It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the RIGHT is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500: (AIR 1984 SC 718 at p. 723), this court pointed out that “punishment of the offender in the interests of the society being one of the objects behind penal statute enacted for larger good of society, the RIGHT to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi”. (1987 AIR SC at PP 889)
If he can be a complainant or initiation of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose withdrawal of the criminal prosecution which has already been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member of the society MUST have locus to initiate a prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. (1987 AIR SC at PP 889)
In fact, in a case like the present where the question is of purity of public administration at a time when moral and ethical values are fast deteriorating and there seems to be a crisis of character in public life, this court should regard as its bounden duty – a duty owed by it to the society – to examine carefully whenever it is alleged that a prosecution for an offence of CORRUPTion or criminal breach of trust by a person holding high public office has been wrongly withdrawn and it should not matter at all as to how many judges in the High Court or the lower Court have been party to the granting of such consent for withdrawal. . (1987 AIR SC at PP 890)
It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. (1987 AIR SC at PP 891)
The criminal process in India is quite tardy and slow moving and as it is, it takes considerable time for a prosecution to ultimately come to an end and if a requirement were super-imposed that no prosecution shall be launched against a person holding high political office under an earlier regime without first setting up a Commission of Enquiry and the Commission coming to a prima facie conclusion that such person has committed acts which would constitute offences, the entire criminal process would be reduced to a mockery because the Commission of Enquiry itself might go on for years and after the inquiry is concluded the prosecution will start where the entire evidence will have to be led again and it would be subject to cross examination followed by lengthy arguments. (1987 AIR SC at PP 892)
When a First Information Report relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is lodged in a POLICE Station under S. 154 or an order is made by a Magistrate directing the POLICE to investigate a non-cognizable case under S. 155, the POLICE is bound to investigate the offence alleged to have been committed. The powers of the POLICE in regard to investigation and the procedure to be followed by them in such investigation are set out in Ss. 157 to 172. Section 173, sub-s (1) casts an obligation on the POLICE to complete the investigation without unnecessary DELAY……...
(1987 AIR SC at PP 893)
The magistrate is therefore given the power to structure and control the DISCRETION of the POLICE. ……….The DISCRETION of the POLICE to prosecute is thus ‘cabined and confined’ and, subject to appeal of revision, and the Magistrate is made the final arbiter on this question.
(1987 AIR SC at PP 894)
“The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the Executive however high the accused, however sure the Government fells a case s false, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle court justice because of hubris, affection of other noble or ignoble consideration.” Once the prosecution is launched, its relentless course cannot be halted except on sound considerations germane to public justice. (1987 AIR SC at PP 894)
the Public Prosecutor(AIR 1938 PC 266) is, in a larger sense, also an officer of the court and that he is bound to assist the court with his fairly considered view and the court is entitled to have the benefit of the FAIR exercise of his function. It has also to be appreciated that in this country the scheme of the administration of criminal justice is that the primary responsibility of prosecuting serious offences (which are classified as cognizable offences) is on the executive authorities. Once information of the commission of any such offence reaches the constituted authorities, the investigation including collection of the requisite evidence, and the prosecution for the offence with reference to such evidence, are the functions of the executive. (1987 AIR SC at PP 895)
{[ It is clear from the wording of the section (190) that the initiation of the proceedings against a person commences on the COGNIZANCE* of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first contingency evidently is in respect of non-cognizable offences as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code on the complaint of an aggrieved person. (R.R. CHARI Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH. 1951 AIR SC 207) ]} *107
It was also emphasised by this court in Subhash Chander v. State, (AIR 1980 SC 423) (Supra) that “justice cannot be allowed to be scuttled by the Pubic Prosecutor of the State because of hubris affection or other noble or ignoble consideration.” (1987 AIR SC at PP 900)
When the Court has come to this conclusion after full consideration and framed a charge, it is difficult to see how on the same material the Court can be persuaded to hold that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution. How can the public Prosecutor be permitted to make a volte face on the basis of the same material? That would be mockery of justice and it would shake the confidence of the court in the purity and integrity of the administration of justice. .” (1987 AIR SC at PP 901)
it would be desirable in the interest of public justice that high political personages accused of offences should face the judicial process and get discharged rather than seem to manoeuvre the judicial system and thus endanger the legitimacy of the political as well as the judicial process. (1987 AIR SC 905)
The Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of criminal justice and so has the Public Prosecutor, its ‘Minister of Justice’. Both have a duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible ABUSE or MISUSE by the Executive by resort to the provisions of S. 321, Cr.P.C. (1987 AIR SC at PP 908)
As such he (prosecutor) is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the land the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnest and vigour indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from IMPROPER methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate one to bring about a JUST one. ( Sheonandan Paswan V State of Bihar 1987 AIR SC at PP 909)
