Case Title:
Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan
Date of Judgement:
April 13, 2022
Bench:
Justice Uday Umesh Lalit
Justice S. Ravindra Bhat
Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Parties:
Appellant – Kamatchi
Respondent – Lakshmi Narayanan
SUBJECT
The Appellant had filed for an appeal in the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of the Madras High Court, which had quashed the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “DV Act”) proceedings initiated by the Appellant, on the ground that Limitation Period for filing an application u/s 12 of the DV Act had passed on the date of such application before the Magistrate.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in this case that starting point of limitation under Section 12 of the DV Act would arise only after there is a breach of an order passed by the Magistrate under the said section.
LEGAL PROVISIONS
Section 468, CrPC –prescribes a period of limitation for certain offences and places a bar to taking cognizance after the lapse of such period of limitation. Six months limitation period is prescribed for offences punishable with fine only. One year is prescribed for offences that are punishable with imprisonment up to 1 year. A limitation period of three years has been prescribed for offences that are punishable with imprisonment of 1 to 3 years.
Section 469, CrPC – This section provides that the period of limitation commences on the date of offence. Several other starting points of limitation are listed in this Section but we are not concerned with them in this Judgment Analysis.
Section 12, DV Act –It primarily states that an application can be presented before the Magistrate by an aggrieved person or a protection officer, or any other person, seeking relief(s) under the DV Act. Furthermore, this section provides that the first date of the hearing must not be ordinarily three days from the date of application and the Magistrate must endeavor to dispose of such application within 60 days from the date of application.
Section 28, DV Act –This section states that proceedings u/s 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23, and offences u/s 31 must be governed by the CrPC in matters of procedure.But a court can lay down its procedure for disposing of an application u/s 12 or 23 (2).
BRIEF FACTS
- In 2018, the Appellant (in the present case) had presented an application u/s 12 of the DV Act to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur, Chennai seeking protection in terms of Sections 17 and 18 of the DV Act. The applicant was preferred against the Husband, the father-in-law, and the sister-in-law of the appellant.
- To get these proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate quashed, the father-in-law and the sister-in-law hadfiled a petition before the Madras High Court u/s 482, CrPC.A similar petition was also moved by the Husband before the High Court.
- The proceedings against the father-in-law and the sister-in-law were quashed by the High Court. As regards the petition moved by the Husband, the High Court observed that the application ought to have been filed by the Appellant within one year of the incident and that on the ground of limitation, the said application before the Judicial Magistrate cannot be sustained.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether the limitation period prescribed u/s 468 CrPC applicable to applications u/s 12, DV Act?
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY APPELLANT
- As per provisions of Section 468, CrPC, the period of limitation is to be calculated from the date of commission of the offence.
- An offense u/s 31, DV Act is said to have been committed if there is a breach of an order passed by the Magistrate u/s 12 of the said Act.
- No limitation period under the CrPC or the DV Act has been prescribed for filing an application u/s 12 of the DV Act. The limitation period applies only to offences that arise from a breach of an order passed u/s 12 of the DV Act.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY RESPONDENT
- Nothing has been alleged by the Appellant after 16.09.2008 for almost 10 years against the husband, the father-in-law, and the sister-in-law.
- The Application before the Judicial Magistrate was a desperate attempt to abuse the process of the court by filing something against the Respondent as the parties have been living separately for several years.
- Reliance was placed by the Respondent on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case ofSarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio-Vascular Diseases [(2014) 2 SCC 62] and it was argued that the starting point for calculating the period limitation should be from the date of application.
JUDGMENT ANALYSIS
- In the major part of the Judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as “the Court”) has dealt with the interpretation of Section 468 of the CrPC. Specifically, the court dealt with the question that whether a court would be barred from taking cognizance of an offence after the limitation period, even if the complaint of that offence is filed well within the limitation period.
- The court deliberated on a practical scenario where a complaint had been filed well within the limitation period as per Section 468, but there was a delay on the part of the court itself to take cognizance and by the time the cognizance was taken, the limitation period to take cognizance passed. So, according to the rigid interpretation of Section 468, the court gets barred from taking cognizance even though the complaint was filed in time.
- On this point, by relying on the Constitutional Bench Judgment in the case of Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio-vascular diseases [(2014) 2 SCC 62], the Court observed that it is well-settled law that the complainant should not be put to prejudice if the Court does not take cognizance of an offence even though the complainant has done his duty by filing a complaint well within the time.
- To sum up the major part of this judgment, the Court observed that a Court would be entitled to take cognizance of an offence even after the limitation period of over if the filing of complaint or initiation of proceedings was within the period of limitation from the date of commission of an offence.
- After settling the question of interpretation of Section 468, the court moved on to the applicability of that Section to the proceedings under the DV Act. The court observed that a magistrate (under Section 12, DV Act) can pass an order after hearing both sides & taking into account the material on record.
- An offence is committed only after the breach of such an order (passed u/s 12, DV Act), as is clear from the provisions of Section 31, DV Act. So, if there is a commission of an offence by breach of an order of Magistrate, the period of limitation would start from the date of commission of such offence as per Section 468, CrPC.
- Furthermore, the court observed that there is no offence under the provisions of Section 12, DV Act unless an order has been passed pursuant to an application preferred under the said Section. So, there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the DV Act unless there is a breach of an order passed under the said section.
CONCLUSION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Madras Court was wrong in equating the filing of an application u/s 12 of the DV Act with a complaint or initiation of prosecution by the State. Furthermore, it was observed that the High Court erred in stating that an application u/s 12 of the DV Act needs to be filed within 1 year from the acts of domestic violence. So, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the view taken by the Madras High Court.
Learn the Practical Aspects of CrPC HERE
Click here to download the original copy of the judgement
