Is Mehul Choksi Going to be Extradited?: From Glittering Empire to Global Fugitive — A Legal Odyssey Across Borders

I. The Emergence of a Diamond Tycoon and the Birth of a Financial Disaster

Nearly three decades of prominence in India's luxury jewellery space was what Mehul Chinubhai Choksi enjoyed as the managing director of Gitanjali Gems Limited. Starting from the legacy of his family business, Choksi evolved his father's business into a corporate behemoth over time. 

With its suite of luxury brand names like Nakshatra, Gili, and Asmi, Gitanjali expanded in global markets to achieve a valuation of over ₹14,000 crore in its peak. To the masses and financial institutions, Choksi represented entrepreneurial success. He had the backing of state-supported banks, the admiration of investors, and the patronage of celebrities.

But under this glittering surface was a rickety edifice, erected on decades of slick financial juggling and intrabank collusion. In February 2018, India's second-largest state-owned bank, Punjab National Bank, reported to the RBI that it had detected fraudulent LOUs amounting to ₹13,400 crore made at its Brady House branch in Mumbai. 

The LoUs, a bank guarantee that enabled importers to take short-term credit from foreign branches of Indian banks abroad, were said to have been made without being captured by the bank's core banking software, thus avoiding audit.

Mehul Choksi and his nephew Nirav Modi were identified as the main beneficiary of this huge fraud. The modus operandi involved collusion with mid-level PNB officials who fraudulently issued LoUs in favour of Choksi’s group of companies, allowing him to access foreign credit facilities with no corresponding margin money or repayment backing in India. 

The funds were routed to overseas suppliers, many of which were alleged shell entities under Choksi’s control. Once the LoUs matured and the bank failed to recover the dues, the scam unraveled in dramatic fashion.

While Nirav Modi chose to maintain a higher public profile, Choksi’s financial network was broader and more deeply embedded in the banking ecosystem. His firm, Gitanjali Gems, had over 30 subsidiaries across India and abroad, and his operations leveraged systemic weaknesses in financial oversight. 

Inquiries by the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate would later confirm that the misused funds were used not only to expand the business but also for buying properties in the UAE, the United States, and Europe, as well as to remit assets to close relatives and friends.

Mehul Choksi had already left the country, apparently for medical attention in the United States, by the time FIRs were first registered in early 2018. Unknown to the enforcement agencies then, he had also sought and obtained Antigua and Barbuda citizenship through their Citizenship by Investment Programme after donating USD 200,000 to the National Development Fund and buying a real estate property worth more than USD 400,000—placing him under the island nation's expedited economic migration pathway.

What started as a money laundering scandal thus quickly turned into a cross-border fugitive matter, paving the way for one of the most intricate and diplomatically delicate extradition fights in Indian legal history.

II. Flight, Citizenship, and the Legal Consequences of Renunciation and Extradition Evasion

When Mehul Choksi had departed from India in the early part of January 2018, a week or so prior to the Punjab National Bank presenting its case against him to the Central Bureau of Investigation, there was already a sense of premeditation around his actions. Indian investigating authorities would subsequently learn that he had not simply left India for undergoing medical treatment but had planned an escape that was legally shielded. 

Choksi had already acquired Antiguan citizenship in 2017, several months prior to the PNB fraud coming to light. This was done under the Citizenship by Investment Programme of Antigua and Barbuda, a policy that permitted affluent individuals to gain citizenship in return for considerable economic contributions.

Choksi’s application underwent due diligence checks, but the Antigua government later confirmed that no red flag had been raised by Indian authorities at the time of issuance. In fact, a key detail that emerged later was that India had not issued any Interpol Red Notice or lookout circular against him when his passport was still valid and his application was under processing.

This lacuna in procedure enabled him to gain legal cover under the jurisdiction of a sovereign nation—an act that would later on cause India great difficulty in extraditing him.

By July 2018, Mehul Choksi formally surrendered his Indian nationality, a circumstance which was indicated by his legal counsel to the Ministry of External Affairs. Based on Indian legislation, the law governing the Indian Citizenship Act is the Citizenship Act, 1955, along with the associated regulations, permits renunciation of citizenship, albeit under normal circumstances to undertake in the face of pending criminal procedure is an infrequent legal occurrence. 

The Indian government challenged the validity of the renunciation on the grounds that citizenship cannot be unilaterally renounced to avoid prosecution. Nevertheless, Choksi’s Antiguan citizenship gave him rights under the Caribbean Community  Charter and the legal protections of Antigua’s own constitutional guarantees, including the right to legal counsel, fair trial, and protection from politically motivated prosecution.

When India commenced formal extradition proceedings, it immediately faced a structural barrier: no bilateral extradition agreement existed between Antigua and Barbuda and India. 

Although the two nations are signatories to multilateral treaties such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, these instruments are infrequently relied upon in the absence of a bilateral treaty and proceedings under them are usually laborious, bureaucratic, and politically fraught.

India made an extradition request in August 2018 to the government of Antigua. As a countermeasure, Antigua began its own legal process to assess if the extradition of Choksi would be against any of his rights as enshrined in its constitution.

This involved assessing whether the offenses for which he was indicted in India had analogous criminal liability under Antiguan law (principle of dual criminality), and whether extradition would lead to torture, unjust trial, or political persecution—grounds which can justify refusal under international extradition law.

While so, Choksi put up a robust legal defense in Antigua. He claimed that the charges against him were politically driven and that he would not be granted a fair trial in India. Furthermore, he had also cited his severe health issues, such as cardiac ailments as reasons to delay or prevent extradition. The courts in Antigua accepted these grounds and permitted an extended legal struggle to gain hold, delaying India's extradition for years.

The Indian government persisted in pursuing the issue diplomatically, presenting affidavits, case records, and court orders to the Antiguan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and even involving Interpol to issue a Red Corner Notice (RCN) against Choksi in December 2018. Antigua, however, made it clear that until its courts ruled on the issue, it would not go ahead with extraditing a citizen to a foreign country—hence underlining the weakness of India's extradition machinery, especially when fugitives find legal sanctuary through second citizenship.

However, just as things seemed to have come to a stalemate in the process, a surprise turn of events in May 2021 changed the dynamics of the case altogether—when Mehul Choksi went missing in Antigua mysteriously and was later discovered in Dominica, another Caribbean island country.

III. The Dominica Incident And Fallout

In May 2021, Mehul Choksi re-entered the headlines around the world when the diamantaire mysteriously disappeared from his Antiguan home. Within 48 hours, the diamantaire was "found" on Dominica's shores, a near-neighbourly island nation, under conditions raising very serious concerns regarding legality, human rights, and global diplomacy.

As per the version given by the Dominican police, Choksi was detained close to the town of Canefield, having entered their country illegally by sea. He was said to be carrying Indian identification papers but no Antiguan passport. 

The story went that he had tried to leave Antigua in an attempt to escape pending extradition proceedings and was caught by Dominican authorities on charges of illegal entry. However, this version was immediately challenged—not only by Choksi’s legal team, but also by media reports and independent testimonies that suggested a far more sinister backstory.

Choksi’s family and lawyers in both Antigua and India alleged that he had been abducted by Indian agents with the assistance of Antiguan nationals, and forcibly taken to Dominica by boat against his will. 

The basis of the charge was in charges that Choksi had been enticed by a woman he had just become acquainted with—a foreign-birth person whose lawyer said had suddenly vanished on the day he was reportedly kidnapped.

There were photographs of Choksi showing swelling and cuts on his arms and face, and his lawyers claimed that these proved physical abuse in the form of a forced transfer.

Lawyers for Choksi on May 28, 2021, filed a petition for habeas corpus to the High Court of Justice of the Commonwealth of Dominica. The petition, following the doctrine of unlawful detention, claimed immediate relief and repatriation to Antigua on grounds that Choksi was the victim of an international abduction at the hands of both Dominican domestic law and the norms of international human rights. 

The matter came before Justice Bernie Stephenson, who issued interim relief, stopping Dominican authorities from removing Choksi out of the jurisdiction and ordering medical care.

The grounds of law used in the habeas corpus application were on principles of due process, sovereignty independence, and the absolute bar of refoulement, which protects a person against being sent to a state where he is likely to face persecution or be tortured. 

Choksi's lawyers also cited precedents in the Inter-American human rights system since Dominica is a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights, and asserted that the methods of his detention were the equivalent of an extraordinary rendition, a practice unanimously condemned under international law.

At the hearings, Dominican officials sought to define the matter narrowly—in terms of a case of unlawful entry by a fugitive with established criminal antecedents. But the Dominica High Court was attuned to the wider constitutional and human rights considerations.

In one of the hearings, the court explained that it could not disregard the "serious allegations of state-sponsored coercion" and would have to carefully review the circumstances under which Choksi arrived before it could rule on his legal status.

In the meantime, the Indian Government was kept ominously quiet about the charges of abduction. There was no official word refusing or admitting India's role in the operation which led to the unexpected arrival of Choksi in Dominica.

This silence led to increased speculation that intelligence operatives may have been involved in orchestrating what was essentially a covert transfer from Antigua to a jurisdiction considered more cooperative for a potential extraction.

With mounting diplomatic pressure, the government of the Dominican Republic was placed in a precarious position. While it was in the public eye over possible abuses of due process, it was also being pressed by India as well as regional allies to quickly process the case.

On July 15, 2021, after being detained for close to 50 days, the Dominican High Court permitted Mehul Choksi to go back to Antigua on humanitarian reasons, citing the medical condition and the ongoing legal process in Antigua.

The incident turned out to be a textbook case on the abuse—and thwarting of abuse—of extradition procedures and cross-border police activity. The whole affair uncovered a perilous twilight zone between lawful extradition, as regulated by treaties and the rule of law, and illegal rendition, which stands outside the formal law.

It also threw a shadow on India's approach in high-profile fugitive cases, showing the diplomatic cost of seeming to evade legal protection even in the case of serious financial fraud.

Choksi’s return to Antigua did not bring finality. Instead, it re-entrenched his legal position as a citizen with constitutional rights under Antiguan law, and effectively reset the extradition clock.

More importantly, the Dominica episode reinforced the need for India to rely on rigorous, transparent legal extradition strategies—not ad hoc international gambits.

The Indian Extradition Framework: Treaty, Procedure, and Contemporary Challenges

India's capacity for seeking or bringing back fugitives who are within foreign jurisdictions is regulated by a combination of international treaties, statutory law, and diplomatic practice. The major law here is the Extradition Act, which forms the legal framework for extraditing individuals from India and for seeking extradition of individuals from other nations.

As in the case of Mehul Choksi, Nirav Modi, and Vijay Mallya, where complex cases have shown, the legal dynamics are as much influenced by foreign home laws and courts as by India's domestic ones. 

A. Statutory and Treaty Framework
Fundamentally, the Extradition Act, 1962 works on two broad frameworks:

Extradition under Treaty (Part II of the Act):
Where India has a bilateral extradition agreement with another nation, the procedure under Sections 3–10 is followed. India has signed extradition treaties with over 50 countries, including the UK, USA, Russia etc. These treaties detail the kinds of offences which are extraditable, the documents required by law, and the grounds for declining extradition (e.g., political motive, dual criminality, or risk of torture).

Extradition under Arrangements or Reciprocity (Part III of the Act):
To such nations with whom India does not have a regular treaty—i.e., in the case of Antigua and Barbuda by Choksi—Section 3(4) authorises India to execute extradition on mutual understanding or principle of comity. Although this is legalised under Indian statute, its enforceability is in the hands of the domestic jurisdiction allowing such surrender without a treaty, which keeps these extraditions diplomatically risky and procedurally time-consuming. 

Both processes involve a process through the court. Where India is the requested state (i.e., somebody is being extradited from India), the involved Magistrate makes an inquiry under Section 5, and where a prima facie case is established, commits the individual to judicial custody, after which surrender is decided upon by the Union Government.

On the other hand, when India wants to extradite an individual, it has to provide detailed documents such as FIRs, charges, court warrants, and relevant laws to the foreign government, usually through diplomatic channels through the Ministry of External Affairs.

B. Key Procedural Concepts
The following legal principles regulate the enforceability of extradition requests:

Dual Criminality:
The alleged act must be a criminal offence both in India and the requested state. For example, PNB fraud charges against Choksi were classified as criminal conspiracy, breach of trust, and money laundering—all of which have corresponding provisions in most criminal jurisdictions.

Rule of Specialty:
The requesting state (e.g., India) cannot try the extradited individual for any offence other than those indicated in the extradition request, except with subsequent consent

Prima Facie Requirement of Case:
The requesting state needs to provide sufficient material to indicate that there is a reasonable basis for prosecution—not evidence beyond reasonable doubt. This was re-emphasized in Sarabjit Rick Singh (2008) and reaffirmed in Sanjeev Kumar Chawla v. State (2020).

Non-Extradition for Political or Military Offences
Most treaties—and India's national law—preclude extradition where the offence is political or military in nature. This is commonly invoked by alleged persons involved in high-profile cases based on political persecution.

Bar on Torture or Unfair Trial:
Courts in nations such as the UK and EU member states habitually scrutinize Indian extradition applications against Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, mandating that the person not be subjected to torture, inhuman treatment, or unfair trial upon return.

C. Executive and Judicial Interplay

Although extradition is initiated and propelled by the Central Government, courts—both domestic and foreign—perform a vital filtering function. In India, cases of extradition (particularly return from foreign courts) are supervised through legal petitions under Articles 32 and 226 for the enforcement of basic rights. The courts have, in various cases, emphasized the fact that extradition cannot be misused as a harassment weapon, nor can the process be undermined by poor documentation or procedural failure.

In Daya Singh Lahoria v. Union of India, (2001) 4 SCC 516, the Supreme Court ruled that extradition judgments, although mostly executive, are always subject to judicial review if the procedure involves a violation of constitutional protections. 

D. Recent Developments and Reforms (2023–2025)

Against the backdrop of delays and collapse in cases such as Kim Davy (Purulia Arms Drop), David Headley, Mehul Choksi, and Nirav Modi, persistent calls have been made to revolutionize India's extradition regime. 

Some principal reforms and efforts include:

Draft Model Treaty Framework (2023)
The Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Home Affairs have developed a model extradition treaty to speed up negotiation with Caribbean, Southeast Asian, and African nations—particularly those that are popular under "citizenship-by-investment" programs. The objective is to harmonize mutual legal assistance and surrender procedures, even in the absence of treaties.

Centralised Database for Extradition Cases (2024)
India rolled out a digital tracking system for all extradition cases, integrating Interpol, CBI, ED, and MEA desks for real-time coordination. This was done to avoid duplication and ensure coherent submission of documentation.

Court-Mandated Guidelines for Extradition Documentation
Following the setback in the UK courts during Nirav Modi’s appeal, Indian courts and agencies now pre-clear affidavits, charge sheets, and medical reports through designated legal review panels before submission to foreign authorities.

Interpol Cooperation and Red Notice Reforms
In 2023, India urged Red Corner Notice reforms, requesting that Interpol expedite notices in cases related to PMLA and FEOA, especially when dual citizenship and small-island protectionism is invoked by fugitives.

FEOA Rejuvenation (Proposed 2025 Amendment Bill)
A draft amendment to the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act is being considered to provide for in absentia trial for economic fugitives who have run out of their rights to be heard and have been declared absconders for more than 3 years. This will directly affect high-value fugitives such as Choksi and Mallya.

Judicial Precedents Revolving Around Extradition

Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India
The Supreme Court judgment in Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India is one of the landmark judgments framing the standard of proof required to be followed for extradition proceedings in India. The case was a result of an extradition request made by the United States against Sarabjit Singh, an Indian national accused of conspiracy to traffic drugs and money laundering of crime proceeds. 

Singh's main contention against extradition before Indian courts was that the documentary evidence filed by the U.S. government failed to qualify as "legal evidence" under the Indian Evidence Act. He argued that the absence of cross-examination, certified copies, and original depositions made the documents inadmissible and, therefore, unusable in an extradition proceeding. 

The Indian government, however, contended that extradition requests were sui generis in nature and not subject to the technical strictures governing domestic trials.

In a soundly argued judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed Singh's argument and rendered valuable insight into the manner in which Indian courts are to deal with evidence in extradition cases. In paragraph 46, the Court unequivocally ruled that the term "information" employed in Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1962 does not demand that the requesting state's evidence fall within the criteria of admissibility prescribed under the Evidence Act. It noted that:

"The term 'information' in Section 7 is of much broader meaning and is not limited to legally admissible evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. The court at this point is not interested in the establishment of the guilt of the accused, but whether the request is worthy of committal for extradition."

Additionally in paragraph 47, the Court explained that extradition requests are quasi-judicial in character, and the role of the Magistrate under Section 5 of the Act is to determine whether there is a prima facie case adequate to warrant the person's surrender—not to determine whether the accused be guilty. This trial-inquiry distinction is paramount in safeguarding the role of extradition against judicial transformation into a full-fledged criminal trial.

This precedent is especially pertinent in the Mehul Choksi context. Indian authorities have faced criticism—particularly from Choksi’s foreign counsel—arguing that the materials submitted in support of extradition lack evidentiary value under the standards of the host jurisdictions.

But the case of Sarabjit Singh provides a straightforward counter: when India files ED charge sheets, PMLA orders, and judicial warrants, it does so within the acceptably permitted purview of its own extradition law, which merely demands that the materials present a plausible case—not definitive proof. This has enabled India to launch legally viable extradition claims in jurisdictions where prima facie evaluations are enough to trigger surrender proceedings.

Sanjeev Kumar Chawla v. State
In this case, the Delhi High Court had to rule on an important question that frequently comes up in extradition matters—whether a lack of charge sheet, at the time of requesting extradition, renders the procedure under the Extradition Act as illegal. The case concerned Sanjeev Chawla, a British citizen of Indian descent, charged in India with being a central player in a high-profile 2000 match-fixing cricket scandal.

The Government of India had requested his extradition from the United Kingdom, a request finally accepted by UK courts. But once he physically surrendered to Indian custody, Chawla went to the Delhi High Court on the grounds that the whole process of extradition was vitiated because, when the UK decided to grant extradition, no charge sheet had been presented against him in India under the CRPC

The petitioner's argument was based on the premise that a charge sheet was a condition precedent to meeting the requirement of a "prima facie case," and in its absence, India's extradition request was without legal basis. This proposition, if granted, would have overturned the extradition jurisprudence developed around anticipatory requisitions and resulted in substantial procedural delay in future extradition requests.

In the judgment, the Delhi High Court categorically dismissed this argument. The Court, in paragraph 37, asserted that:

"The Extradition Act, 1962 does not contemplate that a person against whom a charge sheet has been filed only can be extradited."

Rather, the Court explained that what is needed is the presence of material disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence, and that such material, even pre-charge-sheet, can be enough for an extradition request.

This approach is consistent with international practice, where the availability of investigative reports, witness statements, and preliminary charges, provided they establish a reasonable basis for prosecution, can meet the legal requirement for extradition.

In addition, in paragraph 38, the Court emphasized the rule of prima facie sufficiency by noting:
"If the material deposited is sufficient to warrant committal for trial, although no charge sheet may have been presented, the same would be enough to give effect to the prayer for extradition."

This precedent holds precedence in the case of Mehul Choksi as well, especially during the early stage of extradition efforts when India was still consolidating prosecution complaints and not yet final charge sheets in all the connected PMLA and SEBI cases. 

Chawla's logic sustains the contention that chargesheet filing isn't a precondition for international surrender, particularly where ED and CBI have already made arrest warrants and gathered material under Sections 173(8) CrPC or corresponding statutory orders under PMLA.

Moreover, this case sends a broader signal to foreign courts that extradition should not be stalled merely because the prosecution is still gathering its final documentation, so long as the requesting state is able to produce a credible body of evidence to show that a trial is imminent and legally tenable.

Thus, Choksi’s argument that his extradition is premature due to “incomplete prosecution” falls apart under the principles firmly laid down in the Chawla judgment.

Majibullah Mohammad Haneef v. Union of India

The case is significant for its keen examination on the scope and necessity of judicial inquiry under India's Extradition Act, especially under Section 5, which stipulates the inquiry to be made by a Magistrate before issuance of surrender. The petitioner, Majibullah Mohammad Haneef, as a foreigner, was to be surrendered to the Sultanate of Oman on the charge of conspiracy of multi-homicide in causing the deaths of two businessmen at Muscat.

He went to the Delhi High Court asking for a quashing of the extradition proceedings launched by the Union of India on several counts, such as lack of credible evidence, allegations of procedural faults, and fear of an unequal trial in Oman.

One of the fundamental legal issues before the Delhi High Court was the quantum of proof required to be used by Indian courts while making a decision regarding whether to allow extradition.

Would the Indian Magistrate comport itself as a trial court, using rigorous evidentiary principles and finding guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Or can a prima facie test suffice, considering the peculiar nature of extradition as an administrative-judicial hybrid procedure?

In a thoughtful and clearly worded judgment, the Court replied to this in the affirmative of the prima facie standard. In paragraph 14, it declared:

"The extent of inquiry pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Act is limited to whether or not there is sufficient material to suggest, prima facie, that the person sought is engaged in the alleged offence. It is not a trial, nor an evidentiary hearing in the classical sense."

The Court also made it clear that Indian law does not insist on production of certified copies, nor on cross-examination of witnesses or adherence to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Extradition is intended to determine whether the individual should be sent to stand trial in the requesting nation—not whether the individual is guilty.

Significantly, the Court also dismissed the petitioner's contention that he would be likely to be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment upon return, observing that the Indian government had received diplomatic assurances from Oman pursuant to the terms of the bilateral agreement.

It applied principles derived from Soering v. United Kingdom [(1989) ECHR 14038/88], which have also gained judicial acceptance in Indian courts, to assess the sufficiency of such assurances. The Court did not find any material to indicate that the rights of the petitioner would be compromised, and rejected the petition.

The consequences of this ruling for the Mehul Choksi case are most relevant. His lawyers have all along argued that extradition to India would be against his rights on account of alleged denial of a fair trial and his health. 

But Majibullah Haneef makes it amply clear that unless such fears are corroborated by tangible evidence, Indian courts—and Indian diplomatic representations to foreign courts by extension—are justified in accepting governmental assurances of fair trial and protection of procedures.

Moreover, the Court’s strong re-affirmation that Section 5 proceedings are not trials, and that prima facie satisfaction is enough, strengthens India’s position when it seeks Choksi’s surrender from Belgium. Should Choksi’s legal team attempt to argue that India has not "proven" its case or that the ED's evidence is incomplete, this precedent offers a direct rebuttal: extradition courts should not require trial-level proof before deciding on surrender.

State of Gujarat v. Mehul Choksi

In this significant case, the State of Gujarat had filed the case in the Supreme Court questioning the 2017 ruling by the Gujarat High Court which had set aside an FIR filed against Mehul Choksi and his wife.

The FIR was lodged on the basis of a complaint made by an Ahmedabad jeweller, who claimed Choksi had cheated him into a partnership agreement and, with willful misrepresentation and violation of trust, diverted both stock and profit. The High Court, in its order, had embraced the contention that the conflict was civil in nature and did not reveal a criminal offence, and hence exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CRPC to quash the FIR.

On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, reinstating the FIR and ordering the police to continue with the investigation. The Court seized the moment to enunciate again the distinction between a contractual dispute per se and a criminal offense involving mens rea (fraudulent intent).

In paragraph 14, the Court made the pivotal observation that:

"The High Court seems to have confused breach of contract with lack of fraudulent intent. The FIR in its current form in particular charges inducement, deception, and dishonest misappropriation—hallmarks of criminal breach of trust under Sections 406 and 420 IPC."

Moreover, in paragraph 16, the Court underscored judicial restraint in exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, particularly in situations of involvement in involved financial offenses. It noted:

"Economic offences erode not only personal trust but also institutional integrity. The courts need to resist the temptation to end proceedings at the door where the factual matrix suggests a broader scheme of criminal fraud."

The Court's judgment also relied upon previous judgments like State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, and HDFC Securities Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 1 SCC 640, and they held that quashing could be restricted only to situations wherein the allegations themselves, even being taken in totality, don't reveal an offence.

Resurrection of charges against Choksi in the case had enormous ripple effects. It opened the door to further criminal prosecution on Indian soil, making the FIR a live proceeding and thereby strengthening the grounds on which India could demonstrate ongoing judicial interest in Choksi’s appearance and participation in the criminal process.

It also neutralised a key defence often raised by economic offenders—that civil litigation arising out of failed business arrangements should not attract criminal liability.

For India's extradition authorities, this ruling was especially useful because it supported the argument that Choksi is not just evading commercial obligations but fleeing criminal prosecution, and that several jurisdictions (Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Mumbai Special PMLA Courts) are seized of cases where he is accused. This lends strength to India's argument that he is a declared or potential fugitive, thus meeting both the domestic and international tests for surrender.