Top News Headlines 15th Apr 2022: Compassionate Appointment To Be Cancelled If Undertaking To Take Care Of Aged Mother-in-law Breached

Compassionate Appointment To Be Cancelled If Undertaking To Take Care Of Aged Mother-in-law Breached: Bombay HC

• In the case of Usha Giri vs State of Maharashtra the Bombay HC has made it clear that if the undertaking to take care of the aged mother-in-law is not followed through, the compassionate appointment given to the widow ought to be cancelled.
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• The Bombay HC directed a local Zila Parishad to consider the application filed by a widow seeking a compassionate appointment after she gave an undertaking by way of affidavit that she will take proper care of her 74 year old mother-in-law.
• The Bench, in the instant case, was hearing a plea filed by Usha Giri by which she had challenged the decision of the Zila Parishad given on 13-2-2020 rejecting her plea of compassionate appointment. Usha’s husband was employed in the Zila Parishad and had passed away in 2015, after which Usha had applied before the relevant authorities for seeking compassionate employment.
• However, this application of hers was objected to by her mother-in-law. She alleged that her daughter-in-law had been harassing and ill-treating her. The Zila Parishad had considered this complaint of the mother-in-law and had rejected Usha’s application for compassionate appointment.
• Aggrieved by this order, Usha had filed an application before the Hon’ble HC.
• In an affidavit filed on 8-4-2022, Usha had given an undertaking by way of affidavit in which she wrote that since her mother-in-law is dependent upon her as well as her 10 year old daughter, she will ensure that the mother-in-law is well taken care of.
• The Court also referred to a similar judgement under similar circumstances that was passed by a coordinate bench of the HC in Anita Dnyaneshwar @ Dnayandeo Suryawanshi vs State of Maharashtra.
• Thus, while partly allowing the appeal, the Court ordered the Zila Panchayat to consider Usha’s plea for compassionate appointment and also held that in the event the mother-in-law raises any objection, then the Zila Parishad would deal with the same and ensure, as far as possible, that there is a reconciliation between them.

Forfeiture Of The Right To Maintenance u/s 125(4) Applicable Only If Adultery Is Committed Repeatedly: Delhi HC

• In Sh. Pradeep Kumar Sharma vs Smt. Deepika Sharma the Hon’ble Delhi HC has held that the only continuous and repeated acts of adultery would attract the rigours of section 125(4) of CrPC.
• Section 125(4) of CrPC provides that no wife would be entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery, or if she refuses to live with her husband without sufficient cause, or both the husband and the wife are living separately by mutual consent.
• The instant criminal revision petition was filed seeking to set aside the order and judgement dated 31-7-2020 passed by the Family Court. The marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was solemnised on 9-4-2000 according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and two children were born out of the wedlock. But due to several disputes amongst the parties, several civil and criminal cases were filed by both the parties against each other.
• This petition was filed against the order of the Family Court wherein the Court had granted the maintenance of Rs.6000 per month from 14-2-2012 to 28-2-2013, Rs.6000 per month from 1-4-2014 to 31-12-2015, Rs.7000 per month from 1-1-2016 to 31-7-2020 and Rs. 15,000 per month from 1-8-2020 till the life of the respondent or her marriage.
• The Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Family Court was wrong and perverse, and was hence liable to be set aside. The Court had failed to appreciate evidence and the provisions of section 125 CrPC while passing the impugned order. It was argued that the respondent was capable of maintaining herself, and she had herself admitted to having a job during the pendency of the case during her cross examination.
• It was also argued that the respondent had left the petitioner’s company and had started to live separately without citing any cogent reason. The Family Court also failed to appreciate the misconduct and misdemeanour of the respondent while passing the order.
• The Counsel for the petitioner also argued that the question of adultery was not appreciated correctly. It was argued that the son of the parties clearly stated that he along with his mother, started living with a man named Pankaj Arya since 2014 and that the respondent and Mr. Pankaj Arya were living together as husband and wife.
• The Hon’ble HC observed that the law emanating from the various decisions of the Apex Court and various HCs have clearly established that the right to maintenance cannot be forfeited merely on the grounds of cruelty. Even in cases in which the Courts have granted divorce on the ground of cruelty, the Courts have awarded permanent alimony to the wife.
• As regards the ground of adultery, the Court observed that the petitioner had not taken up this argument himself, he did not add the ground to his pleadings, nor was the respondent put to notice about the alleged adultery. The petitioner failed to establish that the respondent was living with Pankaj Arya, and was not even cross examined to confirm his version. The ground was brought about at a later stage and the respondent was not cross-examined on the question of adultery.
• The Court observed that in order to extract the provision under section 125(4) of CrPC, the husband has to establish with definite evidence that the wife has been living in adultery, and one or two isolated incidents would not amount to ‘living in adultery’.
• The Court referred to the decision of the Bombay HC in the case of Pandurang Bakru Nathe vs leela Pandurang Nathe and anr (1997) SCC wherein the Court had observed that ‘living in adultery’ connotes a wife living perpetually or semi-perpetually with a man other that her husband and having sexual relations with him. Sporadic incidents of sexual relationship between a wife and another man cannot fall within the ambit of ‘living in adultery’.
• The same view has been taken in various other cases like Sandha vs Narayanan (1999) SCC, Ashok vs Anita (2011) SCC and Sukhdev Pakharwal vs Rekha Okhle (2018) SCC.
• Thus, the HC observed that the petitioner was unable to establish the fact that his wife was living in adultery. The Court also observed that the petitioner had filed for divorce on the ground of the alleged cruelty by the respondent, while at the same time stating that the respondent had deserted him and had left his company without any reason. The two grounds cannot coexist. Therefore the second ground of the petitioner also could not be established to contend that the respondent was not entitled to any maintenance.
• The Court upheld the Family Court’s decision and the petition was accordingly disposed of.

If Vendor Admits The Execution Of Agreement And Payment Of Consideration, nothing Else Needs To Be Proved: SC

• In P. Ramasubbamma v. V. Vijayalakshmi And Ors. (2022), the Hon'ble SC was dealing with an appeal against the Karnataka High Court's ruling of setting aside the Trial Court's order issuing a decree for the particular performance of a sale agreement. Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna observed that the vendee is not required to further establish anything in a claim for specific performance of the agreement to sell once the vendor agrees to the execution of the agreement to sell and payment of the advance substantial sale consideration.
• In this case, it was contended that respondent no. 1 had failed to execute the sale deed even after the appellant had advanced a sum total of Rs. 26 lakhs and had endorsed the same. Ultimately, the appellant disclosed that two sale deeds were executed in favour of the sisters-in-law of respondents no. 1 and 2 by respondent no. 2. Thus, the appellant filed a lawsuit, as respondent no. 1 failed to execute the agreement even after receiving a legal notice for the execution of the same. After filing the suit, while respondent no. 1 executed his side of the agreement, respondent no. 2 contested the same.
• Since respondent no. 1 had admitted to the agreement's execution, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. However, respondent no. 2 used his power of attorney to execute the sale deeds in their favour. The Karnataka HC overturned the Trial Court's decision and concluded that such a remedy could not have been given because no petition to declare the following sale null and void had been submitted. The appellant argued that the HC had erred in setting aside the directive passed by the Trial Court in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, and since nobody testified on behalf of the respondents, the Court heard the appeal ex parte.
• Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act talks about discretion as to Decreeing Specific Performance.
• In a relevant case, Lala Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors., 1954 SCR 360, the petitioner was merely seeking the specific fulfilment of the sale agreement. In a suit for specific performance, the subsequent purchaser was held to be a necessary party.
• In another relevant recent decision, R. C. Chandiok &Another v. Chunni Lal Sabharwal &Others ([1971] 2. SCR 573.), while passing a decree for specific performance of a contract, a direction was issued that the rule should be in the same form as in Lala Durga Prasad's case.
• In another notable case, Rathnavathi and Anr. v. Kavita Ganashamdas (MANU/SC/0966/2014: 2015 (5) SCC 223), the Hon'ble Court held that the case was not drawn against the Plaintiff in such a way that he could be barred from filing a subsequent suit to claim specific performance of agreement against the Defendants concerning the suit property.
• After hearing the appeal ex parte, the Hon'ble Court held that the appellant need not prove anything regarding the specific performance complaint as respondent no. 1 had admitted to the execution of the agreement to sell and the payment of the advance sale consideration. Additionally, it was held that since the Trial Court had framed specific issues pertaining to the said sale deeds, the HC could not have overturned the Trial Court's decree because there was no particular relief of cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of subsequent purchasers.
• Furthermore, Hon'ble Court concluded that the appellant was aware of the said agreement as the stamp papers of the agreement to sell in favour of the appellant were purchased in the respondent's (no. 2) name. The Court stated that the HC had resorted to Section 20 of the Special Relief Act to exercise discretion in denying relief, but the same would not hold ground as –

1. The Trial Court determined that the original owner had allowed the execution of the agreement to sell in favour of the appellant by accepting a significant advance consideration;
2. Respondent no. 2 was cognizant of such an agreement;
3. Respondent no. 2 executed nominal sale deeds on behalf of purchasers who were their sisters-in-law.

• Therefore, the appeal was allowed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.