Danial Latifi Vs Union Of India: A Muslim Husband Was Accountable To Keep Up His Divorced Wife Just For The Iddat Period After Such Period The Onus Of Keeping Up The Lady Moves To Her Relatives If She Can't Maintain Herself

Bench:
Justice G.B Pattanaik, Justice S. RajendraBabu, Justice D.P Mohapatra, Justice D.Raju and JusticeShivraj P. Patil

Appellant:
Danial Latifi

Respondent:
Union of India

Issues

1. Whether a Muslim husband is responsible to make sensible and reasonable provision reaching out past the Iddat period regarding Sec. 3(1)(a) of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986?
2. Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is unconstitutional considering Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950?
3. Whether a husband under Muslim law is absolved from any duty towards his divorced wife past the payment of any Mahr because of her and add up to cover maintenance during the Iddat period and Sec. 127(3)(b) of CrPC, 1973?

Facts of the Case

1. The case follows its advantage from the well-known instance of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, normally known as the Shah Bano case.
2. Shah Bano, a Muslim mother of five, 62 years old, from Indore, Madhya Pradesh, was isolated (divorced) by her husband in 1978.
3. She at that point stopped a criminal case under Section 125 of the CrPC, after appealingthe Supreme Court of India, she got the right to alimony.
4. However, later, she was denied her right, when the Parliament of India upset the judgment by establishing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
5. This Act watered down the Supreme Court choice and, it even denied alimony, to those ladies who can't look after themselves, from their past husbands.
6. As indicated by Sec 3(1) (a) of the act, a divorced lady is qualified for sensible and reasonable provisions, and maintains inside the 'Iddat' period, therefore, denying the resulting and future support to such spouses from their divorced husbands.
7. A Muslim woman was left to be kept up in the hands of their relatives after the Iddat period.
8. Therefore, the established legitimacy of the Act was tested under the steady gaze of the Supreme Court for Danial Latifi through a writ appeal.

Appellant’s Contention

1. Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code states to accommodate support just in some specific circumstance and not for each divorced Muslim lady. This doesn't consider Article 21 which is the right to life, to each individual and divorced wife who were reliant everyday also have this right.
2. Article14 which states for equity is disregarded by segregating the Muslim ladies. It is genuinely ridiculous to invalidate a Judgment given for Shah Bano because of some political pressing factor. The reality was segregated the full community of Muslim ladies getting maintenance and equivalent protection from Law.
3. The marriages in Muslim Law are legally binding and a component of consideration is one of the primary necessities for a substantial or valid contract. In Muslim marriages, they give Mahr or Dower as the consideration. Similarly, divorce turns into a binding contract between both partners, and nothing being the consideration makes it invalid.
4. Shah Bano's case was recorded in the Supreme Court under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code where the Judgment was invalidated. Sec. 125 states for the support or maintenance of all divorced wife's from their husbands under specific conditions. The principle essence of Section 125 is to give support or maintenance to all the ladies regardless of religion. When there is such a law why would that be an obstruction to give maintenance for the situation?

Respondent’s Contention

1. It was expressed discrimination and no equivalent treatment for Muslim women. Personal laws in our nation are diverse for every religion and become the reason for segregation. It has been acknowledged by the constitution and isn't violating Article 14. If Section 125 of the CrPC applies to the Muslims also, then the legislation needs to state it and make different provisions for that.
2. Under Sec.3 of the Muslim Woman’s Protection Act, 1986, the parliament has referenced fair and reasonable provision and maintenance to be given by the husband to the wife within the Iddat period. Then why the subject of lifetime maintenance or just within the Iddat period does emerge?
3. Shah Bano's Judgment was denied simply because it didn't make equity to the Muslim personal law. It was additionally expressed that there was no segregation in the Judgment rather the decision made didn't legitimize or was in connection with personal law.
4. Following what the personal law endorses and been acknowledged by the constitution can't be expressed as prejudicial. Personal laws are carried out as the specific community can follow them and has no clue for segregation. The Act carried out by the parliament was to protect the personal law and forestall any interference by different laws. The Act points not to acquire any quirk or contrast in the recommended personal law.
5. It is to be noticed that the Muslim personal law has adequate provisions to protect Muslim women, and it isn't required that simply by broadening Section 125 the Muslim women are secured. Muslim law never expects to make the ladies endure, and it is to be noticed that Muslim law is made focusing on women's protection. In this way, the Act endorsed can't be expressed invalid or unconstitutional.

Judgment

The Supreme Court while maintaining the legitimacy of the act, decided as follows:-

1. Muslim Husband is obligated to pay maintenance which may be reached out past the Iddat Period in terms of Sec 3(1)(a) and makes fair and reasonable provisions for the divorced wife for her future.
2. Whenever divorced Muslim women who have not remarried and who can't maintain themselves after the Iddat period can continue under Sec. 4 of the act, which says that she ought to be maintained by the relatives to the extent of her property which her relatives acquire after her death.
3. If relatives can't look after her, Magistrate may coordinate the State Wakf Board to balance out under the act to pay such maintenance.
4. Article 14,15, and 21 of the Constitution of India isn't outraged by the provision of the act.

Relevant Paragraphs

1. Paragraph 26:A perusing of the Act will show that it arranges and directs the commitments because of a Muslim woman divorcee by putting them outside the extent of Section 125 CrPC as the "divorced woman" has been characterized as "Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law and has been divorced by or has gotten divorced from her husband as per the Muslim law". However, the Act doesn't have any significant bearing to a Muslim lady whose marriage is solemnized either under the Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954 or a Muslim lady whose marriage was disintegrated either under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 or the Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Act doesn't have any significant bearing on the abandoned and isolated Muslim spouses. The maintenance under the Act is to be paid by the husband for the term of the Iddat period and this commitment doesn't stretch out beyond the period of Iddat. When the relationship with the husband has concluded with the expiry of the Iddat period, the duty declines upon the relatives of the divorcee. The Act observes Muslim personal law in figuring out which relatives are capable under which conditions. On the off chance that there are no relatives, or no relatives can uphold the divorcee, at that point the court can arrange for the State Wakf Boards to pay the maintenance.
2. Paragraph 27:Section 3(1) of the Act gives that a divorced woman will be qualified to have from her husband, fair and reasonable maintenance which is to be made and paid to her within the Iddat periodperiod. Under Section 3(2) the Muslim divorcee can document an application before a Magistrate if the previous husband has not paid to her a fair and reasonable provision and maintenance or Mahr because of her or has not conveyed the properties given to her previously or at the time of the marriage by her relatives, or companions, or the husband or any of his relatives or companions. Section 3(3) accommodates system wherein the Magistrate can pass a request guiding the previous husband to pay such sensible and reasonable provision and maintenance to the divorced woman as he may suspect fit and appropriate having respect to the necessities of the divorced woman, the standard of life appreciated by her during her marriage and means for her previous husband. The legal enforceability of the Muslim divorced woman's right to provision and maintenance under section 3(1)(a) of the Act has been exposed to the state of the husband having adequate methods which, rigorously talking, is in opposition to the standards of Muslim law as the risk to pay maintenance during the Iddat period is unrestricted and can't be encircled by the monetary methods for the husband. The reason for the Act seems, by all accounts, to be to permit the Muslim husband to hold his opportunity of staying away from payment of maintenance to his past wife after divorce and the period of Iddat.
3. Paragraph 20:In deciphering the provisions where the marital relationship is included, we need to consider the social conditions predominant in our general public. In our general public, whether they have a place with the dominant part of the minority bunch, what is clear is that there exists an extraordinary dissimilarity in the matter of financial cleverness between a man and a woman. Our general public is male ruled, both financially and socially and women are appointed, constantly, a reliant job, regardless of the class of society to which she has a place. A woman on her marriage frequently, however profoundly taught, surrenders her any remaining diversions and altogether gives herself to the government assistance of the family, specifically, she imparts to her husband, her feelings, opinions, psyche, and body, and her interest in the marriage is as long as she can remember — a hallowed penance of her self and is extremely gigantic to be estimated regarding cash. At the point when a relationship of this nature separates, in what way we could repay her so particularly as far as passionate fracture or loss of speculation is worried, there can be no answer. It is a little comfort to say that such a woman ought to be repaid regarding cash towards her livelihood and such help which shares fundamental basic freedoms to get gender and social equity is all around perceived by people having a place with all religions and it is hard to see that Muslim law expects to give an alternate sort of obligation by giving something similar to those detached with the marital life, for example, the beneficiaries who were probably going to acquire the property from her or the Wakf Boards. Such a methodology appears to us to be a sort of bending of the social facts. Answers for such cultural issues of widespread size relating to skylines of fundamental basic freedoms, culture, pride and respectability of life and directs of need chasing social equity ought to be perpetually left to be settled on contemplations other than religion or strict confidence or convictions or public, partisan, racial or communal requirements. Remembering this viewpoint, we need to decipher the provisions of the Act being referred to.
4. Paragraph 33:In the Shah Bano case this Court has disclosed concerning the reasoning behind Section 125 CrPC to make provision for maintenance to be paid to a divorced Muslim wife and this is plain to stay away from vagrancy or dejection concerning a Muslim woman. The dispute set forth for the benefit of the Muslim associations who are interveners before us is that under the Act, vagrancy or desperation is tried to be stayed away from however not by rebuffing the blundering husband, if by any means, yet by accommodating maintenance through others. If under any condition the understanding put by us on the language of Sections 3(1)(a) and 4 of the Act isn't adequate, we should look at the impact of the provisions as they stand, that is, a Muslim woman won't be qualified for maintenance from her husband after the period of Iddat once the talaq is articulated and, if by any means, from that point maintenance must be recuperated from the different people referenced in Section 4 or from the Wakf Board. This Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. 1985 3 SCC 545 and Maneka Gandhi v. Association of India 1978 1 SCC 248 held that the idea of "right to life and individual freedom" ensured under Article 21 of the Constitution would incorporate the "right to live with respect". Before the Act, a Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband was allowed a right to maintenance from her husband under the provisions of section 125 CrPC until she may remarry and a right, if denied, would not be sensible, just, and reasonable. Subsequently, the provisions of the Act denying the divorced Muslim women of a right to maintenance from her husband and accommodating her maintenance to be paid by the previous husband just for the period of Iddat and from that point to make her run from column to post looking for her relatives in a steady progression and eventually to thump at the entryways of the Wakf Board doesn't seem, by all accounts, to be a sensible and reasonable substitute of the provisions of section 125 CrPC. Such hardship of the divorced Muslim women of their right to maintenance from their previous husbands under the valuable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is generally accessible to any remaining women in India can't be expressed to have been affected by a sensible, right, just and reasonable law and, if these provisions are less advantageous than the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a divorced Muslim woman has been absurdly separated and escaped the protection of the provisions of the overall law as shown under the Code which is accessible to Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian women or women having a place with some other community. The provisions at first sight, along these lines, seem, by all accounts, to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution commanding correspondence and equivalent protection of law to all people in any case correspondingly circumstanced and violative of Article 15 of the Constitution which restricts any segregation on the ground of religion as the Act would apply to Muslim divorced women just and exclusively on the ground of their having a place with the Muslim religion. It is all around settled that on a standard of development, a given rule will become "ultra vires" or "unconstitutional" and, thusly, void, though, on another passable development, the rule stays powerful and usable the court will favour the last on the ground that the governing body doesn't plan to enact unconstitutional laws. We figure, the last understanding ought to be acknowledged and, in this way, the translation put by us brings about maintaining the legitimacy of the Act. It is all around settled that when by proper perusing of enactment the legitimacy of the Act can be maintained, such translation is acknowledged by courts and not the alternate path round.
5. Paragraph 32:As on the date the Act came into power the law material to Muslim divorced women is as pronounced by this Court in Shah Bano case. For this situation to discover the individual law of Muslims concerning divorced women's rights, the beginning stage ought to be Shah Bano case and not the first messages or some other material — even more so while differing variants concerning the realness of the source are appeared to exist. Consequently, we have avoided alluding to them in detail. That statement was made in the wake of thinking about The Holy Quran and different analyses or different writings. At the point when a Constitution Bench of this Court broke down Suras 241-42 of Chapter II of The Holy Quran and other pertinent printed material, we don't think it is open for us to rethink that position and dive into an examination to arrive at another resolution. We consciously keep what has been expressed in that. All that requires to be considered is whether in the Act specific deviation has been produced using the individual laws as proclaimed by this Court in Shah Bano case without ravaging its basic proportion. We have painstakingly dissected something very similar and arrive at the resolution that the Act actually and as a general rule codifies what was expressed in the Shah Bano case. The learned Solicitor-General fought that what has been expressed in the items and reasons in the Bill prompting the Act is a fact and that we ought to dare to be right. We have investigated the facts and the law in the Shah Bano case and continued to discover the impact of something similar on the Act. If the language of the Act is as we have expressed, the simple fact that the lawmaking body observed certain facts in enacting the law won't be of much materiality.
6. Paragraph 31:Considerably under the Act, the parties concurred that the provisions of section 125 CrPC would, in any case, be attracted and surprisingly something else the Magistrate has been consulted with the ability to make proper provision for maintenance and, accordingly, what could be prior allowed by a Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC would now be conceded under the very Act itself. This being the position, the Act can't be held to be unconstitutional.
7. Paragraph 30:The contention of the petitioners that a different plan being given under the Act which is similar or more advantageous on the translation set by us from the one given under the Code of Criminal Procedure deny them of their right loses its significance. The item and extent of Section 125 CrPCare to forestall vagrancy by convincing the individuals who are under a commitment to help the individuals who can't uphold themselves and that article being satisfied, we think that it's difficult to acknowledge the dispute encouraged for the benefit of the petitioners.
8. Paragraph 28:A cautious perusing of the provisions of the Act would show that a divorced woman is qualified for a sensible and reasonable provision for maintenance. It was expressed that Parliament appears to plan that the divorced woman gets adequate methods for livelihood after the divorce and, subsequently, "provision" demonstrates that something is given ahead of time to addressing a few necessities. At the end of the day, at the hour of divorce, the Muslim husband is needed to consider the future necessities and make preliminary plans ahead of time for addressing those requirements. Sensible and reasonable provision may incorporate provision for her home, her food, her garments, and different articles. The articulation "inside" ought to be perused as "during" or "for" and this is impossible since words can't be understood in opposition to their importance as "inside" would signify "at the latest", "not past" and, accordingly, it was held that the Act would imply that at the very latest the termination of the Iddat period, the husband will undoubtedly make and pay maintenance to the wife and if he neglects to do so then the wife is qualified for recuperating it by documenting an application before the Magistrate as given in Section 3(3) yet no place has Parliament given that sensible and reasonable provision and maintenance is restricted distinctly for the Iddat period and not past it. It would reach out to the entire life of the divorced wife except if she gets hitched briefly time.
9. Paragraph 29:The significant section in the act is section 3 which gives that a divorced woman is qualified for getting from her previous husband "maintenance", "provision" and "Mahr", and to recuperate from his ownership her wedding presents and share and approves the Magistrate to arrange payment or reclamation of these aggregates or properties. The core of the matter is that the divorced woman will be qualified for a sensible and reasonable provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat periodperiod by her previous husband. The phrasings of Section 3 of the Act seem to show that the husband has two discrete and particular commitments: (1) to make a "sensible and reasonable provision" for his divorced wife; and (2) to give "maintenance" for her. The accentuation of this section isn't on the nature or length of any such "provision" or "maintenance", yet on the time by which a game plan for payment of provision and maintenance ought to be closed, to be specific, "within the Iddat periodperiod". If the provisions are so perused, the Act would avoid from responsibility for present Iddat period maintenance on a man who has effectively released his commitments of both "sensible and reasonable provision" and "maintenance" by paying these sums in a single amount to his wife, as well as having paid his wife's Mahr and reestablished her endowment according to Sections 3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d) of the Act. Correctly, the point that emerged for thought in Shah Bano case was that the husband had not made a "sensible and reasonable provision" for his divorced wife regardless of whether he had paid the sum concurred as Mahr 50 years sooner and gave Iddat maintenance and he was, accordingly, requested to pay a specified entirety month to month to her under Section 125 CrPC. This position was accessible to Parliament on the date it enacted the law, yet all things being equal, the provisions enacted under the Act are "a sensible and reasonable provision and maintenance to be made and paid" as given under section 3(1)(a) of the Act and these articulations cover different things, initially, by the utilization of two different action words — "to be made and paid to her within the Iddat periodperiod" obviously a reasonable and sensible provision is to be made while maintenance is to be paid. Besides, Section 4 of the Act, which engages the Magistrate to give a request for payment of maintenance to the divorced woman against different of her relatives, contains no reference to "provision". The right to have "a reasonable and sensible provision" in support of herself is a right enforceable just against the woman's previous husband, and notwithstanding what he is obliged to pay as "maintenance"; thirdly, the expressions of The Holy Quran, as interpreted by Yusuf Ali of "mata" as "maintenance" however might be off base and those different interpretations utilized "provision", this Court in Shah Bano case excused this perspective by holding that it is a differentiation without a difference. To be sure, whether "mata" was delivered "maintenance" or "provision", there could be no misrepresentation that the husband in Shah Bano's case had given anything at all via "mata" to his divorced wife. The dispute set forth for the benefit of the opposite side is that a divorced Muslim woman who is qualified for "mata" is just a solitary or onetime transaction which doesn't mean payment of maintenance ceaselessly by any stretch of the imagination. This conflict, aside from supporting the view that "provision" in section 3(1)(a) of the Act consolidates "mata" as a right of the divorced Muslim woman particular from and notwithstanding Mahr and maintenance for the Iddat period, likewise empowers "a sensible and reasonable provision" and "a sensible and reasonable provision" as given under Section 3(3) of the Act would be concerning the requirements of the divorced woman, the methods for the husband and the norm of life the woman appreciated during the marriage and there is no motivation behind why such provision couldn't appear as the ordinary payment of alimony to the divorced woman, however, it might look unexpected that the enactment proposed to invert the choice in Shah Bano case, actually codifies the very reasoning contained in that.
10. Paragraph 34:The learned insight showing up for the Muslim associations battled in the wake of alluding to different sections from the course books which we have adverted to before to express that the law is exceptionally certain that a divorced Muslim woman is qualified for maintenance simply up to the phase of Iddat and not from thereon. What is to be given via mata is just a generous provision to be presented in defence of a divorced Muslim woman who can't keep up herself and that too via noble cause or consideration concerning her previous husband and not because of her right streaming to the divorced wife. The impact of different translations put on Suras 241 and 242 of Chapter II of The Holy Quran has been alluded to in the Shah Bano case. Shah Bano's case articulated what the current law would be. It made a qualification between the provisions to be made and the maintenance to be paid. It was seen that the maintenance is payable simply up to the phase of Iddat and this provision is material if there should arise an occurrence of ordinary conditions, while in the event of a divorced Muslim woman who can't look after herself, she is qualified for gettingmata. That is the premise on which the Bench of five Judges of this Court deciphered the different messages and held so. The enactment however implies to beat the view communicated in Shah Bano case corresponding to a divorced Muslim woman getting something via maintenance in the idea of mata is to be sure legally perceived by making provision under the Act with the end goal of the "maintenance" yet additionally for "provision". At the point when these two articulations have been utilized by the enactment, which implies that the lawmaking body didn't plan to decimate the significance ascribed to these two articulations by this Court in the Shah Bano case. In this manner, we are of the view that the conflicts progressed for the gatherings actually can't be maintained.

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