Supreme Court Dismisses Criminal Appeal In Case Of Assault And Abuse Under Section 319 Crpc

Case title:

Jitendra Nath Mishra vs State of UP

Date of Order:

2nd June, 2023

Bench:

Justice Dipankar Datta and Pankaj Mittal

Parties:

Petitioner: Jitendra Nath Mishra

Defendant: State of UP

Facts:

• By special permission, this appeal challenges an order issued by the Allahabad High Court on June 1st, 2022. According to Section 14A (1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989) (hereafter "1989 Act"), the appellant's appeal was dismissed by the impugned judgement. A summons order issued by the relevant Special Court under the 1989 Act on October 16, 2021, was challenged in the appeal. This was done using the authority granted to him by Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Based on the information provided by the complainant, a First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as a "FIR") was filed by the Khalilabad Police Station in the District of Sant Kabir Nagar under Sections 419, 420, 323, 406, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and 3(1)(r) and (s) of the 1989 Act. The following people were accused of assaulting and abusing the complainant and his wife, which amounted to the commission of offences punishable under the aforementioned provisions: (1) Dharmendra Nath Mishra (hereinafter referred to as "Dharmendra"); (2) Dharmendra's brother; and (3) a "unknown person."
• A charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Cr. PC was submitted as a result of the investigation into the FIR, and Dharmendra was listed as the only accused.
• The offence was recognised by the Special Court established by the 1989 Act, which then filed charges against Dharmendra and the trial got under way. The complainant and his wife both gave testimony as PWs 1 and 2, respectively, during this process. They claimed that Dharmendra, the appellant, and a third individual had assaulted them in addition to calling them names based on their caste.
• At this point, the Special Court issued an order dated October 16, 2021 summons the appellant for trial alongside Dharmendra for charges covered by Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC as well as Sections 3(1)(r) and (s) of the 1989 Act. The appellant unsuccessfully appealed the said ruling of 16 October 2021 to the High Court, which, by judgement dated 1 June 2022, dismissed the appellant's appeal under the aforementioned Section 14A (1) of the 1989 Act.

Contentions of the parties:

• The learned attorney for the appellant raised a number of objections to the summons order. The complainant and his wife's testimony were allegedly conflicting, the FIR was delayed, and the appellant's alleged co-accusation was inflated, among other things. 
• The appellant contended that the evidence was untrustworthy and that the summons order was unreasonable. The learned attorney argued on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh that the Special Court has the authority to summon a defendant for trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. PC). The respondent's position was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92.

 Arguments:

• The FIR has been severely delayed. The assault and abuse episode that gave birth to the FIR is said to have occurred on September 30, 2017, however the complaint wasn't filed until February 28, 2018. This indicates that the information in the FIR is completely fake because there is no plausible explanation for the complaint's late filing.
• There are substantive inconsistencies between PW-1 and PW2 versions. While PW-1 testified that Dharmendra, his brother (the appellant), and an unknown person stopped PW-1 and his family in a car, whereupon the alleged assault and abuse incident occurred, PW-2 testified that the accused Dharmendra, the appellant, and an unknown person arrived at the scene on two motorcycles. The testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 is thus completely unreliable and untrustworthy.
• The versions of PW-1 and PW-2 reveal that they have known the appellant since 2015; thus, the FIR's omission of the appellant's name and disclosure that Dharmendra's brother also participated in the alleged assault and abuse and addition of the appellant's name as a co-accused only during the recording of evidence is a blatant embellishment intended to harass the appellant by subjecting him to an unwarranted legal proceeding.
• There is no question that the appellant and Dharmendra are siblings, but they also have three other siblings. It defies logic why the complainant, who knew the appellant well, would not name him and specifically claim that the complainant had also been abused and assaulted by the brother of Dharmendra if the appellant was one of several co-accused.
• If one were to read PW-1's and PW-2's depositions, the falsity of their accounts would be obvious. The incident that led to the trial happened on September 30, 2017, the day of Dussehra, at 6 o'clock in the evening. Although it was claimed that the accused assaulted and insulted the complainant and his wife as they were walking home from a public venue, no additional public witness has been identified to support the prosecution's case. Therefore, it is an obvious instance of erroneous inference.
• Based on these claims, Mr. Pandey contended that the Special Court's use of its authority under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code was arbitrary and that the High Court erred in both law and fact by failing to challenge this judgement while exercising its appeal jurisdiction. Thus, he requested that the Special Court's order from October 16, 2021, which the High Court later upheld on June 1, 2022, be revoked.
• Mr. Singh, a knowledgeable senior lawyer who represented the State of Uttar Pradesh in opposition to the appeal, argued that the legislation relating to summoning someone to be tried alongside an accused person is no longer res integra. He called our attention to the Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab: (2014) 3 SCC 92 Constitution Bench judgement of this Court and relied on its paragraphs 106, 117.4 and 117.6. He argued that because the Special Court called the appellant in accordance with Section 319 of the Cr. PC and properly considered the oral testimony provided by the complainant and his wife, the order is not unlawful, much less obviously unlawful.
• He said that he could make defence arguments before the Special Court on the grounds raised by the appellant to have the contested order reversed. He requested that the appeal be dismissed on the grounds that the impugned ruling of the High Court, which upholds the Special Court's summons order, does not warrant any interference.

Judgement:

• After giving the competing claims due consideration, we believe that any statements we make while discussing each and every point raised by the appellant could lead to prejudgment and impede a fair trial. As a result, we are taking a cautious approach and only intend to consider whether the evidence presented by the complainant and his wife during the recording of their depositions did support the Special Court.
• If it appears from the evidence that a person is guilty of a crime for which he should be tried alongside the accused who is facing trial, the court holding the trial has the discretion to move forward against that person even if they are not shown or mentioned as an accused under Section 319, Cr. PC. The court may employ this authority with respect to a person who is not mentioned in the FIR or who is named in the FIR but is not listed as an accused in the charge sheet.
• However, the court holding a trial must be satisfied beyond prima facie as formed at the stage of a charge being framed and short of satisfaction to the extent that the evidence, if unrebutted, would result in conviction if it wishes to exercise the power granted by section 319, Cr. PC. This means that the court must be satisfied before issuing an order under this section, rather than simply being satisfied that some evidence has come to light implicating the person sought to be summoned.
• In this instance, the FIR revealed that Dharmendra, his brother, and an unidentified person had all committed crimes. In their testimony before the court, the complainant and his wife both described the method of the assault on the former by Dharmendra and the appellant as well as the remarks made by Dharmendra and the appellant, among other things, regarding the complainant and his wife's caste. Primarily speaking, there doesn't seem to be any dispute at all about this matter.
• We urge the Special Court to get the trial along quickly. However, because the High Court and this Court upheld its judgement under Section 319 of the Cr. PC, the procedure will continue unaffected. The appellant's points, listed above, as well as any additional points, if any, will be accorded the consideration they warrant if brought before the court.

Analysis:

• The complainant's and his wife's claims of the co-accused and the appellant's abuse, including remarks concerning caste, were found to be credible by the court.
• The appellant was not identified in the FIR despite being the co-accused's sibling and being listed as an assailant, but the court decided that the evidence was adequate for the Special Court to form the required satisfaction and summon the appellant.  
• Additionally, it was decided that the summons order and the High Court's decision upholding it were both lawful. During the trial, the Special Court had the chance to hear the appellant's arguments regarding the FIR's late filing, the inconsistent testimony, the absence of any public evidence, and the appellant's acquaintance with the complainant's family. 

Conclusion:

In the present case, during the trial, the Special Court had the chance to hear the appellant's arguments regarding the FIR's late filing, the inconsistent testimony, the absence of any public evidence, and the appellant's acquaintance with the complainant's family.