(A). ask ur father to appoint a good lawyer and give him this copy of judgement. the lawyer will do the needful.

(B). READ THE SC JUDGEMENT CAREFULLY WHAT IT SAYS.

Appeal is the only solution..............very patheic that she entered the house of old-folks

Originally posted by : Sumesh Nair
	I and my wife have been living together since my marriage in 2004 at my various work locations viz. Bangalore, Dharwar, Nedumangad & Hyderabad. We had very strained relationship through the period and as a result and over the request of my wife’s brother I left her at her home in Trivandrum thinking that the separation would do good to improve her attitude towards me. When I saw this was not working I filed for Divorce and for the custody of my child. Today she brought an order from the court which asked my father to let her live in his house which is in Trivandrum. My point  is that since I don’t have ownership in my father’s house as my father and my sister are the owners of that house, does my wife have rights to stay in that house? Please advise.

There is one judgement by Justice Shivnarayan Dhingra which might help you.

I tried searching for it though..

Older members please do help this guy.

Court clarifies application of Domestic Violence Act

‘Can proceed against the culprits under the relevant IPC sections'

Lower court had dismissed the plea saying it was a case of property dispute

NEW DELHI: The Delhi High Court has held that a woman cannot invoke the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act when she is not in a domestic relationship with her family members.

In case of a woman being subjected to violence when she is not in a domestic relationship with her tormentors, she has the option of proceeding against the culprits under the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code. Justice S. N. Dhingra gave this ruling while dismissing a petition by a woman against an order by a lower court here that had dismissed her claim to right of residence at her father's residence in upmarket Defence Colony.

The petitioner, Vijay Verma, is an American citizen and has been living there since 2000. When she came to India and went to her father's house to stay, her brother and his wife did not allow her to enter the premises. She alleged that they also abused her.

In response to her claim to right of residence at the house, her brother submitted that his father had bequeathed his rights and share in the property to his grandson.

Dismissing her petition, Justice Dhingra said that the petitioner could not take shelter under the Domestic Violence Act for redressal of her grievances as she had left her parental house and was living separately along with her husband in America.

“The purpose of the Act is to give remedy to aggrieved persons against domestic violence. The domestic violence can take place only when one is living in a shared household with her family members. The acts of abuse, emotional or economic, physical or s*xual, verbal or non-verbal if committed when one is living in the same household constitute domestic violence,” Justice Dhingra observed.

The lower court had dismissed her plea saying that it was a case of property dispute, not of domestic violence. She had later also filed a suit for partition of the property which is pending in the High Court.

The Court described the attempt by the petitioner to invoke the Act to settle score with her brother as nothing but a case of gross misuse of the Act.

Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel v/s Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel and others
Case No.: Appeal (Civil) 2003 Of 2008 - Bench: S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar - Date Of Judgment: 14/03/2008

Civil Appeal No 2003 OF 2008
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1061 of 2007]
With
Criminal Appeal No. 502 OF 2008
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 213 of 2007]

S.B. Sinha, J :

1.  Leave granted in both the matters.

2. These two appeals being inter related were taken up together for
hearing and are being disposed of by the common judgment.
3. Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel (Appellant in Civil Appeal is the mother in
law of Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai - respondent No.3 in Civil Appeal
and respondent No.2 in Criminal Appeal) while she alongwith her husband
are the appellants in the Criminal Appeal.  For the purpose of disposal of
these appeals, Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel is being described as Appellant No.1
while her husband Ajitbhai Revandas Patel is being described as Appellant
No.2.
4. Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai was married to Jitendra Ajitbhai Patel
(son of the appellants) on 4th May, 1992.  The couple fell apart.  In 1993 a
complaint petition was filed by the 3rd respondent against her husband andthe appellants alleging commission of an offence under Sections 406 and
114 of the Indian Penal Code.  In the said complaint the 3rd respondent
accepted that her husband had incurred huge losses in the business in United
States.  Appellants were granted bail subject to the condition that they would
not leave India without prior permission of the Court.  Allegedly on the
premise that Appellant No.2 requires medical treatment, an application for
permission was filed in October 1997 but they left India without obtaining
the same from the Court. 
5. An application was filed for cancellation of the bail which was
rejected by the Metropolitan Magistrate as also by the Sessions Judge.  The
3rd respondent filed an application before the High Court being Special
Criminal Application NO.1360 of 1997.  The said application was allowed
by the High Court by its order dated 18th November, 1997 cancelling the bail
of the appellants.   The learned Metropolitan Magistrate was directed to
issue Standing Warrant of arrest against the appellants as and when they
returned to India. 
6. On an application filed by the 3rd respondent on 24th April, 1998 the
husband of the appellant was declared an absconder and a public
proclamation was issued in terms of Section 82(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure attaching her properties if she did not present before the Learned
Magistrate within 30 days from the issuance of the said publication. There is
nothing on record to show that the said order was served on the appellants. 
It, however, is not disputed that on their failure to remain present within a
period of 30 days their properties were subjected to order of attachment
under Section 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  By an order dated 5th
January, 2004 the District Magistrate was asked by the Leaned Metropolitan
Magistrate to take further action in terms of Section 85 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure by holding a public auction of the said properties.  In the
said order it was wrongly sated that the properties belonged to the appellants
and husband of the 3rd respondent, whereas in fact Appellant No.1 alone was
the owner thereof. 
7. The 1st Respondent (tenant) and the subsequent auction purchaser
filed an application before the High Court of Gujarat which was marked as
Special Civil Application No.15377 of 2004 against the Mamlatder.  A
learned Judge of the High Court by an order dated 5th April, 2005 directed :-
       
"8. In  view  of the above, I am inclined to pass the
following order:
     
8.1) Rule.   By  interim order it is directed that the
Mamlatdar - Respondent No.1  shall  proceed  with the 
auction  of  the  premises  in  question  on 
condition that the  auction  which  may  be held               
shall be subject to the further condition that -       
i) the possession of the premises  shall  be  handed  over  by  the  Mamlatdar  to  the auction purchaser,
after  the  conclusion of the proceedings as ordered
hereinafter  by   the   ULC   Authority   against  the                     
petitioner as well as respondent No.3;
ii) after the auction, it would  be  open  to  the 
Mamlatdar  to notify the said aspect regarding  the
transfer effected by  auction in the conspicuous
part of the premises and such an intimation may 
also be   given   to   the   concerned   local                     
authority;
iii) it is further directed that the Mamlatdar - 
Respondent  No.1  herein  shall   make reference 
to  competent  Authority under  ULC Act to 
examine  the  aspects  as  to whether   the   
transaction  between  the absconder and
Respondent No.3 can be said in breach  of  the 
condition  of  Scheme under  Section  21  of the
ULC Act and he shall also make reference on the 
aspects  to  the competent authority under ULC
Act as to whether the action of the absconder  and   
subsequently    rectification by respondent No.3 to
give the possession of  the  petitioner  as tenant can
be said in breach of the conditions  of  the  Scheme
under  Section  21  on the basis of which the
premises came to be allotted  to  the                     
absconder # original allottee.  Such reference shall
be made within  a  period  of two weeks from
today and the Mamlatdar shall  request the
concerned authority to decide the reference within
a  period  of  three  months from the date of receipt
of  the reference.  In the event it is  found by  the
competent authority under ULC Act                     
that the action of absconder of  entering into
transaction with respondent No.3 and for  handing 
over  the possession  to the petitioner  as  unlawful, 
the  Mamlatdar shall be at liberty to take
possession of  the   premises   in   question  from 
the petitioner  and   thereafter   he   shall further 
be  at   liberty to hand over the vacant possession
of the premises to the auction purchaser.
iv) It is further  directed  that  until  the                       
aforesaid   reference   is  made  and  is                       
decided by the Mamlatdar, the  petitioner                       
shall  deposit  the amount at the rate of                       
Rs.1,500/= per month with  the  Mamlatdar                     
without  prejudice  to the proceedings of                       the reference and the said  amount  shall                       
remain  as  deposited with the Mamlatdar.   In the
event it is found by the competent authority under
ULC Act as an outcome  of the  reference  and  the
inquiry that the possession is unlawful of the 
petitioner and  the transaction  is unlawful of the
absconder  with   respondent   No.2,   the 
Mamlatdar  shall  be at liberty to refund the
amount.  However, in the event it  is                       
found  that  the possession is lawful and                       
there is no breach of  the  condition  of                       
allotment as per the scheme under Section                       
21 of the ULC Act, the Mamlatdar shall be                       
at  liberty  to appropriate the amount in                       
accordance with  law."
     
v) The aforesaid exercise of holding auction                       
shall be completed  within  a  period  of                       
five weeks from today.
       
9. The report of the proceedings and the outcome  of       
the reference shall also be made by the Mamlatdar to this       
Court."
8. However, the appellant and her husband were not made parties
therein.  Against the said order, an LPA, which was marked as LPA NO.
1792 of 2005, was filed by the 1st respondent and a Division Bench of the
High Court directed that the amount of rent deposited by him with the
Mamlatder be deposited in the High Court and the 3rd respondent will be
permitted to withdraw the same without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties.  The said order was passed, purported to be on the
premise, that the 3rd respondent had placed reliance on an order dated 13th
May, 2005 passed by another Bench of the High Court in First Appeal No.
2626 of 2004 whereby her husband was directed to deposit a sum of
Rs.10,000/- per month towards arrears of maintenance and to continue to
deposit the same.
9. By an order dated 25th January, 2006 the 1st respondent was asked to
deposit a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs (as he expressed his intention to purchase the
said property) apart from a sum of Rs.10,000/- per month which was to be
deposited with the Registrar by him from 10th February, 2006.  It was
furthermore directed :-
"6.2  The withdrawal of Rs.10,000/- by respondent No.
2-Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai shall be adjusted
against any amount which may be payable to her by
Jitendra Ajitbhai Patel under any orders in First Appeal
No. 2626 of 2004, in any other matrimonial proceedings or in any civil or criminal case between her, her husband
and her mother in law."
10. Appellant No.1 made an application to get herself impleaded as a
party  but her application was dismissed by the High Court on 11.9.2006. 
On or about 21st November, 2006 the High Court directed the first
respondent to pay a sum of Rs.17 lakhs to respondent No.3 in regard to the
auction sale of the property in question.  Respondent No.2, Mamlatdar, was
also directed to execute the deed of conveyance and register the same in the
name of the 1st respondent upon full payment. 
11. Appellant and her husband returned to India.  They filed an
application for cancellation of the said Standing Warrants.  By an order
dated 27th June, 2006 the said application was allowed directing :-
"Application is granted and warrant against both the
applicant accused are ordered to be cancelled with a fine
of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) each and with
condition to submit one new surety of Rs.10,000/- (Ten
thousand) and on executing the bond of such like
amount.
CONDITIONS
1. Accused shall not leave India, without prior permission of
the court.
2. Accused shall surrender his passport before the court."
12. Indisputably pursuant to the said order the Passports were deposited
on 28th June, 2006 by them. 
13. The 3rd respondent filed an application for setting aside the said order
by filing a Criminal Miscellaneous Application before the Sessions Judge,
Ahmedabad inter alia contending that the Passports had not been deposited
by the accused pursuant to the said order of 27th June, 2006.  The learned
Additional Sessions Judge set aside the said order dated 27th June, 2006 and
non-bailable warrants were directed to be issued against the appellants
herein.   Aggrieved thereby she filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 14340
of 2006 before the High Court on 13th December, 2006 which by reason by
of the impugned judgment and order dated 27th December, 2006 has been
dismissed. 
14. The questions which arise for consideration are :-
(i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
property of Appellant No.1 could have been sold in auction?
and
(ii) Whether in a case of this nature, the bail granted to the
appellants should have been directed to be cancelled?
     15. Submissions of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
are :
i) Having regard to the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956 duty to maintain a wife being on the
husband and not on her mother-in-law, the impugned judgments
are wholly unsustainable;
ii) The property of a person who is no longer absconding, cannot
be subjected to continuous attachment or sale thereof. 
iii) Appellants having surrendered their Passports and having been
attending the Court subsequently, the High Court committed a
manifest error in directing cancellation of their bail without
appreciating that the factors relevant for interfering with the
order granting bail and directing cancellation of bail are distinct
and different. 
16. Submissions of Mr. Mayur Shah, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the 3rd respondent, are  :-
i) That her husband being the only son of his parents and the
properties having been acquired through ancestral funds and there
being no assertion that the properties are self acquired properties,
she has a right of maintenance out of the Joint Family Property in
terms of Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.
ii) In terms of Section 84 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, keeping
in view the fact that her husband had been directed to pay
maintenance @ Rs.10,000/- per month and which having not been
paid, respondent No.3 could have prayed for realization of the said
amount of maintenance from the sale proceeds of the auction sale. 
iii) Even an offer was made that one residential property would be
transferred in her name, apparently goes to show that the properties
are Joint Family Properties.  She, having been denied her right of
maintenance, could initiate the proceeding before the Metropolitan
Magistrate as also before the High Court. 
iv) The Metropolitan Magistrate committed a serious error in granting
bail upon cancellation of Standing Warrants as appellants have
breached the conditions for grant of bail.  They had, although
placed a large number of documents and in particular medical
certificates to show that they were ill, there is nothing on record to
show that they were bed ridden and not permitted to move out. 
v) Their near relatives in India would be deemed to have knowledge
of the pendency of the said proceeding and in that view of he
matter neither under the guise of the medical certificates nor on the
ground of age, they deserve any sympathy of the Court. 
17. Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st
respondent (Auction Purchaser) would submit :
i) The tenant has a right to reside in the property irrespective of theorder of attachment and the same could not have been interfered
with by Mamlatdar under the orders of the Learned Metropolitan
Magistrate of the District Magistrate.
ii) The 1st respondent had deposited a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten
thousand only) each month for a period of ten months which have
been withdrawn by the 3rd respondent.  Out of the total auction
amount of Rs.17 lakhs, the 1st respondent had deposited Rs. 4 lakhs
which has been invested in a short term deposit, besides a sum of
Rs.1 lakhs.  He has also deposited a further sum of Rs.12 lakhs
which sum have, however, since been refunded.  The learned
counsel would contend that in this view of the matter the amount
deposited by him should be directed to be refunded with interest. 
18. Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai is an Advocate.  She filed a large
number of cases against her husband and in-laws.  She initially filed a
Complaint Petition before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which was registered as Case
No.1662 of 1996.  It was transferred to the Court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Baroda.  It has since been dismissed for default.  She initiated
another criminal proceeding against the appellants and their family members
under Sections 323, 452, 427, 504, 506 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code,
the same proceeding has also been dismissed as withdrawn.  Another
criminal case was initiated by her against appellant No.2, his son and
another, being Case No.47 of 1996 under Section 406, 420, 468 and 114 of
the Indian Penal Code, which is still pending.  Another case, being No.2338
of 2006 was filed by her under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. 
Another case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code being Case
No.2145 of 1993 was filed against the appellants.   
19. Before embarking on the questions of law which arise our
consideration, we may notice some statutory provisions. 
20. The matter relating to grant of maintenance are now governed by the
provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.  Sections 3 (b),
18 and 19 of the said Act read as under :-
"3. (b) "Maintenance" includes-
(i)in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence,
education and medical attendance and treatment;
Section 18 - Maintenance of wife
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu
wife, whether married before or after the commencement
of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her
husband during her life time.
Sub-section (2) of Section 18 thereof, however, lays down certain
exceptions therefor.   
Sub-section  (3) of Section 18 reads :-"(3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate
residence and maintenance from her husband if she is
unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to
another religion."
Section 19 - Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law
(1) A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be
maintained after the death of her husband by her fatherin-law:
Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain
herself out of her own earnings or other property or,
where she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain
maintenance-
(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or
mother, or
(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her
estate.
(2) Any obligation under sub-section (1) shall not be
enforceable if the father-in law has not the means to do
so from any coparcenary property in his possession out of
which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share,
and any such obligation shall cease on the re-marriage of
the daughter-in-law."
21. Maintenance of a married wife, during subsistence of marriage, is on
the husband.  It is a personal obligation.  The obligation to maintain a
daughter-in-law arises only when the husband has died.  Such an obligation
can also be met from the properties of which the husband is a co-sharer and
not otherwise.  For invoking the said provision, the husband must have a
share in the property.  The property in the name of the mother-in-law can
neither be a subject matter of attachment nor during the life time of the
husband, his personal liability to maintain his wife can be directed to be
enforced against such property.
22. Wholly un-contentious issues have been raised before us on behalf of
Sonalben (wife).  It is well settled that apparent state of affairs of state shall
be taken a real state of affairs. It is not for an owner of the property to
establish that it is his self-acquired property and the onus would be on the
one, who pleads contra.  Sonalben might be entitled to maintenance from her
husband.  An order of maintenance might have been passed but in view of
the settled legal position, the decree, if any, must be executed against her
husband and only his properties could be attached therefor but not of her
mother-in-law.
23. Sections 4 and 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act read
as under :-
"4. Overriding effect of ActSave as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any
custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately
before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have
effect with respect to any matter for which provision is
made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the
commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus
insofar as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions
contained in this Act.
28. Effect of transfer of property on right to maintenance
Where a dependant has a right to receive maintenance out
of an estate, and such estate or any part thereof is
transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be
enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice
of the right or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against
the transferee for consideration and without notice of the
right."
24. Section 4 provides for a non obstante clause.  In terms of the said
provision itself any obligation on the part of in-laws in terms of any text,
rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of law
before the commencement of the Act, are no longer valid.  In view of the
non obstante clause contained in Section 4, the provisions of the Act alone
are applicable.  Sections 18 and 19 prescribe the statutory liabilities in regard
to maintenance of wife by her husband and only on his death upon the
father-in-law,   Mother-in-law, thus, cannot be fastened with any legal
liability to maintain her daughter-in-law from her own property or otherwise. 
25. In Unnamalai Ammal  vs.  F.W. Wilson : AIR 1921 Madras 1187 the
obligation to maintain wife by a husband has been held to be a personal
obligation.  This Court in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria  vs. State of Gujarat :
(1996) 4 SCC 479 has held as under :-
"8. We have given serious thought and consideration to
the submissions made above by the learned counsel for
the appellant and notice that Dhayalal Hirachand, the
husband of Respondent 2 Smt Manjulaben, has been
found to be a person of sufficient means and income. It is
also true that there are 5 natural born sons of Respondent
2 besides 2 daughters, who are all major. It is also a fact
that Dalip one of the sons had contested the Municipal
Election and two other sons are carrying on various
businesses. According to the Law of the Land with
regard to maintenance, there is an obligation of the
husband to maintain his wife which does not arise by
reason of any contract # express or implied # but out of
jural relationship of husband and wife consequent to the
performance of marriage. Such an obligation of the
husband to maintain his wife arises irrespective of the fact whether he has or has no property, as it is considered
an imperative duty and a solemn obligation of the
husband to maintain his wife."
It was, furthermore, observed :-
"Further, according to Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions
and Maintenance Act, 1956, a Hindu is under a legal
obligation to maintain his wife, minor sons, unmarried
daughters and aged or infirm parents. The obligation to
maintain them is personal, legal and absolute in character
and arises from the very existence of the relationship
between the parties. But the question before us is whether
a stepmother can claim maintenance from the stepson
under Section 125 of the Code. In other words, whether
Section 125 of the Code includes within its fold the
stepmother also as one of the persons to claim
maintenance from her stepson."
26. We may notice that in Balwant Kaur vs. Chanan Singh : (2000) 6 SCC
310, this Court reiterated the said principle in the following words :-
"21. This provision clearly indicates that if the widowed
daughter-in-law is a destitute and has no earnings of her
own or other property and if she has nothing to fall back
upon for maintenance on the estate of her husband or
father or mother or from the estate of her son or daughter,
if any, then she can fall back upon the estate of her
father-in-law. This provision also indicates that in case of
a widowed daughter-in-law of the family if she has no
income of her own or no estate of her husband to fall
back upon for maintenance, then she can legitimately
claim maintenance from her father or mother. On the
facts of the present case, therefore, it has to be held that
Appellant 1, who was a destitute widowed daughter of
the testator and who was staying with him and was being
maintained by him in his lifetime, had nothing to fall
back upon so far as her deceased husband's estate was
concerned and she had no estate of her own.
Consequently, as per Section 19(1)( a ) she could claim
maintenance from the estate of her father even during her
father's lifetime. This was a pre-existing right of the
widowed daughter qua testator's estate in his own
lifetime and this right which was tried to be crystallised
in the Will in her favour after his demise fell squarely
within the provisions of Section 22(2) of the
Maintenance Act."
27. The Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in favour of a
wife.  She not only acquires a right to be maintained but also thereunder acquires a right of residence.  The right of residence is a higher right.  The
said right as per the legislation extends to joint properties in which the
husband has a share. 
28. Interpreting the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act this Court in 
S.R. Batra  vs.  Taruna Batra : (2007) 3 SCC 169  held that even a wife could
not claim a right of residence in the property belonging to her mother-in-law,
stating : 
"17. There is no such law in India like the British
Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the
rights which may be available under any law can only
be as against the husband and not against the father-inlaw or mother-in-law.
18. Here, the house in question belongs to the motherin-law of Smt Taruna Batra and it does not belong to
her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt Taruna Batra
cannot claim any right to live in the said house.
19. Appellant 2, the mother-in-law of Smt Taruna Batra
has stated that she had taken a loan for acquiring the
house and it is not a joint family property. We see no
reason to disbelieve this statement."
29. Reliance placed by Mr. Goel on V. Tulasamma and others vs.  Sehsa
Reddy (Dead) by L.Rrs. : [1977] 3 SCR 261 is wholly misplaced.  The
question which arose for consideration therein was the nature or the right, a
widow acquires in the property in which she had been in possession in lieu
of maintenance.  Interpreting sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act this Court held that the term "possessed" should receive a
wide meaning.  It is in this context this Court noticed the authorities from
Sastric Hindu Law whereupon our attention has been drawn :-
"Similar observations have been made by the learned
author at p. 528 of the book which may be extracted thus:
'According to both the schools, the lawfully
wedded wife acquires from the moment of her
marriage a right to the property belonging to the
husband at the time and also to any popery that
may subsequently be acquired by him. so that she
becomes a co-owner of the husband, though her
right is not co-equal to that of the husband, but a
subordinate one. owing to her disability founded
on her status of perpetual or life long tutelage or
dependence.
...
This right of the wife to maintenance from
her husband is not lost even if the husband
renounce Hinduism.
This right subsists even after the husband's
death although her husband's right as distinguished from hers may pass by survivorship or by
succession to sons or even to collaterals; these
simply step into the position of her husband, and
she is required by Hindu law to live under their
guardianship after her husband's death.'   "
30. The orders passed by the High Court which are impugned before us
are, thus, wholly unsustainable.  They suffer from total non-application of
mind.
31. The said orders might have been passed only on consideration that
Sonalben is a harassed lady, but the fact that the appellant is also a much
harassed lady was lost sight of.  She has more sinned than sinning.   
Appellant and her husband are old.  They suffer from various diseases.  They
have been able to show before the Court that they had to go to the United
States of America for obtaining medical treatment.  They, we would assume, 
have violated the conditions of grant of bail but the consequence therefore
must be kept confined to the four corners of the statutes.
32. The provisions contained in Section 82 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure were put on the statute book for certain purpose.  It was enacted
to secure the presence of the accused.  Once the said purpose is achieved, the
attachment shall be withdrawn.  Even the property which was attached,
should be restored.  The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do
not warrant sale of the property despite the fact that the absconding accused
had surrendered and obtained bail.  Once he surrenders before the Court and
the Standing Warrants cancelled, he is no longer an absconder.  The purpose
of attaching the property comes to an end.  It is to be released subject to the
provisions of the Code.  Securing the attendance of an absconding accused,
is a matter between the State and the accused.  Complainant should not
ordinarily derive any benefit therefrom.  If the property is to be sold, it vests
with the State subject to any order passed under Section 85 of the Code.  It
cannot be a subject matter of execution of a decree, far less for executing the
decree of a third party, who had no right, title or interest thereon. 
33. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate had, in his order dated 5th
January, 2004 wrongly asked the District Magistrate to put the said
properties on auction sale stating that to be belonging to the appellants and
their son.  The Mamlatdar appears to have exceeded his jurisdiction in trying
to evict the 1st respondent.  His right as a tenant could not have been affected
by reason of any order of attachment.  An order of attachment of a property
has nothing to do with the right of tenancy.  The terms and conditions of
tenancy, being governed by statute, the tenant cannot be evicted except in
accordance with law.  It is a matter of grave concern that an independent
right was also sought to be interfered with at the instance of Sonalben 
34. Right to object in terms of Section 84 of the Code to which reliance
has been placed by Mr. Mayur Shah, could not have been invoked by the
wife as she has no independent claim over the property.  The said provisions
also could not have been invoked for the purpose of execution of a decree.
35. It is in the aforementioned context  that we may now consider the
impugned judgment of the High Court directing cancellation of bail of the
appellants.  36. The fact that they have surrendered is not in dispute.  They are of old
age as also the fact that they have been suffering from various diseases has
also not been disputed. 
37. The contention of Sonalben that the passports had not been deposited,
appears to be wholly incorrect.  Ajitbhai Revandas Patel was the holder of
U.S. Passport.  The same having expired another Passport bearing No.
217921248 was issued.  It is that passport which was deposited.  This is the
current Passport.  Allegations that they are having other passports and may
leave the country appears to be wholly without any basis.  They have been
attending the courts.  The observation made by the Metropolitan Magistrate
that they had not come of their own is unfortunate.  Nobody wants to come
to court of law and that too as an accused, of his own.   
38. The High Court committed a manifest illegality in directing
cancellation of bail in so far as it failed to take into consideration that the
factors relevant for setting aside an order granting bail and directing
cancellation of bail are wholly distinct and different.  An application for
cancellation of bail must be premised on the factors envisaged under subsection (2) of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal procedure.  The learned
Metropolitan Magistrate in passing the order dated 27th June, 2006 while
granting bail took into consideration all the relevant factors.  He imposed a
fine on them.  Even the passports had been surrendered.  Application for
cancellation of bail was filed on a mis-statement that the passports had not
been surrendered.  Various contentions, as noticed hereinbefore, in regard to
purported suffering of the wife appears to have been taken into consideration
which were wholly irrelevant.  We have noticed hereinbefore that such
contentions have also been raised before us not on the basis that there exists
and legal principle behind the same but as an argument of desperation. 
39. In Gurcharan Singh and others  vs.  State (Delhi Adminsitration) :
1978 (2) SCR 358 this Court held :
"24. Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. of the new Code, on the
other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or
the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under
Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section
439(1), Cr. P.C. against granting of bail by the High
Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It
is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or
the Court of Session will be approached by an accused
only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after
the investigation has progressed throwing light on the
evidence and circumstances implicating the accused.
Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have
to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the
question of granting of bail under Section 439(1) Cr. P.C
of the new Code. The overriding considerations in
granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which
are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and
Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. of the new Code are the natureand gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is
committed; the position and the status of the accused
with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the
likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of
repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being
faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the
case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case
as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds
which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be
exhaustively set out.
25. The question of cancellation of bail under Section
439(2) Cr. P.C. of the new Code is certainly different
from admission to bail under Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. The
decisions of the various High Courts cited before us are
mainly with regard to the admission to bail by the High
Court under Section 498 Cr. P.C. (old). Power of the
High Court or of the Sessions Judge to admit persons to
bail under Section 498 Cr. P.C. (old) was always held to
be wide without any express limitations in law. In
considering the question of b ail justice to both sides
governs the judicious exercise of the Court's judicial
discretion."
[See also  Bhagirath Singh s/o. Mahipat Singh Judeja  vs.  State of
Gujarat :  [1984] 1 SCR 839 and Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal  vs.  State
of Tamilnadu : 2005 (2) SCC 13].
40. We may notice that recently a Bench of this Court considered the
consequence of issuance of warrant of arrest at some length in Inder Mohan
Goswami and another  vs.  State of Uttaranchal and others : (2007) 12
SCALE 15.  It was held :-
"26. Before parting with this appeal, we would like to
discuss an issue which is of great public importance, i.e.
how and when warrants should be issued by the Court? 
It has come to our notice that in many cases that bailable
and non-bailable warrants are issued casually and
mechanically.  In the instant case, the court without
properly comprehending the nature of controversy
involed and without exhausting the available remedies
issued non-bailable warrants.  The trial court disregard
the settled legal position clearly enumerated in the
following two cases."   
It was furthermore observed
"51. In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court
should direct serving of the summons along with the
copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding
the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable- warrant. In the third instance, when the
court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the
court's proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance
of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to.
Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution
courts at the first and second instance to refrain from
issuing non-bailable warrants."
41. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case
we are of the opinion that gross injustice has been caused to the appellant. 
She did not deserve such harsh treatments at the hands of the High Court. 
Respondent No.3 speaks of her own human rights,  forgetting the human
rights of the appellant, far less the funadamental right of life and liberty
conferred on an accused in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
42. The right of property is no longer a fundamental right.  But still it is a
constitutional right. Apart from constitutional right it is also a human right. 
The procedures laid down for deprivation thereof must be scrupulously
complied with [See-Devinder Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. :
JT 2007 (12) SC 256].
43. Last but not the least, a plea of equity has been raised by Mr. Shah
stating that this Court should issue some directions keeping in view the
equitable principles.  Reliance has been placed on Chandra Bansi Singh  vs. 
State of Bihar : (1984) 4 SCC 316, wherein it was observed :-
"16. On an analysis of the various steps taken by the
parties and others in the taking of possession, there is
undoubtedly a delay of about 1 years and for the purpose
of calculation and convenience when rounded off, the
delay may be taken to be of two years. So far as this
delay is concerned, the appellants have undoubtedly a
case for payment of some additional compensation in
equity though not under law and as this Court is not only
a Court of law but a Court of equity as well, it will be
impossible for us to deny this relief to the appellants.
After taking into consideration the various shades and
aspects of the case we are clearly of the opinion that apart
from compensation which may be awarded by the
Collector or enhanced by the Judge or a higher Court, the
appellants should get an equitable compensation in the
form of interest calculated at the rate of 7 per cent per
annum for two years on the value of land owned by each
land-owner. This equitable compensation has been
awarded in the special facts of this case and will not be
the subject-matter of appeal, if any, under the Act on the
amount of compensation. "
44. The said case arose out of a proceeding under the Land Acquisition
Act which has no relevance to the issues involved in these appeals.45. On cancellation of bail Mr. Shah has relied upon a decision of this
Court in Raghubir Singh  vs. State of Biahr: (1986) 4 SCC 481 wherein this
Court observed :-
"22. The result of our discussion and the case-law is this:
An order for release on bail made under the proviso to
Section 167(2) is not defeated by lapse of time, the filing
of the charge-sheet or by remand to custody under
Section 309(2). The order for release on bail may
however be cancelled under Section 437(5) or Section
439(2). Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail,
broadly, are, interference or attempt to interfere with the
due course of administration of justice, or evasion or
attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of the
liberty granted to him. The due administration of justice
may be interfered with by intimidating or suborning
witnesses, by interfering with investigation, by creating
or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of
justice may be evaded or attempted to be evaded by
leaving the country or going underground or otherwise
placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may
abuse the liberty granted to him by indulging in similar
or other unlawful acts. Where bail has been granted
under the proviso to Section 167(2) for the default of the
prosecution in not completing the investigation in 60
days, after the defect is cured by the filing of a chargesheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled
on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable
offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit
him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would
expect very strong grounds indeed. "
46. A bare perusal of the decision of this Court demonstrates that the ratio
laid therein runs counter to the submissions of the learned counsel.
47. Reliance has also been placed on I.J. Divakar and others  vs. Govt. of
Andhra Pradesh and another :   (1982) 3 SCC 341.    The said decision was
rendered under the Industrial Law.
Regularization was directed to be provided to the workmen.  A
Constitution Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others 
vs. Umadevi and others : (2006) 4 SCC 1 opined that all such decisions shall
stand overruled. 
Sympathy or sentiment, as is well known, should not allow the Court
to have any effect in its decision making process.   Sympathy or sentiment
can be invoked only in favour a person who is entitled thereto.  It should
never be taken into consideration as a result whereof the other side would suffer civil or evil consequences.
48. We are at a loss to understand as to on what premise such a contention
has been raised.  If we accept the contention of the learned counsel the same
would mean that we send the old couple to jail or deprive them of their
lawful right of a valuable property and/or ask them to meet obligations
which statutorily are not theirs.  Such a direction, in our opinion, should also
not be passed, keeping in view the conduct of the 3rd respondent.  She not
only filed a large number of cases against her in-laws, some of which have
been dismissed for default or withdrawn but also have been filing
applications for cancellation of their bail on wholly wrong premise.
49. We may also notice that after the arguments were over, a strange
submission was made before us.  Learned counsel for respondent No.3
submitted that he may be permitted to withdraw from the case and the 3rd
respondent be allowed to argue in person.  Such a submission was not
expected from a counsel practicing in this Court or form a party, who herself
is an Advocate.  We deprecate such practice. 
50. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this Court we are of
the opinion that the interest of justice shall be subserved if the impugned
judgments are set aside with the following directions :-
i) The property in question shall be released from attachment.
ii) The 3rd respondent shall refund the sum of Rs. 1 lakhs to the
respondent with interest @ 6% per annum.
iii) The amount of Rs. 4 lakhs deposited by the 1st respondent shall
be refunded to him immediately with interest accrued thereon.
iv) The 3rd respondent should be entitled to pursue her remedies
against her husband in accordance with law.
v) The Learned Magistrate before whom the cases filed by the 3d
respondent are pending should bestow serious consideration of
disposing of the same, as expeditiously as possible.
vi) The 3rd respondent shall bear the costs of the appellant which is
quantified at Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) consolidated.
51. The appeals are allowed with the aforesaid directions.
I.A. for direction

Dismissed.

Originally posted by : Sumesh Nair
	Yes. Can this order be given ex parte?

The main disadvantage for males in this DV act is that judge can give exparte orders without hearing your side of the story, until then ghoda he maindaan he, be prepared for the worst.

Originally posted by : s pathak 8558042052
	THE ORDER IS INTERIM OR FINAL

its interim order man

Originally posted by : Sumesh Nair
	My father recieved the notice for the same after she had already entered the house with the court order with the aid of police constables. My father was never heard before passing of judgement wheras the interim order says that both parties were heard.

I faced same situation five years ago, she took help of dv act made false allegations and court passed exparte order to enter inlaws house with help of protection through police.

But as I stay seperately from my parents house, my parents put counter argument citing justice shivnarayan dhingra's judgement.

All that was five or six years back.

Now I too am waiting for final judgement.