A YEAR AFTER 26/11, STILL VULNERABLE

Fifteen days from now, India will be commemorating the carnage of 26/11 and pledging never to let it happen again. If past record is any indicator, it is virtually impossible to see this pledge through though preventing a terrorist strike for one year is quite an achievement. Although a great deal of noise was made post-26/11 about upgrading internal security structures, both at the Centre and in the States, little worthwhile has been done to insulate the country from external terrorism except creating a National Investigating Agency, increasing number of police posts and personnel and purchasing sundry hi-tech gadgetry and weapons. But there is no all-weather mechanism in place to prevent, pre-empt and as a last resort, punish the source and sponsors of terrorism.


Ponder why there has been no attack for one year when the average interval between terrorist assaults has been around 4.8 months for the last eight years. Credit for this lies more outside than inside India. While two major alerts were sounded, no attack materialised. The second alarm was set off last month when the Pakistan Navy was conducting a routine exercise off the Western coast. A 26/11-type Lashkar-e-Tayyeba attack was expected in four cities: Mumbai, Bangalore, Kolkata and Ahmedabad. It turned out to be a false alarm, doubly surprising since according to the Military CBM Agreement with Pakistan, both sides are to notify each other about military exercises. That LeT has been planning strikes against India has never been in doubt. What is relevant is tip-offs.

The David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana multiple-target plan against India, still months from fruition, was recently busted by the FBI in the US. It was masterminded in the US by Headley in coordination with other LeT operatives in America and Pakistan. The FBI dossier suggests HuJI commander Ilyas Kashmiri was also involved in the planning. It seems LeT was torn between attacking the offices of the Danish newspaper which printed cartoons of Prophet Mohammed in 2005 and angered Muslims worldwide, and going for the National Defence College and other targets in India. Incidentally, the LeT has never carried out a terrorist attack inside Pakistan, which is one of the reasons why it is a strategic asset and the Pakistani establishment so deferential to it.


The key lesson of 26/11 is that the US is keeping a hawk-eyed surveillance over LeT and pressurising Pakistan to keep it on a leash, especially when the culprits of Mumbai, notably LeT supremo Hafiz Saeed, have not been booked. When there is the political will, there is the way to muzzle the LeT. The Americans, after enormous effort and investment, have goaded the Pakistani Army to launch an offensive in South Waziristan and the last thing they want is a repeat of 26/11 to provoke India into delivering what Home Minister P Chidambaram initially called "a swift and decisive response", later abbreviated into a "sledgehammer" and most recently refined to warning that "the attack will be defended and retaliated very strongly".


The Americans are familiar with more dire threats and warnings given by Delhi after the LeT attack on Parliament in December 2001 when US troops were fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and a substantial portion of the Pakistani Army was deployed in the west. The Americans also realise that a second strike against India could attract a swift and decisive military response unlike in May 2002 when the second attack at Kaluchak, Jammu, created war hysteria but was contained through crisis management and a personal assurance by Gen Pervez Musharraf.


US Assistant Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage had conveyed that Pakistan would stop all terrorist attacks permanently, visibly, irreversibly and to the satisfaction of India. That landmark commitment held for nearly 18 months and led to the revival of the peace process. A terrorist strike against India would give the Pakistani Army just the excuse to pull out from the offensive in South Waziristan and switch to the eastern front.

By way of action some tinkering with institutional mechanisms has been done but there is no national counter-terrorism strategy as part of homeland security in place. Mr Chidambaram has made several confessions on institutional failures of the past and made stirring speeches on meeting the challenges, promising "till my last drop of blood, I will not allow armed revolution (Maoism) or terrorism and violence to overwhelm India".


The Home Minister's warning was reinforced by Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor who issued a rare public rebuke about the country's hollow zero-tolerance policy on terrorism. He cited the example of "the US which has not allowed a second 9/11 to happen. It's time for all of us to say 'no more'." He called for smarter intelligence and security responses. At the same meeting, Minister of State for Defence, MM Pallam Raju, called for appointing a national Intelligence Coordinator.


One year after 26/11, eight years after 13/12 and suffering several acts of terrorism later, India is still battling with the basics. India cannot defend itself from within its own borders. After 9/11, the US and the West are fighting terrorism at source in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. India has two options: To fight terrorism in Afghanistan and help Pakistan in combating the multiple threats it faces from within; or sit back and be continuously struck at home as it has been these last two decades, exhibiting an exceptional limit of tolerance.


New Delhi should provide Islamabad, at the highest level, the assurance that it will not militarily misuse the voids Pakistan would create by thinning out forces from the east in order to fight its war against terrorism. India must also create overwhelming military superiority to discourage the ISI from unleashing the LeT.


Mr Chidambaram, who has infused a new spirit in internal security, must be capable of implementing the threat of the 'sledgehammer' as part of his swift and decisive response. Western military experts believe that India has a low-yield military which is not put to use to establish either dominance or deterrence, which is why the LeT may be tempted to call Mr Chidambaram's bluff.


The links between the establishment in Pakistan and 'good' terrorists has to be broken and a modicum of civilian control on the military re-established. Mr Chidambaram should follow Gen Patton's advice to his soldiers: "Make sure you bleed the enemy without shedding a drop yourself."