Estoppel by representation

Estoppel by representation

In Corpus Juris Secudum Volume 31 page 283 the law with regard to an estoppel by representation has been stated in following terms:

Generally an estoppel by misrepresentation arises when and if a false representation is knowingly or negligently made by the person to another ignorant of the facts with the intention that such other Act thereon and such other does reasonably rely and Act thereon in his prejudice. Where a person will fully makes a representation intended to induce another to Act on the faith of it or where, whatever his intention, a reasonable man in the situation of that other would believe that it was meant that he should act on it, and in either case that other does not Act on it as true and alters his position, there is an estoppel in pais (sic) to conclude the former from averting against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. An estoppel arising out of an express misrepresentation being an equitable estoppel, all of the essential elements of such an estoppel, considered in Sections 66-67 (supra), must be present. Hence, for an estoppel by misrepresentation to arise there must exist a false representation by the person sought to be estoppel, made with knowledge, actual or constructive of its falsity, to the person seeking trie benefits of the estoppel, with the intent that such person Act in reliance thereon, and that he actually did reasonable rely and Act on such representation to his prejudice.

In some jurisdiction it is essential that the party to whom the representation is made must have in good faith been ignorant of the fact and have had no convenient opportunity of as certaining the fact. In this connection diligence in using means at command to learn the truth is essential except where a confidential relation exists between the parties.

A representation which is uncertain and vague cannot serve as a basis for estoppel.

In American Jurisprudence 2nd Volume 28. Section 28 at page 630 it has been stated as follows:

The proper function of equitable estoppel is the prevention of fraud, actual or constructive and the doctrine should always be so applied as to promote the ends of justice and accomplish that which ought to be done between man and man. Such an estoppel cannot arise against a party except when justice to the rights of others demands it, and when to refuse it would be inequitable. The doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously and only when equity clearly requires it to be done. Hence in determining the application of the doctrine the counter requisites of the parties are entitled to due consideration. It is available only in defence of a legal or equitable right or claim made in justice, or wrong of any character. Estoppel is to be applied against wrong doers, not against the victim of a wrong, although estoppel is never employed as a means of inflicting punishment for an unlawful or wrongful Act.

In regard to the effect of attornment Spencer Bower on Estoppel says:

"192. Where a tenant, with full knowledge of the facts, either expressly in writing, or impliedly by acts, such as the payment of rent, attorns tenant to a person other than his original landlord or one who is claiming the estate or interest of such original landlord by assignment, succession, or otherwise, he is ordinarily estopped from questioning the title of the person to whom he has so attorned. But, here too, it is open to the party sought to be estopped to explain away the attornment, and so escape the estoppel to which is would otherwise be subject, by proof that, when he so attorned, he was labouring under mistake or ignorance as to material facts affecting the title of the person to whom he attorned, particularly if such error or ignorance was due to the fraud of that person."

In 'Estoppel by Representation' by Turner, 3rd Edition in Chapter XIV of the said treatise, the learned author has considered in details the development in the branch of law of promissory estoppel and the author further says that the new estoppel does not. give rise to a permanent modification of the rights of the parties (inter se). It has further been stated that in general their original rights inter se are modified only for so long as is equitable, and the represent or may revert to the status quo, claiming on the original basis in respect of obligations falling due thereafter either by giving sufficient notice, or by restoring the representee to a relative position equivalent to that which he originally occupied. This last may be brought about by Act of the represent or may take place by the happening of some event outside the control of the parties, or by efflux of time.