lying on oath in HMA sec 13, 24. Any Punishment provisions?

II

its there.

DALIP SINGH Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)

check this link

https://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/tem ... 23902p.txt

III

ITEM NO.101(PH) COURT NO.11 SECTION XI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 5239 OF 2002
DALIP SINGH Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)

(With appln(s) for exemption from filing O.T.,directions and office
report )

Date: 03/12/2009 This Appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASOK KUMAR GANGULY

For Appellant(s)
Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh, Adv.
Mr. Prashante Jha, adv.
Ms. Manjula Gupta,Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. L.K. Pandey,Adv.
Mr. Pramod Swarup, Sr.Adv.
Mr. S.K. Dwivedi, Adv.
Mr. Amit Singh, adv.
Ms. Sushma Verma, Adv.
Mr. Chandra Prakash Pandey ,Adv
Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan ,Adv
Mr. K.C. Lamba, adv.
Mr. Chand Kiran, Adv.
Mr. Kartar Singh, Adv.

UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
This appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable order.


(Sukhbir Paul Kaur) (Mithlesh Gupta)
Court Master Court Master

(Signed reportable order is placed on the file)
REPORTABLE


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


CIVIL APPEAL NO.5239 OF 2002


DALIP SINGH Appellant(s)

Versus

STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)


O R D E R




1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic
values of life i.e., `Satya' (truth) and `Ahimsa' (non-violence).
Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to
ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an
integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-
independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in
the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system.
The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for
personal gain has become so intense that those involved in
litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those
who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They
shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving
their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed
of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules
and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to
pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of
justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim
or final.



2. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, this Court

adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the

appellant by making the following observations:

"It is of utmost importance that in making material
statements and setting forth grounds in applications for
special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution,
care must be taken not to make any statements which are
inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with
applications for special leave, the Court naturally
takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained
in the petitions at their face value and it would be
unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making
statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at
the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied
that the material statements made by the appellant in his
application for special leave are inaccurate and
misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that
the appellant may have obtained special leave from the
Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterizes as
misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for
special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the
conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to
the appellant ought to be revoked."



3. In Welcome Hotel and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and

others etc. AIR 1983 SC 1015, the Court held that a party which has

misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled

to be heard on the merits of the case.


4. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy and others v. Governor of

Karnataka and another AIR 1991 SC 1726, the Court denied relief to

the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made

by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section

11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by

the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the

Court observed:

"Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special
Leave Petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to
know about these orders only when the respondents appeared
in response to the notice and filed their counter
affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a
direct bearing on the question raised and the non-
disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of
material facts. On this ground alone, the Special Leave
Petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled
in law that the relief under Article 136 of the
Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who
approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank
and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and
suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be
dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave
Petitions."



5. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath

(dead) by L.Rs. and others JT 1993 (6) SC 331, the Court held that

where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important

document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown

out at any stage of the litigation.



6. In Prestige Lights Ltd. V. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC

449, it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but

is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's

jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to

place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If

there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been

placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in

refusing to entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J.

in R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 K.B. 486, and

observed:

"In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the
conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction.
If the applicant does not disclose full facts or
suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of
misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the
action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The
rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter
unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court
by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction
rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts.
If the material facts are not candidly stated or are
suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the
writ courts would become impossible."



7. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Government of A.P. and

others, AIR 2007 SC 1546, the Court held that Article 136 does not

confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on

this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other

words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular

Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. This Court only intervenes

where justice, equity and good conscience require such intervention.



8. In Sunil Poddar & Ors. v Union Bank of India (2008) 2 326,

the Court held that while exercising discretionary and equitable

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the facts and

circumstances of the case should be seen in their entirety to find

out if there is miscarriage of justice. If the appellant has not

come forward with clean hands, has not candidly disclosed all the

facts that he is aware of and he intends to delay the proceedings,

then the Court will non-suit him on the ground of contumacious

conduct.



9. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others

(2008) 12 SCC 481, the court held that the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and

discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching

the Writ Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the

facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything

and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of

relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of

misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold

without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was

reiterated in G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and

others (2009) 3 SCC 141.



10. This appeal, which is directed against order dated

21.5.2001 passed by the Allahabad High Court is illustrative of how

unscrupulous litigants can mislead the authorities entrusted with

the task of implementing the provisions of U.P. Imposition of

Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (for short, "the Act") and the

courts for retaining possession of the surplus land. The tenure-

holder Praveen Singh did not file statement in terms of Section

9(2-A) of the Act in respect of his holding as on 24.1.1971. After

about four years, the Prescribed Authority issued notice dated

29.11.1975 under Section 10(2) of the Act and called upon Shri

Praveen Singh to show cause as to why the statement prepared under

Section 10(1) of the Act may not be taken as correct and his land

may not be declared surplus accordingly. A copy of the statement

was sent to Shri Praveen Singh along with the notice in C.L.H. Form

No.4. For the sake of convenient reference, the notice is

reproduced below:

"C.L.H. FORM NO. 4

(See Rule 8)

(Form of Notice under Section 10(2) of the imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961)

To,
Name of tenure-holder Sri Praveen Singh
With parentage s/o. Shri Raghubir Singh and
Address r/o Village Tisotara, P.O. Khas, Pargana
Kirat Pur, Tehsil Najibabad, District
Bijnor.

Whereas you have failed to submit a statement/have
furnished incomplete/incorrect statement in respect of all
your holdings in the State of Uttar Pradesh including
holdings of your family members with all the required
particulars within the time mentioned in the notice in
C.L.H. Form 1, published under Section 9;

And whereas the statement of all holdings held by you
in the State on 8th June, 1973, statement showing proposed
ceiling area applicable to you and the proposed surplus
land have been prepared under sub-section (1) of Section
10, they are sent to you herewith and you are hereby
called upon to show cause within a period of 15 days from
the date of service of this notice, why the said statement
be not taken as correct.

On your failure to dispute the correctness of the
statements in any court, within the time allowed, the
aforesaid statement shall be treated as final and ceiling
area applicable to you and the surplus land shall be
determined accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court this day of
29-11-1975.

S/d-
Signature of the Prescribed Authority of the Sub-
Division Prescribed Authority
Tehsil Najibabad."

11. The notice was delivered to Shri Praveen Singh on

3.12.1975, but he neither filed any objection to the proposed

determination of his surplus land nor sought extension of time for

the said purpose. After service of notice, the Prescribed Authority

adjourned the case on 10.12.1975 and again on 19.12.1975 apparently

with the hope that the tenure-holder may file objection to the

statement prepared under Section 10(1). This is evident from the

proceeding sheets of the two dates, which are reproduced below:

Proceedings dated 10.12.1975

10.12.1965 File received after service of notice on
the tenure-holder on 3.12.1975.

It is ordered that the file be put up on
19.12.1975 after receipt of objections.

Sd/-
Prescribed Authority
Proceedings dated 19.12.1975

19.12.1975 File put up. The tenure-holder has not
filed any objection despite service.

It is ordered that the file be put up for
ex-parte orders on 27.12.1975.
Sd/-

Prescribed Authority"



12. On 27.12.1975, the Prescribed Authority noted that Shri

Praveen Singh has not filed any objection and declared that 18.22

acres of irrigated land was surplus in the hands of the tenure-

holder. After six months and twelve days, Shri Praveen Singh

submitted an application dated 8.7.1976 along with what was termed

as an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority and prayed that ex

parte order dated 27.12.1975 may be set aside and he may be given

opportunity to file objections and tender evidence. The Prescribed

Authority rejected the application on the same day i.e. 8.7.1976 by

observing that no valid ground has been made out for reconsidering

the matter after six months. The appeal preferred by Shri Praveen

Singh against the order of the Prescribed Authority was dismissed by

Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Allahabad (Appellate Authority)

in default because no one appeared on the date of hearing. The

restoration application filed by Shri Praveen Singh was dismissed on

27.8.1980. He then challenged the orders of the Prescribed

Authority and Appellate Authority in Writ Petition No. 8342/1980,

which was allowed by the High Court and the matter was remitted to

the Appellate Authority with a direction to decide the application

of Shri Praveen Singh afresh in accordance with law.



13. In compliance of the direction given by the High Court, the

Appellate Authority reconsidered the appeal of Shri Praveen Singh

but dismissed the same on the ground that the tenure-holder had not

filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for

condonation of the delay and even in the application filed for

setting aside the ex parte order, no cause was shown for the delay.

The Appellate Authority also observed that the tenure-holder had not

denied receipt of notice dated 29.11.1975 issued under Section 10(2)

of the Act, but did not file any objection till the passing of ex

parte order on 27.12.1975 and that his assertion of having come to

know of the ex parte order from Lekhpal Halqa on 7.7.1976 is not

believable. It appears that after remand of the matter by the High

Court, Shri Praveen Singh died and, therefore, his legal

representatives (including the appellant herein) were substituted in

his place.



14. The legal representatives of Shri Praveen Singh jointly filed

Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 22790/1990 and prayed for

quashing of orders dated 27.12.1975, 8.7.1976, 7.8.1990 passed by

the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively.

They also prayed for issue of a direction to the Appellate Authority

to remand the case to the Prescribed Authority for entertaining

their objections. In paragraph 3 of the writ petition, the

following statement was made:

"That the petitioner's late father, against whom the
proceedings had been initiated under Section 10(2) of
the Ceiling Act, filed application on 8.7.1976
supported by an affidavit stating therein clearly that
he was seriously ill for about ten months as such he
was not in a position to file objection, and as a
matter of fact he did not have any knowledge of the
date of the proceedings that were being conducted
before the prescribed authority. True copy of the
application dated 8.7.1976 of petitioners' late father
is annexed herewith as Annexure 2. True copy of the
affidavit filed in support of the application dated
8.7.1976 of the petitioners' father is annexed herewith
as annexure 3."

(Emphasis added)



15. By an order dated 7.9.1990, the learned Single Judge of the

Allahabad High Court stayed the operation of the orders passed by

the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. The interim

order remained operative till 21.5.2001 that is the date on which

the writ petition was finally dismissed and during the interregnum

the appellant continued to enjoy the property.



16. In the special leave petition filed against the order of the

High Court, notice was issued on 12.10.2001, but the appellants

prayer for stay was declined. Thereafter, the surplus land of the

tenure-holder was distributed among the landless persons who were

joined as parties pursuant to order dated 27.3.2006 passed in I.A.

No. 9/2004.



17. After service of notice, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed

counter in the form of an affidavit of Shri Pradip Kumar Singh,

Additional Tehsildar, District Bijnor, U.P. In his affidavit, Shri

Pradip Kumar gave details of the steps taken by the Prescribed

Authority in terms of Section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Act and made a

categorical assertion that notice issued on 29.11.1975 was duly

served upon Shri Praveen Singh on 3.12.1975. This is evident from

paragraphs 4(iv) and (v) of the counter affidavit read as under:

"(iv) That the averments of facts made in the list of
dates against date 7.7.1976 are not admitted being
incorrect. The notice in CLH Form No. 4 having been
served on the tenure-holder on 3.12.1975, it was for him
to have filed his objection. It was for the tenure-holder
to have managed his affairs. It is not for a Court or an
Authority to communicate to the tenure-holder each and
every order passed by it once service of the notice is
complete, the Act does not require that each and every
date of proceedings and the copy or information about the
final order ex parte or otherwise be served on him. The
tenure-holder avoided to file his objections since he had
none. The statement of surplus land is prepared by the
revenue authorities in accordance with the provisions of
the Act which is prepared on the basis of revenue records
of land held by a tenure-holder in his name and there is
`Presumption of correctness of the revenue record.'

(v) That the averments of fact in list of date
against date 8.7.1976 are not admitted as stated. It is
submitted that an application dated 8.7.1976 filed by the
tenure-holder did not dispute service of notice in CLH
Form No. 4 dated 29.11.1975. The application was of a
general nature. If a tenure-holder having been asked to
file objections within 15 days of the date of service of
him `chooses not to do so', would proceed to a presumption
that he has nothing to say. Section 11 o the Act provides
that where a tenure-holder chooses not to dispute and not
to file any objection to the statement prepared by the
Prescribed Authority under Section 10 of the Act within
the stipulated period, the Prescribed Authority `shall'
accordingly determine the surplus land of the tenure-
holder. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act further
provides that where an application is made by a tenure-
holder within thirty days of the date of an order under
sub-section (11) of the Act, that being a statutory duly
cast on the Prescribed Authority. In the present case the
Prescribed Authority after passing order dated 27.12.1975
fixed the next date as 27.1.1976 i.e. after 30 days and it
is only on 27.1.1976 that the Prescribed Authority sent
notification regarding publication of surplus land in
official Gazette which was so published on 5.6.1976."



18. Shri Sunil Kumar Singh, son of the appellant Dalip Singh

and grandson of late Shri Praveen Singh filed rejoinder affidavit

dated 18th February, 2002. In paragraph 3 of the rejoinder affidavit

Shri Sunil Kumar Singh made the following statement :-

"That it is denied categorically that the father of the
petitioner had ever received the notice dated
29.11.1975 along with the statement of surplus land,
prepared under section 10(1) of the Act. It is humbly
stated that father of the petitioner could not file any
show cause without going through the above referred
statement prepared under Section 10(1) of the Act."



19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized

the record. In our opinion, the appeal is liable to be dismissed

only on the ground that the tenure-holder Shri Praveen Singh did not

state correct facts in the application filed by him on 8.7.1976

before the Prescribed Authority for setting aside the ex parte order

and the appellant did not approach the High Court with clean hands

inasmuch as, by making a misleading statement in paragraph 3 of the

writ petition, an impression was created that the tenure-holder did

not know of the proceedings initiated by the Prescribed Authority.

By making the said statement, the appellant succeeded in persuading

the High Court to pass an interim order which resulted in

frustrating the efforts made by the concerned authority to

distribute the surplus land among landless persons. Even before

this Court, a patently false statement has been made in the

rejoinder affidavit on the issue of receipt of notice dated

29.11.1975 by Shri Praveen Singh.



20. A perusal of application dated 8.7.1976 submitted by Shri

Praveen Singh for setting aside ex parte order dated 27.12.1975

passed by the Prescribed Authority makes it clear that he had

pleaded his continuous illness for ten months as the cause for his

inability to file objection. In paragraph 2 of the application,

Shri Praveen Singh made a suggestive assertion that he had no

knowledge of the proceedings initiated by the Prescribed Authority

and he came to know about the case having been decided ex parte only

on 7.7.1976 when he went to Lekhpal to procure memo. There was not

even a whisper in the application that notice dated 29.11.1975

issued by the Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) of the Act

had not been served upon him and on that account he could not file

objections within 15 days. The application filed by Shri Praveen

Singh was not supported by any medical certificate or other evidence

which could prima facie establish that he was really sick for ten

months. This is the reason why the Prescribed Authority refused to

reconsider order dated 27.11.1975 and the Appellate Authority

declined to entertain his prayer for remand of the case to the

Prescribed Authority for the purpose of fresh determination of

surplus area case. Notwithstanding this, in the writ petition filed

before the High Court a misleading statement was made that due to

serious illness, Shri Praveen Singh could not file objection and, as

a matter of fact, he did not have any knowledge of the dates of

proceedings which were conducted by the Prescribed Authority. In

view of that statement, the learned Single Judge of the High Court

felt persuaded to stay the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority

and Appellate Authority which, as mentioned above, resulted in

frustration of the action to be taken by the concerned authority for

distribution of the surplus land to landless persons for a good

period of more than eleven years and enabled the heirs of Shri

Praveen Singh to retain possession of the surplus land and enjoy the

same. Before the High Court also, no evidence was produced in

support of the assertion regarding serious illness of Shri Praveen

Singh. Insofar as this Court is concerned, Shri Sunil Kumar Singh,

grandson of Shri Praveen Singh and son of the appellant, boldly made

a false statement that his grandfather did not receive notice dated

29.11.1975 along with the statement of surplus land prepared under

Section 10(1) and he could not file any show cause without going

through the statement. We are amazed at the degree of audacity with

which Shri Sunil Kumar Singh could make a patently false statement

on oath.



21. From what we have mentioned above, it is clear that in this

case efforts to mislead the authorities and the courts have

transmitted through three generations and the conduct of the

appellant and his son to mislead the High Court and this Court

cannot, but be treated as reprehensible. They belong to the

category of persons who not only attempt, but succeed in polluting

the course of justice. Therefore, we do not find any justification

to interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the

appellant's prayer for setting aside the orders passed by the

Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority.


22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We would have saddled

the appellants with exemplary costs but, keeping in view the fact

that possession of the surplus land was taken in 2002 and the same

has been distributed among landless poor persons, we refrain from

doing so.

.......................J.
[G.S.Singhvi]



.......................J.
[Asok Kumar Ganguly]
New Delhi
December 3, 2009
 

IV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3044 of 2003

RAM SARAN
Vs.
I.G. OF POLICE, CRPF & OTHERS

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARIJIT PASAYAT AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR

Dated: February 2, 2006
A person who seeks equity must come with clean hands. He, who comes to the court with false claims, cannot plead equity nor would the court be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. A person who seeks equity must act in a fair and equitable manner. Equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of a person who got the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate by playing a fraud. No sympathy and equitable consideration can come to his rescue. We are of the view that equity or compassion cannot be allowed to bend the arms of law in a case where an individual acquired a status by practising fraud."

10. Though the case related to a false caste certificate, the logic indicated clearly applies to the present case.

11. This is a case which does not deserve any leniency otherwise it would be giving premium to a person who admittedly committed forgery.

V

Karnataka High Court

Equivalent citations: AIR 1975 Kant 162, ILR 1975 KAR 1000, 1975 (1) KarLJ 506
Bench: M Sadanandaswamy

V. Narayana Bhat vs E. Subbanna Bhat on 2/12/1974

JUDGMENT

1. The appellant is the plaintiff. The suit was for recovery of damages of
Rs. 1,000 for defamation'. The defendent-respondent presented a complaint on
28-11-1964 to the Station House Officer, Puttur Police Station, imputing an
offence under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff alleged that the defamatory statements contained in the complaint
brought him disrepute and infamy in society. He alleged that Police Officers
came to his house, questioned him about the contents of the complaint and wanted
to search his house. He also alleged that he had to go with the police and
remain in the Police station till the evening and had to visit the Police
station on several occasions on account of this complaint. The defendant
admitted having lodged a complaint against the plaintiff to the police and
asserted that the plaintiff along with other persons mentioned in the complaint
petition committed acts attributed to them in the complaint. He also pleaded
that the statements made in the complaint were made in the interests of law and
order and to seek justice. The trial court held that the complaint filed by the
defendant is not false or frivolous or vexatious to the knowledge of the de-
fondant, that the plaintiff failed to show that he was defamed in any way by the
allegations in the complaint and dismissed the suit without going into the
question of quantum of damages. The lower appellate court held that the
imputations made in the complaint petition are defamatory per se. It further
held that the defendant's plea of justification by proof had not been
substantiated. But it came to the conclusion that the statements contained in
the complaint are protected by absolute privilege and that the question of
malice or want of justification does not arise. Hence, it confirmed the decision
of the trial court.

2. The complaint was enquired into by the Police and found to be false.
Thereafter, the police prosecuted the defendant for filing a false complaint and
he was convicted, but the conviction was set aside in appeal.

3. It is contended by Mr. Ganapathi Bhat, appearing for the plaintiff-
appellant, that the statements contained in the complaint filed by the defendant
to the police are not covered by absolute privilege and that the defendant could
claim only qualified privilege for the same. It is therefore urged by him that
the defendant must prove that he made the statements in good faith and that if
he succeeds in proving the same then the burden shifts on to the plaintiff to
prove malice and that the finding of the lower appellate court is erroneous. The
question for decision in this appeal is whether the defendant could claim
absolute privilege for the statements made in the complaint or only qualified
privilege for the same.

4. In Watson v. McEwan, (1905) AC 480, H.L., the question was whether
absolute privilege protected a witness against the consequences of statements
made to the client and solicitor in preparing the brief for trial. Lord Halsbury
observed as follows at page 487:

"It appears to me that the privilege which surrounds the evidence actually
given in a Court of Justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case
of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the
conduct of proceedings in Courts of justice when what is intended to be stated
in a Court of justice is narrated to them that is, to the solicitor or writer to
the Signet. If it were otherwise, I think what one of the learned counsel has
with great cogency pointed out would apply-- that from time to time in these
various efforts which have been made to make actual witnesses responsible in the
shape of an action against them for the evidence they have given, the difficulty
in the way of those who were bringing the action would have been removed at once
by saying, "I do not bring the action against you for what you said in the
witness box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor
you were about to say in the witness box". If that could be done the object for
which the privilege exists is gone, because then no witness could be called: no
one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in
debate between the parties. A witness would only have to say, "I shall not tell
you anything; I may have an action brought against me tomorrow if I do;
therefore I shall not give you any information at all." It is very obvious that
the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the
administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is
a step towards and is part of the administration of justice namely, the
preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. It may be
that to some extent it seems to impose a hardship, but after all the hardship is
not to be compared with that which would arise if it were impossible to
administer justice, because people would be afraid to give their . testimony."

In AIR 1924 All 535 (Majju v. Lachman Prasad) the Full Bench held that in the
case of a report made to a Police Officer, the question whether it is covered by
absolute privilege is governed by the English common law and since the
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged
in England, they must be held to be absolutely privileged in India following an
earlier decision of the Full Bench of the same court in ILR 40 All 341 = (AIR
1918 All 69). In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, third Edition, at page 49,
it is stated as follows:--

"89. Absolute privilege: No action lies, whether against Judges, counsel,
jury, witnesses, or parties, for words spoken in the ordinary course of any
proceedings before any court or tribunal recognised by law. It is manifest that
the administration of justice would be paralysed if those who were engaged in it
were liable to actions of libel or slander upon the imputation that they had
acted maliciously and not bona fide. Thus, all witnesses or parties speaking
with reference to the matter before the court have privilege for their evidence,
whether oral or in writing, relevant or irrelevant, malicious or not. The
privilege extends not only to words spoken but also to documents properly used
and regularly prepared for use in the proceedings......"

The last sentence in the above quotation is based on the decision in 1905 AC
480. In Salmond on Torts, fifteenth Edition, page 208, it is stated as
follows:--

"Judicial privilege.

The authorities establish beyond all question this : that neither party,
witness, counsel, jury, nor Judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally for
words spoken in office; that no action of libel or slander lies, whether against
Judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties, for words written or spoken in the
course of any proceeding before any court recognised by law, and this though the
words written or spoken maliciously without any justification or excuse, and
from personal ill-will and anger against the person defamed. This absolute
privilege has been conceded on the grounds of public policy to ensure freedom of
speech where it is essential that freedom of speech should exist, and with the
knowledge that courts of justice are presided over by those who from their high
character are not likely to abuse the privilege, and who have the power and
ought to have the will to check any abuse of it by those who appear before them.
The privilege extends to all courts, superior and inferior, civil and military.

The privilege extends not merely to Judges but witnesses, parties, and
advocates. It includes not merely statements made by a witness in court but also
statements made by him to a party, or to the party's solicitor, in the course of
preparation for trial. For it would not be of much use to grant absolute
privilege to what is said in court, if & plaintiff could say: 'I cannot sue you
for what you said in the witness-box, but I am going to sue you for what you
told your solicitor you were going to say in it.'"

Here also reliance is placed on 1905 AC 480.

5. In AIR 1926 Mad 521--(Sanjivi Reddy v. Koneri Reddi) the defendant
presented a petition to the Deputy Magistrate praying that the plaintiffs and
some others should be bound over under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Magistrate sent the petition to the Police for enquiry and
report. The police reported after enquiry that there was no foundation for the
allegations in the petition. The Magistrate thereafter dismissed the petition.
It was held that the statements made to the police officer with a view to their
being repeated before the Magistrate were absolutely privileged. It was further
held that the petition presented under Section 107, Cr. P. C. was invested under
the common law of England with absolute privilege which attaches not merely to
the actual proceedings of any tribunal exercising judicial functions but to all
preliminary steps which are in accordance with the recognized and reasonable
procedure of such a tribunal. The decision in 1905 AC 480 was followed. In AIR
1941 Mad 26 (Bapa-lal & Co. v. Krishnaswamy Iyer) it was held that a complaint
to a Police Officer being a statement which the complainant is prepared if
called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath later is absolutely orivileged
following the decision of the Division Bench in AIR 1926 Mad 521 (Sanjivi Reddy
v. Koneri Reddi). In AIR 1941 Mad 538 (Vattappa Kone v. Muthu Karuppan) the
allegations made by the defendants in their statement to the village Magistrate
were held to be absolutely privileged following the decision in AIR 1926 Mad
521. In AIR 1939 Cal 477 (Madhab Chandra v. Nirod Chandra) certain defamatory
statements were made by the defendants against the plaintiff in certain reports
to the police. The decision in 1905 AC 480 was followed. The observation by Lord
Halsbury to the effect that "the overwhelming consideration that a witness must
be protected for' a preliminary statement or he has no protection at all" was
referred to. The contention that witnesses and parties stand on a different
footing was rejected, and it was observed:

"It may be said however that when a party comes to depose on oath there can
be no distinction with regard to his liability to answer questions as between
him and any other witness, and the same must be said with regard to statement
preparatory to giving evidence on oath."

It was further observed that in a sense the statements made to the police
appear to be in this respect on a stronger ground than the statements made to
the solicitor as reported in the English case 1905 AC 480 and it was observed as
follows:--

"For statements made to a solicitor may or may not be followed up by
judicial proceeding, the matter being at the option of the party consulting such
solicitor, in which case the statements would slumber in the office of the
solicitor, as Lord Halsbury said. But the party lodging information before the
police has no option and the police are empowered to So on with the matter and
investigate, leading to other results."

The decision in AIR 1926 Mad 521 (Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddy was followed.
In (Lachhman v. Pyarchand) the defendants made a report to the Station House
Officer of the police station. In a suit filed by the plaintiff, against whom
defamatory statements had been made in the said report, it was held that the
statements were absolutely privileged. The decisions in AIR 1941 Mad 538 and AIR
1939 Cal 477 were followed, and the decision of Blagden J. in ILR (1943) 1 Cal
250 (Mayr v. Rivaz) was dissented from.

6. Mr. Ganapathi Bhat relied on the decisions in Gangappagouda v. Basayya,
AIR 1943 Bom 167; Maroti 'sada-shiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao, , and Mayr v.
Rivaz, ILR (1943) 1 Cal 250 in support of his contention that the report to the
police officer filed by the defendant is not covered by absolute privilege, but
that the defendant could only claim a qualified privilege In AIR 1943 Bom 167 a
Mahalkari holding a preliminary enquiry relating to the conduct of a police
patil, on the directions of the Collector in order to report to the Collector,
recorded the statements of the defendants. It was held that the Mahalkari was
not acting in a judicial capacity nor was exercising the attributes of a Court
and that the evidence given before the Mahalkari in such an enquiry is not
absolutely privileged. In it was held that the defamatory statement made before
the police officer in the course of investigation carried on under the Criminal
Procedure Code cannot be regarded as absolutely privileged but that only a
qualified privilege attaches to them. The learned single Judge who decided the
case observed that the Police Officer who recorded the statement cannot be
stated to have been acting in a judicial capacity or exercising the attributes
of a Court and that the statements were not absolutely privileged. The decision
in ILR (1943) 1 Cal 250 was followed and the decisions in AIR 1926 Mad 521 and
AIR 1941 Mad 26 were dissented from since the learned Single Judge felt that he
was bound by the decision of the Division Bench-- AIR 1943 Bom 167. In ILR
(1943) 1 Cal 250, the defendant wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police
containing passages admittedly defamatory to the plaintiff. The learned Single
Judge Blagden J. considered the decision of a Division Bench of the same court
in AIR 1939 Cal 477 but did not follow the same. The decision in AIR 1941 Mad 26
was also dissented from. It was held that the defendant was not protected by
absolute privilege. The learned Judge considered two illustrations to show why a
complaint to a Police Officer cannot come under the principle in 1905 AC 480 and
should not be considered as absolutely privileged. The first is a case of the
Editor of a newspaper who publishes a statement that AB is a murderer and states
therein that he would be prepared later to substantiate the statement upon oath
in a judicial proceeding which may be taken by AB. In such a case, according to
the learned Judge, if AB takes proceedings against the editor, he can plead
absolute privilege if the aforesaid principle applies. The other illustration
referred to by the learned Judge is that in case a report to the police is made
which culminates in a prosecution and the accused is acquitted, it is open to
the person charged to sue the complaint for malicious prosecution and in order
to succeed in the suit, the plaintiff would have to prove malice; but if the
charge appears to the police to be groundless and no prosecution follows, the
person against whom the allegations are made in the report to the police would
have no civil remedy at all; if those allegations are absolutely privileged; and
it would appear odd that a person who makes baseless allegations in a complaint
to the police is in a safer position than a person whose allegations to the
police may be found to be sufficiently justified to result in a prosecution
though it may prove unsuccessful.

7. The reason why absolute privilege is extended to the statement of a
witness made prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding is based on
public policy as stated by Lord Halsbury in 1905 AC 480. There is no reason why
the principle stated in the said decision should not be extended to a party and
the absolute privilege confined only to the statement of a witness under such
circumstances. Of the two instances referred to by Blagden J. in ILR (1943) 1
Cal 250 the first refers to the editor of a newspaper as stated above. But it is
doubtful whether the editor of the newspaper in such circumstances can claim
absolute privilege on the basis of the principle laid down in 1905 AC 480. With
regard to the second illustration referred to by Blagden J., if the complaint to
the police results in an unsuccessful prosecution then the person defamed can
only claim damages for malicious prosecution and not for defamation. In case the
complaint to the police does not result in a prosecution, then also the persons
defamed have no remedy in respect of defamatory statements made in such a
complaint to the police. But if a false complaint is made to the police, the
person who makes such a false complaint would be punishable either under Section
182 or Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. It cannot therefore be said that a
person against whom false charges are made in a complaint to the police, even if
no further action is taken by the police authorities on such complaint, goes
scot-free. I would, therefore, prefer to follow the earlier view of the Division
Bench of the same High Court in AIR 1939 Cal 477 and the other decisions
referred to above which take the view that a complaint to a police officer is
absolutely privileged.

8. It must therefore be held that the statements made by the defendant in his
complaint to the police officer are absolutely privileged'. This appeal is
accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs in this appeal.

9. Appeal dismissed.

A few basic questions to clarify my confusion............ over to some basics !!!   where I always lacked.       :(

In an affidavit..........

The verification/declaration section at the end...........wherein it says that "above statements are true to my belief   etc etc"  where deponent says  "I, the undersigned,....... occ: Presently Unemployed, currently residing at.............etc etc"

as well as the 'oath' section in th beginning, after the heading "affidavit" ............where in it says that "I the undersigned,....... occ: Unemployed, currently residing at............states on solemn affirmation that ....."

These are the locations where that female has lied on oath.....Also in the petition (supporting sworn affidavit) in a few paras she mentioned that "it is now very difficult for her to get the job"

Do "sworn affidavits"+pleading, be considered as "a part of evidence" or "stage of evidence"?

I believe, whole affidavit is a statement on oath, whether 'core/central part' or 'the beginning/Ending declaration part' of the Affidavit,  is an information on oath. because  anything and everything, from first word to last word, is taken as information.

Wrong Age may be taken as typing mistake unless "crucial" in the lights of facts (e.g. legal age to marry ) 

Job/Occupation...if the divorce suit has facts and allegations levelled in connection to salary etc...and int. maint is asked in  main petition also.......Is it liable to treated as "typing mistake" and not as a lie on oath!!!

Can Wife plead in court that .................... it was her ld. legal councel who made the mistake by typing wrongly !!! Not she!!!

This is horrifying.......it is happened in the past also..........

Please comment.............................. Was such act ever condoned by any hon court as a mere typing mistake and not as an offence of 'lying on oath'...when the suit is almost midway? .............In this court suit,................. there had been numorous arguments in front of hon court, between them where the wife's stand was as if she was unemployed.

It is true that.................Before the order was passed on sec 24, she did admit about her employment and did file the  Employment. Letter also....But The husband wants to use this in connection to  the impending divorce petition hearing for his addvantage as a first priority...........and not for wife's App on sec 24 (as it is already ordered and App on Sec24 is disposed off) ...

My opinion was that luckily he was let off with a 4 digit int. maint order and it was ok, in my views.....but he shuold concentrate on divorce plea hearing to get it in his favour...and save/reduce alimony .....but he is hell bent on sec 24 also ...on the merits that "she is employed and needs no maint and her lover shud maintain her credit card bills and not the husband!!".

I hope I am clarifying the whole context...

Please advise.

Declaration and verification section is part of affirmation.

IPC 1860,  Section 181. False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant

Hence Wife indeed committed perjury!!!

Sorry to take your time....................I was under the impression that...a wife would have a escape route to  make a plea of typing mistake but unfortunately ...case is watertight.....

This is a case where wives unnecessarily go with overconfidence and are ready to blame lawyer laterwards!!!!!