can i go for quashing after charge sheet filed

Obviously, a discharge application, as suggested by the Expert Akshay Kolle, can be filed 

Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Anand Kumar Mohatta vs. State reported in 2018 SCC Online SC 2447 particularly paragraph Nos.16 and 18 has held that  FIR can be qaushed even after filing of chargesheet.

While principle of qaushing are enunciated as below 

In the landmark case State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335), a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India considered in detail, the provisions of section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Supreme Court summarized the legal position by laying the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint:

1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or, where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

In again yet another judgment, in the case of Monica Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781, the Apex Court has propounded "Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself." While interpreting this jurisdiction of High Court Apex Court, in the case of Popular Muthiah v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296, has propounded "High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings".

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Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1723 of 2017)]

A full bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Hon'ble Mr. Justice AM Khanwilkar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice DY Chandrachud has laid down broad principles from various precedents in relation to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for quashing of First Information Reports (FIRs) in the judgment passed in an appeal against a decision of the Gujarat High Court.

The Gujarat High Court vide its judgment dated November 25, 2016, had dismissed an application under Section 482 of CrPC filed by the Appellants seeking quashing of FIR registered against them on June 18, 2016 with the City 'C' Division Police Station, District Jamnagar, Gujarat for offences punishable under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code.

Before, the High Court, the plea for quashing the FIR was advanced on the ground that the Appellants had amicably settled the dispute with the Complainant, who had also filed an Affidavit to that effect. On behalf of the prosecution, application for quashing was opposed on two grounds:

1. The Appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. The Appellants had criminal antecedants.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court  Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2017) 9 SCC 641   after discussing various precedents on the subject summarized the following broad principles in relation to Section 482 for quashing FIRs.

1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised;
    
   1. to secure the ends of justice or
   2. to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

further facts of the case will detrime sucess and failure of quashing of your FIR better is to argue on charge as the scope is much wider and possibilty of discharge are better.

Regards

Rohit Naagpal

Advocate