Though the object of SARFAESI Act, 2002 is very good aiming at reducing ‘Non-Performing Assets” (NPA), the Constitutional Courts had to interpret the provisions of the Act dealing with many complicated issues and keeping in view the interests of the borrowers. Many issues under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 are settled now, however, the issue of eviction of Tenant using the authority or the power under Section 14 remains very significant. Many states have special laws protecting the interests of the Tenants and it has a very great object despite criticism. There need not be any written agreement or registered Lease Deed etc. for availing the protection under Tenant Protect Laws and depending upon the provisions of the law in that particular state. Even the express provisions of the Agreement or the Lease Deed can be ignored if the clauses in that particular agreement or the Deed goes against the express provisions of the Tenant Protection Laws in a particular state and the provisions of the Tenant Protection Law will prevail. In the light of the object of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the object of Tenant Protection Laws in a particular State, the issue of eviction of Tenant under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 occupies significance. There can be complications if the Bank is asked to approach the Rent Control Courts to evict the Tenant. Again, there can serious issues if the Bank is allowed to proceed against the Tenant under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 without having any regard to the Lease Agreement, Understanding or the Lease Deed. The complications with the eviction of Tenant by the Bank in the course of its action under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 are, in brief, as follows:
- If the Bank is not allowed to proceed against the Tenant under Section 14 to take physical possession of the property, then, the ‘Secured Asset’ may not fetch good value when it goes for auction. It can be detrimental to the interests of the borrowers and also can be detrimental to the interests of the Banks too in some cases. The bidders may definitely discount the risk of eviction while bidding for the property in auction. If the property is not fetching the market value, then, it may provide a right to the borrower or the owner of the property to challenge the auction too.
- If the Bank is asked to approach Rent Control Courts or Rent Control Tribunal under the special State law dealing with the protection of Tenants, then, it would be interesting to see as to the grounds available to the Bank to ask for eviction of Tenants from the ‘Secured Asset’.
- From Tenants point of view, he or she may suffer an irreparable loss due to the action of the Bank under SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Tenant may find it difficult to proceed against the owner of the property in getting the Advance amount back or in claiming the damages. There is a justification from Tenants point of view and it will be definitely difficult for the Tenant to vacate the premises immediately as against their plans. Who will compensate the Tenant in genuine cases?
- We can not also rule-out the possibility of fictitious arrangements or Agreements if the protection is provided to the Tenants and it is held that the Banks can not take physical possession of the ‘Secured Asset’ under Section 14. We know many cases pending before Rent Control Courts or Tribunal for years. In many cases, Tenants used to approach Debt Recovery Tribunal now under section 17 as soon as they come to the knowledge of SARFAESI proceedings. The DRT, in my opinion, may rule in favour of Bank in many of these cases and the Tenant is carefully been scrutinized.
There can be many complications when it comes to eviction of Tenant by the Bank while it proceeds against the ‘Secured Asset’ under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. The issue is not simple and it is complicated requiring a special law as otherwise, we would be seeing many judgments on this issue expressing different views and it will take some time to see a settled legal position in this regard. After many judgments or views, now the issues like cause of action to file an appeal under section 17, the remedy against the order of
“25. Point no.(ii): The contention of the tenant is that its right to continue to be in possession of the property in question as lessee is protected by the TN Rent Control Act. Hence, under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, only symbolic possession could be taken and not actual/physical possession. It is the further contention that the SARFAESI Act cannot extinguish the right accrued to a tenant under the provisions of the TN Rent Control Act. On the other hand, it is the contention of the bank that the SARFAESI Act has got overriding effect over the TN Rent Control Act in view of the provisions of Section 35 and therefore the rights said to have been accrued in favour of the tenant under the TN Rent Control Act cannot be enforced as against the bank while the bank invokes the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
26. The question is, therefore, as to whether the SARFAESI Act has got overriding effect over the TN Rent Control Act. Section 35 of SARFAESI Act reads as under:-
"35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws.--The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law."
27. The power to make laws by the Parliament and State Legislature flows from Article 245 of the Constitution. Article 246 of the Constitution deals with the respective subject matter of laws that could be made by the Parliament and State Legislature respectively as provided in Seventh Schedule. By virtue of the non obstante clause contained in Article 246(1) of the Constitution, Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of Seventh Schedule. By virtue of the non obstante clause contained in Article 246(2) of the Constitution, Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State shall have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III of Seventh Schedule. Likewise, by virtue of Article 246(3) of the Constitution, subject to clauses (1) and (2), the State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of Seventh Schedule. Article 254 of the Constitution is a mechanism to reconcile a law made by the Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature, in the event there is inconsistency.
28. The scope and ambit of Article 254 of the Constitution came up for consideration before the Supreme Court on various occasions. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M.Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431 had an occasion to consider the issue relating to repugnancy between the law enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislature and evolved certain principles to be applied for determining the repugnancy between those laws. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"8. It would be seen that so far as clause (1) of Article 254 is concerned, it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision between a provision of law made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List,, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means that where both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained in List I, i.e., the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e., the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circumstances:
1. Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.
2. Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.
3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List an entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.
4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.
So far as the present State Act is concerned, we are called upon to consider the various shades of the constitutional validity of the same under Article 254(2) of the Constitution."
29. Subsequently, in Government of Andhra Pradesh and another v. J.B.Educational Society and another, (2005) 3 SCC 212, in paragraph 9, after referring to M.Karunanidhi's case, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"9. Parliament has exclusive power to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I, notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3) of Article 246. The non obstante clause under Article 246(1) indicates the predominance or supremacy of the law made by the Union Legislature in the event of an overlap of the law made by Parliament with respect to a matter enumerated in List I and a law made by the State Legislature with respect to a matter enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule."
30. In Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 CTC 656, after referring to the judgment in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited, (2004) 1 SCC 201, the Supreme Court has observed as "In spite of the fields of legislation having been demarcated, the question of repugnancy between law made by Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature may arise only in cases when both the legislations occupy the same field with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and a direct conflict is seen. If there is a repugnancy due to overlapping found between List II on the one hand and List I and List III on the other, the State Law will be ultra vires and shall have to give way to the Union Law."
31. Recently in Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2010 SC 2633, after referring to the above judgments, more particularly, the judgment of the Constitution Bench in M.Karunanidhi's case, in paragraph 38, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"38. It is common ground that the State legislature does not have power to legislate upon any of the matters enumerated in the Union List. However, if it could be shown that the core area and the subject matter of the legislation is covered by an entry in the State List, then any incidental encroachment upon an entry in the Union List would not be enough so as to render the State Law invalid, and such an incidental encroachment will not make the legislation ultra vires the Constitution."
32. While dealing with an identical case, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings Private Limited v. Bangalore Development Authority and others, 2011 (1) Scale 533, in paragraph 61, has held as follows:-
"61. We are dealing with a federal Constitution and its essence is the distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the State. The Lists enumerate, elaborately, the topics on which either of the legislative constituents can enact. Despite that, some overlapping of the field of legislation may be inevitable. Article 246 lays down the principle of federal supremacy that in case of inevitable and irreconcilable conflict between the Union and the State powers, the Union power, as enumerated in List I, shall prevail over the State and the State power, as enumerated in List II, in case of overlapping between List III and II, the former shall prevail. This principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246(1) of the Constitution should normally be resorted to only when the conflict is so patent and irreconcilable that co-existence of the two laws is not feasible. Such conflict must be an actual one and not a mere seeming conflict between the Entries in the two Lists. While Entries have to be construed liberally, their irreconcilability and impossibility of co-existence should be patent. One, who questions the constitutional validity of a law as being ultra vires, takes the onus of proving the same before the Court. Doctrines of pith and substance, overlapping and incidental encroachment are, in fact, species of the same law. It is quite possible to apply these doctrines together to examine the repugnancy or otherwise of an encroachment. In a case of overlapping, the Courts have taken the view that it is advisable to ignore an encroachment which is merely incidental in order to reconcile the provisions and harmoniously implement them. If, ultimately, the provisions of both the Acts can co-exist without conflict, then it is not expected of the Courts to invalidate the law in question."
33. In yet another judgment in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011 (1) Scale 223, in paragraph 78, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"78. A self-contained code is an exception to the rule of referential legislation. The various legal concepts covering the relevant issues have been discussed by us in detail above. The schemes of the MRTP Act and the Land Acquisition Act do not admit any conflict or repugnancy in their implementation. The slight overlapping would not take the colour of repugnancy. In such cases, the doctrine of pith and substance would squarely be applicable and rigours of Article 254(1) would not be attracted...."
34. Keeping in mind the principles evolved by the Supreme Court in the above judgments, let us consider the scheme of the SARFAESI Act and the TN Rent Control Act. The SARFAESI Act is traceable to Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, whereas the TN Rent Control Act is traceable to Entry 6 of list III. Both the Acts have been enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislature respectively well within their respective competence in their respective fields. The question to be considered is as to whether there is any overlapping between the two enactments. To find out whether a particular enactment is within the legislative competence of the Parliament or State Legislature, the doctrine of pith and substance is to be applied. If the same is applied to the facts of the present case, it goes without saying that the SARFAESI Act is an Act aiming at a mechanism to recover the outstanding dues towards the banks and financial institutions by following certain procedures without the intervention of the Courts and Tribunals. Prior to the enactment of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the dues to the banks were to be recovered only by approaching the civil Courts. Having experienced the delay in civil courts and taking into account that public money is locked in the hands of unscrupulous persons which is not good for the banking sector and ultimately the economy of the country, the Central Government constituted a committee on the financial system headed by Shri M.Narasimhan to go into the issue and based on the recommendations of the said Committee, the above Act was passed thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in respect of the debts due to the banks and constituting Tribunals. Under the said Act, the banks could approach the Debts Recovery tribunal and for appeal, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act for recovery of its dues. The said Act is a complete code in itself. During the working of the said Act, it was felt that even the said Act was not effective, as the same did not achieve the desired result. Therefore, it was thought of evolving a new mechanism so that the debts due to the banks could be recovered in a speedy manner. It was under those circumstances, two committees were constituted and the said committees recommended to the Government that even the intervention of the tribunal may not be necessary and instead, the banks themselves can be given power to directly recover the debts due to the banks by following certain procedures. It was based on the said recommendations, the SARFAESI Act came into being. The Act can be treated as one of the legislative measures taken by the Government for ensuring that the dues of secured creditors including banks and financial institutions are recovered from the defaulting borrower without undergoing long drawn litigation in civil Courts. A close reading of the scheme of the SARFAESI Act would go to show that it aims at speedy recovery of the debts due to the banks and financial institutions without the intervention of either the civil court or tribunal. Certain safeguards are also provided for the debtor to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal by making application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and also to make further appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, if the debtor is aggrieved by any of the actions of the bank under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. From the scheme of the Act, beyond any controversy, the SARFAESI Act is basically procedural in nature only to recover the dues. The Act does not create any substantive right in the bank.
35. As against the above, the TN Rent Control Act was enacted by the State Legislature under Entry 6 of Concurrent List to protect the interest of the tenants. As it was felt that the provisions of the TP Act were not found to be effective to protect the interest of the tenants, the State Legislature thought it fit to bring in the legislation mainly with a view to protect the rights of the lessees. It is needless to point out that under the TP Act, a lease can be terminated without assigning any reason by simply issuing a statutory notice under Section 106 of TP Act. The TN Rent Control Act was enacted to regulate the letting of residential and non-residential buildings and control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom. For the said purpose, Rent Control Tribunals are constituted with a provision of appeal enabling the aggrieved persons to approach them. A further revision is also contemplated to the High Court. Under the TN Rent Control Act, a tenant can be evicted only on specific grounds enumerated under Section 10 of the Act. The lease cannot be terminated by the unilateral act of the landlord. Further, under the TN Rent Control Act, tenancy under an unregistered deed or even under oral agreement is protected and such tenant is also entitled to have equal rights like that of the tenant under the registered lease under Section 107 of the TP Act. The entire scheme of the Act would go to show that it is more substantive as well as procedural and the Act is a complete code in itself. This Act clearly mandates that a tenant is entitled to continue to be in possession of the building until and otherwise he is evicted as per the provisions of the Act and not otherwise.
36. Under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the secured creditor can take possession of the secured assets of the borrower. There can be no difficulty in taking such possession of the secured assets either under Section 13(4) or under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, if the secured asset is in the possession of the borrower or guarantor, as the case may be. SARFAESI Act entitles the creditor to take possession of the secured assets either by issuing possession notice under Section 13(4) or by making application to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate to take physical possession under Section 14. Though the function of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate is only ministerial, the provision of Section 14 confers drastic power to take possession even by use of force. The difficulty arises only in cases where the possession of the property is in the hands of the tenant (lessee). The SARFAESI Act does not contain any specific provision enabling the secured creditor to take possession from the hands of a tenant (lessee). On the other hand, the TN Rent Control Act contemplates that a tenant is entitled in law to continue to be in possession unless he is evicted under the provisions of the said Act. SARFAESI Act being mainly procedural and the TN Rent Control Act being exclusively dealing with the substantive right of tenants, both the Acts operate on different fields. Only in the event the SARFAESI Act contains a provision to enable the bank to take possession of a secured asset from a lessee, then only it can be held that there is conflict between the SARFAESI Act and the TN Rent Control Act in which case, the TN Rent Control Act should give way for the SARFAESI Act to have overriding effect. However, there is no such provision in the SARFAESI Act enabling the bank to take possession from the lessee, though the Act speaks of the right of the bank to take possession of the secured asset. Moreover, right from Section 13(2) till exhausting the provision of appeal, the bank deals only with the borrower/guarantor and the lessee is nowhere in the picture, as the Act does not require the bank to involve the lessee/tenant as well in the proceedings. Thus, we do not find any overlapping or inconsistency between these two Acts. When there is no such overlapping or repugnancy between these two provisions in respect of taking possession from the lessee, it has to be held that physical possession of the secured assets from the lessee/tenant can be taken only by invoking the provisions of the TN Rent Control Act.”
In these cases, the issue of registration of Lease Agreements or Deeds occupies significance and in many cases of this kind, emphasis is being laid on the issue of registration as required under Transfer of Property Act or Registration Act. Even dealing with the issue of requirement of registration of Rental Agreements or Lease Deeds in the light of protection available to the Tenants under the State Laws, the Court has observed as follows:
“44. Incidentally a question was raised as to whether an unregistered instrument can create a lease. The said question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the judgment in Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Shri Rati Ram, (1969) 1 SCWR 341, wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"The agreement was unregistered. It could not create in favour of the defendant the right of a tenant for a period of fifteen years. The agreement was on that account inadmissible in evidence to support that claim. But in support of the plea that his possession was that of a tenant the defendant was entitled to rely upon the recitals contained in that agreement of lease ... ... ... A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property, but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property."
In the event an unregistered document is sought to be relied upon for collateral purpose, namely, the purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right over immovable property, it is admissible in evidence.
45. In Anthony v. K.C.Ittoop and Sons and others, (2001) 1 M.L.J. 12, the Supreme Court found that there are three interdictions to claim that an instrument can create a valid lease in law. The first inhibition is that it should be in accordance with the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. That Section reads as under:-
"107. A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving an yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument."
The second inhibition, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, is Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, which states that where a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving an yearly rent, such document should be compulsorily registered. The third inhibition, as noted by the Supreme Court, is Section 49 of the Registration Act relating to the consequence of non-compliance of Section 17. Section 49(c) contemplates that no document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered.
46. Having regard to the above three inhibitions, the Supreme Court has held that insofar as the instrument of lease is concerned, there is no scope for holding that the appellant is a lessee by virtue of the said instrument. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, taking into consideration of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, found that an unregistered lease deed may be taken as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. The Supreme Court, in paragraph-13 of that judgment, has held as follows:-
"13. When lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property and such transfer can be made expressly or by implication, the mere fact that an unregistered instrument came into existence would not stand in the way of the court to determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise than through such deed."
The Supreme Court further went on to add that when the landlord intended to put the tenant into possession of the building and the tenant was paying monthly rent or had agreed to pay the rent in respect of the building, the legal character of the appellant's possession should be attributed as a jural relationship between the parties. With that finding, the Supreme Court held in paragraph-14 as follows:-
"14. When it is admitted by both sides that the appellant was intended into the possession of the building by the owner thereof and that the appellant was paying monthly rent or had agreed to pay rent in respect of the building, the legal character of the appellant's possession has to be attributed in a jural relationship between the parties. Such a jural relationship, on the facts situation of this case, cannot be placed anything different from that of lessor and lessee falling within the purview of the second para of Sec.107 of the TP Act extracted above. ...."
47. In the given case, the lease deed which is sought to be relied upon by the tenant in a proceeding initiated by the bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act to contend that in the wake of the provisions of Section 31(e) and it being a tenant in bona fide occupation, the bank cannot take possession of the premises in question from the tenant under the provisions of SARFAESI Act. The reliance sought to be placed by the tenant over the unregistered lease deed is only for a collateral purpose to show that the tenant was inducted into the premises right from the year 1992 and thereafter, by an unregistered lease deed, from the year 2000 it had been in possession of the premises.
48. Hence, the contention of the learned senior counsel that in view of sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, the application at the instance of an unregistered partnership firm is not maintainable against the bank cannot be accepted and the point is answered accordingly.”
Note: the views expressed are my personal and a view point only.
Author:
V.DURGA RAO,
Advocate, Madras High Court.
Email: vdrao_attorney@yahoo.co.in
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