Sc Reiterates The Order The Passed By Trial Court Under Section 13 Of The Prevention Of Corruption Act, 1988

Case title:

Soundarajan vs State Rep. by the Inspector of Police Vigilance Anticorruption Dindigul

Date of Order:

17th April 2023

Bench:

Justice Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal

Parties:

Petitioner: Soundarajan

Defendant: State Rep. by the Inspector of Police Vigilance Anticorruption Dindigul 

Facts:

• The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (often referred to as "the PC Act"), which was passed in 1988, contains the following penal provisions: Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) that the appellant was found guilty of committing. The defendant was given a one-year prison term and ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000.   By the contested decision, the High Court upheld the appellant's conviction and punishment.
• The appellant held the position of Sub-­Registrar in the Tamil Nadu district of Dindigul at Kannivadi. M. Sundaramoorthy, the complaint (PW­2), had purchased a parcel of land at 16.05 cents. As a result, on July 12, 2004, the sale deed was delivered to the appellant, who at the time was the Sub­Registrar in the relevant office. There was the complainant and his suppliers.     The complainant claims in his complaint that in addition to paying Rs. 190 for the sale deed's registration fees, he also spent Rs. 880 to have the sale deed typed on stamp paper. The appellant gave out a receipt for the specified sum.
• On the basis of the allegation, a trap was set on August 12th, 2004, but it didn't work.   The prosecution claims that the trap was set once more on August 13, 2004. The plan was successful, and the appellant was caught red-handed collecting the bribe in front of shadow witness Michael (PW­3).  
• Twelve witnesses were questioned by the prosecution.   PW­1 N.Dhanam Jeyan was questioned in order to support the sanction order.  PW­3 Michael is the shadow witness, and PW­2 M.Sundaramoorthy is the complainant, as was already mentioned. There isn't another witness who can support the appellant's asserted demand. The accuser (PW­2) was labelled hostile since he did not support the prosecution. The appellant cross-examined two defence witnesses, S. Kathiresan and Kalaiselvi, in order to introduce into the record an audit report of the office where the appellant was employed as well as a circular issued by the Inspector General of Registration requiring the Sub-­Registrar to visit a piece of land that is the subject of a sale deed in order to determine its value.

Arguments:

• Speaking on behalf of the appellant, learned senior counsel Mr. S. Nagamuthu claimed that no charges had been laid in relation to the demands made on August 6 and August 13. He drew our attention to the Special Court's first accusation, arguing that it relates to an alleged demand made on July 12, 2004, the date the sale deed was registered. He argued that, even in light of the prosecution's argument, no demand was made on July 12, 2004, when the sale deed was registered.
• We gave the submissions some thought. It is well established that evidence of the demand for and acceptance of gratification is a need to prove the conduct of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act. Furthermore, the Constitution Bench reaffirmed in the case of Neeraj Dutta3 that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act may only be utilised on proof of the relevant facts, namely the accused's demand for payment and acceptance of it.
• As previously mentioned, complainant PW2 has not backed the prosecution.   Regarding the demand made by the appellant, he made no mention of it in his primary examination. PW2 was cross-examined by the public defender. The witness claimed that the appellant did not make any demands for bribes. He claims that because the return of the selling deed was delayed, he filed a complaint.   Although PW­2 acknowledged that he had filed the complaint, he was not challenged with the crucial parts of the complaint during the cross­examination where he had described how the purported demand was made.
• We now move on to the shadow witness' (PW­3) testimony.   He said that the appellant questioned the PW2 about whether or not he had the money during the chief examination.   PW3 did not state that the appellant made a specific gratification demand to PW2 while he was present. The prosecution must prove the demand for gratification beyond a reasonable doubt in order for Section 7 of the PC Act to apply.   'Gratification' is the word used in Section 7 as it read prior to July 26th, 2018. There must be an urge for satisfaction. It must be a desire for satisfaction rather than just a straightforward demand for money.   
• There is no circumstantial proof of desire for pleasure in this situation. The crimes punishable by Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been proven in these circumstances.   The offence of receiving a financial benefit through corrupt means encompassed by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proven unless both demand and acceptance are proven.
• A failure to charge or an error in charging is never fatal under Section 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code unless the Court determines that it has actually caused a failure of justice. In this case, it is clear that the appellant had a clear understanding of the prosecution case regarding the initial alleged demand made on August 6, 2004, as well as the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance on August 13, 2004, after reading the cross-examination of PW3 and other prosecution witnesses conducted by the Advocate for the appellant. There is no question that a legitimate charge was not made in this instance, and whatever charge was made is inherently flawed. However, the accused was not harmed in terms of his right to defense due to the aforementioned omission or defect. As a result, in this instance, the failure to frame the charge or the framing error are not deadly.
• We discover that the accusation has been laid out extremely carelessly in this instance. When it comes to charging, the Trial Courts should be extremely thorough. Any such mistake or omission in a particular case could result in acquittal and/or a protracted trial due to a remand order that could be issued in accordance with subsection (2) of Section 464 of the CrPC.  

Analysis:

• In this instance, the plaintiff had bought land measuring 16.05 cents, and the appellant held the position of Sub-Registrar. The complainant and his sellers handed the sale deed to the appellant. The complainant asserts in his complaint that in addition to having the sale deed typed on stamp paper, he also paid Rs. 190 for the sale deed's registration fees. The appellant gave out a receipt for the specified sum. For the appellant to be able to visit the site, the complainant set up transportation. The complainant was given instructions by the appellant to get a TOPO Sketch from the relevant authority to demonstrate the cultivability of the land subject to the sale.
• The complainant claims that at the time, the appellant requested Rs. 500 as payment for delivering the registered sale deed. A trap was set, but it didn't work. The trap was also set again, and this time it worked, catching the appellant in the act of accepting the bribe in front of shadow witness Michael (PW3). As a result, the Trial Court found the appellant guilty of the crimes listed in Sections 7 and 13 read in conjunction with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The trial court sentenced the appellant to one year in prison and a fine of Rs. 2000, and the High Court later upheld that decision. The appellant then appealed his conviction to the highest court.
• According to the Supreme Court, the Special Court failed to frame a particular allegation regarding the purported demands made by the appellant on August 6 and August 13 and acceptance of those demands on August 13. In this instance, it was clear that the appellant had understood the prosecution's case about the first claimed demand after reading the cross-examination of PW3 and other prosecution witnesses conducted by the appellant's advocate. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, and the contested rulings were overturned. Additionally, the appellant was cleared of the charges brought against him, and his bail bonds are no longer valid.

Conclusion:

In the present case it was concluded by the court that the appeal is accepted. The contested rulings are overturned and annulled, and the appellant is exonerated of all charges brought against him. The appellant's bail bonds are no longer valid. The apex court also warned the trial courts to pass the judgement after appropriate examination.

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