Kerala HC Acquits Mother For Allegedly Killing Her 9 Year Old Son; Says When A Woman Kills Her Progeny, There Is More Than Meets The Eye
- In the case of Teena vs. State of Kerala the Hon’ble Kerala HC has acquitted a woman who was accused of killing her 9 year old son, who was her only child. This was apparently done by her to avenge her disturbed marital life.
- The case of the prosecution was that due to marital discord, to wreck vengeance against her husband she murdered her child by feeding him sleeping pills and then slitting his wrist. When he started waking up, she smothered him with a pillow. Then she herself drank some pesticide and slit her own wrist in order to commit suicide.
- The Counsel appearing for the accused argued that the trial Court’s decision was not based on the evidence that was led, else it would have exonerated the accused instead of convicting her. The post mortem report of the child clearly states death by smothering and while the alleged dying declaration of the accused does not speak of smothering at all. It was also vehemently argued that the accused did not pass away after making her statement, which makes that statement irrelevant under section 32(1).
- It was also argued that the alleged dying declaration could not be treated as a confession as well since the provisions of section 164(2) and (4) have not been compiled with. Invocation of power under section 311 of CrPC was also questioned by the Counsel for the accused when he said that it seemed that the learned Judge himself tried to step into the shoes of the prosecutor and tried to convict the accused.
- Reliance was placed by the Counsel for the accused on a multitude of cases including Shivappa vs. State of Karnataka (1995)2 SCC, Parmanand Pegu vs. State of Assam (2004)7 SCC and Kishan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2000)1 SCC, among others.
- The HC, at the outset, observed that the it would be unfair to attribute the motive of the murder and suicide solely on the fact that she hated her husband and her sour marriage and she did the same due to the sole reason that she was vengeful. The Court also noted that the husband in this case was an addict and had a history of mental illness. It was alleged by the accused that he had been abusive on multiple occasions. However, the Court was unable to attribute this as her motive to commit the offense.
- The HC also objected to the reliance that was placed by the trial Court Judge on the dying declaration of the accused. It was held by the HC that the moment a dying declaration transformed into a confession because of the maker not passing away but surviving, and in cases where there is a possibility that the maker is himself the accused, the Magistrate ought to pause and comply with the provisions of section 164(2) to (4) of CrPC.
- The HC also noted that as per section 32 of the Evidence Act, since the declarant had survived and was not under threat of imminent death, her statements cannot be treated as a dying declaration but a mere confession. The same was held to be inadmissible as it stood in violation of Article 20(3), unless it was recorded following the procedure in section 164 CrPC.
- The Court also held that the invocation of section 311 of CrPC was also bad in law, since it has been laid down in various decisions of the Hon’ble SC that there should be strong and valid reasons for the invocation of this power, which were absent in this case, particularly in the light of the fact that the Public Prosecutor had not asked for a recalling of the witnesses.
- In light of the aforesaid contentions, the Court held that the prosecution had been unable to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the appeal was allowed and the conviction of the accused was set aside.
Burden Of Proof Cannot Be Shifted On The Accused By Placing Reliance On Section 106 Of The Evidence Act: SC
- The Hon’ble Supreme Court (SC or Court), in the case of Satye Singh & Anr v State of Uttarakhand observed that if the prosecution fails to prove the prima facie facts against the accused, then burden of proof cannot be placed on the accused under the cloak of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act).
- Acquitting the accused from the charges of murder, the two judge Bench observed that the prosecution cannot be relieved from its duty to prove the guilt of the murder by pressing into service the provisions contained under Section 106.
- The High Court (HC) had dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence awarded by the District & Sessions Judge, Tehri Garhwal for offences under Sections 302 read with 34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced to life imprisonment for murdering his wife.
- Placing reliance under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, prosecution for the State argued that the accused failed to give any explanation regarding the whereabouts of the deceased the night of the murder when she went missing and also alleged that the accused tried to mislead the Investigating Officer.
- The Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the prosecution failed to submit any cogent evidence to prove the charges levelled against the appellants and they were being wrongly targeted given their relationship with the deceased.
- Based on the evidence placed before it and the finding of the doctor who had examined the deceased’s body, Court observed that there was no shadow of doubt it was homicidal death. The Court also remarked that the entire investigation was conducted in a very cursory and shoddy manner.
- The Court also observed that despite there being evidence that the deceased was harassed by the accused, no charge was framed against the latter under section 498A of IPC by the Trial Court.
- The Court noted that the entire case of prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness to the alleged incident and remarked that it is a settled position of law that circumstances however strong cannot take the place of proof and that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
- Countering the argument put forth by the prosecution and relying on SC decision in the case of Shambu Nath Mehra v State of Ajmer, the Court remarked that Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution from discharging its duty to prove the guilt of the accused. The general rule in a criminal case is that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
- In view of the matter that no compelling evidence or witness was produced against the accused, the Court set aside the impugned judgments of the earlier Courts and directed the accused to be set free.
Liberty Of An Accused Can Be Put At Stake by Denying Bail On the Pretext of Investigation Not Being Complete: Punjab & Haryana HC
- The Hon’ble High Court (HC) of Punjab & Haryana in the case of Joginder Singh v State of Haryana, set aside an order of the Trial Court rejecting default bail to the Petitioner and ordered the Petitioner to be released on furnishing requisite bonds.
- The petitioner was arrested under the Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) for carrying Tramado Hydrochloride Prolonged-release Tablets-IP and Tricore-SR, a contraband.
- The Petitioner applied for bail under Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) read with Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act since challan was not filed within the stipulated period of 180 days.
- Section 36A(4) of NDPS provides for extending the period of detention of an accused beyond the stipulated period of 180 days upon submission of the report the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of investigation and specifying the reasons extending the detention beyond 180 days.
- The bail was denied on the grounds that prosecution had been permitted to file the final report under Section 173 CrPC. within an extended period upto one year.
- The Court noted that mere filing of an application does not ipso facto empower the court to extend the stipulated period for filing challan; progress of investigation and reasons for extending detention must be recorded. It was also stated that a copy of application for extension of time was not served to the Petitioner and the impugned order was also passed in the absence of the petitioner.
- The Court also remarked that the Public Prosecutor, being an independent statutory authority, and his report to the Court, on the face of it, must disclose that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the investigation.
- Further, the court remarked that the Prosecutor’s report is of vital importance given the fact that its acceptance affects the liberty of the accused and therefore, it must strictly comply with the requirements laid down under Section 36A(4).
- Elaborating on the issue, the Court further remarked that the court must be satisfied with the justification, from the report of the Public Prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation.
- The Court noted that in the instant case, the application for extension of time by the Investigating Officer (IO) cannot be construed as a report of the Public Prosecutor since the latter had merely appended his signatures at the bottom of the page.
- The Prosecutor’s report did not even make an endorsement that he had perused the grounds and if he was satisfied about the progress of investigation and reasons set out for extension of time to complete the investigation. The Court held that the application for seeking extension of time was nothing but a transmission of request of an IO.
- Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a similar case of Sanjay Kumar Kedia v Narcotics Control Bureau the Court held that the Prosecutor’s order lacked adherence to the mandatory conditions laid out under Section 36A(4).
- In the absence of an appropriate report, the court would have no jurisdiction to deny an accused his indefeasible right to be released on bail owing to the Prosecution’s default to file the challan within the prescribed time provided the accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by the Court.
- Elaborating on the indefeasible right of an accused person under Section 167(2) of the CrPC, the Court observed that the section creates an indefeasible right in an accused, on account of the ‘default’ by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the prescribed period or the extended period, as the case may be, to seek an order for his release on bail.
- It is for the aforementioned reason that an order for release on bail under this section is termed as an “order-on-default” as it is granted on account of the default of the prosecution to complete the investigation and file the challan within the prescribed period.
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