1. On 11th April, 2008, a two Judge Bench in Jitendra Singh vs Bhanu Kumari & Ors [C.A. No.2786 of 2008] held that "the purpose of Section 24 CPC is merely to confer on the Court a discretionary power. A Court acting under Section 24 CPC may or may not in its judicial discretion transfer a particular case. Section 24 does not prescribe any ground for ordering the transfer of a case. In certain cases it may be ordered suo motu and it may be done for administrative reasons. But when an application for transfer is made by a party, the court is required to issue notice to the other side and hear the party before directing transfer. To put it differently, the Court must act judicially in ordering a transfer on the application of a party."
2. On 16th April, 2008, a two Judge Bench in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs vs Union of India & Another [C.A. No.1897 of 2003] held that "Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only." The Bench held that the "ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as :-"that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation." While adopting this course, the Bench kept in view the "well recognized rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible." As a sequel to the above, the Bench held that the "Explanation appearing below Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act will have to be treated as redundant." Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act was thus partly struck down.
3. On 21st April, 2008, a two Judge Bench in Surjit Singh vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd [C.A. No. 5354 of 2002] held that "where two relatives are living in the same house a distinction has to be drawn between a telephone line in the name of a person who is economically dependent on another (who may be the husband, father etc.), and the telephone line in the name of a person who has an independent source of income from which he is paying the telephone bills. In the case of the former, i.e. a person who is economically dependent on another who is paying his telephone bills, the telephone line in the name of such other relative on whom the subscriber is dependent can be disconnected for non-payment of the telephone bills of the nominal subscriber."
4. On 6th May, 2008, a two Judge Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Yellamma & Anr [C.A. No.3317 of 2008] held that "a contract of insurance like any other contract, is a contract between the insured and the insurer. The amount of premium is required to be paid as a consideration for arriving at a concluded contract. If the insurer insists that a cheque should be issued only by the insured and not by a third party, no exception thereto can be taken."
5. On 6th May, 2008, a two Judge Bench in Sudhir Kumar Rana vs Surinder Singh & Ors [C.A. No.3321 of 2008] held that "if a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence", but the "same, by itself, may not lead to a finding of negligence as regards the accident."
6. On 12th May, 2008, a two Judge Bench in Mausami Moitra Ganguli vs Jayant Ganguli [C.A. No.3500 of 2008] held that "while determining the question as to which parent the care and control of a child should be committed, the first and the paramount consideration is the welfare and interest of the child and not the rights of the parents under a statute. Indubitably the provisions of law pertaining to the custody of a child contained in either the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Section 17) or the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (Section 13) also hold out the welfare of the child as a predominant consideration. In fact, no statute, on the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate the vital factor of the welfare of the minor." "Better financial resources of either of the parents or their love for the child may be one of the relevant considerations but cannot be the sole determining factor for the custody of the child", the Bench said. The Bench emphasized that "a heavy duty is cast on the Court to exercise its judicial discretion judiciously in the background of all the relevant facts and circumstances, bearing in mind the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration."
7. On 12th May, 2008, a two Judge Bench in Dev Dutt vs Union of India & Ors [C.A. No. 7631 of 2002] held that "fairness and transparency in public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation. This is the correct legal position even though there may be no Rule/G.O. requiring communication of the entry, or even if there is a Rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle of non-arbitrariness in State action as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution requires such communication. Article 14 will override all rules or government orders." The Bench held that when the entry is communicated to the public servant, he "should have a right to make a representation against the entry to the concerned authority, and the concerned authority must decide the representation in a fair manner and within a reasonable period." It further held that "the representation must be decided by an authority higher than the one who gave the entry, otherwise the likelihood is that the representation will be summarily rejected without adequate consideration as it would be an appeal from Caesar to Caesar." The Bench made it clear that "the above directions will not apply to military officers because the position for them is different", but "they will apply to employees of statutory authorities, public sector corporations and other instrumentalities of the State (in addition to Government servants)." In the opinion of the Bench, "non-communication of entries in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant, whether he is in civil, judicial, police or any other service (other than the military), certainly has civil consequences because it may affect his chances for promotion or other benefits. Hence, such non-communication would be arbitrary, and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."
8. On 16th May, 2008, a two Judge Bench in United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Manubhai Dharmasinhbhai Gajera & others [C.A. Nos.4113-4115 of 2008] examined the question as to whether renewal of a mediclaim policy on payment of the amount of premium would be automatic. The Bench held that "renewal of a medi-claim policy subject to just exceptions should ordinarily be made. But the same does not mean that the renewal is automatic. Keeping in view the terms and conditions of the prospectus and the insurance policy, the parties are not required to go into all the formalities. The very fact that the policy contemplates terms for renewal, subject of course to payment of requisite premium, the same cannot be placed at par with a case of first contract." Before parting with the case, the Bench observed that keeping in view the role played by the insurance companies, it is essential that the Insurance Regulatory Authority lays down clear guidelines by way of regulations or otherwise.
9. On 16th May, 2008, a two Judge Bench in A.P.S.R.T.C. & Anr. vs. K. Hemalatha & Ors. [C.A. Nos.3623-3626 of 2008] held that "when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of ’composite negligence’ will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50."
