High Court of Delhi
Prithvi Singh… Petitioner
Vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Limited… Respondent
Reported in: 56 (1994) DLT 535
Head note:
(A) Principles of natural justice: When a cancellation of dealership is notified on the ground of manipulated date based on the objections by a third party, the fair procedure in accordance with principles of natural justice should be followed.
(B) It has to be borne in mind that Court is primarily concerned with process involved while arriving at decision by the administrative and or quasi-judicial bodies and it is not for the Court to give a finding on the merits of the dispute except under exceptional circumstances. Court has to examine the procedure adopted by the authority and if the Court finds any error therein the Court would direct the concerned authority to reconsider the matter.
K. ShivashankarBhat, J.
(1) The petitioner applied for the Retail Outlet Dealership at Chant Road, Faridabad District.
(2) The petitioner asserts that his date of birth was 26.12.1965 and the date of birth shown in the Matriculation certificate was got corrected and he has produced the corrected matriculation certificate also. According to the petitioner he was not given any opportunity to dispel the inference drawn by the first respondent before cancelling the Dealership and the principles of natural justice were thus violated.
(3) The rival applicant has come on record as the second respondent. In the counter affidavit she has asserted that the petitioner has manipulated the correction in the Matriculation certificate and according to her the petitioner’s date of birth (26.12.1965) as stated, is not at all correct. She has produced a few documents to substantiate her contention that there was no entry of the birth of the petitioner on the date referred by the petitioner in the relevant Register.
(4) The basic question is whether the cancellation of the Dealership given to the petitioner was preceded by a proper enquiry. Learned Counsel for the second respondent contends that though the principles of natural justice as such were not complied with, this is not a case where this Court should set aside the order having regard to the documents produced by the second respondent and that no useful purpose will be served by directing the first respondent to go into the question afresh after considering the objections, if any, of the petitioner against cancellation.According to the learned Counsel for the second respondent the facts are indisputable having regard to the documents produced by the second respondent.
(5) I do not think that the facts could be considered as indisputable. To what extent the documents produced by the petitioner and the documents produced by the second respondent are to be considered and appreciated are matters for the fact finding authority and not for this Court to go into. Admittedly no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner. If the petitioner had been notified of the proposal to cancel the Distributorship, petitioner would have placed sufficient material before the first respondent to show that his date of birth was December,1965. It is for the fact finding authority like the first respondent to accept the explanation or not depending upon the circumstances of the case and the nature of the documents produced. Mr. Tandon learned Counsel for the second respondent urged that the register of births is the best evidence and the petitioner will not be able to sustain his date of birth as 23/12/1965 without producing it at the relevant time. Again it is for the first respondent to consider this question as to whether the evidence produced by the petitioner is sufficient or not to accept hisassertion. Having regard to the nature of the dispute raised by the second respondent it will be fair to hear her before the 1st respondent decides the question.
(6) Mr. Tandon relied on a decision of the Supreme Court Ogla Tell is and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, in support of his contention that this Court need not always remit back the matter to the fact finding authority only because principles of natural justice were not complied with. Learned Counsel referred to para 51 of the report which reads as follows:
Normally, we would have directed the Municipal Commissioner to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to show why the encroachments committed by them on pavements or footpaths should not be removed. But, the opportunity which was denied by the Commissioner was granted by us in an ample measure, both sides having made their contentions, we are of the opinion thatthe Commissioner was justified in directing the removal of the encroachments committed by the petitioners on pavements, footpaths or accessory roads. As observed in S.L. Kapoor, “where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice, but because Courts do not issue futile writs”. Indeed, in that case, the Court did not set aside the order of supersession in view of the factual position stated by it. But, though we do not see any justification for asking the Commissioner to hear the petitioners, we propose to pass an order which, we believe, he would or should have passed, had he granted a hearing to them and heard what we did.
(7) The above passage in no way supports the proposition advanced by Mr. Tandon. The Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in S.L. Kapoor’s case which itself shows that when facts are admitted or indisputable only then the Court may decide the question straightway instead of remitting back the matter. Further, the opening word in the above observation itself shows that “normally” the matter shall have to be sent back to the fact finding authority. It has to be borne in mind that this Court is primarily concerned with the process involved while arriving at decision by the administrative/quasi-judicial bodies and it is not for this Court to give a finding on the merits of the dispute except under exceptional circumstances. The Court has to examine the procedure adopted by the authority and if the Court finds any error therein the Court would direct the concerned authority to reconsider the matter.
(8) In the result this writ petition is allowed. The impugned letter of the first respondent is set aside. The first respondent or its appropriate bodies are directed to reconsider the question afresh after hearing both the petitioner and the second respondent within three months from today. Counsel for the first respondent states that this dispute shall have to be placed before the Oil Selection Board. First respondent shall to take expeditious steps to place the matter before the said Board for its recommendations after hearing both the parties.
(9) Rule made absolute.
