1. Acts operate differently and tried by different designated Courts. Maintenance under Civil Laws such as S. 24 HMA, S. 18, 20 HAMA and S. 125 CrPC operates out of Family Courts jurisdiction.
2. If the query is that of S. 18 and S. 20 DV Act then it does not operate out of Family Court jurisdiction instead operates out from a Magistrate Court. Hence question of usage of S. 10 CPC does not bar a Family Court to go ahead and try out trial of above referred Civil maintenance cases in reference to question of S. 18 and S. 20 DV Act.
3. However, if the query is that of S. 18, 20 HAMA and later due to filing of S. 13 1 (ia) (ib)HMA the lady also files S. 24 HMA then S. 10 CPC gets applied in Family Courts as agitation from a defendant husband side is my view. Short reason being the matter in issue in earlier proceeding U/s 18, 20 HAMA is identically in issue in the later proceeding i.e. S. 24 HMA there can be granted stay of the former proceeding for a simple fact the later is under consideration presently at State’s HC is one view / reason.
Longer view / reason why S. 10 CPC applies squarely in instance query before us is that in my opinion, it will be more profitable to examine the requirements of S. 10, the provisions of which are really not in doubt. Under this section, the Court is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of a suit where two conditions exist, namely, (i) where there is a previously instituted suit between the same parties and (ii) where the matter directly and substantially in issue in both the suits is the same. The first of these requirements of S. 10 can present no difficulty and for determining whether the second one exists or not, the court has to direct its attention to the pleadings of both the suits and to determine what is the matter directly and substantially in issue in the two suits. Having ascertained this the Court has further to consider whether or not the matter directly and substantially in issue in both the suits is the same. The test to be applied for this purpose is not whether the cause of action or the reliefs claimed in both the suits are the same nor whether one of the issues arising in both of them is the same. The test is whether the decision of the matter directly and substantially arising in the former suit will decide not merely that suit, but will also operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit between the same parties. It will be noticed that the expression 'directly and substantially in issue', which has been employed in S. 10, is also to be found in S. 11 of the Code. While S. 10 relates to res sub judice that is a matter which is pending a judicial adjudication, S. 11 relates to res judicata that is to say a matter already adjudicated upon by a competent Court. Whereas S. 10 bars the trial of a suit in which the matter directly and substantially in issue is pending adjudication in a previous suit. S. 11 bars the trial of a suit or an issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has already been adjudicated upon in a former suit. The object of both the sections is similar, namely, to protect the parties from being vexed twice, for the trial of the same cause and to achieve the public policy that there should be an end of litigation.
Therefore, one of the objects of S. 10 is to prevent competent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from having to try parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue, and thereby to pave the way for the application of the rule of res judicata contained in the next following section. So, what the Court has really to see is if the decision of the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit will or will not lead to the decision of the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit, and if it is satisfied that it will, then it must stay the trial of the subsequent suit and await the decision in the former suit i.e. S. 24 HMA in reference to this query.
