Court : Supreme Court
Brief : Section 498A in The Indian Penal Code, 1860
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 498 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 304 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860
The Estate Duty Act, 1953
Citation : U. Suvetha vs State By Inspector Of Police And Another (06.05.2009)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 938 OF 2009
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7163 of 2008)
U. Suvetha .... Appellant
Versus
State by Inspector of Police and another .... Respondents
JUDGMENT
S.B. SINHA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Whether the term "relative of husband of a woman" within the
meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code should be given an
extended meaning is the question involved herein.
3. Respondent No.2 was married to one Tutus Gunaraj on 18th May,
2005. Allegedly, he had some connection with the appellant. On coming to
know about the same the first informant asked her husband thereabout. She
was allegedly ill treated. She was left by her husband to live with her
mother-in-law at Cuddalore while he went to his place of work at
Sivagangai.
4. Allegedly dowry demands were again made, the details whereof are
not necessary to be noticed. However, we may notice that portion of the
allegations made in the first information report, which is relevant for our
purpose. It reads as under :-
"Even though properly advised my husband he has
not cut the illegal relationship with the said
Swetha. If I talk about her, my husband beat me
and tortured me. My mother-in-law also abetting
him. If my husband received the salary, he gave
the same with his aunt Thangam, then whenever
required, at that time he get the money from her
for his expenses. Even though my mother-in-law
has known very well about the illegal intimacy of
the husband with Swetha wantonly given married
me with him. The address of the said lover Swetha
is D/o. Venka Takrishnan, No.167, Majestic
Colony Valasaravakkam, Alwarthirunagar,
Chennai-50, for not paying the money and
jewellery my husband of my mother-in-law
compelled me to get divorce and tortured me. I am
tolerating all these hardships. In the deepavali of
the year 2006 my husband told me that he is going
to his native and left me with my parents' house.
2
Hence my father send/issued a legal notice to my
husband and my mother-in-law on 13.11.2006,
then even though conciliation talks made, but the
said conciliation failed on 12.1.07. My husband
filed petition for divorce. Hence I request you to
take immediate action on my complaint and get
back my dress and my TV Scooty NoTN05 C
4971. My husband and my mother-in-law
concealed the true facts and married me and
spoiled my life. Hence, I also request you to take
action against them and file a case against them
and get punished them in accordance with law.
My husband and mother-in-law tortured and ill-
treated me by demanding dowry. They have
scolded me with untoward and untolerable words
and beat me so many times and treated me very
badly. Hence, I pray to take action in accordance
with law against them and punish them. My
husband's aunt Tmt. Thangam, her son-in-law
Utha, and his concubine Swetha all are inducing
my husband and my mother-in-law to ill treat me
and tortured me. Hence I request you to take
action against those persons and punish them in
accordance in law after filing a case."
5. Inter alia on the premise that the allegation made against the appellant
in the first information report, even if it be given face value, does not
disclose an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, an
application for discharge was filed by her. The same was dismissed on 25 th
March, 2008. A revision application filed thereagaisnt has been dismissed
by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment dated 1st August,
2008.
6. In the first information report except at one place the appellant has
been described by the first informant as `girl friend' of her husband and only
at the end the word `concubine' has been used.
The core question which arises for consideration is as to whether the
`girl friend' would be a `relative of husband of a woman' in terms of Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:-
"498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation-For the purpose of this section,
"cruelty" means-
(a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security
or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her meet such demand."
7.
The aforementioned provision was inserted in the Indian Penal Code
by reason of The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No.45
of 1983). The statement of objects and reasons thereof reads as under :-
"The increasing number of Dowry Deaths is a
matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil
has been commented upon by the Joint Committee
of the Houses to examine the working of Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. Cases of cruelty by the
husband and the relatives of the husband which
culminate in suicide by, or murder of, the hapless
woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction
of the cases involving such cruelty. It is therefore
proposed to amend the Indian Penal Code, the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian
Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only
with cases of Dowry Death but also cases of
cruelty to married woman by their in laws."
8. The High Court opined that the word `paramour' and the `concubine'
stand on the same footing. In arriving at the said opinion, it agreed with the
decision of a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High in Vungarala
Yedukondalu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [ 1988 CRI. L.j. 1538 ] and
differed with the decision of the Bombay High Court, to opine :-
"The term "relative" has not been defined in Indian
Penal Code and in the absence of any such
definition, we have to go by the precedents.
Assuming that the allegations made against the
Petitioner viz., that she is the concubine of A1 is
true, then, it is to be held that there is a living
relationship between the petitioner and A1 in the
case and there are specific allegations to the fact
that only at the instigation of the revision
petitioner, A1 is harassing the second respondent
and as such this Court is of the considered view
that a charge under Section 498-A of IPC among
other offence has also been rightly framed against
the revision petitioner."
9. Ingredients of 498A of the Indian Penal Code are :-
a). The woman must be married
b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment;
and
c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown
either by husband of the woman or by the relative
of her husband."
10. Appellant herein had not been charged for abetment of a crime. Any
conspiracy amongst the accused persons has also not been alleged. A
woman in terms of the aforementioned provision must be subjected to
cruelty by her husband and/or his relative. The word `cruelty' has also been
defined in the explanation appended thereto. It is in two parts. Clause (a) of
the said explanation refers to a conduct which is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical); clause (b) provides for harassment of the
woman, where such harassment, is with a view to coercing her or any person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security.
It is not the case of the first informant that the appellant had any role
to play with regard to demand of dowry.
11. The word `cruelty" having been defined in terms of the aforesaid
explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another
woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose
of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion,
would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by the persons
specified therein. They have to be the `husband' or his `relative". Either the
husband of the woman or his relative must be subjected to her to cruelty
within the aforementioned provision.
If the appellant had not been instigating the husband of the first
informant to torture her, as has been noticed by the High Court, the husband
would be committing some offence punishable under the other provisions of
the Indian Penal Code and appellant may be held guilty for abetment of
commission of such an offence but not an offence under Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code.
12. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term `relative' must be
assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include
father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or
niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any
person. The meaning of the word `relative' would depend upon the nature
of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.
The word `relative' has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar
Advanced Law Lexicon - Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-
"Relative, "RELATIVE" includes any person
related by blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy
Act ].
The expression "REALTIVE" means a husband
wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister.
[Estate Duty Act].
"RELATIVE" means in relation to the deceased,
a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
b) the father, mother, children, uncles and
aunts of the deceased, and
c) any issue of any person falling, within either
of the preceding sub-clauses and the other
party to a marriage with any such person or
issue [Estate Duty Act].
8
A person shall be deemed to be a relative of
another if, and only if, -
a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided
family, or
b) they are husband and wife; or
c) the one is related to the other in the manner
indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act,
1956].
"RELATIVE" in relation to an individual means -
a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the
individual, or
b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or
niece of the individual, or
c) a grandson or grand-daughter of the
individual, or
d) the spouse of any person referred to in sub-
clause (b) [Income tax Act].
"REALTIVE" means -
1) spouse of the person ;
2) brother or sister of the person ;
3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person;
4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the
person;
5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the
spouse of the person;
[Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act]."
Random House Webster's Concise College Dictionary defines
`relative' at page 691 to mean :-
"Relative n. 1. a person who is connected with
another or others by blood or marriage.2.
something having, or standing in, some relation to
something else. 3. something dependent upon
external conditions for its specific nature, size, etc.
(opposed to absolute). 4. a relative pronoun,
adjective, or adverb. - adj. 5. considered in relation
to something else; comparative: the relative merits
of gas and electric heating. 6. existing or having its
specific nature only by relation to something else;
not absolute or independent: Happiness is relative.
7. having relation or connection. 8. having
reference : relevant; pertinent (usually fol. by to):
two facts relative to the case. 9. correspondent;
proportionate: 10. depending for significance upon
something else: "Better" is a relative term. 11. of
or designating a word that introduces a subordinate
clause and refers to an expressed or implied
element of the principal clause: the relative
pronoun who in "That was the woman who
called." 12. (of a musical key) having the same
key signature as another key: a relative minor."
13. Further
more, the provision is a penal one. It, thus, deserves strict
construction. Ordinarily, save and except where a contextual meaning is
required to be given to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed
strictly.
This Court in T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Bangalore, [ 2007 (8) SCALE 354 ] held as under :-
"19. It is now a well-settled principle of law that
the more is the stringent law, more strict
construction thereof would be necessary. Even
when the burden is required to be discharged by an
assessee, it would not be as heavy as the
prosecution. [See P.N. Krishna Lal and Ors. v.
Govt. of Kerala and Anr. 1995 Supp (2) SCC
187]."
[See also Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, [ 2008 (9) SCALE 681].
14. A Three Judge Bench of this Court, however, in Shivcharan Lal
Verma and another v. State of M.P., [2002 (2) Crimes 177 SC = JT (2002)
2 SC 641] while interpreting Sedction 498A of the Indian Penal Code, in a
case where the prosecution alleged that during the life of the first wife-
Kalindi, appellant therein married for the second time, Mohini, but after
marriage both Kalindi and Shiv Charan tortured Mohini as a result thereof,
she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself, opined :-.
"..One, whether the prosecution under Section
498A can at all be attracted since the marriage
with Mohini itself was null and void, the same
having been performed during the lifetime of
Kalindi. Second, whether the conviction under
Section 306 could at all be sustained in the absence
of any positive material to hold that Mohini
committed suicide because of any positive act on
the part of either Shiv Charan or Kalindi. There
may be considerable force in the argument of Mr.
Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant so far
as conviction under Section 498A is concerned,
inasmuch as the alleged marriage with Mohini
during the subsistence of valid marriage with
Kalindi is null and void. We, therefore, set aside
the conviction and sentence under Section 498A of
the IPC."
15. A Two Judge Bench of this Court, however, in Reema Aggarwal v.
Anupam, [ (2004) 3 SCC 199 ], while construing the expression 'husband'
opined that the word should not be given a restricted meaning to include
those, who had married for the second time strictly in accordance with law,
stating :-
"...If such restricted meaning is given, it would
not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it
would be against the concern shown by the
legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman
over demand of money in relation to marriages.
The first exception to Section 494 has also some
relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy
will not apply to "any person whose marriage with
such husband or wife has been declared void by a
court of competent jurisdiction". It would be
appropriate to construe the expression "husband"
to cover a person who enters into marital
relationship and under the colour of such
proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects
the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in
any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated
in the relevant provisions -- Sections 304-B/498-
A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage
itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498-A
and 304-B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and
recognized as purposive construction has to come
into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a
definition of "husband" to specifically include
such persons who contract marriages ostensibly
and cohabit with such woman, in the purported
exercise of their role and status as "husband" is no
ground to exclude them from the purview of
Section 304-B or 498-A IPC, viewed in the context
of the very object and aim of the legislations
introducing those provisions."
16. It is not necessary to go into the controversy as to whether Reena
Agarwal (supra) was correctly decided or not as we are not faced with such a
situation here. We would assume that the term `husband' would bring
within its fold a person who is said to have contracted a marriage with
another woman and subjected her to cruelty.
17. Herein, as noticed hereinbefore, relationship of the appellant with the
husband of the first informant, is said to have been existing from before the
marriage. Indisputably they lived separately. For all intent and purport the
husband was also living at a separate place. The purported torture is said to
have been inflicted by the husband upon the first informant either at her in-
law's place or at her parents' place. There is no allegation that appellant had
any role to play in that regard.
18. By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an
etymological sense would be a `relative'. The word `relative' brings within
its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or
marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one
being relative of another would not arise.
19. We may notice that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajeti Laxmi v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, [ 1 (2007) DMC 797 ], held as under :-
"4. The entire reading of the charge-sheet and
the statements of L.Ws. 1 to 7, goes to show that it
is nobody's case of the accused or the prosecution
that A-6 is the relative of husband of L.W. 1. She
is only concubine of A-1 and having illicit
intimacy with him. Therefore, in the absence of
any averment in the charge-sheet or any statement
that she is a relative of A1, I am of the opinion that
the offence under Section 498A, IPC do not attract
to A-6. Even as per the dictionary meaning
"relative" means a person connected by blood or
marriage or `a species' related to another by
common origin". Simply because A-6 is having
illicit intimacy with A-1, it cannot be said that she
is a relative of A-1. Accordingly, the Criminal
Petition is allowed quashing the proceedings in
C.C. No.233 of 2004 for the offence under Section
498-A, IPC, against the petitioner,A-6. Insofar as
the other offences are concerned, it may go on."
A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Bench at
Aurangabad, in Swapnaja v. State of Maharashtra and another, [ Criminal
Application No.388 of 2008 decided on 21.4.2008 ], opined :-
"....Even assuming that due to her extramarital
relation with husband of the respondent No.2, she
is being ill-treated or subjected to harassment by
her husband and his relatives, then also it is
difficult to say that the applicant is accountable to
answer the charge for offence punishable under
Section 498-A of the I.P.C. For, she is not related
to husband of the respondent No.2 nor can be
regarded as the person, who can fall within
explanation (a) or (b) of Section 498-A of the
I.P.C."
To the similar effect is the law laid down by the same High Court in
Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v. State of Maharasthra, [ 2007 CRI.L.J. 3866 ].
A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, however, preferred to
follow Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) in preference to Reena Aggarwal
(supra) to hold that precedentially the former is binding on the High Court,
stating :-
" Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal
Verma (supra) will clearly take precedence over
the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra). That
being the case, the arguments advanced by the
learned Counsel for the petitioners would have to
be accepted that the provisions of Section 498-A
IPC would not be attracted inasmuch as the
marriage between Mohit Gupta and Shalini was
null and void and Mohit Gupta could not be
construed as a `husband' for the purposes of
Section 498-A IPC. Clearly, therefore, the charge
under Section 498-A IPC cannot be framed and the
Metropolitan Magistrate had correctly declined to
frame any charges under Section 498-A IPC."
Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of the same High
Court in Capt. Rajinder Tiwari v. The State (NCT of Delhi), [ Criminal
Revision P. No. 872 of 2006 decided on 14.12.2006 ], stating :
"9. As already indicated above, insofar as the
charge under Section 498A IPC is concerned, that
issue is no longer open for debate. The same has
been decided by this Court in the case of Mohit
Gupta & others (supra) applying the ratio of the
Supreme Court decision in the case of Shivcharan
Lal Verma (supra). Since the marriage between
Rajidner and Meenakshi was a nullity in view of
the pendency of Rajinder's divorce proceedings
qua his first wife, the offence under Section 498A,
which is specific to "husband", would not be
maintainable, therefore, the impugned order needs
to be corrected on this ground also."
20. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that a learned Single Judge
of the Kerala High Court in John Idiculla v. State of Kerala, [ 2005 M.L.J.
(Crl.) 841 ] relying on Reema Agarwal (supra) gave a wider meaning to the
word "second wife" to hold :-
"25. The test under Section 498A IPC is whether
in the facts of each case, it is probable that a
woman is treated by friends, relatives, husband or
society as a "wife" or as a mere "mistress". If from
the pleadings and evidence the Court finds that the
woman concerned is regarded as wife and not as a
mere mistress, she can be considered to be a 'wife'
and consequently as 'the relative of the husband'
for purpose of Section 498A IPC. Proof of a legal
marriage in the rigid sense as required under civil
law is unnecessary for establishing an offence
under Section 498A IPC. The expression
"marriage" or "relative" can be given only a
diluted meaning which a common man or society
may attribute to those concepts in the common
parlance, for the purpose of Section 498A IPC. A
second wife who is treated as wife by the husband,
relatives, friends or society can be considered to be
'the relative of the husband' for the purpose of
Section 498A of IPC. If she inflicts cruelty on the
legally-wedded wife of the husband, an offence
under Section 498A IPC will not lie against her."
21. Applying the principles laid down in various decisions referred to
above, we have no doubt, in our mind, that the appellant is not a relative of
the husband of the first informant.
22. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
................................J.
[ S.B. Sinha ]
................................J.
[ R.M. Lodha ]
New Delhi
May 06, 2009
