Date of Judgment:
February 11, 2025
Parties Involved:
- Appellant: Hari Nandan Singh
- Respondents: The State of Jharkhand
Subject Matter:
The case concerns whether calling someone ‘Miyan-Tiyan’ or ‘Pakistani’ amounts to an offense under Sections 298, 504, and 353 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The complainant, a government Urdu translator, alleged that the accused used these terms in a derogatory manner, intending to wound religious sentiments, provoke communal disharmony, and obstruct a public servant from performing official duties. The trial court framed charges under these IPC provisions, which were upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that while such remarks may be offensive and inappropriate, they do not automatically qualify as a criminal act unless there is clear intent to incite violence, disrupt public order, or obstruct a public servant in duty. The Court held that offensive speech alone is not enough to attract criminal liability, reinforcing the principle that not all socially inappropriate remarks warrant prosecution unless they lead to actual harm or disorder.
Introduction
The Supreme Court's decision in Hari Nandan Singh v. State of Jharkhand rekindled controversy over the bounds of free speech, communal sensitivity, and to what extent law should interfere with policing offensive speech. The case revolved around whether referring to someone as ‘Miyan-Tiyan’ or ‘Pakistani’ constituted a criminal offense under Sections 298, 504, and 353 of the IPC. The petitioner, Hari Nandan Singh, raised an objection to the legal basis of the charges against him on the grounds that while his words were offensive, they were not of a kind which would amount to criminal speech requiring punishment.
The role of the Supreme Court in this case was to balance free expression and ensuring social harmony without enabling criminal law to be used as an instrument of oppression of individual grudges. The Court had to examine the purpose of the speech, the effect of the words, and whether or not the recourse to criminal provisions was justified in law in India. In so doing, the ruling brought much-needed clarification of the legal test used to determine whether speech constituted a criminal offence, affirming the rule that not everything that is offensive is actionable
Arguments Before the Supreme Court:
Prosecution's Case
The prosecution's main contention was that the petitioner's comments had a purposeful communal connotation that denigrated the complainant based on their religious identity rather than being merely inadvertent or casual.
Using names like "Miyan-Tiyan" and "Pakistani," it was suggested, implied a sense of otherness and isolation, which may lead to deep-seated animosity given the social fabric of India. According to the prosecution, these labels have historically been used to marginalise and stereotype communities, making them naturally contentious and prone to causing discord within the community.
To substantiate their contention, the prosecution also referred to Section 298 IPC, which provides for criminal action against words used with the intention of offending the religious feelings. They argued that the term 'Miyan-Tiyan' has been used colloquially and pejoratively to describe a member of a particular religion, and the use of that term against an officer of government by the petitioner was an attempt to publicly discredit the complainant on the ground of his religion.
The prosecution further contended that Section 504 IPC was applicable as the words were intended to insult the complainant and thus create a breach of peace. They also invoked Section 353 IPC, charging that verbal threat of a public servant can be defined as obstruction of duty, irrespective of the use of physical force.
The legal argument of the prosecution was based on previous cases where communal comments were found to be punishable under the IPC, specifically when religiously loaded language resulted in disturbance. The prosecution argued that even if violence was not immediate, the possibility of communal polarization and hostility was enough to warrant criminal action.
Defense's Case
In response, the defence argued that offensive speech cannot be criminalised unless it surpasses the legal threshold for public disorder or incitement. They determined that although the petitioner's remarks were impolite and unsuitable, they did not amount to hate speech or an effort to obstruct a government official who was on duty. The defense's main argument was that, in order to prevent overreach and the ensuing restriction of free expression, criminal statutes should be narrowly applied, particularly when speech is involved.
Citing earlier Supreme Court rulings, the defense contended that words, except insofar as they are associated with imminent violence or a direct incitement, are not a criminal act. They referred to Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the Supreme Court established the clear and present danger test, holding that speech can be criminalized only if it has a direct and immediate effect on public disorder. Applying this principle, the defense maintained that calling someone ‘Pakistani’ or ‘Miyan-Tiyan’—while offensive—did not in itself provoke unrest or disrupt public order, making the application of Section 504 IPC invalid.
On Section 353 IPC, the defense argued that verbal insults do not amount to criminal force. They also urged that public officials should be required to a greater level of tolerance, and enabling criminal prosecution over verbal exchanges would create a sinister precedent whereby disagreement with a public official could easily be escalated into a criminal offence. This would, they held, choke off free discussion and provide an ambiance where public servants could abuse the provisions of law to quash dissent.
The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Central Legal Provisions
Section 298 IPC: The Willful Intent Requirement in Criminal Liability
The provision punishes speech intended to offend religious sentiments, was one of the most important provisions considered in this case. Calling someone "Miyan-Tiyan" or "Pakistani," according to the prosecution, is an intrinsically communal statement meant to disparage the complainant's religious identity. They maintained that such statements should be considered crimes under Section 298 IPC since they strengthen religious divisions and perpetuate stereotypes.
But the Supreme Court held that not all such offensive speech having religious connotations can be criminalized. The intent behind the speech is a significant factor, and in order for Section 298 IPC to apply, it must be proved by the prosecution that the accused had willfully intended to offend religious sentiments. The Court relied on its decision in Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar, where it decided that irresponsible or ignorant statements, even if religiously offensive, do not necessarily reach the threshold to be prosecuted unless malice can be established clearly.
The Court noted in Hari Nandan Singh that although the comments were offensive and had a communal meaning, they were not made in a way that openly disparaged religious doctrine, customs, or holy symbols. The decision reiterated that criminal law would unnecessarily restrict free expression and have a chilling effect on public conversation if it were to prosecute every offensive or repulsive statement. As a result, the case was acquitted when the Court determined that the use of these phrases was insufficient to establish an offence under Section 298 IPC.
Section 504 IPC: Actual Requirement of Provocation to a Breach of Peace Under the Law
The prosecution also based their argument on Section 504 IPC, which criminalizes intentional insults aimed at creating a breach of peace. They contended that such public words could lead to severe public disturbance or violent revenge and thus needed criminalization of the defendant.
The Supreme Court, however, reasserted the use of the "clear and present danger" test, as discussed in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar. Speech was criminalized under Section 504 IPC only if it manifestly had a tendency to cause immediate public disorder, according to the Court. There was no concrete proof that the accused's words were responsible for, or likely to cause, violence, riots, or public disturbance in this situation.
The Court also quoted Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, in which the people who had raised pro-Khalistan slogans following the assassination of Indira Gandhi were acquitted because their words did not immediately result in violence. The Court in Hari Nandan Singh followed the same principle and held the fact that words, though as offensive as they can be, cannot be prosecuted for the offense under Section 504 IPC unless there is an immediate and direct effect in a public disturbance.
By acquitting under Section 504 IPC, the Supreme Court asserted that mere conjecture that offending speech "may" lead to violence is not enough for criminal prosecution. Rather, there need to be concrete, provable effects attached to the speech act for it to be criminalizable under the law.
Section 353 IPC: Is Verbal Abuse of a Public Servant a Crime?
The prosecution invoked this provision as well, which forbids the employment of violence or other illegal means to hinder a public officer from performing his duty.
The accused person in this instance, a government translator of Urdu, had been accused of intimidation by the use of the derogatory term "Pakistani" and inhibiting him from performing his task.
This premise was rejected by the Supreme Court, which adjudicated that the use of such derogatory epithets, even though odious, does not amount to "criminal force" unless it accompanied actual physical intimidation, coercion, or obstruction of duty.
The Court was guided by the State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai, in which the Court held that the use of Section 353 IPC is based on the premise that the official duty of a public servant was actually hindered by physical action and intimidation and not by words.
In Hari Nandan Singh, the Court observed that the complainant had continued working and had made no tangible report of obstruction by the accused's words. Accordingly, the charges under Section 353 IPC were held to be legally unsustainable. This judgment protects public servants from invoking criminal laws simply to punish offending words uttered against them unless there is positive proof of coercion or interference with their duties.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Hari Nandan Singh v. State of Jharkhand is a clarion call on the limits of offensive speech and criminal hate speech under Indian law. In acquitting the accused on charges under Sections 298, 504, and 353 IPC, the Court reconfirmed that free speech cannot be restricted just because it is offensive or offensive-minded—there has to be an explicit causal connection between speech and harm in the real world.
This decision will have significant implications for future cases of hate speech, ensuring courts scrutinize context, intent, and effect of speech before applying criminal statutes. It also serves as a critical precedent in shielding people from unjust criminal prosecution for subjective offense, affirming that laws must not be abused to silence dissent or public debate.
Nevertheless, the judgment also poses crucial ethical and social concerns, specifically with respect to the normalization of communal discourse in Indian society. Although the Court adjudicated that the comments did not merit criminal prosecution, the reality is that such comments feed into larger trends of discrimination and exclusion. This highlights the necessity for more robust societal efforts to enact responsible speech, yet also ensure that legal interventions are proportionate and non-excessive.
As India grapples with walking the tight rope between free speech and communal concord, this judgment is a crucial judicial marker, guaranteeing that criminal law continues to act as a protector of real danger while not falling into the realm of being used for subjective cause.
