CASE TITLE:
Manoj Kumar Tiwari Vs Manish Sisodia & Ors.
DATE OF ORDER:
17 October 2022
JUDGES:
Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice V. Ramasubramanian
PARTIES:
Petitioner: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Respondent: Manish Sisodia&Ors.
SUBJECT
A minister or public employee (a person protected by Section 199(2)) can submit a private complaint alleging defamation and is not required to follow the specific procedure outlined in Section 199(2) & (4) CrPC, according to the Supreme Court.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
- Section 199 - No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence:Provided that where such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf.
- Section 237 - Procedure in cases instituted under section 199(2) – (1) A Court of Session taking cognizance of an offence under sub-section (2) of section 199 shall try the case in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted otherwise than on a police report before a Court of Magistrate.
(2) Every trial under this section shall be held in camera if either party thereto so desires or if the Court thinks fit so to do.
Indian Penal Code
- Section 499 - Defamation. - Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
BRIEF FACTS
- Manish Sisodia, a minister in the Delhi government, filed a complaint regarding the commission of the offences under Sections 499 and 500 read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Indian Penal Code before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Rouse Avenue Courts. The summons order was contested by the accused before the Delhi High Court.
- The High Court denied these petitions, thus the accused appealed to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, Manoj Tiwari’s sole argument was that the Court shouldn’t have accepted a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., particularly one from a person covered by Section 199(2) of the Code, without first completing the steps outlined in Section 199’s subsection (4).
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether a minister or a public servant can file a private complaint alleging defamation without following the special procedures prescribed by Section 199(2) and 199(4) of CrPC?
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT
- Accused No. 1 challenges the summons on the grounds that the court erred in accepting a private complaint under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, particularly one from a person covered by Section 199(2) of the Code, without adhering to the procedure outlined in sub-section (4) of Section 199.
- The order of summoning is challenged by Accused No. 5, who is the appellant in the second appeal, on three grounds: (i) that Respondent No. 1 should have followed the special procedure specified in Section 199(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because he is a Minister of a Union Territory; (ii) in accordance with Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, the transcript of the tweets ascribed to him did not come with a valid certificate, and (iii) the tweets he published on their own do not establish a claim of defamation under Section 499 IPC, which is punishable under Section 500 IPC.
- The learned counsel for the appellants relies heavily on the rulings in P.C. Joshi and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1, Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, and K.K. Mishra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reached by this Court. The learned senior counsel for the appellants contends that Respondent No. 1's attempt to get around the special procedure outlined in Section 199(2) is motivated by his desire to avoid the consequences of Section 237 of the Code, which are specified in cases of malicious prosecution initiated under Section 199(2).
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT
- The learned counsel for the respondent argues that what is outlined in Section 199(2) of the Code is a special procedure that does not preclude the general procedure outlined in Section 199(6) and that a public servant’s right to pursue a defamation case on an individual basis is guaranteed by Section 199(6) of the Code. These arguments are made in defence of the summoning order issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the order of the High Court dismissing the challenge to the same.
JUDGMENT ANALYSIS
- The court observed that it is true that under Section 237 subsection (3), the court has the authority to order a public employee (other than the president, vice president, governor of a state, or administrator of a union territory) to provide justification as to why he should not pay damages to a person accused of committing the crime of defamation in situations where the court not only discharges or acquits the accused but also believes there was no reasonable cause for making the statement in question. However, Section 237(3) is not a brand-new idea. Section 237 features a new format for what was previously found in sub-sections (6) through (11) of Section 198B of the previous Code from 1898.
- Furthermore, when a person uses subsection (6) of Section 199, it is not as though there is no such safety valve against prosecution by a person without a good reason.By virtue of Section 199(6), whenever a person is brought before a Magistrate for prosecution by a public employee acting alone, the accused is always entitled to compensation under Section 250 on the grounds that the accusation was made without reasonable cause. As a result, the Code’s Section 237 has no effect. The argument based on Sections 199(2) and 199(4) cannot be supported by Section 237 as a crutch. Since the court rejected the argument centered around subsections (2) and (4) of Section 199 and because this was the only argument on which he had raised the above appeal, therefore, it was rejected.
- The summoning order from the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, dated November 28, 2019, makes no mention of the content of Shri Vijender Gupta’s tweets. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate did not apply his or her thinking in that regard. The summoning order issued by the Magistrate was upheld despite the High Court’s initial review of the tweets under Section 499. The assertion made by a politician that the responses given by his opponent in government to the questions he presented will reveal his scam cannot be categorically characterised as an attempt to damage the reputation of the person in office. The statements such as “I will expose you”, “I will expose your corrupt practices” and “I will expose the scam in which you are involved, etc.” are not by themselves defamatory unless there is something more.
CONCLUSION
In view of the above, Appellant 5 is appeal is likely to be successful on the sole pretext that his tweets cannot be considered defamatory as defined by Section 499 of the IPC. In the end, the summoning order dated 28.11.2019 issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-I, Rouse Avenue Court Complex, New Delhi in Ct. Case 51/2019, so far as Shri Vijender Gupta (A-5) is concerned, is set aside and the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No.658 of 2021 is allowed. However, the complaint may go forward with regard to other defendants. It is decided to dismiss the appeal stemming from S.L.P. (Criminal) No.351 of 2021, which was brought by Shri Manoj Kumar Tiwari.
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