Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu And Others Vs The State Of Karnataka: Section 34 IPC Not Attracted When Final Outcome Or Offence Committed Is Distinctly Remote And Unconnected With Common Intention, Supreme Court

Date of Judgment:
16th February 2022.

Bench:
Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Bela M.Trivedi, J.

Parties:
Appellants: Krishnamurthy@ Gunodu and others.
Respondent: The state of Karnataka.

Subject

The court held that Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code does not apply when the result or offense committed is remote and unrelated to the common aim. A co-perpetrator with a common intention is only accountable to the degree that he intends or could or should have visualized the final act's likelihood or probability.

Legal Provisions

• Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – states the acts done by doing more than two people in furtherance of a comment intent When numerous people commit criminal conduct in the name of a common goal, each of them is held responsible in the same way as if the act had been committed by him alone.
• Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – states the punishment for murder, whoever commits murder will be liable to imprisonment with life or death along with a fine.
• Section 447 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – states that whoever commits trespass(criminal trespass) shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three months or with a fine.
• Section 341of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – states the punishment for wrongful restraint, i.e., Whoever illegally restrains another person shall be punished by simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding one month, a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees or both.

Overview

• The appellant, upon aggrieved by his conviction U/s. 302 read with Section 34 and other individual provisions passed in Criminal Appeal of 2017 by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Kalburgi Bench, has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court after having examined the attested pieces of evidence and oral depositions given by (PW-6) and (PW-7).
• The alleged Krishnamurthy@Gunodu was ascertained to have been assaulted the deceased Venkataraman with his legs and hands, and the oral deposition given by Dr. Sharanabasava who conducted the post-mortem on the deceased affirmed that the death of the deceased caused by contusion around the neck and clotting on the chest, and the proximate cause of death was opined to be haemorrhagic shock resulting from multiple injuries.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that though the accused was not armed with any sort of weapon his attacks were cruel and were sufficient in the ordinary court of nature to cause the death of the deceased, the inclusion of Section 300 of IPC would get attracted for causing injuries to the deceased and it was ascertained that it was a homicidal act by Krishnamurthy which resulted into the death of Venkatarama.
• Furthermore, the Hon’ble Court deposed Dullaiah(PW-6) and Dodda Narasimha(PW-7) after which it was concluded that it was similar, the Court observed that the accused Gopala was assisting in getting hold of the deceased Venakatarama and when he was vulnerable then Krishnamurthy assaulted the deceased with his own hands.
• Upon the cross-examination of eyewitnesses, they did not confirm adequately as to who confined the hands and who pulled the legs of the deceased, but they both testified that it was the accused ‘Venkatarama’ who kicked with both legs and assaulted with hands, but here the court saw an anomaly as from the depositions it was ‘Krishnamurthy’ who was an accused and not ‘Venakatarama’.
• Likewise, upon deposition given by the wife of the deceased, it was clear as to that Accused No.3 ‘Thimmappa and Accused No.4 were the ones who held the deceased hands and Accused No. 4 Gopala was the one who pulled the legs of the deceased and the Accused No.1 Krishnamurthy assaulted the ‘Venkatarama’ which resulted into a fatal injury.
• Also, the son of the deceased ‘Venkatarama’, Ramanjaneya(PW-4) averred the statements given by his mother and the Hon’ble Court accepted the versions of Channamma(PW-1) and Ramanjaneya(PW-4).
• Likewise, the Hon’ble Court averred the statements made by the eyewitnesses of the incident and accepted the statements made by ‘Dullaiah’(PW-6) and ‘Dodda Narasimha’(PW-7), that the accused were completely unarmed and ascertained that this was not a premeditated attack to murder the deceased ‘Venkatarama’.
• Further, the Court distinguished between the severity of the acts omitted by ‘Thimmappa’ and ‘Gopala’ are of a lesser degree as compared to that of the assault inflicted upon the deceased by the accused ‘Krishnamurthy’.
• Additionally, the post-mortem reports and the deposition submitted by Dr. Shranabasava (PW-9) have affirmed that the immediate cause of death was the result of the injuries inflicted by the accused ‘Krishnamurthy’.

Issues

• Whether the Joint-perpetrators/participants shall be held liable as the main/principal perpetrator?
• Whether the attributed common intent of both the Joint-perpetrators could be associated with that of the Principal perpetrator for conviction U/s. 302 for murder and U/s.34 for sharing common intent?

Judgment

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court placed reliance on the case of Suresh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, to assess questions posed on common intention U/s 34 of the Penal Code, 1860, the notion of vicarious culpability is applied. It makes a person accountable for the actions of another person with whom he shared a common intention, even if the offense was not committed by him. It is an evidence rule that does not result in a substantive offense.The section codifies the common-sense idea that when more than two people do anything together on purpose, it is the same as if each of them had done it separately.
• The Hon’ble Court also observed that the common intention can be formed at the spur of the moment or the moment of occurrence, and it is ascertainable only in the matter of inference in certain circumstances of the case.
• Likewise, in the case of Satrughan Patar v. Emperor, the Hon’ble Court observed that Section 34 may be utilized only where a court determines with reasonable certainty that a specific accused must have foreseen or premeditated the outcome or acted in collaboration with others to bring about that outcome.
• Also, relying on an earlier decision in the case of Afrahim Sheikh and Others v. State of West Bengal, which referred to the expression “act” explained in the case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The kind Emperor, which explained that the criminal offense is the final result or the outcome but it can also be achieved through individual or several criminal acts.
• When a person is assaulted by a group of others, the "ultimate criminal conduct" is usually the offense that resulted in or may result in death, simple bodily harm, or grievous bodily harm.Following this, it was held that common intention, of the whole of the perpetrators, is attributable to each offender, individually although they may have done separate acts.
• The examined question was the second part of Section 304 is concerned with does not refer to the intention which has been segregated, but it was noted that the knowledge is the knowledge of the likelihood of causing the death of the deceased. Therefore, to establish that there existed a common intention before a person can be vicariously convicted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860.
• Incriminating facts must be irreconcilable with the accused's innocence and beyond the reach of any other plausible explanation. A criminal act in Section 34 of the IPC includes omission to act, according to Section 33 of the Indian Penal Code.Thus, a co-perpetrator who did nothing but stand outside the door while the crime was committed may be held accountable.
• Furthermore, the Hon’ble Court placed reliance on the case of Krishnan and Another v. State of Kerala and held that an overt omission of the act is not the requirement of the placed law but the burden lies upon the prosecution to establish that there the person concerned with the incident resulting into the death of the deceased shared the common intention.
• The essence and proof that co-participants in the illegal activity had a simultaneous consensus of thought are, nonetheless, needed, and important.
• Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on an old judgment by a divisional bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Bashir v. the State, emphasizing that it is tantamount that each co-perpetrator should have the necessary knowledge about the intent to participate or otherwise has slight knowledge about the offense that is likely to be committed in “furtherance” of the common object, and merely follow the Principal Accused may not establish the common intention.
• Thus, the co-perpetrator shall be held liable to only to such extent to which he has acted and should have visualized the possibility of the final act. And simultaneously if the final act is not connected then he shall not be held liable jointly and severally.
• Subsequently to prove to substantiate the conviction U/s 34 of Indian Penal Code, the Hon’ble Court has referred Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, two factors must be established is (i) Common intention and (ii) Participation of the accused in the commission of an offense, and although if the common intent is proved but no overt act is attributed to the same then the conviction under this provision is not attracted.
• In Rajnesh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, In order to prove the charge of common intention, the prosecution must show, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that there was a plan or meeting of minds among all the accused persons to commit the offense for which they are charged under Section 34, whether pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; however, it must occur prior to the commission of the crime.
• After the reference to the above case,highlighting the similar circumstances of the case where the accused attacked the deceased with a lathi and on a non-vital part of the body. The conviction was converted from Section 302 to U/s. 326 of Indian Penal Code
• In another reference in the case of Arun v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, the benefit was given to one of the accused as he was not acting conjointly with others to commit the act of murder. Unless some other incriminating evidence is produced before the court and in the absence of such material pieces of evidence of the intent of the principal offenders and co-perpetrators, they cannot justifiably be held guilty for every offense committed by the principal offender.
• Thus, allowing the appeal partially, the Hon’ble Court while applying the aforesaid principles of applicability of Section 34 IPC, to the facts of this case, held that ‘Thimmappa’ and ‘Gopala’ are entitled to benefit of the doubt on the ground of lacking common intent with that of Principal offender ‘Krishnamurthy’. Subsequently, the court acquitted them of charges meted out U/Ss. 300 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code.
• And were further convicted U/s 323 read with section 34 of IPC to a maximum sentence of one year. And additionally, principal offender ‘Krishnamurthy’ was sentenced to life imprisonment and shall not be entitled to early release.-

Conclusion

The phrase "act in furtherance of common aim" is also used in Section 34 of the IPC. As a result, if Section 34 is invoked, it is important to determine whether the criminal offense has occurred.If the crime was committed in a far-flung location,Section 34 would not be applicable if it had nothing to do with the common goal.

However, if the criminal offense committed or performed was attributable to, or was primarily connected to, or was a known or reasonably possible outcome of the pre-concert/contemporaneous engagement or a manifestation of mutual consent for the accomplishment of a common purpose, it will fall within the scope and ambit of the act is done in furtherance of common intention.

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