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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
JUDGMENT
Gyan Chand
V/s.
Smt. Rekha
S.B. CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION No.1329/09
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition Under Section 397 read with
Section 401of Criminal Procedure Code
Date of Judgment :: 10.11.2009.
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.S. CHAUHAN
Mr. Reashm Bhargava for the petitioner.
Mr. Naveen Sharma for the respondent.
The petitioner has challenged the order dated
03.07.2009 passed by the Judge, Family Court, Ajmer whereby
the learned Judge has directed that the maintenance of
Rs.1,000/- per month to be paid to the respondent.
In brief, the facts of the case are that on 15.12.2005
the petitioner and respondent were married in accordance with
the Hindu rites and customs in Ajmer. According to the petitioner,
on 30.03.2006 the respondent had left the matrimonial home
between 10 to 12 AM. He had tried to settle the problems. While
he failed to settle the problems and to bring back the respondent
wife, he had moved a petition on 04.12.2006 under Section 9 of
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the Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court Ajmer. Thereafter
the respondent had registered a criminal case against the
petitioner through FIR No.8/2007 for offence under Section 498A
and 406 IPC. The respondent wife also filed an application under
Section 12 of the Protection of Women (from Domestic Violence)
Act, 2005 before the Judicial Magistrate No.6, Ajmer. The said
application has been rejected vide order dated 19.08.2008.
Thereafter, the respondent wife moved an application under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance from the husband. The
learned trial Court after hearing the parties vide order dated
03.07.2009 granted Rs.1,000/- per month to the respondent as
maintenance. Being, aggrived from the said order, the petitioner
has preferred this petition.
Mr. Reashm Bhargava, the learned counsel for the
petitioner, has contended that prior to filing of an application
under Section 125 Cr. P.C. of the Act, the respondent had filed an
application under Section 12 read with Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 22
and 23 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act,
2004. However, the learned Judicial Magistrate No.6, Ajmer, vide
order dated 19.08.2008, had rejected her application ostensibly
on the ground that she had not been able to prove either the
cruelty committed upon her, or to prove that she had sufficient
reasons for staying away from the husband. Although, the
respondent had challenged the said order before the Special
Court (SC/ST) Prevention of Atrocities Cases, Ajmer, but vide
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order dated 08.10.2009, the said appeal was dismissed and the
order dated 19.08.2008 was confirmed. Secondly, thus, a clear
cut finding was given by the learned Court that the respondent did
not have any sufficient reasons for staying away from the
petitioner. Thirdly, this judicial finding acts as an issue estoppel in
a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. However, the learned Judge
has observed that the dismissal of the petition under Section 12
of the Domestic Violence Act would not affect the finding of the
Court in a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. According to the
learned counsel, while making such an observation, the learned
Judged has erred in not granting the benefit of Section 125(4) of
Cr.P.C to the petitioner.
On the other hand, Mr. Naveen Kumar Sharma, the
learned counsel for the respondent, has strenuously argued that
the proceedings under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act
and under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are two distinct and unrelated
proceedings. Therefore, the finding given in a petition filed under
Section 12 of the Act would have no bearing on a proceeding
initiated under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Moreover, the respondent had
also filed a case under Sections 498A and 406 IPC which is still
pending. Thirdly, the respondent had clearly stated in her
testimony before the learned Judge that she had been subjected
to cruelty by the petitioner. Thus, she had shown sufficient
reasons for staying away from the petitioner. Hence, the learned
Judge was justified in not granting the benefit of Section 125(4)
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Cr.P.C. to the petitioner. Thus, the learned counsel has supported
the impugned order.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the impugned order as well as the orders dated
19.08.2008 and 08.10.2009.
The proceedings under Section 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act and under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are similar in nature.
Both the proceedings are basically civil suit filed for seeking
maintenance from the spouse. The burden of proof in both the
cases is equally similar and the case has to be established by
preponderance of probabilities. In both the proceedings, unlike a
criminal trial, the case need not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Lastly the issues which arise before the Court are identical
namely whether the petitioner was subjected to cruelty and
whether the wife has sufficient cause to stay away from the
matrimonial home or not. Under the doctrine of issue estoppel, if
a judicial finding has been given by a Court, then the same issue
cannot be agitated before another forum. Therefore, once the
finding has been given under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence
Act, the same issue cannot be agitated between the same parties
before another forum. Keeping in mind the doctrine of issue
estoppel, the learned Judge was certainly unjustified in observing
that the finding given by the learned Judicial Magistrate, vide
order dated 19th August, 2008, would not affect the proceedings
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under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Clearly, the learned Judge has ignored
the existence of the doctrine of issue estoppel.
While considering the petition under Section 125
Cr.P.C., the Court is required to also consider if the benefit of
Sub-Cluase (4) can be given to the husband or not. Therefore,
the court perforce would be concerned with the issue whether the
wife had sufficient cause to stay away from the husband or not.
Since, there was already a finding given by the learned Judicial
Magistrate, vide order dated 19.08.2008, the said finding would
be binding in a proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Hence, the
learned Judicial Magistrate should have given the benefit of
Section 125(4) to the present petitioner.
In this view of the matter, the present petition is,
hereby, allowed and the order dated 03.07.2009 is quashed and
set aside.
[R.S.CHAUHAN]J
A.Asopa/