United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Reserved on: September 19, 2024
Pronounced on: March 18, 2025
Coram: Circuit Judges Millett and Wilkins, Senior Circuit Judge Rogers
Subject Matter
The case of Thaler v. Perlmutter presents a landmark dispute in copyright law and artificial intelligence, testing the legal framework’s adaptability to technological advancements. The central issue concerns whether a work created entirely by an AI system, with no direct human involvement, is eligible for copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1976. The case raises profound questions about the definition of “authorship” in intellectual property law and whether the existing legal framework should evolve to accommodate AI-generated content.
The dispute also involves a broader challenge to the United States Copyright Office’s policies regarding the human authorship requirement. Dr. Stephen Thaler, the creator of an AI system called the Creativity Machine, sought copyright protection for an artwork that was generated autonomously by the AI. When the Copyright Office denied registration on the basis that only human-created works can receive copyright, Thaler initiated a legal battle that escalated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Beyond copyright law, the case also touches on constitutional arguments, as Thaler contends that the Copyright Office’s rejection violates the First and Fifth Amendments by arbitrarily excluding AI-generated works from intellectual property protections. This case is pivotal not just for Thaler but for the future of AI-generated creativity and its legal recognition in the United States.
Facts of the Case
The case is about Dr. Stephen Thaler, a computer scientist with a focus on artificial intelligence, who created an AI system named the Creativity Machine. The AI system independently created a painting named "A Recent Entrance to Paradise", which was tried to be registered for copyright protection by Dr. Thaler with the United States Copyright Office. In his application, he marked the Creativity Machine as the single author and himself as the owner of the copyright.
The Copyright Office denied the application, claiming that the work did not qualify under the requirement of human authorship, a fundamental requirement for copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1976. Dr. Thaler appealed for reconsideration on various levels within the Copyright Office, all of which supported the initial rejection, contending that only works created by humans are entitled to copyright protection.
Dissatisfied with such a ruling, Dr. Thaler sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the human authorship prerequisite of the Copyright Office was unconstitutional and illegal.
The District Court ruled against Thaler, once more upholding that copyright law requires human authorship. He appealed such a ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, leading to the present ruling.
Issues Before the Court
Whether a work composed entirely by artificial intelligence, with no human intervention, is entitled to copyright protection under American law. This meant raising the issue of whether the Copyright Act, which fails to define "author" expressly, must be interpreted as covering non-human creators.
The second question was whether Dr. Thaler, as the creator and owner of the AI system, could obtain copyright under the "work-for-hire" doctrine. Thaler argued that since corporations and other non-human entities can be treated as legal authors under the work-made-for-hire provision, works created by AI should be treated in the same way.
Lastly, the case also raised the general constitutional issue of whether enforcing human authorship infringes upon the First and Fifth Amendments through limiting intellectual property rights based upon an archaic understanding of authorship and creativity.
Arguments from Both Sides
Arguments of the Appellant (Dr. Thaler's Side)
Dr. Thaler's main argument was that the human authorship requirement of the Copyright Office is not directly included in the Copyright Act and hence is an antiquated interpretation not consistent with current technological developments.
He argued that nothing in American copyright law expressly provides that human beings alone may be authors and that the law must adapt to include AI works.
He further reasoned that his Creativity Machine acted independently to generate the artwork and that this is comparable to an artist employing a camera or software program to produce creative works. Because copyright protection is afforded artists who employ digital tools, then AI-generated artwork should not be denied based solely on the fact that a machine independently generated it.
In addition, Thaler claimed that by the work-made-for-hire provision (17 U.S.C. § 201(b)), he, as the creator and owner of the AI system, would be entitled to be deemed the legal author. He referred to the fact that corporations are not human, yet they may own copyrights, and therefore, there is no rational basis on which an AI-generated work may not be considered the property of the owner of the AI.
Lastly, Thaler appealed the Copyright Office's ruling on constitutional grounds, claiming that withholding copyright on works created by AI suppresses creativity and innovation, in express contravention of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8).
He further claimed that the requirement of human authorship infringes the First and Fifth Amendments by imposing arbitrary restrictions on the application of copyright law on the basis of an outmoded human model.
Arguments of the Appellees (U.S. Copyright Office's Side)
The U.S. Copyright Office, through the Department of Justice, in defense of its requirement of human authorship pointed out that U.S. copyright law has for a long time demanded a work be produced by a human being. It cited various precedents, starting with the Supreme Court's ruling in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884), affirming human authorship as a core element of copyright law.
The government also reasoned that copyright law has the purpose of stimulating human creativity, and awarding copyright to AI would basically destabilize the legal system by bringing in non-human parties as rights holders. This, the government believed, could bring about significant legal uncertainties such as disputes over ownership and possible monopolization of AI-created content by companies.
As for Thaler's work-for-hire defense, the government dismissed the argument, stating that the doctrine of work-made-for-hire only takes effect when a human author is present.
The Copyright Act, they contended, was never meant to consider a machine an employee or contractor under the said provision. Because the Creativity Machine lacked legal capacity to enter into a contract, it could not be deemed a "hired author" under the law.
The government also rejected Thaler's constitutional arguments, saying that Congress has the discretion to define copyright law as it pleases and that the requirement of human authorship was within its legislative discretion. The court was asked not to intrude in this policy matter, and that any shift in the definition of authorship must be by Congress, not the courts.
Court's Analysis and Findings
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court and reiterated that human authorship is an essential prerequisite for copyright protection. The court made it clear that the language, form, and history of the Copyright Act all seem to assume that an "author" will be a human.
The court pointed out several provisions of the statute in support of this reading. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) provides for copyright protection to last for the life of the author plus 70 years, a rule which only applies if the author is a human with a limited life span.
In the same way, 17 U.S.C. § 203 provides for the transfer of copyright interests to the heirs of an author, which emphasizes the fact that authors have to be legally inheritable, which they cannot because of AI.
The court also used the long-standing administrative and judicial tradition that has always insisted on human authorship for copyright. It quoted the Copyright Office's long-standing policy that works generated entirely by a machine without any human creative input are not entitled to copyright protection.
The court concluded that Thaler's Creativity Machine was autonomous, and there was no direct human input in the creative process, making the work ineligible for copyright.
In the case of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, the court denied Thaler's argument, observing that the doctrine only applies where there is employment or a contractual relationship between human beings and legal persons, but not with non-persons making works on their own accord. As the Creativity Machine was not a legal person able to form contracts, it could not be an employee or a contractor for purposes of copyright law.
Lastly, the court refused to reach Thaler's constitutional claims, holding that the Copyright Act itself constituted a legitimate basis on which to deny his suit. The court believed that if Thaler wished to modify the law, it should do so through the process of legislative change, not by way of judicial fiat.
Final Judgment
The Court of Appeals upheld the rejection of Thaler's copyright application in a decision that AI works with no human authorship are not eligible for protection under the Copyright Act of 1976. The court held that only Congress can make changes to copyright law to allow protection for AI-generated works, and so long as no such legislative amendments are made, copyright protection is reserved for works authored by humans.
