Power coupled with duty

Administrative Law and the Judicial Review of Administrative actions

5.4 Power and duties:

[Power coupled with duty]

Every public servant is a trustee of the society and in all facets of public administration; every public servant has  to exhibit honesty, integrity, sincerity and faithfulness in implementation of the political, social, economic and constitutional policies to integrate nation, to achieve excellence and efficiency in the public administration. A public servant entrusted with duty and power to implement constitutional policy and all inter-related directive principles, should exhibit transparency in implementation and should be accountable for due effectuation of constitutional goals. The Constitution has trusted the public servant as honest administrator to effectuate public policy and constitutional goals.

Supreme Court

Superintending Engineer vs. Kuldeep singh

Apart from statutory or administrative discretionary powers, the Law also imposes a “statutory duty” to be discharged toward the Citizens for achieving the object of the Act. The duty is so imposed by the Legislature or the Parliament to seek “better welfare” of the Citizen, or to achieve what is called the “public good”.

Dividing line between the “powers and duties” exercisable by the authorities is now blurred across the pages. The “power can be transformed in a duty”. When the law empowers the authority, and when the law imposes a “clear duty to be discharged”, there is no option with the authority, but to “discharge the duty according to law”. The discharge of duty that exists under the provision of law cannot be avoided by assuming, presuming or pretexting that such power to discharge the duty is permissive.

The discretionary statutory power conferred upon an authority for a public good is generally “coupled with a duty” to perform it under relevant circumstances. The fact that the exercise of the power is left to the discretion of the authorised person “does not exonerate the public authority from discharging his duty”, or else why the Parliament, or the Legislature would cloth the authorities with such a power.

If the discretionary power so conferred is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably or by taking into consideration extraneous and irrelevant consideration, in the eye of law, the authority concerned must be deemed not to have exercised the discretion at all, that is, he has not discharged his duty. If the Court on the facts placed before it comes to definite conclusion that a particular authority has not exercised his duty for one or other of the aforesaid reasons, it will compel the authority to discharge his duty, or to put it differently, to exercise discretion honestly and objectively.

There is an essential distinction between the “refusal to exercise the discretion” and the “manner of its exercise”. If the authority fails to discharge his duty by refusing to exercise his discretion, when facts calling for its exercise exist, or if the authority exercises the discretion under the circumstances mentioned above, which is not an exercise of discretion in law, the Court will compel that authority to do so.

“Often quoted observation of Lord Cairns” in case of Julius vs. Bishop of Oxford3 fits well as far as the power coupled with duty is concerned:

“But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person on whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so”

And the case decided:

“where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised, and the Court will require it to be exercised” Padfield vs. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food4, (1968) AC 997 is a considered landmark in administrative law. There were powers with the Minister to refer the Complaint to the Committee for its investigation and redressal in relation to “milk price deferential” to producers and he should have referred the complaint to the committee.

The question at issue in that appeal before the House of Lords was the nature and extent of the Minister's duty under section 19(3)(b) of the 1958 Act in deciding whether to refer to the Committee of Investigation, a complaint as to the operation of any scheme made by persons adversely affected by the scheme.

The approval of Parliament shows that this scheme was thought to be in the public interest, and in so far as it necessarily involved detriment to some persons, it must have been thought to be in the public interest that they should suffer it. But in sections 19 and 20 Parliament drew a line.

They provide machinery for investigating and determining whether the scheme is operating or the Board is acting in a manner contrary to the public interest. The effect of these sections is that if, but only if, the Minister and the Committee of Investigation concur in the view that something is being done contrary to the public interest the Minister can step in. Section 20 enables the Minister to take the initiative. Section 19 deals with complaints by individuals who are aggrieved.

If the Minister directs that a complaint by any of them shall be referred to the Committee of Investigation, that committee will make a report which must be published. If they report that any provision of this scheme or any act or omission of the Board is contrary to the interests of the complainers and is not in the public interest then the Minister is empowered to take action, but not otherwise. He may disagree with the view of the Committee as to public interest, and, if he thinks that there are other public interests which outweigh the public interest that justice should be done to the complainers, he would be not only entitled but bound to refuse to take action. Whether he takes action or not, he may be criticised and held accountable in Parliament but the Court cannot interfere.

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