Professional misconduct-Jurisdiction of High Court - Interference by Supreme Court.

The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in cases of professional misconduct is neither civil nor criminal as these expressions are used in Arts. 133 and 134 of the Constitution. In one aspect it is a jurisdiction over an officer of the Court and the Advocate owes a duty to the Court apart from his duty to his clients,. In another aspect it is a statutory power and a duty vested in the Court under S. 10 of the Bar Councils Act to ensure that the highest standards of professional rectitude are maintained, so that the Bar can render its expert service to the public in general and the litigants in particular and thus discharge its main function of co-operating with judiciary in the administrance of justice according to law.

The object of a proceeding in respect of professional misconduct differs totally from the object of a proceeding in a criminal court. Proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and similar statutes are taken in order to ensure that the highest standards of professional conduct are maintained at the bar. These proceedings, though in a sense penal, are solely designed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure that a person does not continue in practice who by his conduct has shown that he is unfit so to do. It is not a jurisdiction which is exercised in aid of the Criminal law, for the only question for the court to consider is whether the practitioner has so misconducted himself as no longer to be permitted to continue a member of an honourable and responsible profession. The object of Criminal proceedings, on the other hand, is to enforce the law of the land and to secure the punishment of an offender.

No doubt, if a criminal prosecution is initiated in respect of the subject matter of the complaint and the charge is held proved, the conviction might be a ground for a later proceeding under the Bar Councils Act. No doubt, also if the practitioner is acquitted or discharged by a criminal court on the merits, the facts would not be reinvestigated for the purpose of founding a charge of professional misconduct on those very facts. The object of the two proceedings being thus different, it is not any rule of law but merely a matter of discretion depending on the facts of each case as to whether the Court would straightway proceed to enquire into the allegation of professional misconduct or leave it to the complainant to prosecute the practitioner and await the result of such a proceeding. It is not incompetent for or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with an inquiry in a case where the misconduct charged against the advocate or practitioner amounted to an offence under the ordinary criminal law. There is a clear distinction between cases where the misconduct is one in relating to the practitioner's duty to his client and other cases where it is not so. In the former class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with charge as a piece of professional misconduct without driving the complainant to seek his remedy in a Criminal Court.

This task which is at once delicate and responsible the statute vests in the High Court and therefore the primary responsibility of ensuring it rests with it. The Supreme Court is in consequence most reluctant to interfere with the orders of High Courts in this field, save in exceptional cases when any question of principle is involved or where the Supreme Court is persuaded that any violation of the principles of natural justice has taken place or that otherwise there has been a miscarriage of justice. Where however none of these factors are present, it is not the practice of the Supreme Court to permit the canvassing of the evidence on the record either for re-appraising it or to determine whether it should be accepted or not. The findings of the High Court therefore on questions of fact are not open before the Supreme Court and it would only consider whether on the facts found, the charge of professional misconduct is established.