Satbir Singh & Anr V. The State of Haryana (2021) � 113A is of little use - Prosecution has not proved the case

BENCH:
HON’BLE CJI NV RAMANA
HON’BLE JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE

DATE OF JUDGEMENT:
28 / 05/ 2021

PARTIES:
APPELLANTS - SATBIR SINGH
RESPONDENT - STATE OF HARYANA

FACTS

• The present appeals are based on the impugned judgement dated 06.11.2008 issued by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Chandigarh in a Criminal Appeal, in which the High Court denied the appellants' appeals and confirmed the Trial Court's decision of conviction and sentence dated 11.12.1997.
• According to the prosecution, the dead and accused-appellant no. 1 married on July 1, 1994. Some people informed the complainant on 31.7.1995, about 4 or 4.30 p.m., that his daughter was ill and had been admitted to the hospital. On the basis of this information, he, his wife, and their son went to the hospital and discovered that the deceased had died of burn injuries.
• The prosecution claimed that the deceased committed suicide by lighting herself on fire just one year after her marriage and that she was subjected to abuse and harassment by both the defendants shortly before her death because she brought less money.
• The appellants were found guilty of violating Sections 304B and 306 of the IPC by the Trial Court in a decision dated 11.12.1997 and were sentenced to seven years in prison for the offence punishable under Section 304B, and five years in prison for the offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.
• The High Court maintained the Trial Court's order and dismissed the appellants' appeal in the impugned judgement of 06.11.2008.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Trial Court and the High Court were proper in convicting the accused on the allegation of violating Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code?
2. Whether the Trial Court and the High Court were proper in convicting the accused on the allegation of violating Section 306 of the IPC?

CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES

• The appellants' learned counsel argued that the potential of an accidental fire has not been ruled out in this case. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the prosecution failed to establish that a dowry demand existed. Finally, the prosecution has failed to show that the demand, if there was one, was made shortly before the victim's death.
• The respondent State's counsel argued that the appellants had failed to produce any evidence that would justify this Court interfering with the concurrent conclusions of the lower courts. The deceased victim's strange death occurred within about a year of their marriage, according to the attorney. Furthermore, the witnesses have stated the exact instances of dowry demand with consistency.

ANALYSIS

• The first point of contention in the interpretation of Section 304­B, IPC is the phrase "soon before," which appears in the Section. Because it is a criminal statute, it must be read strictly in most cases. However, in circumstances where rigid interpretation leads to absurdity or goes against the spirit of the law, courts may, in suitable instances, rely on the real import of the words, taken in their ordinary context, to resolve difficulties.
• Given the significance of such a law, a stringent reading would undermine the very purpose for which it was passed. As a result, it is safe to assume that the lawmakers did not mean "exactly before" when they used the words "soon before." Rather, they decided to leave it up to the courts to decide.
• The definition of cruelty or harassment varies by circumstance. Even the definition of cruelty is broad, as it can be physical, verbal, or even emotional in nature. This is by no means an exhaustive list. As a result, this Court cannot impose any rigid criteria to determine what exactly the expression "soon before" signifies.
• The establishment of a "proximate and living link" between the cruelty and the victim's death is critical to the aforesaid determination. When the prosecution establishes that "shortly before her death such woman was exposed to cruelty or harassment by such person for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry," a presumption of causation against the accused emerges under Section 113B of the Evidence Act.
• The second point of contention with Section 304­B of the IPC is that it does not use a categorical approach to categorising death as homicidal, suicidal, or accidental, as was done previously. The reason for this lack of categorization is because death that occurs "other than under normal conditions" can be violent, suicidal, or accidental in some cases. However, Section 304­B of the IPC attempts to address cases in which murders or suicides are misrepresented as accidents.

JUDGEMENT

• Following a thorough examination of the aforementioned witnesses, the Trial Court and the High Court came to the conclusion that their statements were corroborative and consistent. They judged the witnesses to be trustworthy, and on the basis of their testimony, they concluded that the deceased was subjected to brutality just before her death because she did not bring enough dowry. The Trial Court's and the High Court's findings are completely in agreement with us.
• Issue 1 - It is apparent that the prosecution was able to successfully prove that the deceased's death from burn injuries occurred within one year of her marriage. It has also been established that shortly before her death, she was subjected to harassment and cruelty as a result of dowry demands. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act works against the appellants, who are assumed to have caused the offence stated under Section 304B of the IPC because the elements of Section 304B of the IPC have been met. In this case, the defendants failed to produce any evidence to show that the death was unrelated to them or was caused by an accident.
• Issue 2 - The deceased committed suicide, according to the Trial Court and the High Court in this case. We are, however, of the considered judgement that the Courts below reached a decision based on assumptions, as there is no evidence on record to support the same. Because there was insufficient evidence to establish the fact of suicide beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act is of little use to the prosecution. The prosecution has not shown adequate evidence to prove the necessary factor of the deceased committing suicide. The prosecution has not been able to prove that the death was caused by suicide in this case. As a result, we believe this Court should intervene in the lower courts' convictions of the appellants under Section 306 of the IPC.

CONCLUSION

The legislative objective of Section 304B of the IPC must be taken into account while interpreting it. The prosecution must first prove the existence of the elements that make up an offence under Section 304B of the IPC. Once these conditions are met, the rebuttable presumption of causality established by Section 113B of the Evidence Act works against the accused.

The wording "soon before" in Section 304B of the IPC cannot be interpreted to indicate "exactly before." The prosecution must show that there is a "direct and live relation" between the dowry death and the husband's or relatives' abuse or harassment for dowry demand. In defining death as homicidal, suicidal, or accidental, Section 304B of the IPC does not use a pigeonhole method. The reason for this lack of categorization is because death that occurs "other than under normal conditions" can be violent, suicidal, or accidental in some cases.

Because of the fragile nature of Section 304B of the IPC in conjunction with Section 113B of the Evidence Act, judges, the prosecution, and the defence should exercise caution during the course of the trial.