BENCH: Dr Arijit Pasayat, D.K. Jain
FACTS:
- The appellant was married to respondent no.2 in 1959 and had a child born to them in 1966. The son died in the year 1991 after which the respondent, living separately from the appellant stopped visiting the house of the appellant whereby a notice was also sent for maintenance to the respondent
- An application under s.125 Cr.P.C was filed on denial of any maintenance where after the respondent stated that they divorced long back on the utterance of words ‘Talaq’ thrice
- The respondent further stated that he married for the second time and also provided Mehr to the appellant and that the Iddat period was over for any claims of maintenance
ISSUE:
- Whether the husband is liable to pay maintenance after the date of divorce
- Whether divorce can be accepted based on a written statement alleging utterance of the word ‘Talaq’
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:
- That the First Revisional Court was erroneous. There is no bar on Muslim woman filing a petition in terms of Section 125 Cr.P.C.
- That mere statement in the written statement about a divorce does not meet the requirement of the law
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:
- That the absence of reasons has rendered the revision petition by the High Court to be unsustainable
JUDGEMENT:
The court held that the view expressed by the First Revisional Court that no Muslim woman can maintain a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is unsustainable. Conclusions in the view of a statement alleging utterance of the word ‘Talaq’ thrice is not sustainable under the law. Provisions for fair maintenance have to be made by the husband under s.3(i)(a) of the Act and that the duty of the husband does not end with the iddat period. The appeal was dismissed holding the Act to be valid under Article 14, 15 and 21 and the decision of the High Court was set aside.
