IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5680 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP)No.248 of 2007)
Ajit Singh & Anr. ..Appellants
Versus
Jit Ram & Anr. ...Respondents
JUDGMENT
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This is an appeal by special leave against the
judgment and final order dated 8th of February, 2006 of
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in
Civil Revision No. 4231 of 2004, whereby the High Court
in the exercise of its revisional power had interfered with
the findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority
which was the final authority on fact and set aside the
order of the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh dated 5th of
August, 2004 directing the eviction of the respondent
only on the ground of subletting, which affirmed the
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order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on a
different ground namely, on the ground of sub-letting.
3. The appellants are father and son and the appellant
No.1 (son) is the owner of a shop being Shop No. 142,
Village Badheri, U.T. Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to
as "the said shop") on the basis of a family partition
dated 26th of August, 1998 and the appellant No.2 is the
landlord of the said shop. Prior to the family partition
dated 26th of August, 1998 the father, namely, appellant
No.2 was the owner and landlord of the said shop.
Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are also father and son. The
father, namely, respondent No.1 was inducted as a
tenant in respect of the said shop at a monthly rental of
Rs.500/- per month excluding the electricity charges.
The appellants filed an eviction petition against the
respondents for evicting them from the said shop inter
alia on the ground of sub- letting, for non payment of
rent and also for bonafide requirement for the personal
use and occupation of the appellant No.1. According to
the appellants, the respondent No.1 had sub-let the said
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shop to respondent No.2, his own son, who is in
possession of the same and has been running the said
shop under the name of M/s. New Paris Furniture
without the consent of the appellants. It was further
alleged that the respondent No.1 neither paid the rent of
the said shop nor tendered the same as such was in
arrears of payment of rent since 1st of October, 1995 till
the filing of the application for eviction. The appellants
further alleged in the eviction petition that the said shop
was required for the personal use and occupation of the
appellant No.1. Accordingly, the appellants were
constrained to file the eviction petition against the
respondents in respect of the said shop when it was
found that in respect of the notice, the respondents had
failed to vacate and deliver peaceful possession of the
said shop to the appellants.
4. The respondents entered appearance and filed a
written statement inter alia contending that the eviction
petition against them was not maintainable and the
personal necessity of the said shop for the use and
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occupation of the appellant No.1 was also not available
and that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to try
and entertain the eviction petition. Accordingly, the
respondents prayed for rejection of the eviction petition.
5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as
noted herein above, the Rent Controller framed the
following issues :-
" (I) Whether the respondents were in arrears of rent
w.e.f. 01-10-95 and as such were liable to be evicted
from demised premises on the ground of non-payment of
rent?
(II) Whether the rent tendered by the respondent was
short and insufficient?
(III) Whether the said shop was sublet by the respondent
no. 1 to respondent no.2 without the consent of the
appellants?
(IV) Whether the appellant No1 for his personal use and
occupation required the said shop?
(V) Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try and
entertain the eviction petition?
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(VI) Whether the ground of personal necessity was not
available to the appellants as the shop in dispute was
not a commercial property?
(VII) Whether the respondents are entitled for counter
claim as prayed for?
(VIII) Relief."
The Rent Controller decided issue Nos. 1, 2 and 7
together and held that the respondents were not
defaulters in payment of rent nor they were entitled to
get refund of any amount from the appellant as the case
made out by them that they have paid the appellant in
excess. This finding arrived at by the Rent Controller by
holding that the appellant had failed to produce any
credible and reliable evidence, accordingly, Issue Nos. 1,
2 and 7 were held against the appellant and, therefore,
no order for ejectment could be passed on the ground of
non-payment of rent. Issue No.4 and 6 were also taken
up together. Issue No.4 was decided against the
appellants and Issue No.6 was decided in favour of the
respondents. Accordingly, the Rent Controller held that
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the ground for personal necessity was not made out and
therefore, on that issue, the appellants were not entitled
to evict the respondents from the said shop. So far as
Issue No.5 was concerned, before the Rent Controller the
said issue was not pressed. It may be mentioned here
that the Rent Controller, however, held that there was
relationship of landlord tenant between the parties as the
respondents in their examination-in-chief admitted that
the appellant No.2 was the owner of the said shop who
had given the same to the appellant No.1 by way of
family settlement dated 26th of August, 1998.
Accordingly, the Rent Controller held that the appellants
were entitled to evict the respondents only on the ground
of sub-letting as the said shop was sub-let by respondent
No.1 to respondent No.2 without the consent of the
appellants. Upon the issues being decided in the manner
indicated above, the Rent Controller finally passed the
order of eviction against the respondents in respect of the
said shop only on the ground of sub-letting.
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6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by
the Rent Controller, the respondents filed an appeal
before the Appellate Authority under the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in short the `Rent Act').
The Appellate Authority by its judgment and final order
dated 5th of August, 2004 allowed the appeal and also the
cross objections of the appellants and directed the
eviction of the respondents from the said shop on the
ground of personal necessity by the appellants.
7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of
the Appellate Authority directing eviction on a finding
that the appellants required the said shop for their own
use and occupation, the respondents filed a civil revision
petition in the High Court which, by the impugned order,
was allowed and the High Court, as noted herein earlier,
in the exercise of its revisional power had set aside the
order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority on the
ground that appellant No.2 was the landlord of the said
shop but they had failed to prove the ingredients as
required under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It was
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held by the High Court that the averments made in the
eviction petition would evidently show that such
averments were made only to the extent of the personal
requirement of the appellant No.1, Ajit Singh, but such
pleadings did not relate to the personal requirement of
the appellant No.2, who was also the landlord of the said
shop and, accordingly, in the absence of any pleading or
averment made in the eviction petition to the extent of
the personal requirement of the said shop of the
appellant No.2, the High Court held that the order of
eviction passed by the Appellate Authority could not be
sustained in law. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with
the order of the High Court allowing the revision petition,
the appellants filed a special leave petition which on
grant of leave was heard in presence of the learned
counsel for the parties.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and after examining the impugned order of the High
Court as well as the order of the appellate authority and
the Rent Controller and the materials on record including
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the averments made by the appellants in their petition
for eviction, we are of the view that the High Court in the
exercise of its revisional power under the Rent Act was
not entitled to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at
by the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide
requirement of the said shop at the instance of the
appellants. Since the findings arrived at by the Appellate
Authority on the question of bonafide requirement was
set aside by the High Court in the exercise of its
revisional power under the Rent Act and the eviction of
the respondents from the said shop therefore rests only
on the ground whether the pleadings made by the
appellants in their eviction petition would satisfy the
requirement of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. The
pleadings made by the appellants in the eviction petition
must therefore be looked into in depth and in detail.
9. It is an admitted position that the said shop is at
Village Badheri, Chandigarh. Since the eviction granted
by the appellate authority and reversed by the High
Court in revision was on bonafide requirement of the
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appellants, it will be fit and proper that Section 13(3)(a)
(ii) of the Rent Act should now be referred to, which runs
as under :
"13. Eviction of tenant -
(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the controller for an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession;
(i).......................................
(ii) in the case of non-residential building or rented
land, if
(a) he requires it for his own use;
(b) he is not occupying in the urban area
concerned for the purpose of his business any
other such building or rented land as the case
may be; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented
land without sufficient cause after the
commencement of this Act, in the urban area
concerned;"
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A plain reading of the aforesaid provision, namely,
Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act would show that in
order to get an order of eviction on the aforesaid ground,
the landlord had to aver and prove that the landlord
required the said shop for his own use as the said shop
was a non-residential building. In Joginder Pal vs.
Naval Kishore Behal [(2002) 5 SCC 397], this Court
considered the aforesaid provision in detail and
interpreted the words "his own use" in regard to a non-
residential building. In that view of the matter, it would
be appropriate for us to refer to the aforesaid
consideration by this Court in the aforesaid decision
which crystallised the question as under :
" (1) The words "for his own use" as occurring in
Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act must receive a wide,
liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or
narrow construction.
(2)The expression - landlord requires for "his own
use" is not confined in its meaning to actual
physical user by the landlord personally. The
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requirement not only of the landlord himself but
also of the normal "emanations" of the landlord is
included therein. All the cases and
circumstances in which actual physical
occupation or user by someone else, would
amount to occupation or user by the landlord
himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It
will depend on a variety of factors such as
interrelationship and interdependence -
economic or otherwise, between the landlord and
such person in the background of social, socio-
religious and local customs and obligations of the
society or region to which they belong.
(3)The tests to be applied are : (i) whether the
requirement pleaded and proved may properly be
regarded as the landlord's own requirement; and,
(ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of a given case, actual occupation and user by a
person other than the landlord would be deemed
by the landlord as "his own" occupation or user.
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The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the
nature and degree of relationship and/or
dependence between the landlord pleading the
requirement as "his own" and the person who
would actually use the premises; (ii) the
circumstances in which the claim arises and is
put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the
claim. The court on being satisfied of the
reasonability and genuineness of claim, as
distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the
tenant, will uphold the landlord's claim.
(4) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall
adopt a practical and meaningful approach
guided by the realities of life.
(5)In the present case, the requirement of the
landlord of the suit premises for user as office of
his chartered accountant son is the requirement
of landlord "for his own use" within the meaning
of Section 13(3)(a)(ii)."
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10. This judgment is the answer to the question posed
before us. Here also, the requirement is made for the
son who is admittedly the owner of the shop room and
also the landlord, after the said shop was, by a family
partition dated 26th of August, 1998, given to the son
who also became the landlord after family partition and
also he became the owner of the said shop by such
family partition.
11. From the aforesaid decision of this Court, it is
therefore, clear that this Court has laid down
authoritatively that a non-residential premises, if
required by a son for user by him would cover the
requirement of words used in the Section, i.e. "for his
own use" in reference to a landlord. Therefore, if "his own
use" has been interpreted by this Court in the above-said
manner, then the requirements as laid down in Section
13(3)(a)(ii)(b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in
the same manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord
has to plead in the eviction petition that, (b) he is not
occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose
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of his business any other such building or rented land as
the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a
building or rented land without sufficient cause after the
commencement of the Rent Act, in the urban area
concerned.
12. In the present case, it was pleaded and proved that
the said shop was required for the use of the son and,
therefore, the pleadings of the son in regard to the
aforesaid requirement, being mandatory, were satisfied,
otherwise it would make the requirement laid down
under the said provisions nugatory in view of the
interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid
decision, with which we are in full agreement.
13. Applying the principles as laid down by the
aforesaid decision namely, Joginder Pal (Supra) which
also deals with commercial premises, as in the present
case, we are of the view that a plain reading of Section 13
(3)(a)(ii) (a) to (c) in conjunction with Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a)
& (b) of the Rent Act, would make it ample clear when
the said shop is being got vacated on the ground of user
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for the son of the landlord, then in the eviction petition,
the son (appellant No. 1) must plead that he was not
occupying any other building and that he had not
vacated such a building without sufficient cause. It is
well settled that while interpreting a provision of a
statute, the same has to be interpreted taking into
consideration the other provisions of the same statute.
In the aforesaid decision, namely, Joginder Pal (Supra),
this Court has clearly laid down that a balanced
interpretation has to be given in regard to the rent
legislation and the provisions itself contemplate a case in
regard to user of non-residential building by a
professional and the statute itself lays down requirement
in that regard within the same requirements will have to
be read in regard to shop required to be used by the son
of the landlord for business purpose. Accordingly, we
are of the view that the impugned decision of the High
Court is in direct conflict with the Judgment of this
Court in Joginder Singh's case (supra) and therefore,
the said Judgment cannot be sustained.
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14. There is another aspect of this matter. While
making an interpretation of Section 13 of the Act, the
High Court did not deal with Section 13 of the Rent Act
completely but it dealt with only that part of Section 13
which deals with residential building only and has not
dealt with portion of Section 13, which deals with non-
residential building. It is true that while reversing the
order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority, the
High Court in the impugned order had also taken note of
the decision in Joginder Pal's case (supra), but in view
of our discussions made herein above, the ratio of the
aforesaid decision was not applied in the present case.
There is yet another angle in which the High Court was
not justified in interfering with the order of eviction
passed by the Appellate Authority which was the final
court of fact. The Appellate Authority while directing
eviction to the respondents considered the oral and
documentary evidence on record and also the pleadings
of the parties and then came to a finding that the
appellants had successfully averred and proved their
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case of personal requirement as made out by them under
Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It is true that the High
Court in its revisional jurisdiction could have interfered
with such findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate
Authority, if the High Court had found that the findings
of the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide
requirement were either perverse or arbitrary. On a close
examination of the impugned order of the High Court, we
do not find any ground to hold that the findings of fact,
regarding the bonafide requirement of the appellants,
were perverse or arbitrary or the pleadings made by the
appellants in their eviction petition could be said to be
not in conformity with the requirement of Section 13(3)(a)
(ii) of the Rent Act. Therefore, we are also of the view that
the High Court was in error in interfering with the order
of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority on the
ground of bonafide requirement.
15. At this stage, an argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the respondents may be considered. The
learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision
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of this Court in Hasmat Rai & Anr. Vs. Raghunath
Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103] and contended that a portion
of the demised premises may also be used as a
residential premises, which cannot be considered to be a
commercial premises for the purpose of evicting the
tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. We are
unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel
for the respondents, for the simple reasons, first, the
decision in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) was based on
M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 which confers on
the authority to pass order of eviction on the ground of
bonafide requirement on a different wording from the
words used in East Punjab Urban Rent Registration Act,
1949. Furthermore, it may be reiterated that in order to
obtain an order of eviction under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of
the Rent Act, the landlord has to prove, as noted herein
earlier, that he required the said shop for his own use
and the said shop was a non-residential building. In this
case, admittedly the said shop is used for commercial
purposes and therefore there was no question of the said
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shop being used as residential purposes or being used
for a portion of residential purposes for residential use.
That being the position, the aforesaid decision, in our
view, is clearly distinguishable. Accordingly, the above
decision of this court is of no help to the respondents.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of
the High Court is hereby set aside and the order of the
Appellate Authority is restored and the eviction petition
filed by the appellants stands allowed.
17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case
and considering the facts that the respondents are
using the said shop for commercial purposes and
have been carrying on business in the same, we
grant the respondents 9 months' time to vacate the
same, subject to filing the usual undertaking in this
Court within two weeks from this date. Accordingly,
the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to
costs.
.........................J.
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[Tarun Chatterjee]
New Delhi; .........................J.
September 16, 2008. [Aftab Alam]
