REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1182 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (Crl. ) No. 6715 OF 2006)
Ponnam Chandraiah ...
Appellant
Versus
State of A.P. ...Respondent
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1183 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6792 OF 2006)
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellants question correctness of the judgment
rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court.
3. Sixteen persons including the appellants faced trial for
alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections
147,148, 448 read with Sections 149, 302 read with Section
149 and Section 324 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') Learned III Additional
Sessions judge, Karimnagar for each one of them guilty. In
appeal, High Court upheld the conviction of A1, A3, A7 to A9,
A12 and A13 and sentence of imprisonment for life as
imposed by the trial court. Rest of the accused persons were
acquitted. The present appeals are by A7 to A9 and A 13.
4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
PW-1 is the wife,. PW-2 is the father, PW-3 is the mother,
PW-4 is the brother and PW-5 is the sister-in-law of the
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deceased. The accused, deceased and the material witnesses
are residents of Neerukulla village. The deceased purchased
an Auto and was plying in between Sulthanabad and
Neerukulla. On 02-07-2003 at about 9-00 PM, the deceased
returned to his house from Sulthanabad and informed PWs.l
to 3 that when he requested A-1 and A-2 to travel in his Auto
as per the serial number, they refused to travel in his Auto
and beat him. On 03-07-2003 morning, PW-1 and the
deceased went to the house of the Sarpanch and raised a
dispute. 'The Sarpanch called A-1-and informed about the
incident. A-1 admitted his guilt in the presence of PWs.9 and
10. On the same day at about 6-00 PM, A-1 to A-16 came to
the house of the deceased and attacked him. A-1 beat the
deceased with a stick. The deceased ran into the house and
bolted the door. In the meanwhile, when PW-2 intervened to
rescue the deceased, A-1 beat him with a stick. A-3 broke the
doors and all the accused entered the house and beat the
deceased. Some of the accused were armed with iron rods and
axes. They beat the deceased indiscriminately. Then the
deceased ran out from the house. The accused chased and
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beat him indiscriminately. Finally, the deceased fell down at
the Gram panchayat office on receipt of the injuries. Later, the
deceased was taken in an Auto to the Government Hospital,
Sulthanabad. On the advise of the Doctor, they went to the
Police Station and gave Ex P-1 report. On the basis of Ex.P-1,
the police registered a crime for the offences under Sections
147, 148, 448, 307, 327 read with 149 of I.P.C. Thereafter, the
deceased and PW-2, who received injuries, were referred to the
Government Hospital, Karimnagar. The deceased, while
undergoing treatment, succumbed to the injuries. After the
death of the deceased, the Sections of law were altered in the
crime through the alteration memo. The Inspector of Police
took up investigation, prepared the rough sketch, observed
the scene of offence, held inquest over the dead body of the
deceased, seized M.Os.1 and 2 and later sent the dead body
for postmortem examination. The accused were arrested and
weapons were recovered. After completion of the investigation,
the police laid the charge sheet. The accused denied the
charges and claimed for trial.
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The prosecution, in order to prove the guilt of the
accused, examined PWs.1 to 22 and marked Exs.P-.1 to P-39.
On behalf of the defence, no oral evidence was adduced, but
Ex.D-1, a portion of Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of PW-3
was marked.
5. High Court by a common judgment disposed of four
appeals numbered as Criminal Appeal Nos. 1114, 1128, 1130
and 1155 of 2005.
6. In support of the appeals learned counsel for the accused
persons submitted that the conviction is based primarily on
the evidence of witnesses who were related to the deceased.
Further the accusations even if accepted in toto do not make
out a case relatable to Section 302 IPC.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent State on the other
hand supported the judgments of the Courts below.
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8. In regard to the interestedness of the witnesses for
furthering the prosecution version, relationship is not a factor
to affect the credibility of a witness. It is more often than not
that a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be
laid if a plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the
court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to
find out whether it is cogent and credible.
9. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab (AIR
1953 SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-
"A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from
sources which are likely to be tainted and that
usually means unless the witness has cause,
such as enmity against the accused, to wish
to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close
relation would be the last to screen the real
culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person. It is true, when feelings run high and
there is personal cause for enmity, that there
is a tendency to drag in an innocent person
against whom a witness has a grudge along
with the guilty, but foundation must be laid
for such a criticism and the mere fact of
relationship far from being a foundation is
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often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we
are not attempting any sweeping
generalization. Each case must be judged on
its own facts. Our observations are only made
to combat what is so often put forward in
cases before us as a general rule of prudence.
There is no such general rule. Each case must
be limited to and be governed by its own
facts."
10. The above decision has since been followed in Guli
Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in
which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)
was also relied upon.
11. We may also observe that the ground that the witness
being a close relative and consequently being a partisan
witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This
theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh's
case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the
impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of
the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses.
Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:
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"We are unable to agree with the learned
Judges of the High Court that the testimony of
the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration.
If the foundation for such an observation is
based on the fact that the witnesses are
women and that the fate of seven men hangs
on their testimony, we know of no such rule.
If it is grounded on the reason that they are
closely related to the deceased we are unable
to concur. This is a fallacy common to many
criminal cases and one which another Bench
of this Court endeavoured to dispel in -
`Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan' (AIR 1952
SC 54 at p.59). We find, however, that it
unfortunately still persists, if not in the
judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the
arguments of counsel."
12. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P. (AIR 1965
SC 202) this Court observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):
"But it would, we think, be unreasonable
to contend that evidence given by witnesses
should be discarded only on the ground that it
is evidence of partisan or interested
witnesses.......The mechanical rejection of
such evidence on the sole ground that it is
partisan would invariably lead to failure of
justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid
down as to how much evidence should be
appreciated. Judicial approach has to be
cautious in dealing with such evidence; but
the plea that such evidence should be rejected
because it is partisan cannot be accepted as
correct."
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13. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) and Lehna v. State of
Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76). Stress was laid by the accused-
appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by
some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out
entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the
principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one
thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even
if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case
residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused,
notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused
persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of
Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be
separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict
an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been
found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons.
Falsity of particular material witness or material particular
would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim
"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India
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and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim
"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general
acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of
rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts
to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and
not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves
the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in
a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called
`a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Ali v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 366).
14. The above position was elaborately discussed in Sucha
Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab (2003 (6) JT SC 348), and
Israr v. State of U.P. (2005 (9) SCC 616)
15. In S. Sudershan Reddy v. State of A.P. (AIR 2006 SC
2716), it was observed; Relationship is not a factor to affect
credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a
relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations
against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea
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of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to
adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out
whether it is cogent and credible.
16. In Criminal appeal Nos. 222 of 2007, this Court has
occasioned to deal with the cases of some of the co-accused
persons. In that case it was concluded as follows:
"If the evidence on record is considered on the
touchstone principles set out above the
inevitable conclusion is that the proper
conviction would be Section 304 Part I IPC
instead of Section 302 IPC. The conviction of
the appellants is accordingly altered from
Section 302 read with Section 149 to Section
304 Part I read with Section 149 IPC.
Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the
ends of justice. The findings of the guilt in
respect of other offences and the sentences
imposed do not warrant interference. The
sentence shall run concurrently."
17. In view of what has been stated in the aforesaid Criminal
Appeal, the appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.
18. The appeals are partly allowed.
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...............................J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
...............................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
New Delhi,
July 30, 2008
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