Tale of two chief justices
Sometime in the 1960s the younger brother of a chief justice of Madras High Court celebrated his Sashtiabhda Poorthi. This family function became the ground for a writ petition against the chief justice questioning his continuation in office. Reason? If the younger one was 60, the chief justice, who was elder to him, must be above 60. He should have already retired as a judge, and how then could he continue in office. The court registry informed the chief justice that a writ petition had been filed on the ground that he could not continue in office. The very next minute the chief justice sent in his resignation.
Look at the factual and moral aspects of the case. In the days when the chief justice was born ‘at the start of the 20th century’ no official birth certificate procedure existed. The proof of date of birth used to be the school certificates (usually the SSLC certificate book). He must have been four or five when his parents, while admitting him in school, must have given a wrong date. The chief justice himself had done no wrong, morally or legally. He may have had good legal and factual grounds to defend himself, perhaps even successfully. But obviously he did not think about whether he was morally or legally right. His instantaneous reaction must have been to ask himself whether it was morally acceptable to continue in office when a writ petition questioning his continuation had been filed which was sufficient to deny him the moral authority to sit as a judge. When he raised that question within, the answer was obvious. So he sent in his resignation within minutes rather than hours and days. Since his reaction and consequent resignation was instantaneous, obviously he could have consulted none except his own conscience. This is an inner directed inquiry, which not the law, only higher morals and values promote and guide. In the strict legal sense he could have defended himself in a court, but only at the cost of public norms and private morality. That was Justice Ramachandra Aiyar. He was universally respected as one of the finest judges, with high intellect and equally high integrity, the judiciary had seen.
It is a long way from the time of Chief Justice Ramachandra Aiyar to the days of Chief Justice P D Dinakaran, also a judge from the bar at Madras. The villagers of Kaverirajapuram had charged that Justice Dinakaran had grabbed hundreds of acres of public land, intended for waterways and roadways of the village. The media had shown photographs of the fenced land with a signboard bearing the name of the judge. In his report, V Palanikumar, an honest district collector, confirmed the charges of land grabbing against the chief justice. Later, a committee sent by the collegium of the Supreme Court to verify the report of the collector also reportedly agreed with the collector’s version. So, prima facie, charges of land grabbing have been established against Justice Dinakaran. In Tamil Nadu, in many places land grabbers have been arrested under the Goondas Act as it is the explicit policy of the government to treat land grabbers as anti-social elements. So the legal character of Justice Dinakaran’s action needs no further elucidation. But see how Justice Dinakaran has responded to the charges against him.
First, or even later, he never thought of resigning on his own when his reputation came under a cloud. Many advocates of the Madras High Court sought his resignation. They appeared before the collegium of judges of the Supreme Court and tendered evidence. As the demands for his resignation became shrill, he steadfastly brushed them aside. When pressure mounted for his sack, the Chief Justice of India said that for action to be taken against Justice Dinakaran, the case against him should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Incidentally, this is the standard of proof, in criminal law, against criminals! Yet obviously under the weight of the evidence on record, the collegium of judges had to ask Justice Dinakaran not to preside over the Karnataka High Court as chief justice, but not before the bar at Karnataka revolted against Justice Dinakaran and physically refused to allow him to attend court. From then, Justice Dinakaran stands virtually in a state of suspended animation as a judge. Meanwhile impeachment proceedings have been initiated in the Rajya Sabha.
Now comes the climax. When the collegium of judges advised him to go on leave, Justice Dinakaran refused. The collegium then requested him to accept transfer to Sikkim High Court, the smallest high court with the least number of cases. Justice Dinakaran refused to accede to that request also. Meanwhile the bar association at Gangtok in Sikkim revolted against Justice Dinakaran, justifiably so because, if he was not fit enough to be the Chief Justice of Karnataka, he should be equally considered unfit for Sikkim also. And here comes the anti-climax. When Justice Dinakaran had been asked to go to Gangtok, Justice Barin Ghosh, whose appointment as the Chief Justice of Sikkim High Court had been notified by the president on March 30, had arrived in Gangtok to take oath as chief justice on April 13. The media reported a senior official of the high court of Sikkim as saying that Justice Ghosh would take oath on April 13 as scheduled. How come Justice Dinakaran was requested to go to Sikkim as chief justice almost around the same time when Justice Barin Ghosh had already been notified for the office on March 30 itself? Whatever Justice Dinakaran did or did not do in the cause of the judiciary, he has done a great favour to justice by not going to Gangtok for being sworn in. Had he done so, there would have been two candidates for the same office, waiting to be sworn in on April 13!
The Dinakaran story as contrasted with Ramachandra Aiyar’s demonstrates the huge erosion of norms and values in the judiciary. Citizens are entitled to claim the protection of the statute. But judges must lay claim to respect by a higher code — of morals, norms and values, not just protection by law. Even contempt law does not earn respect for the judiciary. One of the most celebrated judicial personalities of the world, Lord Denning, said that no punishment should be inflicted for contempt as, in his words, “insults are best treated with disdain”. In a case, upset at his verdict, a lady litigant threw two law books on him. Lord Denning dodged the missiles to escape being hurt, but refused to punish her for contempt. It is not the law but only high moral values and norms, which the society respects, that will enhance the respect for the judiciary. The Justice Ramachandra Aiyar and Justice Dinakaran cases demonstrate this truth inversely.
Readers may thank the Author: Shri.S Gurumurthy is a well-known commentator on political and economic issues
