Child Witness Testimony: What is the law on child witness evidence in India?

Index

1. Introduction
2. Legal Framework Governing Child Witnesses
3. Judicial Analysis
4. Understanding the Child’s Mind
5. Child Witness Protection Schemes and Anonymity Safeguards in India
6. Systemic Challenges in Protecting and Empowering Child Witnesses
7. Conclusion

Synopsis

This article presents a comprehensive and analytical exploration of the legal and procedural transformation in how Indian criminal jurisprudence treats child witness testimony. From a time when children were deemed inherently untrustworthy and their testimonies seen as needing strict corroboration, the judicial attitude has gradually shifted toward a more sensitive, contextual, and inclusive understanding. 

The article examines the statutory and procedural frameworks under the Indian Evidence Act, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, and the POCSO Act, tracing how these instruments converge to protect and validate a child's voice in court. 

It provides detailed analyses of leading judgments such as Rameshwar, Dattu Ramrao Sakhare, Sanjay Kumar, and Sakshi v. Union of India, showing how courts have evolved from viewing child witnesses with suspicion to treating their accounts as both credible and central in abuse-related prosecutions. It also delves into the role of cognitive development in assessing testimony, evaluates systemic failures in child witness protection and anonymity, and outlines the institutional challenges faced at the ground level. 

The article calls for comprehensive procedural reforms, increased judicial training, interdisciplinary support, and post-trial rehabilitation to close the gap between statutory promise and practical enforcement.

Introduction

The treatment of child witnesses in criminal trials has always been a mixture of legal conservatism, cultural bias, and institutional suspicion. The law historically treated children as inherently untrustworthy, too fanciful, or vulnerable persons whose memories could be manipulated. 

The evidentiary standard applied to children was therefore higher, reflecting a pervasive assumption that only adults were capable of contributing significantly to judicial truth-finding. This method had especially severe consequences in cases of child sexual abuse and domestic violence, where the child was usually the only direct witness and where physical or corroborative evidence was minimal.

Indian law has progressively shifted away from this exclusionary and strict criterion towards a sensitive and inclusive framework. This shift has not occurred in isolation but is the result of several converging factors evolving child psychology, international norms like the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, legislative laws like the POCSO Act, and liberal judicial interpretations reflecting an increasing need to balance evidentiary stringency with child-sensitive protection. 

Significantly, courts have now started recognizing the trauma which legal processes can inflict on children and the need to reform legal practices to limit this harm without sacrificing the rights of the accused to a fair trial.

Contemporary jurisprudence sees that although children can have development vulnerabilities, they are not unable to tell the truth. Indeed, in intra-familial abuse cases, children will often be the sole source of information available, and their exclusion can lead to terrible injustices. The movement, then, has moved from exclusion to accommodation—protecting the child from being retraumatized by legal processes, yet permitting them to speak their truth with dignity and security.

Legal Framework

India's procedural and evidentiary framework for child witnesses is influenced by the intersection of special law, general law, and constitutional principles. While the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 still controls admissibility and competency of witnesses, procedural safeguards formerly enshrined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have since been repealed and enacted again via the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

According to Section 118 of the Evidence Act, any child is competent to give evidence as long as they have sufficient understanding to understand the questions asked and give rational responses. This test is more concerned with mental and moral maturity rather than chronological age. The test is generally judicially made by way of preliminary contact or voir dire process to determine the child's understanding of truth, memory recall, and ability to communicate. Indian courts have always upheld this competency test as being based on individual assessment, rather than general assumption.

Procedurally, the BNSS now regulates how such testimony is to be taken. Notably, Section 369 of the BNSS reflects and duplicates the earlier Section 273 of CrPC, enabling courts to shield vulnerable witnesses from confrontation with the accused in the same room. The provision is necessary in child cases, especially where the suspect is a member of the child's family, teacher, or authority figure. The BNSS allows evidence to be given on video link, behind a one-way screen, or by special procedures to preserve the emotional well-being of the witness without impairing the rights of the accused to a fair trial. 

Concurrently, Section 385 of the BNSS, which is the equivalent of the erstwhile Section 327 CrPC, still allows in-camera trials, especially in sexual offences and child-related crimes. Courts are now once again obligated to make sure that child-related proceedings are confidential, discreet, and without intimidation or unnecessary publicity, in line with Article 21 of the Constitution that ensures dignity and privacy.

The incorporation of the POCSO act within the BNSS is an evidence of a step-by-step model. POCSO's provisions, specifically Sections 33 to 38, continue to hold good and are still overriding ordinary procedural norms on the occasion of conflict. For example, POCSO enforces support persons, counselling of psychology, non-repetitive depositions, and trauma-sensitive courtrooms, none of which were previously outlined under CrPC or BNSS but now become judicially enforceable in light of POCSO's overriding effect under Section 42.

The BNSS, however, is not mere CrPC retelling—it's also meant to revamp procedure delivery, shorten delay, and promote the implementation of technology-friendly trials, something that can heavily assist children in decreasing their duration in hostile courtroom environments. 

Nonetheless, there is reason for apprehension. BNSS does not give a chapter devoted to child witnesses, and it does not include POCSO's procedure protection within the text of its primary sections as explicitly as its supporters would desire. Therefore, the success of the BNSS in safeguarding child witnesses remains reliant to a large extent on judicial initiative, interpretive convergence with POCSO, and administrative readiness to deploy child-sensitive infrastructure at the trial court level.

Judicial Analysis

Indian jurisprudence on child witness testimony developed starting with a basis of skepticism, not based on statutory exclusion but on judicial concern. Among the earliest cases to consider the probative value of child evidence was Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1952 SC 54). 

There, a 15-year-old girl alleged rape by her stepfather, and her deposition was the foundation of the prosecution case. The trial court had already determined her statement consistent and reliable despite the lack of direct corroboration through physical or circumstantial evidence. 

The Supreme Court, being faced with the query whether such uncorroborated testimony may lead to conviction under the law, established a nuanced standard. Justice Vivian Bose, writing the decision of the court, emphasized that corroboration of a child's statement is not a rule of law, but it has become a "rule of prudence" over time, particularly in prosecutions of sexual offences. Significantly, the Court ruled that the requirement of corroboration must be assessed contextually—if the trial court is satisfied with the inherent credibility of the child's testimony, then that testimony alone can be sufficient to sustain a conviction. 
This is well encapsulated in paragraph 6 of the judgment, wherein Justice Bose elucidates that "the rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is necessary before there can be a conviction but that the requirement of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the facts render it safe to do without it, must be present to the mind of the judge." 

The ruling determined that child witnesses are not to be dismissed outright on the basis of age, but courts need to use greater caution when considering their testimonies.

This level of cautious admissibility was prevalent until courts started dealing with cases where the child was the sole eyewitness, like intra-familial abuse cases. Here, the corroboration requirement led to impunity to the accused. 

One of the big deviations from law was the case of Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, where the Apex Court had specifically overruled the premise that the testimony and evidence of the child were required to be corroborated solely on account of age. The case involved a girl of eight years who witnessed her mother's murder by the accused.

The child's testimony, though straightforward, was found to be natural and untutored. The court, in words of Justice G.T. Nanavati, ruled that "a child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one, such evidence could be the basis of conviction.". 

That is to say, even without oath, a child witness' evidence can be taken into consideration under Section 118 of the Evidence Act as long as it is proved to be reliable." The judgment reaffirmed the pre-eminence of Section 118 of the Evidence Act and shifted the law away from dogmatic evidentiary suspicion to an ability-and-content-based analysis. What was significant was not the witness's age, but whether his or her testimony seemed spontaneous, truthful, and free from external influence.

This emerging standard was subsequently reiterated in more complicated cases, particularly those involving claims of child sexual assault, where the child was also the victim. A characteristic ruling came in State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar (2017) 2 SCC 51. Here, a child girl aged seven had alleged sexual assault by the appellant. The accused had been acquitted by the High Court on the grounds that the statement of the minor was uncorroborated and inconsistent. 

Reversing the acquittal in appeal, the Supreme Court held that where the child victim of sexual assault's testimony is cogent, consistent, and reliable, it is enough to uphold conviction. The court scrutinized the girl's deposition with great care and found her account to be credible, especially since the chronology of events she had narrated had the ring of truth, and she had stood up to cross-examination without wavering. 

The Court asserted at paragraph 9: "The child witness had stated in detail the manner in which the incident occurred and nothing had been elicited during her cross-examination to discredit her evidence.". We believe that the trial court was justified in placing reliance on her testimony." The decision was a jurisprudential milestone by consciously disapproving of the mechanical requirement of corroboration in cases of child sexual abuse, especially under such legislation as POCSO where the child's voice may be the only evidence available.

The changing attitude of the judiciary towards child testimony is also a reflection of the growing reliance on global standards. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518 stands out in this context. 

An NGO involved with gender justice, Sakshi moved a writ petition requesting changes to the procedural acts concerning the recording of evidence of victims of sexual offences, children among them. The petitioner argued that face-to-face, direct cross-examination of a child by the accused before an open court traumatizes the child and frustrates the utility of the evidence. 

The Court, in cognizance of India's duty under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, opined that extraordinary measures like in-camera hearing, screen partitioning, and video-recorded statements need to be allowed under the CrPC (now BNSS). It observed in paragraph 31: "A child who has been the victim of a sexual offence is already under mental stress and fear.". 

The trauma is compounded if the child is compelled to narrate the details in open court, before the accused." Although Sakshi was not strictly a criminal trial, it set the precedent for what would eventually be enacted as the statutory regime under POCSO in 2012, enshrining many of these procedural innovations as enforceable rights.
In all such instances, the judiciary increasingly unraveled the presumption of unreliability once invoked in relation to child witnesses. Rather than generalizing incapacity, courts currently conduct a nuanced evaluation of credibility founded upon internal consistency, demeanor, detail, and contextual probability. 

Notably, courts have also come to appreciate that children, especially abuse victims, tend to relate their stories in broken or non-linear forms—not because they are lying, but as a psychological coping mechanism to trauma. 
This interpretative perspective is apparent in decisions like Mahender Singh v. State of Haryana (2004) 13 SCC 142, where the Court ruled that minor inconsistencies or delays in revealing by a child witness should not be mechanically construed as signs of falsehood. The Court noted children perceive traumatic experience differently, and their words have to be decoded with sensitivity of age and background.

Child Witness Protection Schemes and Anonymity Safeguards in India:

From Procedural Norms to Institutional Gaps
In any justice system, the process of testifying is a psychological burden, but one that becomes infinitely more severe where the witness is a child. Outside of the courtroom, the threat of retaliation, social stigma, and family pressure commonly discourage child witnesses, especially in cases of domestic violence or sexual assault, from revealing the truth, or even pursuing legal proceedings. 

Though India has brought a number of legal and procedural changes designed to child-proof courtrooms, the infrastructure to provide thoroughgoing protection of child witnesses, both in and out of court, is underdeveloped, scattered, and haphazardly implemented.

The most straightforward procedural scheme covering the protection and concealment of child witnesses is to be found in the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. Provisions 33-38 of the Act require the identity of the child not to be disclosed during any stage of investigation or at trial. Section 23 forbids media to disclose any information that could cause the identification of the child. These protections are in sync with the larger constitutional safeguards under Article 21.

However, these protections are rarely respected more in breach than observance. Courtrooms in India are often bereft of official witness protection policies specific to children's needs. In contrast to jurisdictions like the UK or the US, where the witness protection units coordinate with the courts, prosecution, and child welfare agencies, India lacks a nationally codified and enforcible child witness protection programme. The Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, validated by the Supreme Court in Mahender Chawla v. Union of India [(2019) 14 SCC 615], although a landmark scheme, is essentially drafted with adult whistleblowers or hostile environment witnesses in view. Its extension to child witnesses is theoretically possible but practically doubtful.

The absence of functional coordination among POCSO courts, police, and child welfare agencies creates a lacuna wherein children, especially those belonging to socio-economically disadvantaged sections, slip through the net. Although Section 44 of POCSO grants the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) the authority to oversee implementation of the Act, it does not have the teeth of enforcement and logistical backing to step in individual trials where protective measures fail.

In many instances, children are compelled to wait in court buildings without proper privacy, being forced to relive the trauma in the presence of their abuser, or being compelled to face defense lawyers in corridors — all of which are directly in contravention of the intent of protection under POCSO and international standards.
Additionally, the lack of anonymity protection post-trial is a grave and under-addressed issue. In small towns or close-knit neighborhoods, even where the child's identity is not disclosed in public hearings, the social story about the case typically leads to identification. 

Children may be compelled to move schools, experience bullying, or be removed from school altogether because of social pressure. In the absence of post-trial rehabilitation and reintegration programs, the psychological toll of testimony is still unacceptably high. The trauma does not stop at the verdict — it merely takes another form.
Comparative models are instructive. In Canada, for instance, the Victim/Witness Assistance Program offers continuous emotional and logistical assistance to child witnesses throughout and subsequent to the trial. In the UK, Coroners and Justice Act, 2009 gives the Witness Anonymity Orders a statutory procedure for hiding identities in court cases and on the public records.

These orders are supported by severe sanctions for violation, as opposed to India's patchy enforcement in which violations under POCSO Section 23 usually go unpunished or are resolved informally.
India requires a child-centric model of witness protection laws or protocols, specifically tailored to address the unique vulnerabilities and risks posed to child witnesses. 

This must entail (i) pre-trial risk assessments, (ii) relocation assistance in sensitive cases, (iii) access to counseling and mental healthcare services, (iv) anonymization of data even in court records, and (v) regular protective services after the verdict. Further, these safeguards should be state-funded, they should be automatically activated, and overseen by independent child protection agencies to avoid recurrence or time lag.
The judiciary also has a crucial role to play. Courts should insist on sealed records, in-camera hearings, and use of initials or pseudonyms in all orders relating to minors. In some recent POCSO trials, High Courts like Delhi and Bombay have ordered that names and details of minor victims should not be mentioned even in appeal judgments—a practice which needs to be institutionalized uniformly. These judicial innovations must transition from isolated orders to codified norms.

Systemic Issues in Safeguarding and Empowering Child Witnesses in India

In spite of the development of statutory safeguards and judicial empathy for the plight of child witnesses, the Indian criminal justice system still grapples with deeply ingrained structural and cultural barriers that hinder these protections from becoming a reality. These are not just logistical challenges—these are based on institutional resistance, interagency lack of coordination, and a larger societal failure to place the lived realities of child survivors at the heart of legal structures.

The most glaring and enduring deficiency is the uneven application of statutory safeguards across the jurisdictions. Procedures laid down in the POCSO, such as child-friendly courtrooms, support persons, counseling by a psychologist, and protection infrastructure, are implemented sporadically. 

In most of the districts, Special POCSO Courts are in name only. Courtrooms are still daunting and indistinguishable from regular trial courts. The benches are raised, the tone is formal and confrontational, and no physical adjustments—like lower stages, soft lighting, or isolation rooms—are implemented to support a child's comfort. This sets an environment that is not only hostile but psychologically threatening to children.

The second essential challenge is the lack of trained professionals—judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, police officers, and forensic interviewers—educated in child psychology and trauma-informed interviewing. 

Children are often asked complex, suggestive, or threatening questions which not only mislead them but also taint the validity of their testimonies when inconsistencies arise. Although the POCSO Rules require child-friendly procedures, there are no uniform protocols on how to phrase questions, what tone to employ, or how to modify cross-examination to a child's level of development. Without such provisions, trials turn into adversarial battle.

Inter-institutional coordination is another significant challenge. The operation of POCSO courts depends on the coordination of different organizations: police, Child Welfare Committees, District Child Protection Units, hospitals, and non-governmental care organizations. In reality, these agencies operate in silos and lack communication, have duplicative intervention, or worse, institutional indifference. 

Children are frequently required to repeat their abuse several times—to police, medical officers, CWCs, and subsequently in court—with scant regard for the re-traumatizing impact of such repetition. Ideally, one, video-recorded, forensic interview should be enough, but this model is infrequently implemented due to inadequate infrastructure or procedural definition.

Just as disturbing is the lack of effective aftercare and reintegration processes.Upon completing the trial, most child witnesses—especially rural and economically vulnerable communities—are left to their own devices as to the consequences of their testimony. These include victim-blaming among families, social isolation, psychological trauma, as well as disruption of schooling. 

India does not have a post-trial welfare system that offers long-term counselling, educational assistance, relocation in extreme situations, or vocational training to enable the child to return to normal life. Although the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, imagines such care for "children in need of care and protection," in reality, POCSO survivors seldom receive these benefits unless they happen to be in state facilities or under NGO care.

The over-burdening and underfunding of POCSO courts, particularly in urban jurisdictions, is another pressing issue. Because of the sheer number of cases, judges tend to club several matters in a day, hurriedly taking depositions without the time or the means to guarantee compliance with procedural protections. 

Cases linger for months, even years, in open defiance of POCSO's requirement to conclude trials within a year under Section 35(2). Delays have a ruinous effect on children, whose memories fade, whose trauma becomes more ingrained, and whose faith in the justice system is lost.

The role of media is also that of a double-edged sword. While there is greater public awareness regarding child sexual abuse, sensationalism in reporting often infringes the privacy standards established in Section 23 of POCSO.

Photos, village names, school information, or even fuzzy images can be enough to identify a child in small villages. The self-regulation model for the press has failed, and Section 23 prosecutions are nonexistent, reinforcing that transgressions have no repercussions.

In addition, patriarchal and family-controlled power relationships regularly lead to coercion or withdrawal of child witnesses, particularly when the perpetrator is an immediate family member. In these situations, children are coerced into recanting, forgiving, or remaining silent to "uphold family honour." 

The justice system does little in the way of proactively reversing this coercion, despite the fact that courts have the authority to compel CWCs to appear, hear testimony in-camera, or activate witness protection procedures. More often, though, withdrawal of testimony is accepted at face value, leading to acquittals and impunity.

Finally, despite repeated judicial focus, there is no standard protocol for the identification of children vulnerable to intimidation or retaliation, nor any institutional process for highlighting such cases for special protection. Some of the High Courts have issued guidelines, but these are incredibly varied across states and have not been adopted nationally.

Conclusion

The jurisprudential journey from presumptive unreliability to contextual trust has reshaped the place of child witnesses in the Indian legal system. However, this shift is not yet a story of completion—it is one of ongoing reform, fractured implementation, and unrealized potential. While the legal framework under the Evidence Act, BNSS, and POCSO provides a robust scaffold for safeguarding the rights of child witnesses, the courtroom reality often remains harsh, inaccessible, and poorly adapted to the emotional and cognitive needs of children. The insistence on trauma-informed courtrooms, support mechanisms, and protective anonymity remains more an aspiration than a norm in many jurisdictions.

To fulfill the promise of child-sensitive justice, courts must go beyond formal legal provisions and commit to structural and cultural transformation. This includes institutionalizing child witness protection units, funding post-verdict care, enforcing media anonymity obligations, and harmonizing procedural standards across states. Most importantly, the legal system must recognize that a child’s capacity to testify is not a privilege contingent on age or corroboration, but a right—rooted in dignity, autonomy, and access to justice. Only when the child’s voice is heard not merely with tolerance but with care, support, and trust, can we claim to have built a jurisprudence worthy of its most vulnerable participants.

FAQs 

Q1. Can a child be a competent witness in court under Indian law?
Yes. Under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child is a competent witness if they can understand the questions put to them and give rational answers. Age alone is not a disqualifier.

Q2. Is corroboration always required for child witness testimony to be accepted?
No. Courts have held in cases like State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar and Dattu Ramrao Sakhare that if a child’s testimony is credible and consistent, it can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration.

Q3. What procedural protections exist for child witnesses under Indian law?
The POCSO Act provides for in-camera trials, non-repetitive examination, the presence of a support person, video-conferencing, and protection from aggressive questioning. The BNSS also allows shielding the child from direct confrontation with the accused.

Q4. Are there any formal child witness protection schemes in India?
India has a general Witness Protection Scheme (2018), but it lacks specific adaptations for children. While POCSO mandates anonymity and protection, there is no universal, fully-implemented child witness protection program across India.

Q5. What role does developmental psychology play in interpreting child testimony?
Courts are increasingly recognizing that children may recall traumatic events in fragmented, emotional, or non-linear ways. Testimony must be evaluated with an understanding of trauma, memory development, and suggestibility.