Condonation of Delay in Land Acquisition: A Justice-Oriented Approach under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Date of Order:

July 13, 2023.

Bench:

Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka

Appellant-Delhi Development Authority

Respondents- Jagan Singh & Ors.

Parties:

SUBJECT

IMPORTANT PROVISIONS

Article 226 of The Constitution of India

OVERVIEW

• In summary, the first respondent filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Delhi to challenge the acquisition of certain lands. The acquisition was carried out under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
• The process began with a notification issued on 23rd June 1989, and the final award was made on 18th June 1992. In 1990, the first respondent filed another Writ Petition against the acquisition proceedings, but it was dismissed on 20th May 2005. The appellant took possession of the acquired land on 19th January 2006.
• Subsequently, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was repealed, and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013, came into effect from 1st January 2014. 
• On 25th May 2015, the first respondent filed yet another Writ Petition, arguing that the acquisition should be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act because they had not received compensation despite the appellant taking physical possession of the land. The High Court, citing a decision in the Pune Municipal Corporation case, agreed with the first respondent and directed the appellant to pay compensation according to the 2013 Act.
• However, on 6th March 2020, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors. overturned the earlier decision in the Pune Municipal Corporation case and other decisions based on it. 
• The Constitution Bench held that another decision in the Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association case, relied upon in the impugned judgment, was also incorrect.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the   delay   of   1231   days   in approaching this Court should be condoned. 

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT

The appellant's lawyer argues that the acquired land has already been utilized for public purposes. He asserts that the acquisition cannot be deemed as lapsed, especially based on a decision that has been explicitly overturned. The lawyer contends that the reasons for any delay in the process have been adequately explained.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

• The first respondent strongly opposes the application for condonation of delay, primarily because there is an unexplained delay of 1231 days. According to their argument, the appellant and the Government of NCT Delhi's actions indicate that they accepted the impugned judgment. The respondent contends that when dealing with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the court must consider that the successful litigant has obtained significant rights based on the judgment being challenged. 
• They emphasize that courts should treat applications for condonation of delay made by the State or its agencies no differently than those made by other litigants. 
• Merely overturning the judgment in the Pune Municipal Corporation case with a subsequent ruling by the Constitution Bench does not guarantee success for the appellant, unless they provide a sufficient cause for the significant delay.

JUDGEMENT ANALYSIS

• The Constitution Bench in the Indore Development Authority case interpreted Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which states that land acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act will be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. 
• According to the interpretation, if an award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, and either the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings will be considered lapsed. 
• The appropriate government can then choose to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
• In their ruling, the Constitution Bench clarified that the word "or" in Section 24(2) should be read as "nor" or "and." This means that the deemed lapse occurs when, due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, either the possession of land has not been taken or compensation has not been paid. 
• In cases where possession has been taken but compensation has not been paid, or vice versa, there will be no lapse.
• In the present case, as stated in the impugned judgment, the possession of the acquired land was taken over on 19th January 2006. Therefore, based on the decision in the Indore Development Authority case, Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act will not apply, even though the compensation has not been paid.
• Regarding the factual aspects, it is important to note that paragraph 2 of the challenged judgment states that the acquired land has been put to use for the car maintenance depot of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) at Kalindi Kunj, as part of the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) Project Phase-III. 
• In response to the court's order on 17th February 2023, the appellant was directed to provide the current status of the acquired land. An affidavit was filed on 13th April 2023, along with photographs, which have not been contested by the first respondent's counsel.
• Hence, we can proceed with the understanding that the acquired land has indeed been utilized for a public purpose by DMRC for the metro depot, as accurately recorded in paragraph 2 of the challenged judgment.
• Over the years, this Court has consistently emphasized the need for a liberal and justice-oriented approach when dealing with applications for condonation of delay, ensuring that substantive rights of parties are not forfeited merely due to delays. The power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should be exercised meaningfully to serve the cause of justice.
• It is acknowledged that the fact that the impugned judgment's basis has been overruled is not, in itself, a sufficient ground to condone a long delay. In this particular case, the Special Leave Petition was filed two years and three days after the Constitution Bench's decision in the Indore Development Authority case.
• It is essential to note that the acquired land has been in use by DMRC for the metro depot, serving an important public purpose, as recorded in the impugned judgment. This long-standing public use of the land is a relevant factor that supports a more lenient approach when considering the application for condonation of delay. 
• The timing of the filing of the petition invoking Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, almost seventeen months after the Act came into force, would have been treated differently if the land were not used for a public purpose.
• The policy incorporated in the notification dated 22nd December 2017 applies to cases where the acquisition has been validly held to have lapsed and does not aid the first respondent's claim.
• While the application for condonation of delay may have been drafted casually, given the peculiar circumstances of the case discussed above, a justice-oriented and liberal approach necessitates the condonation of the delay.
• Regarding the compensation issue, since it is now established that the acquisition under the 1894 Act remains valid, the first respondent is not entitled to claim compensation under the 2013 Act, which was not applicable to this acquisition. The appellant is entitled to receive the compensation already determined under the award made under the 1894 Act.
• Before concluding, the court noted that a part of the pavement adjacent to the metro depot, which is part of the acquired land, has been occupied by a car clinic and other vendors. The appellant and the relevant authorities are urged to take immediate action to rectify this and ensure the pavement is used for pedestrians only.
• Although the appeal succeeds, due to the appellant's conduct, they are directed to pay costs amounting to ₹50,000/-.
• Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with the following terms: 
• a. The impugned judgment and order dated 11th August 2016 are quashed and set aside. 
• b. The Writ Petition (C) No.3819 of 2015 filed by the first respondent before the High Court of Delhi stands dismissed.
• c. The appellant is directed to pay costs of ₹50,000/- to the first respondent within one month from today. 
• d. The first respondent must provide their bank account details and a photocopy of a canceled cheque to the appellant's advocate. The appellant shall make an online payment of the costs to the first respondent's account. 
• e. If the compensation determined under the Award made under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has not been paid yet, the appellant and/or the second respondent must pay the same to the first respondent within one month from today, following the manner provided in clause (d) above.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court's ruling serves as an excellent illustration of the significance of taking a justice-oriented approach when evaluating requests for the condonation of delays in land acquisition proceedings. 
• The Court highlighted that the power granted by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be used properly to further the interests of justice and that substantive rights of parties should not be eliminated only as a result of delays. 
• Although the overturning of the assailed judgment's legal foundation was not a sufficient excuse for the lengthy delay, the Court took the case's unusual circumstances into account. Notably, the newly acquired site had previously been used for a crucial public function, notably the metro depot run by DMRC. In making its judgment to award the condonation, the Court heavily relied on this increased public use.