Case title:
Jhabbar Singh (D) through Legal Heirs & Ors. Vs. Jagtar Singh S/o. Darshan Singh
Date of Order:
17th April 2023
Bench:
Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Ajay Rastogi
Parties:
Petitioner: Jhabbar Singh (D) through Legal Heirs & Ors.
Defendant: Jagtar Singh S/o. Darshan Singh
Facts:
- Jhabbar Singh (the "Appellant/Defendant") purchased the land that Mr. Jit Singh had sold to him in 1980. The person in charge of an immovable property has the right to pre-emption, which allows them to buy back an adjoining property that has been sold to a third party. Mr. Jagtar Singh ("Plaintiff") initiated the two civil lawsuits in 1981, alleging joint ownership of the khewat with the dealer Jit Singh.
- The Plaintiff requested ownership of the property on the grounds that, as a co-sharer in the joint "khewat," he has a higher right to pre-empt those sale deeds. However, the aforementioned owner, Jit Singh, did not inform the Plaintiff of the sale. The Defendant initiated a suit for partition of joint Khata (containing the Property) before the Assistant Collector while the proceedings were awaiting adjudication.
- The Assistant Collector issued an order on July 31, 1982, dividing the real estate assets between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. As a result, the Trial Court dismissed the civil lawsuits, ruling that the khewat in question was no longer joint in light of the decision from the 31st of July 1982 and that the Plaintiff no longer qualified as a joint owner as of the date the judgement and decree were issued.
- The District Judge dismissed the Plaintiff's first appeal, which she had filed. The High Court then granted the Plaintiff's Regular Second Appeal. On August 17, 2007, the High Court ruled that the parties' joint status had not ended because no instrument of division had been drawn at the time the Trial Court's order had been issued. The Defendant appealed the High Court's decision to the Supreme Court.
Issue Raised:
- The question before the Bench was whether the Plaintiff had proven his superior right of pre-emption from the beginning of the case up until the date the court of first instance issued the order.
Arguments:
- The Bench stated that the pre-emptor must demonstrate that he had the right to pre-empt on the date of the sale, the date the lawsuit was filed, and the day the Court of First Instance issued its decree. Before the case is decided, the pre-emption suit would be unsuccessful if the claimant-plaintiff lost that right, or the vendee improved his right to the point where it was equal to or greater than the claimant's right.
- It was noted that according to Section 121 of the Revenue Act, after the partition is finished, the Revenue Officer must cause a partition instrument to be drafted and include the date on which the partition is to go into force.
- For the purpose of interpreting Section 121 of the Revenue Act, the Bench relied on Order XX Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ("CPC"), which deals with the steps to be taken after the decree for the partition of the property is issued.
- It was noted that when the Revenue Officer makes a determination under Section 118 on the assets to be divided and the method of partition, the parties' rights and status are predetermined, and the partition is presumed to have taken place. Such a decision must be treated as a "decree" at this point.
- The court made the observation that preparing the instrument of partition as provided for in Section 121 of the Land Revenue Act would only be a ministerial or administrative act that needed to be completed in order to fully resolve the partition case that had been brought before the Revenue Officer. Therefore, the joint status of both sides would be severed on the date of the Revenue Officer's decision about the property to be divided and the method of partition, subject to the outcome in any appeals that the party may have requested.
- It would therefore be necessary to draught a partition instrument as a result. Therefore, it could not be stated that the partition was not finished or that the parties' joint status had not been severed just because the instrument of partition had not been drawn.
- The Court held that the partition would be complete, the parties' joint status would be severed, and they would no longer be joint beyond the term of limitation specified by the Act, in light of the Revenue Officer's decision made according to Section 118 of the Revenue Act. To fully resolve the partition matter, the additional step to draught an instrument of partition would only be an executory or ministerial task.
- The Bench determined that because the division had been approved in accordance with "Naksha Be," the parties' joint status was no longer valid. In striking aside the decisions made by the trial court and the appellate court, the High Court erred by applying the wrong interpretation to the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. The Bench upheld the appeal and reversed the High Court's decision.
Analysis:
- As a co-sharer in the joint khewat, the plaintiff Jagtar Singh filed two lawsuits in 1981 demanding ownership of the suit lands on the grounds that he had a superior right to preempt those sale deeds. However, the plaintiff was not provided notice of the sale by the alleged owner Jit Singh. Jhabbar Singh and other defendants fought back against the lawsuits, challenging the plaintiffs' assertion of a superior right of pre-emption.
- Based on the case's facts, the Bench concluded that the parties' joint status ended when the Assistant Collector issued the order, and the Collector ratified it.
- According to the Bench, the trial court and the appellate court correctly decided that plaintiff Jagtar Singh did not have the status of a co-sharer on the date of the decree, which was December 1, 1982, and that his right of pre-emption had expired by the time the judgements in the suits were issued.
Conclusion:
Therefore, in the present case, the Bench granted the appeal and stated, the High Court had grossly erred in misconstruing the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and the Land Revenue Act, and in striking aside the judgements and decrees issued by the trial court and the appellate court.
