Case Title:
RAGHUVEER SHARAN VERSUS DISTRICT SAHAKARI KRISHI GRAMIN VIKAS BANK & ANR.
Date of Order:
10th September 2024
Bench:
Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
Parties:
Appellants - RAGHUVEER SHARAN
Respondents: DISTRICT SAHAKARI KRISHI GRAMIN VIKAS BANK & ANR.
Subject:
In 1998, Savitri Shyam made two installment deposits of ₹10 lakh at the Madhya Pradesh District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank. Later, reports appeared that the deposit's term was illegally modified from three to fifteen years by altering the bank's records. Raghuveer Sharan, who was employed by the bank at the time, was charged with the crime when his initials were found near the modified paperwork. Following the presentation of fresh evidence by PW-1 Parmar, the trial court officially classified Sharan as a defendant in line with Section 319 CrPC. Both the Trial Court and the High Court upheld Sharan's position as a defendant.
Important Provisions
Code of Criminal Procedure
Section 319: Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.—(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then— (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; 139 140 (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.
Indian Evidence Act
Section 132- Witness not excused from answering on the ground that answer will criminate.
A witness shall not be excused from answering any question, as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind :Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him, in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.
Facts
In 1998, during her tenure as the president of Shyam Sunder Shyam Sansthan, a philanthropic organization, Savitri Shyam deposited a predetermined sum of ₹10,00,000 with the District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank in Madhya Pradesh.
The deposit was initially established for a period of three years and was made in two separate transactions, with a total of ₹8.5 lakh and ₹1.5 lakh. Rajendra Bharti, a defendant in the ongoing legal proceedings, was the biological mother of Savitri Shyam.
Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the fixed deposit's duration had been deceptively altered to 10 years and subsequently to 15 years through the use of correction fluid and interpolations in the bank's records.
Raghuveer Sharan, the appellant, was purportedly the teller at the bank during the specified timeframe when the reported modifications were allegedly implemented. Furthermore, the bank's ledger was modified by omitting the "3 years" timeframe and extending it to "15 years" by incorporating Sharan's initials.
Sharan was first listed as a witness on behalf of the bank, and a formal criminal case was eventually filed. Sharan stated that during a pre-summoning screening in 2016, the fixed deposit's tenure was changed from three years to 10 years, and then to fifteen. In his capacity as a witness, the preceding statement was made.
Further evidence was disclosed during the trial when Narendra Singh Parmar, PW-1, provided testimony on March 31, 2022. Parmar stated during his examination-in-chief that the appellant was responsible for adding correction fluid to the fixed deposit documents, which led to a modification of the duration from three years to ten years, and subsequently to fifteen years. It was upon such evidence that the bank had filed a Section 319 CrPC plea to have Sharan and Rajendra's brother, Rakesh Bharti, called as extra defendants.
On April 17, 2023, the trial court decided to call Sharan as a defendant but declined to present Rakesh Bharti, so partly authorizing the petition. Subsequently, Sharan was charged on June 15, 2023.
Sharan appealed the trial court's decision in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which denied his request for revision and upheld the trial court's decision to name him as a defendant, citing the testimony of prosecution witness 1 Parmar.
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant argued that Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not justify his summoning as an accused. He admitted that the basis for his summons was a 2016 statement he gave when he was summoned as a witness rather than an accused party. The appellant argued that he should not be charged for his previous evidence by utilizing Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
He argued that no witness should be penalized for their responses, unless they were provided under duress. He argued that his 2016 statement, which recognized the change in the fixed deposit duration, was made in a witness capacity and should not be considered as evidence to support his summons under Section 319 CrPC, since no substantial evidence had been presented against him at that time.
Sharan contended that Section 319 CrPC explicitly empowers courts to call upon additional accused parties solely when new and unique evidence emerges during the trial, indicating a significant suspicion of their participation in the crime.
His contention was that the testimony provided by PW-1, Narendra Singh Parmar, during the trial on March 31, 2022, lacked any novel or substantial evidence that would warrant the application of Section 319.
Additionally, Sharan's attorney referenced the Supreme Court's decision in R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State, emphasizing that Section 319 CrPC should be implemented with caution and exclusively in cases where the evidence clearly establishes an individual's involvement.
He argued that the court should establish a more stringent standard before summoning future defendants and that mere suspicion is inadequate to invoke this clause. The appellant argued that the trial court erred in summoning him based on testimony that did not conclusively establish his connection to the alleged forgery.
He also argued that his previous assertions could not be used as evidence against him in the absence of independent supporting evidence. As a result, Sharan sought legal action under Section 132, arguing that the Indian Evidence Act and the principles of criminal law had not been appropriately applied to his situation.
Respondent’s Arguments
Mr. Saurabh Mishra, the respondent's counsel, stated that Sharan's summons was based not just on his pre-summoning statement from 2016, but also on fresh evidence submitted by Parmar (PW-1) in 2022.
The appellant then certified instances of interpolation in fixed deposit records, which Parmar's evidence revealed. The material given was unique and independent, hence Section 132 of the Indian Material Act could not be used to hold Sharan accountable for his fraudulent conduct.
Mishra stated that in circumstances when convincing evidence clearly demonstrates a witness's participation in the crime, Section 132 fails to provide adequate protection. Parmar's testimony, which contained substantial evidence beyond Sharan's 2016 confession, rendered Section 132 insufficient in protecting Sharan from prosecution.
Mishra provided more details on the appellate court's decision to call Sharan under Section 319 CrPC, emphasising that this clause permits the addition of a further defendant in the event that fresh evidence arises during the trial.
Parmar's testimony served as the initial evidence required for Sharan's summons, thereby validating the court's decision. The introduction of new evidence during a trial may justify the summons of additional accused individuals, even if they had been previously questioned as witnesses, as Mishra clarified in prior cases in which Section 319 CrPC was applied in similar situations.
In this specific case, Parmar's evidence was deemed sufficient to summon Sharan, rendering his prior statements superfluous.
Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court, headed by Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, extensively investigated the appellant's arguments under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act. While Section 132 does provide witnesses immunity from prosecution based solely on compelling evidence, the court contended that this protection is not without limitations.
The court emphasized that Section 132 does not grant immunity if there is independent evidence linking the witness to a crime. Sharan's summons as an accused under Section 319 CrPC was justified by the substantial, independent evidence provided by PW-1 Parmar, which implicated him in the forgery of fixed deposit records.
The court denied the appellant's claim that the summons was based on his 2016 pre-summoning statement. The court concluded that Parmar's most recent testimony from 2022 was the primary source of evidence that substantiated the trial court's decision, as opposed to the earlier statement.
The appellant's reliance on R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State was also dismissed, as the court determined that the circumstances were distinguishable. In contrast to R. Dinesh Kumar, where no additional evidence was present, Parmar's testimony in this case provided sufficient new material.
As a consequence, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to depose Sharan, finding that Section 132 does not give universal immunity and that Parmar's evidence was sufficient to invoke Section 319 CrPC. The appeal was rejected, and the contempt petition related with it was settled. All interim orders were vacated.
