Bench
Hon’ble Chief Justice S. Muralidhar
Hon’ble Justice B.P. Routray
Date of the Judgement
9 June 2021
Parties
Petitioner - O.A.T. Bar Association, Cuttack, represented by its Secretary Sri Prakash Kumar Rout
Respondent - Union of India and Others
Background Facts
● The context of these writ petitions is that Article 323-A was incorporated into the Indian Constitution by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act 1976.
● Article 323-A (1) states that Parliament may provide, by law, for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State, or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Union or of any State, or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Union.
● Article 323-A (2) specifies the provisions of such a statute enacted by the Parliament. Article 323-A (3) contains a non-obstante clause, which states that the provision will take effect despite any other provision of the Constitution or any other law now in force.
● The 42nd Amendment Bill's Statement of Objects and Reasons (SOR) said that the purpose of inserting Article 323-A into the Constitution of India was to reduce "growing arrears in High Court" and "to assure the quick disposition of service problems," among other things.
● The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (AT Act) was enacted in accordance with Article 323-A (1) and (2) of the Indian Constitution and went into force on February 27, 1985. The AT Act called for the establishment of a Tribunal, with jurisdiction over both the Centre and the States, to supplant/substitute the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The aggrieved party could file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India under Article 136 of the Constitution to challenge the Tribunal's decision.
● The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) is established by Section 4 (1) of the AT Act, whereas the State Administrative Tribunal is established under Section 4 (2). (SAT). Accordingly, upon receiving a request in this regard from the State in question, the Central Government may establish an SAT by notification, which would then exercise the "jurisdiction, powers, and authority" given on it by the AT Act.
● In the case of Odisha, the OAT was constituted by the Central Government through a notification issued in the Indian Gazette on July 4, 1986. With effect from July 14, 1986, the OAT began to function as such.
● On November 1, 1985, five CAT Benches were formed in accordance with the AT Act. Several writ petitions were filed in the High Court and the Supreme Court of India contesting the constitutional validity of Article 323-A as well as the provisions of the AT Act, even before the aforementioned Benches could be created.
● However, in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1125, a 7-judge Supreme Court Constitution bench held that Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent that they exclude the High Courts' and Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Various State Administrative Tribunals were abolished as a result of this.
● On September 9, 2015, the State of Odisha Cabinet approved the proposal to abolish the OAT, stating that the decision would lower the Government's litigation load and shorten the time it takes to resolve disputes. After the OAT was abolished, the government of Odisha declared that it would take appropriate measures to strengthen the High Court, including increasing judgeships to deal with the increased burden at the High Court level. The DoPT then released the contested notice on August 2, 2019, rescinding the earlier notification dated July 4, 1986, which established the OAT.
Issues
1. Is the establishment of an SAT required under Article 323-A (1) of the Constitution?
2. Is it possible to abolish an SAT by issuing a notification under Section 4 (2) of the AT Act read with Section 21 of the GC Act, or does it require a special provision in both the Constitution and the AT Act?
3. Is the challenged notification a quasi-judicial decision in the terms of 2. above? Is it a violation of the principles of natural justice since it was formed without giving the stakeholders a chance to be heard?
4. Is the impugned notification abolishing the OAT arbitrary, irrational, and unreasonable in the sense that it is based on an incorrect interpretation of the ratio of the Supreme Court of India's Constitution Bench decision in L. Chandra Kumar and, in any case, not on relevant material but extraneous considerations? Is it, in other words, a violation of the Constitution's Article 14?
Judgement
● Issue 1 - After studying the clause and pertinent rulings, the Court concluded that "it cannot be maintained that the word ‘may’ should be construed as 'shall' just because the High Courts are inundated with pending cases."
While the strain placed on the High Courts or the Supreme Court may be a consideration in the Central Government's or State Government's decision to establish a Tribunal, it cannot be the only factor. There are many additional issues pertinent to the matter, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the preceding judgement. Examining data from institutions and the Tribunal's disposition of cases, the rate of such disposition, the quality of the decisions rendered, how often they are overturned on appeal or review by a higher legal forum, and so on." the Court made a comment.
As a result, the Court concluded that Article 323A (1) was not intended to make it mandatory for either the Central Government or the State Government to establish an SAT, regardless of the actual need for such a tribunal and its effectiveness in achieving the goal of ensuring fair and expeditious justice.
Furthermore, because SATs are still only operational in three or four states across the country, government employees in the majority of states must first approach the concerned High Court for a redress of their grievances.
As a result, it cannot be asserted that the elimination of the OAT, which will result in either the transfer of current petitions to the High Court or the institution of new petitions there as a Court of First Instance, will obstruct access to justice as claimed. In other words, filing a writ petition in the High Court before a Single Judge cannot be compared to pursuing an original application in the OAT.
For a litigant, the former remedy would always be favoured. As a result, the argument that abolishing the OAT will deny litigants access to justice is unworkable.
● Issues 2 and 3 - Noting that the remaining conflicts before the OAT have been referred to the High Court for adjudication, the Court stated that rather than bringing the case to a close, the case would be handled by an even more effective body, namely the High Court.
While the SAT fulfils a judicial role in and of itself, the decision of the State and Central Governments to establish it or abolish it under Article 323-A (1) read with Section 4 (2) of the AT Act cannot be described as anything other than an administrative decision. "This distinction becomes essential primarily for the purpose of evaluating the question of whether such a decision can be revoked by using Section 21 of the GC Act," the Court noted.
Furthermore, the Court held that because the contested decision to abolish the OAT was an administrative decision rather than a quasi-judicial one, the State and Central governments could use Section 21 of the GC Act and Section 4 (2) of the AT Act to rescind the notification that had previously been issued establishing the OAT.
● Issue 4 - Litigants awaiting adjudication of their cases before the OAT cannot be left in the lurch if it is abolished. They would have filed their applications before the High Court if there had been no OAT. It is this position that the initiative to transfer all pending cases to the High Court aims to achieve." the Court made a comment.
Furthermore, the Court observed that the executive and judicial branches of the State have ensured that the litigants before the OAT are not denied justice and that the pending cases are transferred to the High Court to be heard, opining that it was a necessary step forwarding the ends of justice in order to ensure that the litigants before the OAT were not left high and dry.
"The foregoing views represent a comprehensive response to comparable arguments made by the Petitioners in front of this Court. It cannot be stated that the State of Odisha's decision to seek the elimination of the OAT is arbitrary, illogical, or in violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution because there is adequate evidence on record to justify the decision. The Petitioners' arguments in this regard are dismissed." The Court decided in favour of the plaintiff.
Conclusion
The Court issued the following orders in dismissing the petitions: "For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court believes that there is no basis for the Court to intervene with the contested notification dated August 2, 2019. As a result, all of the writ petitions have been dismissed. However, there will be no expense order in these cases."
