Deprivation Of A Person's Private Property Without Due Process Of Law Would Violate Human And Constitutional Rights: Sukhdutt Ratra & Anr Vs State Of Himachal Pradesh &Or

Date of Judgement:
06thApril2022

Coram/judge:
The Hon’ble Justice S. Ravindra Bhat
The Hon’ble Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

Parties to the Case:
Appellants-Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr
Respondents-State of Himachal Pradesh &Ors.

Legal Provisions

• Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – which deals with Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon in matters related to property.
• Article 136 of Constitution of India – lays down provision for Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

Overview

• The Appellants claimed to be owners of a land which was utilised by the state for the construction of the ‘Narag Fagla Road’ in 1972-73, but it was alleged that no land acquisition proceedings were initiated, nor compensation given to the appellants or owners of the adjoining land.
• After a judgement of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, a notification was issued and an award was passed, thereby fixing the compensation at Rs. 30,000 per bigha. Subsequently, proceedings for enhancing such compensation were imitated by land owners of nearby areas.
• It was held that the petitioner would be entitled to enhanced compensation of Rs.39,000 per bigha; solatium of 30% per annum on the market value of the land; additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum under Section 23 of the Act w.e.f. 16.10.2001 (date of issuance of notification under Section 4) till the date of making of the award by the Collector, i.e. 20.12.2001; and under Section 28, interest of 9% per annum from 16.10.2001 for a period of one year, and thereafter 15% per annum, till date of payment.
• In 2009, the High Court dismissed the appeal against the order by those claimants, who were seeking statutory interest from the date of taking possession (rather than date of initiation of acquisition proceedings).  
• The present appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court, seeking compensation for the subject land or initiation of acquisition proceedings. Relying on a Full bench decision of the High Court, it was held in the impugned judgment that the matter involved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on the starting point of limitation. The same could not be decided in writ proceedings.

Arguments Advanced by The Appellant

• Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the state had illegally taken over the appellants’ lands, without following due process of law. Leading case laws were cited to support this contention.
• It was further submitted that the appellants’ case was on the same footing as that of adjoining land owners who were granted compensation and consequential benefits. Counsel urged that the state’s inaction was arbitrary, given that the lands adjoining the subject land were acquired under directions of the High Court, despite it being used for the same purpose.
• In Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, there were similar facts and circumstances, the petitioners’ lands had been taken by the State at the same time and for the same purpose as that of the appellants, and the Apex court had after condoning delay of 1756 days, allowed the appeal and directed the State to pay compensation along with all statutory benefits, including solatium, interest, etc.

Arguments Advanced by The Respondent

• Learned Counsel for the state, contended that the petition was immensely delayed and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Appellants had approached the High Court after a delay of 38 years in 2011, against action taken by the State in 1972-73. Further, there had been a delay of about 6 years for approaching the Supreme court after passing of the impugned judgment in 2013. The State opposed the application for condonation of delay by the appellants before the Apex Court.
• It was submitted that the Narag Fagla Road was constructed at the request of the appellants, and other landowners who wanted the benefit of connectivity. Learned Counsel claimed that they volunteered the land for the said purpose, and hence, it was constructed with verbal consent of the appellants.
• There was no objection raised by the appellants till 2011. Further, counsel contended that the lands dealt with in other writ proceedings were not adjoining to the subject land of the appellants. Therefore, the ground of parity would be untenable
• It was contended that in light of the questions of fact relating to limitation, construction of the road, and verbal consent, the appropriate authority would be a civil court, and thus the impugned order should not be interfered with.

Issue

Whether the appellants were entitled to compensation for their land and can such a long delay in filing the petition be condoned?

Judgement Analysis

• The Apex Court observed that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, right to property was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right to property unless in conformity with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.
• The court observed that the State’s actions had compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach the court, although very late. The commencement of acquisition proceedings in the 1990s occurred only at the command of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State’s conduct was noticeable from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and no other land owners. The State sought to avoid its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law.
• In light of the facts of the present case, the State should not shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice.
• The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a secretive and arbitrary manner, tried to limit disbursement of compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was specifically pleaded the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled.
• This arbitrary action and violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration. In State of U.P. v. Manohar the name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading to his dispossession from the land without payment of compensation. The Apex Court held that the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State had taken an unmanageable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a reasonable claim.
• The Court found that the contentions raised by the State deserved to be rejected. The State merely contended to the appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but did not place any material on record to support the plea. The State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in the lawful manner, or that they had ever paid any compensation.
• The court also rejected the State’s contention that since the property was not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. The subject land was acquired for the same reason and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following due process of law. Hence, resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court’s intervention under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of consent in writing to give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation as prescribed in terms of law.
• The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the petition to the Court was liable to be rejected. Delay and laches couldn’t be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay should be a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose.
• In light of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 and 142 of the Constitution, the State was directed to treat the subject lands as a deemed acquisition and disburse compensation to the appellants in the same terms as the order of the reference court dated 04.10.2005. The State was directedto ensure that the appropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the compensation and disburses it to the appellants. The appellants would also be entitled to benefits of solatium, and interest on all sums payable under law as previously adjudicated.
• The appeal was allowed and the order of the High Court was liable to be set aside.

Conclusion

Honourable Supreme Court, pursuant to its discretionary powers, condoned the delay to file a petition against arbitrary acquisition of private property by state. It was held that the state cannot disregard the due procedure established by law in disbursement of compensation as required by law. The appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law.

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