IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10613 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.36237 of 2012)
REPORTABLE
STATE OF M.P. & ORS. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
PARVEZ KHAN …RESPONDENT
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
1. Leave granted.
J U D G M E N T
2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment
and Order dated 20
th
March, 2012 of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No.262 of 2010.
3. The question raised for our consideration is whether the
refusal by the competent authority to give compassionate
appointment in police service on the ground of criminal
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antecedents of a candidate who is acquitted for want of evidence
or who is discharged from the criminal case on account of
compounding can be justified.
4. Sultan Khan was serving with the Madhya Pradesh Police.
He died in harness on 21
st
June, 2005. His son, the respondent
Parvez Khan, applied for compassionate appointment. The
competent authority sent his record for police verification. It was
found that he was involved in two criminal cases. In one case,
he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 325,
294 and 506-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and in the other
under Sections 452, 394 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code. The
Superintendent of Police held that he was not eligible for
appointment in Government service and closed his case.
5. The respondent challenged the said order by way of Writ
Petition No.15052 of 2008 on the ground that in the first case he
was acquitted on 31
st
January, 2007 and in the second he was
discharged on account of compounding of offence.
6. Learned Single Judge did not find any merit in his
contention in the writ petition and dismissed the petition. On
appeal, the Division Bench took a different view. It was held that
the object of verification was to verify suitability of a candidate
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for employment. Since the respondent was acquitted in both the
criminal cases he could not be considered unsuitable. No
reason had been given as to why after acquittal in the criminal
case, the respondent was considered to be unsuitable.
Accordingly, the Division Bench directed consideration of case of
the respondent afresh in the light of observations in the order
within three months. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has
preferred this appeal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Learned counsel for the State submitted that since on
police verification, it was found that the respondent was involved
in criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he could not be given
appointment. Mere acquittal for want of evidence or discharge
on account of compromise could not be taken to be conclusive
for suitability of a candidate. The result of criminal proceedings
was not conclusive of suitability of a candidate for recruitment to
police service.
9. It is submitted that in a criminal case, a person cannot be
punished in absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt but the
standard of proof required for consideration of suitability or
otherwise of a candidate was not the same. Discharge on
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account of compounding of the offence by the victim depended
upon the attitude of the parties. The victim may be prepared to
settle the matter for any consideration other than innocence of
the accused, but it did not wash off the criminal antecedents of
an accused. Entering into police service required a candidate to
be of character, integrity and clean antecedents. If a person is
acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was
falsely involved and he had no criminal antecedents. All that
may be inferred is that he has not been proved to be guilty.
Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in
Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh
1
.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the
impugned order and submitted that some other similarly placed
candidates had been given compassionate appointment. Two
such instances have been pointed out by the respondent in the
counter affidavit. He has also submitted that the State of
Madhya Pradesh has issued Guidelines dated 5
th
June, 2003 for
character verification of candidates for recruitment to
Government service and such guidelines do no justify rejection
of candidature of the respondent. One of the instances given is
of Dilip Kumar Samadhiya son of Shri Jagdish Prasad
1
2013 (7) SCC 685
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Samadhiya against whom three criminal cases were registered
prior to the recruitment in Government service but he was
acquitted either on account of compromise or on account of
benefit of doubt. Still, he was given appointment. Similarly,
Jitender Sharma was recruited to Police service though he was
tried for a criminal case, but acquitted on account of
compounding or on the basis of benefit of doubt. As per
Guidelines dated 5
th
June, 2003, an independent view can be
taken only where candidate has concealed the information about
pendency of trial and not where there is no such concealment,
as in the present case.
11. After due consideration, we are of the view that the
impugned order cannot be sustained. Refusal by the competent
authority to recruit the respondent on the ground of criminal
antecedents is not liable to be interfered with. The applicable
Guidelines dated 5
th
June, 2003 inter alia provide :
“On the basis of merits and demerits by the Hon’ble
Court the acquitted candidate will be eligible for the
Government Service.”
The above guidelines show that acquittal is not conclusive.
Even after acquittal, basis of order of the Court has to be gone
into by the competent authority. Even after order based on
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compromise or lack of evidence may render a candidate
ineligible. In the present case, the relevant part of the order of
the Superintendent of Police is as follows:
“Action was taken in regard to the proceedings of
compassionate appointment, character verification
was got done, wherein vide Letter
No.V.S./21/VHR/2007/17(F)283/07 dated 17.9.2007
of the Police Headquarters it was informed that a
case under Section 294, 323, 506, 324, 34 of IPC
had been registered against the applicant in Police
Station Kotwali as Crime No.185/06 and the
applicant was acquitted on the basis of a
compromise by the Court on 23.2.2007. In the
same manner in Crime No.494/06 under Section
394, 364, 451 of IPC a case was registered and vide
judgment dated 31.1.2007 of the Court he was
acquitted.
Two separate crimes had been registered against
the applicant, wherein in one case Section 394,
451, 365 of IPC are there and which come in the
category of moral turpitude. In the judgment of the
Court benefit of doubt has been given, therefore, as
per the new guidelines of 2003 issued by the
Government of Madhya Pradesh in respect of
character verification the applicant Parvez Khan
alias Sonu alias Raja has been found to be ineligible
for Government service.”
12. In Mehar Singh (supra), the question considered by this Court
was as follows :
“18. The question before this Court is whether the
candidature of the respondents who had made a
clean breast of their involvement in a criminal case
by mentioning this fact in their
application/attestation form while applying for a
post of Constable in Delhi Police, who were
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provisionally selected subject to verification of
their antecedents and who were subsequently
acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be
cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi
Police on the ground that they are not found
suitable for appointment to the post of Constable.”
After considering the rival contentions, the Court held :
“23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to
conclude that the Screening Committee would be
entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of
moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are
acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable.
The Screening Committee will be within its rights to
cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the
acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct
of the prosecution case or is the result of material
witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers
of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge
whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely
to revert to similar activities in future with more
strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police
force. The Screening Committee will have to consider
the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in
the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for
worsening the law and order situation rather than
maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the
Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this
Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only
persons with impeccable character enter the police
force.
24. We find no substance in the contention that by
cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening
Committee has overreached the judgments of the
criminal court. We are aware that the question of corelation
between a criminal case and a departmental
enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can
be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in
connection with it because the issue involved is
somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person
with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While
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the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof
beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a
departmental proceeding is preponderance of
probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal
because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not
acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of
doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal
on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no
indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P.
Kapur v. Union of India
[
AIR 1964 SC 787] this Court
has taken a view that departmental proceedings can
proceed even though a person is acquitted when the
acquittal is other than honourable.
25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was
considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram [2013 (1)
SCC 598]. In that case this Court was concerned with a
situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against a police officer. Criminal case was pending
against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4
of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case
because of the non-examination of key witnesses.
There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal
case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring
to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh
Panchal [1994 (1) SCC 541] where in somewhat similar
fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s action of
refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the
ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by
giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not
an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High
Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment
imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court
observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”,
“acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are
unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal
Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define what is meant by the expression
“honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that
when the accused is acquitted after full consideration
of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably
fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused,
it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably
acquitted.
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26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion that
since the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to
keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or
dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of
moral turpitude, out of the department, if found
necessary, because they pollute the department, surely
the above principles will apply with more vigour at the
point of entry of a person in the police department i.e.
at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the
Screening Committee that the person against whom a
serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is
discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the
same charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the
Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his
candidature. Stricter norms need to be applied while
appointing persons in a disciplinary force because
public interest is involved in it.
27. Against the above background, we shall now
examine what is the nature of acquittal of the
respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal,
respondent Mehar Singh and others armed with iron
chains, lathis, danda, stones, etc. stopped a bus,
rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to
take the fare from one of their associates. Those who
intervened were beaten up. They received injuries. The
miscreants broke the side windowpanes of the bus by
throwing stones. The complainant was also injured.
This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public
order. The assault on the conductor was preplanned
and premeditated. The FIR was registered under
Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 IPC. The order dated
30-1-2009 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under
Sections 323, 341 and 427 IPC are concerned, the
accused entered into a compromise with the
complainant. Hence, the learned Magistrate acquitted
respondent Mehar Singh and others of the said
offences. The order further indicates that so far as
offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 IPC is
concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. The
learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused
of the said offence. This acquittal can never be
described as an acquittal on merits after a full-fledged
trial. Respondent Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in
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the police force by portraying this acquittal as an
honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no discussion
on merits of the case in this order. Respondent Mehar
Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the
evidence.
28. So far as respondent Shani Kumar is concerned,
the FIR lodged against him stated that he along with
other accused abused and threatened the
complainant’s brother. They opened fire at him due to
which he sustained bullet injuries. The offences under
Sections 307, 504 and 506 IPC were registered against
respondent Shani Kumar and others. The order dated
14-5-2010 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the
injured person did not support the prosecution case.
They were declared hostile. Hence, the learned
Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt
and acquitted them. This again is not a clean acquittal.
The use of firearms in this manner is a serious matter.
For entry in the police force, acquittal order based on
benefit of doubt in a serious case of this nature is
bound to act as an impediment.
29. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil
Kumar [1996(11) CC 605]. In that case, the
respondent therein had appeared for recruitment as a
Constable in Delhi Police Services. He was selected
provisionally, but, his selection was subject to
verification of character and antecedents by the local
police. On verification, it was found that his
antecedents were such that his appointment to the
post of Constable was not found desirable.
Accordingly, his name was rejected. He approached
the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on
the ground that since the respondent had been
discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable
under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34
and Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of
appointment to the post under the State. This Court
disapproved of the Tribunal’s view. It was observed
that verification of the character and antecedents is
one of the important criteria to test whether the
selected candidate is suitable for the post under the
State. This Court observed that though the candidate
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was provisionally selected, the appointing authority
found it not desirable to appoint him on account of his
antecedent record and this view taken by the
appointing authority in the background of the case
cannot be said to be unwarranted. Whether the
respondent was discharged or acquitted of the
criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the
question as to whether he should be appointed to the
post. What would be relevant is the conduct or
character of the candidate to be appointed to a
service and not the actual result thereof.
30. It was argued that Sushil Kumar must be
distinguished from the facts of the instant case
because the respondent therein had concealed the
fact that a criminal case was registered against him,
whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment.
It is not possible for us to accept this submission. The
aspect of concealment was not considered in Sushil
Kumar at all. This Court only concentrated on the
desirability to appoint a person, against whom a
criminal case is pending, to a disciplined force. Sushil
Kumar cannot be restricted to cases where there is
concealment of the fact by a candidate that a criminal
case was registered against him. When the point of
concealment or otherwise and its effect was not
argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in
Sushil Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its
observations to the cases where there is concealment
of facts.
xxxxxxxxx
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned,
his case appears to have been compromised. It was
urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a
compromise should not be treated as a
disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose
of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no
merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements
have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and
amiable atmosphere in the society by according a
quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also
to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from
the agony of pending litigation. But these
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considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to
maintain integrity and high standard of police force,
the Screening Committee may decline to take
cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be
dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted
for that.
xxxxxxxxxx
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders
the great responsibility of maintaining law and order
and public order in the society. People repose great
faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that
confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must
have impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this
category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the
criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will
have to be examined to see whether he has been
completely exonerated in the case because even a
possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a
threat to the discipline of the police force. The
Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of
taking decisions in these matters to the Screening
Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee
must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent
times, the image of the police force is tarnished.
Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward
manner by misusing power are in public domain and
are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police
force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we
would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of
a mechanism like the Screening Committee created
by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are
likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police
force. At the same time, the Screening Committee
must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed
in it and must treat all candidates with an even
hand.”
13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a
candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of
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confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must
have impeccable character and integrity. A person having
criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is
acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was
completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the
credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. No
doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the
case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by learned
counsel for the Respondent, in the present case, the
Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The
Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no
allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said
decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.
There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely
implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want of
evidence or discharge based on compounding.
14. The plea of parity with two other persons who were recruited
can also not help the respondent. This aspect of the matter was
also gone into by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and it was
held :
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“36. The Screening Committee’s proceedings have
been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and
unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no
evidence of this. However, certain instances have been
pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious
offences have been recommended for appointment by
the Screening Committee. It is well settled that to such
cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of
the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine
does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur (2010
(11) SCC 455). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or
fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the
Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out
the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that
people with doubtful background do not enter the
police force, deviates from the policy, makes exception
and allows entry of undesirable persons, it is
undoubtedly guilty of committing an act of grave
disservice to the police force but we cannot allow that
illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents
to rely on such cases. It is for the Commissioner of
Police, Delhi to examine whether the Screening
Committee has compromised the interest of the police
force in any case and to take remedial action if he finds
that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-depth
examination of this allegation at the highest level.
Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are
responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect
the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into the
matter and if there is substance in the allegations to
take necessary steps forthwith so that policy
incorporated in the Standing Order is strictly
implemented.”
15. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of the
view that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified
in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the respondent
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for recruitment to the police service by way of giving him
compassionate appointment.
16. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the
impugned order. There will be no order as to costs.
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 1, 2014.
…………………………………………J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
.…………………………………………J.
(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
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