Test of Real Likelihood of Bias or Reasonable Suspicion of Bias

INTRODUCTION

Bias is a peculiar phenomenon that we encounter even in our common day work. Simply put, it is the lack of neutrality. For example a teacher may be biased toward a student who happens to be his/her relative, a license grantor may be biased towards a candidate who is friend or a relative. Many a times this goes unnoticed, as in the example cited above, they are acts of bias that do not affect a substantial proportion of the general population. But, it is an altogether different case when bias makes a debut in adjudicative action.

Rule against bias is a fundamental principle often expressed in maxim ''nemo judexa in causa sua''. In absence of statutory authority, consensual agreement or the operation of necessity, no man can be a judge in his own cause. Hence, a person having a direct interest in the subject matter of an enquiry before a tribunal, if takes part in adjudication upon it, the tribunal is improperly constituted and the court will grant an order of prohibition to prevent it from adjudicating or an order of certiorari to quash a determination arrived at by it or order of injunction or of declaration as may be appropriate. A Judge is disqualified from determining any case in which he may be or may fairly be suspected to be biased.

There are many ways to discover bias. One of the most important ways is the real likelihood of bias or reasonable suspicion of bias. In this project, the test of real likelihood of bias or reasonable suspicion of bias has been dealt with in detail. Also, an attempt has been made to bring out the thin line of difference (if any) which is there between the two tests. Finally, the position of Indian courts on the topic has also been explored.

PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

Principles of natural justice which are judge-made rules and still continue to be classic example of judicial activism were developed by the courts to prevent accidents in the exercise of outsourced power of adjudication to the administrative authorities. In India, there is no statute laying down the minimum procedure which administrative agencies must follow while exercising decision making powers. There is, therefore, a bewildering variety of administrative procedure. Sometimes the statute under which the administrative agency exercises power lays down the procedure which the administrative agency must follow[1] but at times the administrative agency is left free to device its own procedure.[2] However, the courts have always insisted that the administrative agencies must follow a minimum of fair procedure. This minimum fair procedure refers to the principles of natural justice.

For some three or four hundred years Anglo-American courts have actively applied the two principles of natural justice. These two principles are – nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet i.e. no one should be made a judge in his own cause, or the rule against bias and audi alteram partem i.e. rule that nobody should be condemned unheard.

RULE AGAINST BIAS

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary states that bias is an oblique or slanting line. The meaning of the word has also developed over the last four centuries to include more relevant meanings like "predisposition towards", "prejudice" and "unfavourably inclined". Lord Thankerton in the English case of Franklin v. Minister of Town & Country Planning[3]stated that:

"I would not wish that the use of the word "bias" should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator.”

‘Bias’ may be generally defined as partiality or preference which is not founded on reason and is actuated by self-interest – whether pecuniary or personal.[4] It means an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious, in relation to a party or an issue. Such an operative prejudice may be a result of a preconceived opinion or a predisposition or a predetermination to decide the case in a particular manner, so much so that it does not leave the mind open.

Rule against bias strikes against those factors which may improperly influence a judge in arriving at a decision in any particular case. The requirement of this principle is that the judge must be impartial and must decide the case objectively on the basis of evidence on record. It is a fundamental principle often expressed in maxim nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet. In absence of statutory authority, consensual agreement or the operation of necessity, no man can be a judge in his own cause.[5] Hence, a person having a direct interest in the subject matter of an enquiry before a tribunal, if takes part in adjudication upon it, the tribunal is improperly constituted and the court will grant an order of prohibition to prevent it from adjudicating or an order of certiorari to quash a determination arrived at by it or order of injunction or of declaration as may be appropriate? A Judge is disqualified from determining any case in which he may be or may fairly be suspected to be biased.[6] So important is this rule that Coke CJ supposed that it should prevail even over an Act of Parliament; and he reported a where the Court of Chancery that the equity judge in Chester was incompetent to judge a case in which he himself was a party.[7]

The Supreme Court in Crawford Bayley & Co. v. Union of India[8] restated that the doctrine of rule against bias comes into play if it is shown that the officer concerned has a personal connection or personal interest or has personally acted in the matter concerned and/or has already taken a decision one way or the other which he may be interested in supporting. This rule of disqualification is applied not only to avoid possibility of a partial descion but also to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of the administrative adjudicatory process because not only must “no man be a judge in his own case” but also “justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”[9] A decision which is a result of bias is a nullity and the trial is “Coram non-judice.”[10] Inference of bias, therefore, can be drawn only on the basis of factual matrix and not merely on the basis of insinuations, conjectures and surmises.[11] Bias cannot be presumed, it must be proved from the facts of the case.[12]

DOCTRINE OF BIAS EXTENDED TO ADMINISTARTIVE ACTIONS

The principle of impartiality of a judge is extended even to administrative authorities that take decisions affecting rights or interests of people. The fundamental principle of xommon law that no person should be a judge in her own cause was laid down by Lord Coke in Dr.Bonham’s case.[13]it was further developed with a view to strengthening public confidence in the administration of justice and in conformity with the principle that justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. It is important to note here that disqualification on the ground of bias applies not only to quasi-judicial authorities but also to administrative authorities.[14] This was laid down in the case of A.K.Kraipak v. India[15]. However, it normally does not apply to those performing either legislative or administrative functions.

KINDS OF BIAS

(1)   PERSONAL BIAS

Personal bias arises from a certain relationship equation between the deciding authority and the parties which incline him unfavourably or otherwise on the side of one of the parties before him. Such equation may develop out of varied forms of personal or professional hostility or friendship. However, no exhaustive list is possible.[16]

(2)   PECUNIARY BIAS

Judicial approach is unanimous and decisive on the point that any financial interest,  howsoever, small it may be, would vitiate administrative action. The disqualification will not be avoided by non-participation of the biased member in the proceeding if he was present when the decision was reached.[17] However, the rule against bias will not be applied where the judge though having a financial interest, has no financial interest in the outcome of the case.[18]

(3)   SUBJECT-MATTER BIAS

Those cases fall within this category where the deciding officer is directly, or otherwise, involved in the subject matter of the case. Here again mere involvement would not vitiate the administrative action unless there is a real likelihood of bias.[19]

(4)   DEPARTMENTAL BIAS/INSTITUTIONAL BIAS

The problem of departmental bias is something which is inherent in the administrative process, and if it is not effectively checked, it may neglect the very concept of fairness in the administrative proceeding.[20] The problem of departmental bias also arises in a different context – where the functions of a judge and a prosecutor are combined in the same department. It is not uncommon to find that the same department which initiates a matter also decides it, therefore, at times, departmental fraternity and loyalty militates against the very concept of fair hearing.[21] However, where there is no such conflict between the duty and interest of the department, concept of institutional bias cannot be narrowly construed in view of compelling institutional constraints.[22]

(5)   PRECONCIEVED NOTION BIAS

Bias arising out of preconceived notions is a very delicate problem of administrative law. On one hand, no judge as a human being is expected to sit as a blank sheet of paper, on the other hand, preconceived notions would vitiate a fair trial.[23] However, the problem of bias arising from preconceived notions may have to be disposed of as an inherent limitation of the administrative process.

(6)   BIAS ON ACCOUNT OF OBSTINACY

The Supreme Court[24] has discovered a new category of bias arising out of thoroughly unreasonable obstinacy. Obstinacy implies unreasonable and unwavering persistence and the deciding officer would not take no for no answer. This new category of bias was discovered in a situation where a judge of the Calcutta High Court upheld his own judgment while sitting in an appeal against his own judgment.

TEST OF REAL LIKELIHOOD OF BIAS OR REASONABLE SUSPICION OF BIAS

Much confusion has been caused in the past by the concurrent use of two differently formulated tests for disqualifying bias. Many judges have laid down and applied the ‘real likelihood’ formula, holding that the test for disqualification is whether the facts, as assessed by the court, give rise to real likelihood of bias[25]; and this test has naturally been emphasizeed in cases where allegation of bias was far-fetched.[26] Other judges have employed a ‘reasonable suspicion’ test emphasizing that justice must be seen to be done, and that no person should adjudicate in any way if it might reasonably be thought that he ought not to act because of some personal interest.[27] In one case it was even said that the rule for judges of all kinds was that they must be free from even unreasonable suspicion of bias.

In many cases, both the tests lead to the same result, since ‘likelihood’ was given the meaning of possibility rather than probability. For if there was no real possibility of bias, no reasonable person would suspect it. But other judicial statements, more naturally, equated ‘likelihood’ with ‘probability’[28], so that the two tests became different, and courts confronted with them felt obliged to elect between them.

In order to challenge administrative action successfully on the ground of personal bias, it is essential to prove that there is a “reasonable suspicion of bias”[29] or a “real likelihood of bias”. The “reasonable suspicion” test looks mainly to outward appearance, and the “real likelihood” test focuses on court’s own evaluation of possibilities; but in practice the tests have much in common with one another and in the vast majority of cases they will lead to the same result.[30] In this area of bias, the real question is not whether a paerson was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore, what the courts see is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that the deciding officer was likely to have been biased.

THE REASONABLE SUSPICION TEST

As the name of the reasonable suspicion of bias test indicates, reasonableness plays a vital role in its application. The real question regarding this test is whether it actually exists.

This test postulates that where the statements or actions or position of an adjudicator causes necessarily a reasonable person[31], not a fool[32], nor a whimsical, capricious, or morbid person[33], to think that there is a real possibility of bias on his part for or against a party in a particular case, he is disqualified from sitting.

In the earlier days of rule against bias, the courts implicitly denied the existence of reasonable suspicion test by relating non-pecuniary interest to only the real likelihood test[34] and the peculiar substantial interest doctrine.[35]

Even at that time, however, Lord Esher M.R. stated that the law required that an adjudicator could not “reasonable be suspected of being biased”[36]; while Lopes L.J. said that the test of bias was whether there was “any reasonable – any real or substantial – ground for suspecting bias.”[37] This test secured the quashing of a conviction for illegal salmon fishing in England when the presiding justices were members of prosecuting association.[38] It was also applied on other occasions in England and Australia.[39]

This test enjoyed a major break-through in R. v. Sussex Justices ex. p. McCarthy[40]. In this case Lord Hewart C.J. laid down that “it is not merely of some importance but it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” Adding that nothing should be done which created “even a suspicion” of improper interference with justice, Lord Hewart reinforced the reasonable suspicion test.

In the three decades following this case, the test was employed in many other cases, suppressing the decisions of valuation assessment committees and justices presiding over family disputes in England, quashing the orders of magistrates making unfortunate remarks in New Zealand and Australia and avoiding arbitration awards  in Australia. Moreover, this test was otherwise recognized.

THE REAL LIKELIHOOD TEST

Ever since English justices certified that a corporation, in whose bonds their cestui qui trustees had invested, might appropriate a stream, and Blackburn J. held that non-pecuniary interest had not been proved as there was no “real likelihood” of bias[41], no one has doubted the existence of the real likelihood of bias test.

What has been queried, by Danckwerts L.J. for example, is this : “must there be a real likelihood that the tribunal was biased, or is it sufficient that a reasonable person would think that the tribunal might be biased?”[42] Those answered question are apt to throw doubt on whether a court must apply the perception of a reasonable person in determining a real likelihood of bias. Likewise, Devlin L.J. posists that “ ‘real likelihood’ depends on the impression which the courts gets from circumstances.”[43] Noticeably he speaks of the impressions of “the court”, not of the “reasonable person”, without stating what criteria the court would use in gaining its impression.

Surely, when the founding fathers of the Commonwealth Bills of Rights guaranteed to the individual the right to have his criminal charge and his civil rights or obligations determined by an “independent and impartial”[44] tribunal, they doubtless meant to secure freedom from bias as judged by the reasonable person.

Obviously the standard of a morbid person cannot be used. Nor, however, can one use that of an irrepressible optimist, never accepting that “even when Man’s passions are noble they are too often diverted from their true course.”[45]Rather one agrees with Lord Denning J.R. that a real likelihood bias exists when “a reasonable man would think it likely or probable” that an adjudicator favoured one side unfairly.[46] So, too Professor de Smith suggests that real likelihood “is based on the reasonable apprehensions [47]of a reasonable man.”

DIFFERENTIATING THE TWO TESTS

1.      ABSENCE OF DIFFERENTIATION

Three reaons may be identified for absence for differentiation. Firstly, so ling as the existence of reasonable suspicion test was denied, differentiation was unimportant. Now that this test if flourishing, thid differentiation is unavoidable. The second is the conviction that “in the great majority of cases either test will lead to the same result.”[48] And, thirdly, there is little (if any) difference between the two tests.[49] Also according to Lord Widgery C.J. no good purpose would be served by attempting a differentiation.[50]

But, on the other hand, it is inelegant to have two tests existing pari passu without an articulated differentiation. Since, there are two tests, and tow formulations of one test, there must be some real difference between them.

2.      OUTWARD APPEARANCES

Professor de Smith suggests that “reasonable suspicion tests” look mainly to outward appearances; “real likelihood tests” focus on the court’s own evaluation of the probabilities.[51] If by the “court’s own evaluation”, Professor de Smith means the judgment of the court uninfluenced by that of a reasonable man, this conflicts with his opinion that real likelihood is based on “the reasonable apprehensions of a reasonable man”.

Moreover, both the tests mainly look to the outward appearances. Lord Denning reaffirms the principle because it emphasizees that real likelihood does not consider the mind of the adjudicator”, so that even if he was as impartial as he could be, still his decision cannot stand if “right-minded persons”, if his “good friends”, perceive a real likelihood of bias.[52]

The entirety of rule against bias must be concerned with the outward appearances because it is never necessary to prove that an adjudicator has actually been biased.[53]

3.      THE DIFFERENTIATION

Difference between the two tests is a reflection of the nearness to which a given circumstance approximates to a concrete temptation to an adjudicator to deviate from the path of impartiality in order to favour unfairly a party to or an interest in a matter. Real likelihood od bias denoted the predominant probability of the risk of bias as discerned by a reasonable person; whereas a reasonable suspicion of bias, connoting a less commanding danger of bias than does a real likelihood, presents a substantial possibility of the risk of bias as perceived by a reasonable person.[54]

The courts almost invariably identify real likelihood with “probability”. But they very rarely associate reasonable suspicion with possibility. And Professor de Smith defines real likelihood in terms of both probabilities and possibilities.[55]

4.      DIFFERENTIATION IN THE INDIAN SCENARIO

In the case of S. Parthasarthi v. State of A.P.[56], it was held that the tests of real likelihood of bias and reasonable suspicion of bias are inconsistent with each other. The first test if preferable and surmise conjecture is not enough. In case where there is real likelihood of bias the ultimate decision based on the report of the Enquiry Officer will be quashed. The cumulative effect of following circumstances show bias:

(i)                  Repeated memorandums given by the authorities threatening disciplinary action.

(ii)                Overlooking claim for promotion.

(iii)               Making deduction from pay for absence which were restored by higher authorities.

(iv)              Asking him to tale charge of weeding section and not giving facilities asked for.

(v)                Sending a letter to hospital for mental diseases asking about the mentak condition of the appellant and his refusal not to advise  retrenchment on medical grounds and starting disciplinary proceedings therafter.

TEST OF REASONABLE SUSPICION OF BIAS OR REAL LIKELIHOOD OF BIAS IN THE INDIAN SCENARIO

In deciding the question of bias, the judges have to take into consideration the human possibilities and ordinary course of human conduct.[57] But there must be a real likelihood of bias and not a mere suspicion of bias before the proceedings can be quashed on the ground that the person conducting the proceedings is disqualified by bias.  In Jiwan K. Lohia v. Durga Dutt Lohia[58], upholding the decision of High Court while removing an arbitrator appointed by the court on the ground of bias, the Supreme Court observed that with regard to bias the test that has to applied is not whether in fact bias has affected the judgment but whether the litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable might have operated against him in the final decision.

Therefore, the real test of “real likelihood of bias” is whether a reasonable man, in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely or whether the authority concerned was likely to be disposed to decide the matter in a particular way.”

In the case of Ramanand Prasad Singh v. Union of India[59], the Supreme Court held that participation in the selection committee as a member where his brother was a candidate but was not selected is inconsequential bias on which the whole select list cannot be quashed. In the case of Jasvinder Singh v. State Bank of J&K[60], the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any specific allegation against the Selection Board or any member thereof, awarding of higher percentage of marks to those who got lower marks in a written examination would not vitiate selection especially when there were only a few negligible instances and there was no conscious effort to bring candidates within the selection zone. In Federation of Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India[61], the court further held that the allegation of bias on imaginary basis cannot be sustained.

In Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P.[62], it was held that the doctrine of bias is equally applicable to authorities though they are not courts of justice or judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others i.e. authorities who are empowered to discharged quasi-judicial function.

In the case of Charanjit Singh v. Harinder Sharma[63], the Court held that there is a real likelihood of bias when in a small place there is a relationship between selectees and members of selection committee. Some important cases related to this rule are:

1.      MANAK LAL v. Dr. PREM CHAND[64]

In order to decide a complaint for professional misconduct filed by Dr. Prem Chand against Manak Lal, an advocate of Rajasthan High Court, the High Court appointed a Tribunal consisting of a senior advocate, once Advocate-General of Rajasthan, as Chairman. The decision of the tribunal was challenged on the ground of personal bias arising from the fact that the Chairman had represented Dr. Prem Chand in an earlier case. The Supreme Court refused to quash the action holding that the Chairman had no personal contact with his client and did not remember that he appeared on his behalf, and that, therefore, there seemed to be no ‘real likelihood of bias’. However, high professional standards let the court to quash the action in the final analysis on the ground that justice should not be done but must appear to have been done.

2.      STATE OF U.P. v. MOHD. NOOH[65]

In this case, a Deputy S.P. was appointed to conduct a departmental enquiry against a police constable. In order to contradict the testimony of a witness, the presiding officer offered himself as a witness. The Supreme Court quashed the administrative action on the ground that when the presiding officer himself becomes a witness, there is certainly ‘a real likelihood of bias’ against the constable.

3.      A.K.KRAIPAK v. UNION OF INDIA[66]

In this case, Naquishbund, who was the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, was a member of the Selection Board and was also a candidate for selection to the all India cadre of Forest Service. Though he did not take part in the deliberations of the Board when his name was being considered and approved, the Supreme Court held that there is a real likelihood of bias, for the mere presence of candidate on the Selection Board may adversely influence the judgment of the other member.

4.      GANGA BAI CHARITIES v. CIT[67]

In this case, the lawyer while acting as a special counsel for the Income Tax Department had given his opinion that the assessee trust was not entitled to tax-exemption. Later on he was elevated as a judge of the High Court and seven years later heard and decided the seven years later, heard and decided the same point, in a reference, against the trust. None of the parties brought this aspect before the judge during the hearing. On appeal, the Supreme Court rightly held that there was no real likelihood of bias opinion had been given seven years ago and the judge may not have remembered the routine opinion given as a busy lawyer after a long lapse of time.

5.      INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS AUHTORITY v. K.D.BALI[68]

It was held that in order to constitute bias there must be reasonableness of apprehension of bias in the mind of the party. The purity of administration requires that the party to the proceedings should npt have apprehension that the authority is biased and is likely to decide against the party. But it is not every suspicion felt by the party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from a reasonable, healthy and average point of view and not a mere apprehension of a mere whimsical person. Vague suspicios of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people are not our standard to regulate our vision. It is the reasonable and apprehension of an average honest man that must be taken note of.

6.      APSRT CORPORATION v. SATYANARAYANA TRANSPORT PVT. LTD, GUNTUR[69]

A scheme containing proposals for the State to take over road transport services in the area of Guntur district form private operators was published in accordance with the provisions of Ch IV A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Objections were invited from persons who were likely to be affected by the scheme. The minister of transport gave a hearing and approved the scheme. In the Supreme Court, the petitioners, who were the proprietors of a private transport company, which was to lose its business under the scheme, contended that the minister, who heard the objections was biased against them. The minister had asked the petitioner to persuade some members of the Congress party to vote for him in the elections. The petitioner had tried to do so but had not succeeded, with the result that the minister lost the election. The Court held that this was enough to cause prejudice in the minister’s mind, and in the absence of an effective rebuttal against this allegation by the minister, the minister could not hear the parties. The order of minister was, therefore quashed, since it was vitiated by bias.

CONCLUSION

Hence, it can be concluded that every kind of preference is not sufficient to vitiate an administrative action. If the preference is rational and unaccompanied by consideration of rational interest, pecuniary or otherwise, it would not vitiate the decision. There must be a real likelihood and not a mere suspicion of bias, before the proceedings can be quashed on the ground of bias. This apprehension must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not a mere apprehension and a vague suspicion of whimsical capricious and unreasonable people. [70]

There is, according to some authors, a thin line of difference between the two tests i.e real likelihood of bias and reasonable suspicion of bias. But these tests yield the same result when applied to particular situation. So, it can be said that these two tests are same in effect. In the Indian circumstances also, the courts have no doubt applied these tests in various cases. But they have been very cautious in its application. It is judged from a reasonable man’s point of view and not from the point of view of a person who is whimsical.[71]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The articles referred to in this article are:

1.      Francis Alexis, Reasonableness in the Establishing of Bias, PUBLIC LAW

2.      Sir Hugh Wooding, Law Reform Necessary in Trinidad and Tobago 9 CAN. B.J. 292 (1966)

3.      Urias Forbes, Administartive Law in West Indies 21 I.C.L.Q. 95 (1972)

The books referred to in this article are:

1.      C.K.THAKKER, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW (1992)

2.      H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (8th ed, 2000)

3.      I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (7th ed, 2008)

4.      S.A. de SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (3rd ed., 1973)

5.      S.P.SATHE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (7th ed, 2004)

6.      WADE AND PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (9th ed, 1978)

7.    PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (6th ed., 2008)

8.    D.GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURE (1996).

The cases referred to in this article are:

1.      A.K.Kraipak v. India, AIR 1970 SC 150

2.       Allinson v. General Medical Council, [1894] 1 Q.B. 750

3.      APSRT Corporation v. Satyanarayana Transport Pvt. Ltd, Guntur, AIR 1965 SC 1303

4.      Bridgman v. Holt, (1693) Shower PC 111

5.      Charanjit Singh v. Harinder Sharma, (2002) 9 SCC 732

6.      Crawford Bayley v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 25

7.      D.C. Aggarwal v. State Bank of India, (2006) 5 SCC 153

8.      D.K.Khanna v. Union of India, AIR 1973 HP 30

9.      Eckersley v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, [1894] 2 Q.B. 667

10.  Egerton v. Lord Derby, (1613) 12 Co.Rep.114.

11.  Federation of Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 289

12.  Franklin v. Minister of Town & Country Planning, [1948] A.C. 87

13.  G.N.Nayak v. Goa University, (2002) 2 SCC 290

14.  Ganga Bai Charities v. CIT, (1992) 3 SCC 690

15.  Govindaraju v. State of T.N., (1973) 1 SCC 336

16.  Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC, AIR 1959 SC 308

17.  Hannam v. Bradford Corporation, [1970] 1 WLR 937

18.  Hari v. Dy. Commr. Of Police, AIR 1956 SC 559

19.  International Airports Authority v. K.D.Bali, (1988) 2 SCC 360

20.  Jasvinder Singh v. State Bank of J&K, (2003) 2 SCC 132

21.  Jiwan K. Lohia v. Durga Dutt Lohia, (1992) 1 SCC 56

22.  Law v. Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, [1919] 2 Ch. 276

23.  M. Sankaranarayanan v. State of Karnataka, (1993) 1 SCC 54.

24.  Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, AIR 1957 SC 425

25.  Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719

26.  Metropolitan Properties Co. (FCG) Ltd. .v Lannon, [1969] 1 QB 577

27.  Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh, AIR 1954 MP 111

28.  R v. Barnsley Licensing Justices ex p. Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association, [1960] 2 QB 167

29.  R v. Sutherland Justices, (1901) 2 KB 357

30.  R. .v. Altrincham, ex p. Pennington, [1975] 1 Q.B. 549

31.  R. v. Allan, (1864) 4 B.& S. 915

32.  R. v. Bow Street Magistrate ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [2000] 1 AC 119 (HL).

33.  R. v. Camborne Justices ex p. Pearce, [1955] 1 QB 41

34.  R. v. Cork Country Justices, [1910] 2 I.R. 271

35.  R. v. Deal Justices ex p. Curling, (1881) 45 LT 439

36.  R. v. Edwards, (1922) 1 St.R. 36

37.  R. v. Gaisford, [1892] 1 QB 381

38.  R. v. Hendon Rural Distt. Council ex p. Chorley, (1933) 2 KB 696.

39.  R. v. Henely, [1892] 1 Q.B. 504

40.  R. v. Huggins, [1895] 1 Q.B. 563

41.  R. v. Mulvihill, (1990) 1 All ER 436

42.  R. v. Rand, (1866) LR 1 QB 230

43.  R. v. Sussex Justices, ex p. McCarthy, (1924) 1 KB 256, 259

44.  R. v. Taylor, ex p. Vogwill (1898) 14 T.L.R. 185

45.  Ramanand Prasad Singh v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 64

46.  Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611

47.  Rexats Kudan v. Carty, (1933) 1 J.L.R. 99

48.  S. Parthasarthi v. State of A.P., AIR 1973 SC 2701

49.  Sharp v. Carey, (1897) 23 V.L.R, 248, F.S.C.

50.  South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union v. Kerela State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 201

51.  State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86

52.  Turner v. Allison, [1971] N.Z.L.R. 833

[1] Section 5(A), Land Acquistion Act, 1894

[2] Section 33, Indian Medical Council Act, 1956

[3] [1948] A.C. 87

[4] G.N.Nayak v. Goa University, (2002) 2 SCC 290

[5] H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 445 (8th ed, 2000)

[6] http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Rule+Against+Bias+Components+and+Tests-a01073987704 (last updated Feb 3, 2011)

[7] Egerton v. Lord Derby, (1613) 12 Co.Rep.114.In Bridgman v. Holt, (1693) Shower PC 111, a King’s bench case involving the rights of Holt CJKB, he sat with his counsel and not as judge; see at 111. See also [1974] CJL 80 (D.E.C.Yale). See R. v. Bow Street Magistrate ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [2000] 1 AC 119 (HL).

[8] (2006) 6 SCC 25

[9] R. v. Sussex Justices, ex p. McCarthy, (1924) 1 KB 256, 259

[10] Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611

[11] M. Sankaranarayanan v. State of Karnataka, (1993) 1 SCC 54. See also Crawford Bayley & Co. v. Union of India, supra note 8

[12] D.C. Aggarwal v. State Bank of India, (2006) 5 SCC 153

[13] (1610) 8 Co Rep 1142. WADE AND PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 55 (9th ed, 1978)

[14] S.P.SATHE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 (7th ed, 2004)

[15] AIR 1970 SC 150

[16] Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719. The Supreme Court held that the manager cannot conduct an enquiry against worker arising from an allegation that he had beaten the Manager. In D.K.Khanna v. Union of India, AIR 1973 HP 30, the High Court quashed the selection of he candidate where his son-in-law was a member of the Selection Committee.

[17] R. v. Hendon Rural Distt. Council ex p. Chorley, (1933) 2 KB 696.

[18] R. v. Mulvihill, (1990) 1 All ER 436. See also C.K.THAKKER, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW 174-75 (1992)

[19] R. v. Deal Justices ex p. Curling, (1881) 45 LT 439; Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh, AIR 1954 MP 111; Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC, AIR 1959 SC 308

[20] Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC, Id.

[21] Hari v. Dy. Commr. Of Police, AIR 1956 SC 559

[22] South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union v. Kerela State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 201

[23] Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, supra note 3; Govindaraju v. State of T.N., (1973) 1 SCC 336

[24] THE TRIBUNE, May 18, 1998, at 11

[25] R. v. Rand, (1866) LR 1 QB 230; R v. Sutherland Justices, (1901) 2 KB 357; Hannam v. Bradford Corporation, [1970] 1 WLR 937

[26] R. v. Camborne Justices ex p. Pearce, [1955] 1 QB 41

[27] R. v. Gaisford, [1892] 1 QB 381; Metropolitan Properties Co. (FCG) Ltd. .v Lannon, [1969] 1 QB 577

[28] R v. Barnsley Licensing Justices ex p. Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association, [1960] 2 QB 167

[29] Metropolitan Properties Co. (FCG) Ltd. .v Lannon, supra note 27

[30] I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 204 (7th ed, 2008)

[31] Contrary to Lord Esher M.R.’s suggestions in Eckersley v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, [1894] 2 Q.B. 667 that one should consider the suspicions of “not necessarily reasonable people”; criticized by Lord O’ Brien C.J. in R. v. Cork Country Justices, [1910] 2 I.R. 271 as being “loose expressions”.

[32] Unlike that which Day J. in R. v. Taylor, ex p. Vogwill (1898) 14 T.L.R. 185 proscribed : “Anything at any time  which would make fools suspect.”

[33] See R. v. Cork Country Justices, supra note 31

[34] R. v. Rand, supra note 25;  R. v. Deal Justices, supra note 19

[35] R. v. Henely, [1892] 1 Q.B. 504

[36] Allinson v. General Medical Council, [1894] 1 Q.B. 750

[37] Id.

[38] R. v. Allan, (1864) 4 B.& S. 915

[39] Law v. Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, [1919] 2 Ch. 276; R. v. Huggins, [1895] 1 Q.B. 563; Sharp v. Carey, (1897) 23 V.L.R, 248, F.S.C.

[40] supra note 9

[41] R v. Rand, supra note 25

[42] Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon, supra note 29

[43] R. v. Barnsley Licensing Justices, supra note 28

[44] Urias Forbes, Administartive Law in West Indies 21 I.C.L.Q. 95 (1972)

[45] Sir Hugh Wooding, Law Reform Necessary in Trinidad and Tobago 9 CAN. B.J. 292 (1966)

[46] Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon, supra note 29

[47] S.A. de SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 230 (3rd ed., 1973)

[48] Turner v. Allison, [1971] N.Z.L.R. 833

[49] Hannam v. Bradford Corporation, supra note 25

[50] R. .v. Altrincham, ex p. Pennington, [1975] 1 Q.B. 549

[51] S.A. de SMITH, supra note 47, at  231

[52] Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon, supra note 29

[53] R. v. Edwards, (1922) 1 St.R. 36; Rexats Kudan v. Carty, (1933) 1 J.L.R. 99

[54] Francis Alexis, Reasonableness in the Establishing of Bias, PUBLIC LAW

[55] S.A. de SMITH, supra note 47, at  230

[56] AIR 1973 SC 2701

[57] G.N.Nayak v. Goa University, supra note 4

[58] (1992) 1 SCC 56

[59] (1996) 4 SCC 64

[60] (2003) 2 SCC 132

[61] (2003) 4 SCC 289

[62] supra note 19

[63] (2002) 9 SCC 732

[64] AIR 1957 SC 425

[65] AIR 1958 SC 86

[66] supra note 15

[67] (1992) 3 SCC 690

[68] (1988) 2 SCC 360

[69] AIR 1965 SC 1303

[70] PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 419 (6th ed., 2008)

[71] D.GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURE 437-450 (1996).