N Rajendran Vs S Valli: Bar On Remarriage After Divorce Will Apply On Mere Filing Of Appeal By Other Party Within Limitation: Supreme Court

Date of Judgement:
3rd February 2022.

Bench:
K.M. Joseph, J.
Hrishikesh Roy, J.

Parties:
Appellant: N. Rajendran.
Respondent: S. Valli.

Subject

The Supreme Court has ruled that the opposing party doesn’t need to file an appeal against the Family Court ruling with the High Court within the time limit specified in Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 for the restriction on remarriage after divorce to apply.

Legal Provisions

• Section 15 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 – states that When a marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there is, the period for appealing has elapsed without an appeal being filed, or an appeal has been filed but dismissed, it is legal for either party to the marriage to marry again.
• Article 142 of the Constitution of India – states that In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary to render complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any such decree or order shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in the manner prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament, and, until such provision is made, in the manner prescribed by the President by order.
• Section 12, 29(2) of Family Courts Act, 1984 - Section 12 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not override the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation to file matrimonial appeals under the Family Courts Act - Nothing inconsistent in Section 12 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act - Section 20 will not override the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation to file matrimonial appeals under the Family Courts.
• Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – states that Any marriage that was solemnized before or after the effective date of this Act may be dissolved by a decree of divorce based on a petition brought by either the husband or the wife.

Overview

• The Hon'ble Supreme Court remarked that permission of the parties is not required under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve a marriage based on irretrievable breakdown. In the current case, the HC reversed a couple's marriage dissolution decision. The Family Court earlier granted the husband's petition for divorce based on cruelty.
• The aggrieved appellant was married to the respondent under the Hindu laws and rites and as per apt customs. And according to the appellant, there were certain disputes between his sister and the respondent’s brother, who were supposedly married to each other which eventually led to the appellant’s sister returning to her parent’s house.
• She was hesitant to return to her husband’s house and accused them of cruelty and accordingly a divorce petition was filed on 05/03/2001 seeking dissolution of the marriage.
• Subsequently the family court allowed the petition by its decree on 23/07/2004. Consequent tothis an appeal was filed by the respondent before the Madras High Court U/s. 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 on 09/09/2004.
• The Appellant contended that since the period for filing an appeal by the respondent has lapsed, following which he re-married on 31.10.2004 on the strength of the decree of dissolution dated on 23/07/2004. Further, he was served with a notice in the matter in May 2005, and the respondent had filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights U/s. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act dated 27/12/2004.
• The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court made an obvious error in overturning the Family Court's decision and that he would assert that the respondent was guilty of marital cruelty and that after assessing the evidence, the Trial Court made a final decision rationalizing the disintegration of the marriage.
• Furthermore, Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that The trial court found, based on the evidence, that tension between the respondent and the appellant's sister had a significant impact on the relationship between the appellant and the respondent.
• The appellant's experienced counsel claimed that the respondent would threaten to commit suicide. Furthermore, the appellant's skilled counsel would argue that, notwithstanding the appellant's plea for the respondent to return, the respondent refused. But she declined, claiming that she needed more time since she had gone to birth a kid. She had asked for a five-month extension.
• It was also observed that the inconsistencies in the contested judgment in this regard He would compare the result that no such tension existed with the conclusion that the families' connection was strained. The respondent refused to reside with the appellant at any time. The High Court's decision that the respondent was always ready and willing to re-join has been questioned as factually unsound.
• Learned counsel for the appellant also point out to the fact that it was 22 years since they are living apart and restoring the sanctity of marriage was only a legal fiction and it cannot be mended by any means, as a result, it was contended by the learned counsel that High Court’s decision must be overruled, and the respondents appeal filed U/s. 19 was out of the time window prescribed by the limitations act and the same is not sustainable.
• The learned counsel for the appellant claims that in a matter governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal must be accompanied by a certified copy, but that when Section 19(1) is properly understood, this condition must be viewed as obviated. He further relies on Section 19(1) to argue that the Family Courts Act's requirements apply despite any conflict with other laws.
• Further the ld. Counsel pointed out that the Hon’ble High Court wrongly relied on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, because falls U/s 29(3), and subsequently the appeal U.s 19 is non–suit.
• The ld. Counsel further placed reliance on the case of Lata Kamat v. Vilas, 1989that sections 19 and 20, the term 'proceeding' as used in Section 29(3) would include an appeal filed under Section 19. He would then argue that the appeal must be filed per Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
• Following which the learned counsels for the respondent contended that no case would be made out of the appellants to seek dissolution of the marriage and that after the marriage She discovered she was pregnant after the marriage and went to her parent’s house, as is natural. It was rather difficult. Her father had died. Circumstances beyond her control forced her to return to her parent’s home, and it had nothing to do with the respondent's unwillingness to perform her responsibilities under the marital ties.
• Furthermore, In the case of the applicability of Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, he would point out that Section 19 of the Family Courts Act is a special provision within the meaning of Section 29(2), hence Section 29(2) would apply. He would point out that the term "proceeding" in Section 29(3) must be limited to procedures analogous to a suit, which is original actions launched by the parties rather than an appeal.
• Additionally, the argument regarding the meaning sought for the term "offered" in Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act has no substance. He would also point out that the Court may take note of the facts and the circumstance.

Issues

• Whether the period spent for obtaining a certified copy of the decree can be exhausted from the limitation period?
• Whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act, which excludes time spent for obtaining a certified copy of the decree from the limitation period, will apply to a matrimonial appeal?

Judgment

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the contentions made by the appellant regarding the matter of reversing the decree of the family court do not have sufficient merits.
• Likewise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the petition is submitted in less than two years from the date of the marriage. Brutality may take many forms, including both physical and emotional cruelty. It is a question that must be resolved based on the facts of each instance. However, we are convinced that the appellant's argument was without merit by any standard.
• Additionally, the Hon’ble Court found that the High Court has determined that the claim of cruelty, which is based on the so-called strained relationship between the respondent and the appellant's sister, has no validity at all.
• Simultaneously, the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that The appellant claims that, in light of Section 15's requirements and the fact that the appellant remarried on October 31, 2004, the case must be reviewed and decided in light of the second marriage, which is perfectly legal. The appeal was submitted on September 9, 2004, which is after the 30-day limit set out in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act.
• To which the Hon’ble High Court concluded that the appeal was timely filed, noting that after the decree was issued by the Family Court on July 23, 2004, the respondent filed an application for a certified copy on July 31, 2004, and the time spent getting the document is to be omitted.
• Upon subsequent examinations of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the appellant that given the requirements of the Family Courts Act, i.e., Section 19, Section 29(3) would apply, and the Limitation Act would not apply. Because the Limitation Act does not apply, the respondent cannot remove the time spent applying for and receiving a certified copy from the calculation of the period of limitation.
• Furthermore, the question posed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was The question of whether the Limitation Act applies to a matrimonial law appeal is not res Integra.
• The Hon’ble Court observed that The First Schedule makes no provision for an appeal against a decree or order made under the Hindu Marriage Act. The test of a "prescription of a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule" as laid down in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is now held to be satisfied even where a difference between the special law and the Limitation Act arose as a result of omissions to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.
• Likewise, the Hon’ble Court placed reliance on the case of Sm. Sipra Dey v. Ajit Kumar Dey, 1988, in this case, the Court has given the rationale for the change that was brought about in the provisions of Section 29(3) in the Limitation Act, 1963.
• The court held that it would be not in the best interest of justice to the parties because matrimonial problems like restitution of conjugal rights, divorce, and guardianship are by their very nature matters for which a statute of limitations may not be appropriate.
• Further the court observed that a free copy may be provided as required by the Family Courts Act, as the High Court noted, but it is a far cry from ruling that an appeal can be heard without a certified copy. We are again bolstered in this regard by a Rule promulgated under Section 21 of the Family Court Act.
• Furthermore, the courts had previously dealt with the clauses that would retain authority. This Court believes that the Family Courts Act must be read in conjunction with the cognate enactments, given the establishment of the Family Court and the jurisdiction it was to exercise under Section 7 of the Act.
• To put it another way, the Family Courts Act is not a stand-alone piece of legislation. Acts like the Hindu Marriage Act provide it with nourishment. This is because, after a Family Court is established in India, a petition within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act, for example, has to be dealt with by the Family Court, based on the Hindu Marriage Act.
• The Hon’ble Court rejected submissions based on Section 20 because it lacked sufficient merits, also to involve the same the appellant must first succeed in eliminating the application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to apply Section 20 and rule out Section 12 of the Limitation Act. When Section 29(2) is invoked, the Family Courts Act becomes a special enactment, allowing for a special term of limitation as anticipated by Section 19, but also bringing the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act into play.
• The Hon’ble court after because both appellants and respondents have been living separately for 22 years and further cohabitations were not possible, by that Article 142 of the Constitution unquestionably vests this Court with the authority to issue orders that provide complete justice to the parties. The thought of an irreversible marriage breakup comes to mind.
• Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the judgment given by the High Court and refused to grant a decree of dissolution on the subsequent grounds of cruelty, and conclusively declared the marriage between the appellant and respondent as dissolved, further disposing of the above appeal.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has ruled that the ban on remarriage after divorce imposed by Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 does not require the other party to file an appeal against the Family Court order with the High Court within the time limit. Section 15 is invoked simply by filing an appeal within the statute of limitations, Section 19 of the Family Courts Act is a special provision within the meaning of Section 29(2), and hence Section 29(2) would apply. That the phrase "proceeding" in Section 29(3) must be limited to proceedings akin to a suit, which are initial acts taken by the parties rather than an appeal.

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