IStridhan proceedings – Legal evidence required

PETITIONER: R. P. KAPUR

Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/03/1960

BENCH: SHAH, J.C.

BENCH: SHAH, J.C.

SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)

IMAM, SYED JAFFER

SARKAR, A.K.

GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:

1960 AIR  862                          1960 SCR  (3) 311

CITATOR INFO :

R             1975 SC 706           (16)

ACT:

Criminal Trial–Quashing of Proceedings -Inherent power of High   Court–When   to    be exercised–Code   of   Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), s. 561-A.

HEADNOTE:

1. Subsequently the High Court dismissed the  petition. K obtained special leave and appealed: Held   that  no case for quashing the proceedings  was made
2. The     following  are            some

categories  of cases where the inherent  jurisdiction  could and should be exercised to quash proceedings:

(i)  where there was a legal bar against the institution  or continuance of the proceedings;

(ii)  where the allegations in the first information  report or complaint   did not make out the offence alleged; and

(iii)where  either  there was no legal evidence adduced  in support of  the charge or the evidence adduced clearly  or manifestly failed to prove the charge.

1. In  exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A of  the        Code the  High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to  whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not . In the present

case  there  was  no legal bar to  the      institution  of     the proceedings or to their continuance; the allegations made in the  first  information report did constitute  the  offences alleged        and it could not be contended that on the  face  of the record the charge was unsustainable.

1. Govind  Bhandhu

Majumdar,  A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiar  v. K.  Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar, (1924) I.L.R. 47  Mad.    722, referred to. S.P. Jaiswal v. The State, (1953) 55 Punj.  L.R. 77, distin- guished,

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JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 217 of 1959.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September  10,      1959 of the Punjab High           Court  in  Criminal Misc. No. 559 of 1959.

Appellant in person.

1. M. Sikri,   Advocate-General for the State of  Punjab, Mohinder Singh Punnan, T. M. Sen and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
2. When the appellant found that  for several months no further action was taken on the said First Information Report which was hanging like a sword over  his  head he filed a criminal complaint on  April     1, 1959,  against Mr. Sethi under ss. 204, 211 and 385  of the Indian            Penal  Code and thus took upon himself the  onus  to
3. After hearing arguments the learned Magistrate ordered  that the appellant’s  complaint  should stand adjourned.
4. Pending the hearing of the said petition in          the
5. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave, 50 390

1. Earnest money was accordingly paid to the vendors and it was agreed that the sale had to be  completed
2. Some of the persons concerned in the said lands filed
3. That is how the title of the lands in question passed to Mrs. Kaushalya Devi. The First Information Report filed by Mr. Sethi alleges that

he  and the  appellant were friends  and  that     on  January 4,1958,     the appellant dishonestly and fraudulently  advised him-to  purchase 2,000 sq. yds. of land in Khasra  Nos. 22, 23,  24 and 25 in the aforesaid village Mohammadpur  Munirka on the representation that as owner of the land in the area Mr. Sethi would get a plot of desired dimensions in the same area  developed by the Ministry under its  housing  scheme.

The  appellant also represented to Mr. Sethi,  according  to the First Information Report, that since under the scheme no person would, be allotted more than one 391 plot he would have to surrender a part of his land; that  is why  as a friend he was prepared to give to Mr.  Sethi one plot at the price at which it had been purchased.  According to Mr. Sethi the appellant dictated an application which  he was  advised  to send to the Secretary of  the Ministry  of Works  and  he accordingly sent it as  advised. The  First

1. Sethi stated            that  he would have liked to add one clause  to  the deed to the effect that in the event of the authorities not accepting the sale for the purpose of allotment, the  amount
2. The appellant urged before the Punjab High  Court
3. The question which arises for our  decision in the present appeal is: Was the Punjab         High Court  in  error  in  refusing           to  exercise  its   inherent
4. jurisdiction  under  s.561 -A of the Code in favour  of    the appellant ?
5. It  is  well-established          that  the   inherent jurisdiction  of  the High Court can be exercised  to  quash
6. However,  we may  indicate    some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can       and
7. Cases may also arise where the a11egations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they      are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not  constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no  qu es-

tion of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter  merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information  Report to  decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or          not.

1. In cases falling under this  category  the  allegations made against the accused person do constitute an

offence alleged  but  there is   either no  legal  evidence adduced  in support of the case or evidence adduced  clearly or  manifestly fails to prove the charge.  In  dealing with this  class  of cases it is important to bear  in  mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal  evidence or  where there is evidence which is manifestly and  clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where  there

is  legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may     not support    the  accusation  in question. In  exercising         its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not  embark upon  an enquiry as to whether the evidence in       question  is

1. That is the function of the trial  magistrate,         and ordinarily it would not be open to any party  to invoke            the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and’  contend that  on  a  reasonable appreciation  of  the  evidence            the  accusation made against the accused would not be  sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 561-A in the matter of quashing

394

1. 452  of the  Code and it does appear from the judgment of  the   High Court that the learned judge elaborately considered all       the
2. It is,  however,  clear from  the  judgment  that the learned judge  was  very            much

impressed  by  the fact that the police    had  reported   that there  was no case or at the most only a  technical  offence against  Jaiswal but the district magistrate had  interfered

1. Besides, in    the opinion       of  the  learned judge the evidence  on  which   the prosecution relied showed that the essential ingredients  of
2. It  is
3. We have merely referred to the  relevant  findings recorded by

(1)  A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 184.

(2)  (1954) 56 Punjab L.R. 54.

(3)  (1924) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 722.

(4)  (1899) I.L.R. 26 Cal. 786.

(5)  A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 1018.

(6)  (1953) 55 Punjab L.R 77.

395

1. His argument,  however, is that the evidence on  record  clearly and  unambiguously  shows that the allegations made  in      the First Information Report are untrue; he also contends that ” certain powerful influences have been operating against          him with  a       view  to  harm him and    debar  him  officially     and
2. Sethi  against him”.            In this connection he has naturally placed  emphasis on  the        fact that the investigating agency has     acted   with

extraordinary  dilatoriness  in     the  matter  and  that    for several       months the police did not make the report under  s. 173 of the Code.

It  is true that though the complaint against the  appellant is  essentially    very  simple  in  its       nature   the   police authorities  did  not  make their report  for  nearly  seven

1. months after the First Information Report was   lodged.   We have already indicated how the appellant was driven to file. a complaint on his own charging Mr. Sethi with having  filed a  false First Information Report against him, and  how           the

Report  in question was filed after the appellant moved   the High

396

1. It is perhaps likely that the appellant being the senior-most  Commissioner  in the punjab  the  investigating authorities may have been cautious and circumspect in taking further      steps on the First Information Report; but  we  are
2. Even  so  it  is

difficult to see how this conduct on the part of the  police officers  can materially assist the appellant in his  prayer that  the  proceedings which have now reached  the  criminal

1. court should be quashed. We must, therefore, now proceed to consider the       appellant’s
2. 20,000  as a  result  of      the  several misrepresentations alleged in the First Information  Report.

1. Sethi any information about the pendency  of         the proceedings  before  the  Collector,  and  fraudulently         re-
2. According  to the   appellant,   if        the correspondence            on  the  record  is  considered,  and      the
3. We   are anxious not to express

397

1. We  would, however, like to emphasise that in rejecting the appellant’s prayer          for  quashing the proceedings at this stage  we   are expressing no opinion one way or the other on the merits  of the case.
2. The appellant has            come to this Court under Art. 136 of the  constitution against the decision  of the Punjab High Court; and the High  Court   has
3. Under the  circumstances  of

this case we are unable to answer this question in favour of the appellant.

Appeal dismissed.