for the State to set the law into motion and come to the aid of the person aggrieved."
19. The Magistrates/Judges should not shirk their legal responsibility to pass an order for registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on the applications under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in the cases where on the basis of the allegations made therein and the material, if any, brought on record in support thereof, prima facie cognizable offence of serious nature requiring police investigation is made out and in such cases the aggrieved person should not be compelled to collect and produce the evidence at his cost to bring home the charges to the accused by passing an order to treat the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. as complaint thereby forcing the aggrieved person to proceed in the manner provided by chapter XV Cr.P.C.
20. The following observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 4 & 5 of the judgement in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & others (2008) 7 SCC 164 are also worth mentioning:-
"4.It is a matter of experience of one of us (B.N. Agrawal,J.) while acting as Judge of the Patna High Court, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court and Judge of this Court that inspite of law laid down by this Court, the police authorities concerned do not register FIRs unless some direction is given by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the High Court or this Court. Further, experience shows that even after orders are passed by the courts concerned for registration of the case, the police does not take the necessary steps and when matters are brought to the notice of the inspecting Judges of the High Court during the course of inspection of the courts and Superintendents of Police are taken to task, then only FIRs are registered. In a large number of cases investigations do not commence even after registration of FIRs and in a case like the present one, steps are not taken for recovery of the kidnapped person or apprehending the accused person with reasonable dispatch. At times it has been found that when harsh orders are passed by the members of the judiciary in a State, the police becomes hostile to them, for instance, in Bihar when a bail petition filed by a police personnel, who was the accused was rejected by a member of the Bihar Superior Judicial Service, he was assaulted in the courtroom for which contempt proceeding was initiated by the Patna High Court and the erring police officials were convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment."
"5. On the other hand, there are innumerable cases that where the complainant is a practical person, FIRs are registered immediately, copies thereof are made over to the complainant on the same day, investigation proceeds with supersonic jet speed, immediate steps are taken for apprehending the accused and recovery of the kidnapped persons and the properties which were the subject-matter of theft or dacoity. In the case before us allegations have been made that the Station House Officer of the police station concerned is pressurising the complainant to withdraw the complaint, which, if true, is a very disturbing state of affairs. We do not know, there may be innumerable such instances."
21. After making above mentioned observations, the Hon'ble Apex Court issued certain directions vide para 6 at page 165:-
"6. In view of the above, we feel that it is high time to give directions to the Governments of all the States and Union Territories besides their Director Generals of Police/ Commissioners of Police as the case may be to the effect that if steps are not taken for registration of FIRs immediately and copies hereof are not made over to the complainants, they may move the Magistrates concerned by filing complaint petitions to give direction to the police to register case immediately upon receipt/production of copy of the orders and make over copy of the FIRs to the complainants, within twenty-four hours of receipt/production of copy of such orders. It may further give direction to take immediate steps for apprehending the accused persons and recovery of kidnapped/abducted persons and properties which were the subject-matter of theft or dacoity. In case FIRs are not registered within the aforementioned time, and/or aforementioned steps are not taken by the police, the Magistrate concerned would be justified in initiating contempt proceeding against such delinquent officers and punish them for violation of its orders if no sufficient cause is shown and awarding stringent punishment like sentence of imprisonment against them inasmuch as the disciplinary authority would be quite justified in initiating departmental proceeding and suspending them in contemplation of the same."
22. When the aforesaid case was called for hearing on 08.08.2008, the Hon'ble Apex Court passed the following order, which too is worth noticing:-
"Registry is directed to communicate this order by fax as well to the Chief Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories and all the Director Generals of Police/Commissioners of police, as the case may be, let order dated 14th July, 2008, and this order be put on the website of the Supreme Court of India so that the people of India may know what directions have been given by this Court and they may take appropriate steps in case of any inaction on the part of the concerned officer of the police station in instituting a case and the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall take action in a case of inaction upon filing of complaint petition and give direction to institute the case within the time directed in the said order failing which the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall not only initiate action against the delinquent police officer but punish them suitably by sending them to jail, in case the cause shown is found to be unsatisfactory. Apart from this, the Chief Judicial Magistrate/ Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall report the matter to the disciplinary authority at once by fax as well upon receipt of which the disciplinary authority shall suspend the concerned police officer immediately in contemplation of departmental proceeding."
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in the case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. & others (2008)1 scc (Cri.) 440 that the magistrate has implied/incidental power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to moniter the police investigation.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion, I held that the Special Judge under the P.C. Act is empowered to pass order for registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on the basis of the application under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of the offences under this Act and cognizance of the offences under the P.C. Act can be taken by the Special Judge on the compliant of private person also. It is further held that the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can not be rejected on the ground that 'sanction' of appropriate government or authority would be required at the time of taking cognizance. Since the Court below did not pass the order on merit on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. moved by the applicant and the said application has been rejected on wholly untenable grounds, hence there is no alternative, but to send the matter back to the Court below for passing fresh order on the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the light of the observations made herein-above in this order.
25. Consequently, the revision is allowed. The impugned order is hereby set aside. The Special Judge/Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar is directed to pass fresh order on the application dated 16.01.2008 moved by the applicant-revisionist Mahipal under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and it must be ensured that after registration of the FIR on the basis of that application, proper investigation is carried out.
Dated:- 17th October, 2008
Yachna/-
