State Legislature Cannot Enact Law Providing Direct Appeal To Supreme Court: SC

Without mincing any words, it has been held very categorically and convincingly by the Apex Court in HS Yadav vs Shakuntala Devi Parakh in Civil Appeal No(s). 5153 of 2019 most recently on October 15, 2019 that a State Legislature cannot enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India. All the States are bound to comply with this latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment. The Bench comprising of Justice Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose struck down Section 13(2) of Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011, in so far as it provides an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, holding explicitly that the same is totally illegal, ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers of the State Legislature.

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment authored by Justice Deepak Gupta for himself and Justice Aniruddha Bose by first and foremost observing that, ''Whether the State Legislature can enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India?' is the question arising in this appeal.' The entire judgment, therefore, revolves rightly around this moot question. Very rightly so!

To be sure, it is then envisaged in para 3 that, 'Section 13 of the Act provides for an appeal against orders of the Rent Controller and the Tribunal. It reads thus:-

'13. Appeal.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, a landlord and/or tenant aggrieved by any order of the Rent Controller shall have the right to appeal in the prescribed manner within the prescribed time to the Rent Control Tribunal.

(2) Appeal against an order of the Rent Control Tribunal shall be with the Supreme Court.'

Needless to say, it is then pointed out in para 4 that, 'A bare perusal of Section 13 shows that from any order of the Rent Controller an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal and in terms of Section 13(2), an appeal lies as a matter of right to the Supreme Court.'

What follows next is as mentioned in para 5 that, 'When the present appeal, filed under Section 13(2) of the Act, came up for admission, while issuing notice we had also ordered as follows:-

'xxx xxx xxx

Notice be given to the learned Advocate General of the State of Chhattisgarh and the learned Attorney General for India as to whether the provisions contained in Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 providing for an appeal to the Supreme Court of India against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, Chhattisgarh would be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

xxx xxx xxx''

Para 6 then further states that, 'Pursuant to the notice, learned Attorney General has appeared and assisted the Court.'

As it turned out, it is then noted in para 7 that, 'At the outset, we would like to point out that the Tribunal has been constituted in exercise of the powers vested in the State Legislature under Article 323B of the Constitution of India which deals with tribunal for other matters. Sub-clause (h) of Clause (2) of the said Article which empowers the appropriate legislature to constitute a tribunal to deal with the issues relating to rent and its regulations read as follows:-

'323B. Tribunals for other matters:-

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) The matters referred to in clause (1) are the following, namely:-

xxx xxx xxx

(h) rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues including the rights, title and interest of landlords and tenants:'

Of course, it is then clarified in para 8 that, 'It is not in dispute before us that the State has the power to constitute the Tribunal. The only issue is whether in terms of Section 13(2) of the Act, the State Legislature could provide an appeal as a matter of right from the order of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court.'

What's more, it is then laid down in para 9 that, 'Article 246 of the Constitution specifically provides that Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws in respect of matters enumerated in List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule. As far as the Concurrent List, i.e. List III is concerned, both the Union and the State have the power to enact laws but if the field is occupied by any law enacted by Parliament then the State cannot legislate on the same issue.'

Simply put, it is then made clear in para 10 that, 'Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule reads as under:-

'77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before the Supreme Court.'

Entry 77 gives power to the Union in respect of jurisdiction and the powers of the Supreme Court. This power cannot be exercised by the State Legislature.'

While continuing in the same vein, it is then enunciated in para 11 that, 'It would also be apposite to refer to Entry 65 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, which reads as follows:-

'65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.'

A bare reading of Entry 65 clearly indicates that the State Legislature has no power to enact any legislation relating to jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court. This power is specifically excluded.'

Be it noted, para 12 then lays bare that, 'Entry 46 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is also relevant. This reads as follows:-

'46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list.'

Even Entry 46 makes it clear that as far as the jurisdictional powers of the Supreme Court are concerned, they cannot be exercised under the Concurrent List. Therefore, the powers with regard to jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court vest with the Union and Parliament alone can enact a legislation in this regard. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 is always there. However, the State cannot enact a legislation providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court. That would amount to entrenching upon the jurisdiction of the Union, which the State Legislature does not have.'

More importantly, it is then observed unambiguously in para 13 that, 'We are constrained to observe that the men who drafted the Act did not even consider the hierarchy of Courts. As pointed above, the Rent Control Tribunal is headed by a retired Judge of the High Court or District Judge in the Super Time Scale or above. What was the rationale of making such an order appealable directly to the Supreme Court? We see no reason why the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court should be excluded.'

Equally important is what is spelt out in para 14 that, 'We, therefore, have no doubt in our mind that Section 13(2) of the Act, in so far as it provides an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, is totally illegal, ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers of the State Legislature. Section 13(2) of the Act is accordingly struck down.'

A key point is then made in para 15 that, 'While dealing with the issue, we may make reference to the fact that the Rent Control Tribunal is a tribunal constituted under Article 323B of the Constitution.'

While referring to a landmark case of the past, it is then revealed in para 16 that, 'In L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119, this Court clearly held that tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution are subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts. In view of the law laid down in L Chandrakumar's case (supra), the High Court can exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution against the orders of the Rent Control Tribunal.'

Finally and no less importantly, it is then held in the last para 17 that, 'In view of the above, we hold that an appeal under Section 13(2) of the Act directly to the Supreme Court is not maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, we keep it open to the appellant to approach the High Court for redressal of his grievance under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the appellant does so, the High Court shall decide the matter strictly in accordance with law. Pending application(s) if any, stand(s) disposed of.'

No doubt, on a concluding note, it has to be said that it is a very well written and well reasoned judgment which deserves unqualified appreciation. All the State Legislatures must always keep in mind in similar such cases what the Apex Court has so very rightly laid down in this case also so elegantly, eloquently and effectively! As a corollary, no denying that it must always be ensured by all the State Legislatures that no law should be enacted which provides direct appeal to the Supreme Court in such cases as has been very held in this case!