DATE OF ORDER:
14 October 2022
JUDGES:
Justices S. Abdul Nazeer, AS Bopanna and V. Ramasubramaniam
PARTIES:
Appellant: Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd.
Respondent: State of UP
SUBJECT
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court’s Three Judges Bench addressed a question that had been referred to it on whether the time frame set forth in Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 applied to acquisitions started by using Section 17’s urgency provision.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
- Section 6 - Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. - (1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act, appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (I) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2).
- Section 11A - Period shall be which an award within made. - The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
BRIEF FACTS
- An area of 2-06-1/3-0 Bighas located in the hamlet of Haldauni, Tehsil and Pargana Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, was also included in the enormous extents of land that were notified. This area is known as “Abadi” land. The appellant, a business organised in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act of 1956, asserts ownership of the aforementioned tiny parcel of property. The appellant claims they were not given the notice required by Section 9(1) of the Act of 1894. Possession was nonetheless taken on 04.02.2003, and this is undisputed.
- The complaint made by the Appellant, however, is that neither the initial requirement of tendering and paying 80% of the estimated compensation outlined in sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act of 1894, nor the requirement of Section 11A of the Act of 1894 to pass the award within two years of the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, was met. Given that more than three and a half years had passed and neither of the requirements had been met, the appellant filed the writ petition on March 1, 2006, in this opinion. Therefore, the appellant argued that the purchase insofar as the appellant’s land has expired and should restore to the appellant.
- After considering the situation, the High Court determined that the purchase proceedings conducted in accordance with Section 17 of the Act of 1894 do not fall under the purview of Section 11A of that Act.
ISSUES RAISED
- Is the requirement to tender payment of 80% of the estimated compensation as contemplated under sub-section(3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894, mandatory to ensure absolute vesting of the notified land?
- Whether the requirement to pass the award within the time frame contemplated under Section 11A applicable to the acquisition notified under Section 17 of Act, 1894?
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
- In the beginning, the learned senior counsel for Respondent No. 1 vehemently argued with regard to the State’s use of eminent domain in the matter of acquiring land for public purposes and relied on the case in Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore Vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Karnataka and Others (1988) 3 SCC 263 in an effort to sustain the acquisition.
- The opinion is that the decision in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Others (2020) 8 SCC 129, rendered by the Constitution Bench, will not be applicable to the issue under consideration before us in that case. The learned counsel for the beneficiary-Respondent No.2 relied on that decision to argue that it has been held therein that “paid” as contained in Section 24(2) of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not include deposit of compensation in Court.
JUDGMENT ANALYSIS
- This Court refused to grant the Government’s requests in light of the circumstances. The State’s attempt to invalidate the acquisition on the grounds that it had violated Sections 16 and 17 was heartbreakingly rejected by this Court (3-A). Landowners were not intended to suffer any loss; rather, they were to be protected. It was strongly opposed to the harmful practise that was spreading, which was to only partially comply with the law and to pursue the acquisition procedure piecemeal before claiming that its own mistakes made the acquisition illegal.
- Although this is technically obiter, the bench felt it was important to make it clear that in the event that the landowners do not contest the acquisition, they may be able to request a mandamus for payment of the remaining compensation to them after a reasonable amount of time. At that point, the remaining compensation will change from a mere estimate to the actual compensation for the expropriation.
- The court believed it was important to make a distinction between annulling an acquisition and returning possession to the original landowners. Although the latter is prohibited under the LA Act, this does not automatically entail that the former is also not a possibility. We would not necessarily hold that the land reverts to the appellants if we permitted the acquisition of land that the Government deems necessary to be set aside since it is possible for the Government to retain ownership if it reacquires the land with a new Section 4 notification. This option upholds Section 11-A even in cases of acquisition under Section 17, while maintaining the requirement of Section 17 that the unencumbered possession of the land remain vested in the Government. This option, particularly in the current factual matrix, does the least violence to the intent and content of the LA Act.
- Additionally, it upholds the intentions of Sections 11-A and 17 while protecting the rights of landowners and enabling the government to purchase land in times of emergency without having its title contested. Any other interpretation of the law would only protect those landowners who had filed a lawsuit in order to prevent the Government from reversing an emergency acquisition, leaving out equally harmed landowners who were trying to enforce their right to fair compensation for their property in the cold. Even equity requires that the errant State, not the innocent landowner, should be the party incurring the consequences of the delay in the judgement.
- The decision in this case based on the legal principle established herein, if it arises for consideration in any other case under the Act of 1894 or any other law relating to land acquisition containing parimateria provisions, shall only be applied prospectively, and cases which have reached finality shall not be reopened.
CONCLUSION
Since possession in such cases cannot be considered to have been taken in accordance with law and the vesting is not absolute, the provision in Section 11A of the Act, 1894, shall be applicable to cases in which the acquiring authority has not complied with the requirement of sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of the Act, 1894 by tendering and paying eighty percentum of the estimated compensation before taking possession. The appellant is entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with these proceedings. The appeal is decided in accordance with that. Any pending applications are dismissed.
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