IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2277-2278 OF 2009
DURYODHAN ROUT … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF ORISSA … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.
These appeals are directed against the common judgment
dated 8
th
January, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa at
Cuttack in Death Reference Case No.2 of 2007 and J. Crl.
A.No.12 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
upheld the conviction of the appellant for the offence under
Section 376, 302 and 201 IPC. However, taking into
consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the
age of the appellant, his family background and the fact
that the appellant had no criminal antecedent, the capital
sentence for the offence under Section 302 IPC has been
commuted to life imprisonment; and rest of sentence remain
unaltered.
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 11
th
2004, at about 3 p.m. accused Duryodhan Rout, on the pretext
REPORTABLE
September,
Page 1
1
that the deceased, Subhasini, a minor girl aged about 10
years would talk over phone with his brother, Bamodev Bhoi
took her on a bicycle. When the evening set in, the accused
alone returned to the village and on enquiry about
Subhasini, by Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), father of the deceased, he
told that she had gone with a woman of Ranibandha to her
house. On the next day, as she did not return Mulia Boi (PW-
5) again questioned the accused regarding the where about of
the deceased. The accused confessed in presence of Rabi
Biswal (PW-3), Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) and Subashini Bhoi that
he killed the deceased by pressing her neck. With the help
of these three witnesses, Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) took the accused
to Thakurgarh P.S. got the FIR scribed by one Laxman Senapti
and lodged it before Udit Narayan Pany, Officer-in-charge of
the said Police Station. A P.S. Case No.51 dated 12
September, 2004 under Section 302/201 IPC was instituted.
The accused was arrested, his statement was recorded under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of which
he went to the spot made recovery of the dead body of the
deceased, held inquest over it, seized the Chadi
(underwear) of the victim lying near the spot, prepared
seizure list in respect thereof and sent the dead body to
Adhamalik Hospital for autopsy. He also seized the wearing
apparels of the accused, forwarded to the Court on 13
December, 2004 and handed over charge of investigation of
th
th
Page 2
2
the case to the C.I. of Police. After completion of
investigation, Investigating Officer (I.O.) submitted charge
sheet against the accused under Sections 376/302/201 IPC.
3. Learned Session Judge secured the presence of the
accused, framed charges u/s 376/302/201 I.P.C. The accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. In order to establish its case, the prosecution
examined 8 witnesses. The accused examined himself as DW-1
besides examined DW-2, his father to prove his stand. After
assessing the evidence on record, the Trial Court found the
accused guilty for the offence under Sections 376(f)/302/201
IPC convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to death for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Session
Judge also sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to
pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under
Section 376(f)IPC and RI for one year and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC.
It was further ordered that in default of payment of fine,
the convict would suffer imprisonment for one year for the
offence punishable under Section 376(f) IPC and three months
for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and the
substantive sentences would run consecutively.
5. The High Court, as noticed above in Reference,
converted the capital sentenced to life imprisonment but
ordered that rest of the sentence remain unaltered.
Page 3
3
6. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the occurrence,
the order of conviction was based on the circumstantial
evidence only. From the evidence of Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and
Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2), it transpires that on the date
occurrence at about 4 p.m. while they were making chips by
braking boulders by the side of road, they saw the accused
carrying the deceased on a cycle and at about 5 p.m. they
saw him returning alone. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) and Kalpana Bhoi
(PW-6), the father and the mother of the deceased
respectively, stated that the accused took the deceased on a
cycle on the pretext that the later would talk to her
brother, working at Bargarh, over phone from the house of
Bijaya Bhoi of village Anandpur. While the accused was in
Police custody, he confessed his guilt which was recorded
under Ext.7. The Ext.7 reflects that on 11
th
September, 2004
afternoon he took the deceased near Arakhkuda Salabani
Jungle, undraped her and then committed rape on her. When
she cried. He strangulated her to death and left the dead
body covering it with branches of trees. On the basis of
statement of the accused the I.O recovered the dead body and
the Chadi (underwear) of the deceased lying nearby, from
Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle. The statement of the accused made
before the Police Officer which distinctly relates to the
facts of recovery is admissible under the law.
Page 4
4
7. Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9) stated that on 12
th
2004 he was attached to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Athamallik
as a Specialist in O and G. On that date at 5 p.m. on Police
requisition, he conducted autopsy over the dead body of the
deceased-Subhasini Bhoi aged about 10 years and found as
follows:
"(i) Bleeding from nostrils and mouth and both the ears
with small clotting of blood.
(ii) Eyes were half opened.
(iii) Bloody froth present in the nostrils and mouth.
(iv) Stool had been discharged from anus.
(v) Thumb marks were present on the front of the
neck.
(vi) Two linear abrasions of size 3” x 4” on the front of
the neck due to scratching by some sharp weapon
like human nail.
(vii) Finger marks were present on both sides of the
neck and back of the neck.
(viii) Extravasation of blood in to the sub-cutaneous
tissues under the thumb and finger marks and
adjacent muscles of the neck.
(ix) Muscles of neck corresponding to the thumb and
finger marks were mildly lacerated.
(x) Multiple abrasions (linear) of size varying from 2”
and 3” on both sides of scapular region. Most
probably caused by weapon like human nails.
(xi) Multiple abrasions on the back of both buttocks due
to friction on a rough surface, like rough ground
and the abrasions were associated with very mild
bleeding. The size of multiple abrasions varies from
½” x ½” to ¾” x ½”.
(xii) Laceration of the vagina with bleeding with clots,
most probably because of attempt to introduce the
penis-forcibly. The penis most probably was large
in size and the vaginal orifice of the deceased girl,
aged about 10 years was very narrow. The
laceration appears to have been caused by several
attempts to introduce the penis into the vagine.
(xiii) All the injuries were ante mortem in nature. The
throttling was also ante mortem in nature. There
was no evidence of seminal fluid in or around
vagina or on any part of the body of anywhere in
the clothings of the victim.
September,
Page 5
5
According to Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9), the cause of
death was due to throttling and probably homicidal in
nature. He further stated that the accused might have
attempted three to four times to introduce his penis into
the vaginal orifice of the deceased. From his evidence, it
further transpires that on 13
th
September, 2004, he examined
the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his pant. He
also found one linear abrasion of size ¼ on the postero-
lateral aspect of the left elbow and another linear abrasion
of the same size on the medial aspect of his right knees.
According to him, those injuries might have been caused 12
hours earlier to the alleged incident. Therefore, it is not
safe to hold that in course of rape and murder of deceased,
the accused sustained those injuries. Dr. Narayan Udgata
(PW-9),however, could not notice any sign of recent sexual
intercourse on the private part of the accused.
8. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), stated that the accused confessed
before him and Rabindra Biswal (PW-3) and Dasarathi Bhoi
(PW-4) that he killed the deceased. Rabindra Biswal (PW-3)
and Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) turned hostile and did not support
the prosecution. However, Kalpana Bhoi (PW-6) corroborated
this part of evidence of Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). When asked by
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) regarding the whereabout of the deceased,
accused told that she went with a woman of Ranibandha, which
was found to be incorrect.
Page 6
6
9. The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of
the chain of circumstantial evidence available against the
accused. It was found that the accused carried on the
deceased in his cycle at about 4 p.m. but returned alone at
5 p.m. He confessed to have murdered the deceased before
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). On the basis of the statement of the
accused recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the
I.O. discovered the dead body; the opion of the Doctor was
that the deceased was raped and murdered. The Doctor
examined the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his
pant. The accused gave false statement that the deceased
went with a woman of Ranibandha. Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and
Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2)saw the accused carried the
deceased on a cycle at about 4 p.m. and returned alone one
hour thereafter. Thus, the accused was last seen with the
deceased. There is nothing to indicate that within one hour,
there was any scope for anybody else, other than the accused
to commit rape and murder of the deceased. The chain of
circumstances of the case thereby leads to the hypothesis
that the accused and the accused alone was the author of the
crime, and therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted the
accused under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.
10. During the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant
mainly argued on the question of consecutive sentence as
passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. It
Page 7
7
was contended that Trial Court and the High Court wrongly
held that the sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC to
run consecutively.
11. The question arises whether the judgment passed by the
Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court, that the
sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC are to run
consecutively is contrary to the proviso to sub Section (2)
of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).
12. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent-
State of Orissa proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of
the Cr.P.C. cannot be made applicable to a conviction for
life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.
13. It was submitted that imprisonment can be rigorous or
simple (Section 60 of the Indian Penal Code). As far as life
imprisonment is concerned, there is no such classification.
The first classification was attempted by the Law Commission
of India through its 39
th
report to qualify it as rigorous
but the same was never translated into legislation. But such
submission is not based on any reasoning.
14. In order to fully appreciate the question involved in
the present case it is desirable to notice the relevant
provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code.
15. Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases
of conviction of several offences at one trial. Under
Page 8
8
proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no
case a person can be sentenced to imprisonment for a period
longer than fourteen years and the aggregate punishment
shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the
Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. Section
31 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
“31. Sentences in cases of conviction of several
offences
at one trial.
(1) When a person is convicted at one trial
of two or more offences, the Court may, subject
to
the
provisions
of
section
71
of
the
Indian
Penal
Code (45
of 1860
), sentence
him
for
such
offences,
to
the
several
punishments
prescribed
therefor
which
such
Court
is
competent
to
inflict;
such
punishments
when
consisting
of
imprisonment
to
commence
the
one
after
the
expiration
of
the
other
in
such
order
as
the
Court
may
direct,
unless
the
Court
directs
that
such
punishments
shall
run
concurrently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it
shall not be necessary for the Court by reason
only
of
the
aggregate
punishment
for
the
several
offences
being
in
excess
of
the
punishment
which
it
is
competent
to
inflict
on
conviction
of
a
single
offence,
to
send
the
offender
for
trial
before
a higher Court:
Provided that-
(a) in no case shall such person be
sentenced to imprisonment for longer period
than
fourteen
years;
(b)
the aggregate punishment shall not
exceed twice the amount of punishment
which the Court is competent to inflict
for a single offence.
Page 9
9
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted
person, the aggregate of the consecutive
sentences passed against him under this section
shall be deemed to be a single sentence.”
16. Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code defines life as
“The word “life” denotes the life of a human being, unless
the contrary appears from the context”.
The word “imprisonment” has not been defined either in
the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code.
As per the General Clauses Act, 1897 under Section
3(27) – “imprisonment” shall mean imprisonment of either
description as defined in the Indian Penal Code. The
definition of imprisonment under the General Clauses Act
would, therefore, in case of life imprisonment mean
imprisonment for life/imprisonment for the remainder of the
convict’s life.
We are not in agreement with submission made on behalf
of the State that imprisonment for life has not been
included in the definition of term ‘imprisonment’ under
Section 3(27) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
17. Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years of
imprisonment. A reading of Section 55 IPC and Section 433
and 433A Cr.P.C. would indicate that only the appropriate
Government can commute the sentence for imprisonment of life
for a term not exceeding fourteen years or exceeds the
Page 10
10
release for such person unless he has served at least
fourteen years of imprisonment.
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code merely relates to
calculating fractions of terms of punishment by providing a
numerical value of 20 years to life imprisonment.
Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code lists the
punishments to which offenders are liable under the Code
which reads as follows:
“First-Death;
Secondly-Imprisonment for life;
Fourthly-Imprisonment, which is of two
Descriptions, namely:-
(1)Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
(2)Simple
Fifty-Forfeiture of property;
Sixthly-Fine.”
Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is
bound to serve the remainder of his life in prison unless
the sentence is commuted by the appropriate Government in
terms of the Section 55, 433 and 433A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
18. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra &
Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600, the Constitution Bench of this Court
while dealing with the question as to whether there is any
provision of law whereunder a sentence for life
imprisonment, without any formal remission by the
Page 11
11
appropriate Government can be automatically treated as one
for a definite period. In the said case this Court held:
“5. If so, the next question is whether
there is any provision of law where under a
sentence for life imprisonment, without any
formal remission by appropriate Government,
can be automatically treated as one for a
definite period. No such provision is found
in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Government
of
India
stated
before
the
Judicial
Committee
in
the
case
cited
supra
that,
having
regard
to
Section
57
of
the
Indian
Penal
Code,
20
years'
imprisonment
was
equivalent
to
a
sentence
of
transportation
for
life,
the
Judicial
Committee
did
not
express
its
final
opinion
on
that
question.
The
Judicial
Committee
observed
in that
case thus
at p. 10:
“Assuming that the sentence is to be
regarded as one of twenty years, and
subject to remission for good conduct,
he had not earned remission sufficient
to entitle him to discharge at the time
of his application, and it was therefore
rightly dismissed, but in saying
this, Their Lordships are not to be
taken as meaning that a life sentence
must in all cases be treated as one of
not more than twenty years, or that the
convict is necessarily entitled to remission.”
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no
real bearing on the question raised before
us. For calculating fractions of terms of
punishment the section provides that transportation
for life shall be regarded as
equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.
It does not say that transportation for life
shall be deemed to be transportation for
twenty years for all purposes; nor does the
amended section which substitutes the words
“imprisonment for life” for “transportation
for life” enable the drawing of any such all
embracing fiction. A sentence of transporta-
Page 12
12
tion for life or imprisonment for life must
prima facie be treated as transportation or
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining
period of the convicted person's natural
life.”
19. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors.,
(1976) 3 SCC 470, this Court held that sentence of
imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the
end of 20 years. This Court held:
“9. From a review of the authorities and
the statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure the following propositions
emerge:
“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for
life does not automatically expire at the end
of 20 years including the remissions, because
the administrative rules framed under the
various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act
cannot supersede the statutory provisions of
the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment
for
life
means
a
sentence
for
the
entire
life
of
the
prisoner
unless
the
appropriate
Government chooses to exercise its
discretion to remit either the whole or a
part of the sentence under Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure;”
20. This Court in Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj & Ors.,
(1983) 2 SCC 454, relying upon the judgment made by the
Privy Council in ‘Kishor Lal’ and Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in ‘Gopal Vinayak Godse’ held that
the appellant in the said case was liable to serve the
sentence until the remainder of his life in prison.
21. In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC
498, this Court held that the expression “life imprisonment”
Page 13
13
must be read in the context of Section 45 of the Indian
Penal Code which would mean imprisonment for the full or
complete span of life. This Court further held that the
provisions in Section 57 that imprisonment for life shall be
reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years is for
the purpose of working out the fraction of the terms of
punishment.
22. This Court endorsed the view taken by this Court in the
case of Niab Singh, the Privy Council judgment in Kishori
Lal and the judgment in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse in
Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1992) 4 SCC 172.
23. In Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC
458, this Court held that life imprisonment means
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
convicted person’s natural life unless the appropriate
Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit
either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401
Cr.P.C.
Similar was the view taken by this Court in Shri
Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296.
24. This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not
equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd.
Munna vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 417. The Court
held that the life imprisonment means imprisonment for whole
of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural
Page 14
14
life. There is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code
or in the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment
could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without
there being of formal remission by the appropriate
Government.
25. In Swamy Shraddananda vs.State of Karnataka, (2008) 13
SCC 767, this Court while substituting the sentence of death
to life imprisonment held that the prisoner shall not be
released from prison till the rest of his life.
Similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet & Anr.
vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452. In the said case
this Court held that a prisoner serving a life sentence has
no indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14
years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life
imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end
of his life subject to any remission granted by the
appropriate Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C.
26. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,
it is clear that a sentence of imprisonment for life means
a sentence for entire life of the prisoner unless the
appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to
remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
27. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of
conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub
Page 15
15
Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the
aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer
than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment
means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the
question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for
several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in
case a person is sentenced of conviction of several
offences, including one that of life imprisonment, the
proviso to Section 31(2) shall come into play and no
consecutive sentence can be imposed.
28. In the case of Kamalanantha and others vs. State of
T.N., (2005) 5 SCC 194, this Court held:
“75. Regarding the sentence, the trial court
resorted to Section 31 CrPC and ordered the sentence
to
run
consecutively,
subject
to
proviso
(a)
of
the
said section.
76. The contention of Mr Jethmalani that the
term “imprisonment” enjoined in Section 31 CrPC
does not include imprisonment for life is unacceptable.
The
term
“imprisonment”
is
not
defined
under
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure.
Section
31
of
the
Code
falls
under
Chapter
III
of
the
Code
which
deals
with
power
of
courts.
Section
28
of
the
Code
empowers
the
High
Court
to
pass
any
sentence
authorised
by
law.
Similarly,
the
Sessions
Judge
and
Additional
Sessions
Judge
may
pass
any
sentence
authorised
by
law,
except
the
sentence
of
death
which
shall
be
subject
to
confirmation
by
the
High
Court.
In
our
opinion
the
term
“imprisonment”
would include the sentence of imprisonment
for
life.”
29. The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by this Court in
Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 37, and held:
Page 16
16
“9. Although, the power of the court to impose
consecutive sentence under Section 31 of the
Criminal Procedure Code was also noticed by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Prab-
hakaran v. P. Jayarajan
2
, but, therein the ques-
tion of construing proviso appended thereto did
not and could not have fallen for consideration.
10. The question, however, came up for consideration
in
Zulfiwar
Ali
v.
State
of
U.P.
it was held: (All LJ p. 1181, para 25)
“25. The opening words ‘In the case of consecutive
sentences’ in sub-section (2) of
Section 31 make it clear that this sub-section
refers
to
a
case
in
which
‘consecutive
sentences’
are ordered. After providing
that in such a case if an aggregate of punishment
for
several
offences
is
found
to
be
in
excess
of
punishment
which
the
court
is
competent
to inflict on a conviction of
single offence, it shall not be necessary
for the court to send the offender for trial
before a higher court. After making such a
provision, proviso (a) is added to this
sub-section to limit the aggregate of sentences
which
such
a
court
pass
while
making
the
sentences consecutive. That is this
proviso has provided that in no case the
aggregate of consecutive sentences passed
against an accused shall exceed 14 years.
In the instant case the aggregate of the
two sentences passed against the appellant
being 28 years clearly infringes the above
proviso. It is accordingly not liable to be
sustained.”
3
wherein
11. In view of the proviso appended to Section
31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the
opinion that the High Court committed a manifest
error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years’
rigorous imprisonment. The maximum sentence imposable
being
14
years
and
having
regard
to
the
fact
that
the
appellant
is
in
custody
for
more
than
12
years.
Now,
we
are
of
the
opinion
that
interest
of
justice
would
be
subserved
if
the
appellant
is
directed
to
be
sentenced
to
the
period
already
undergone.”
Page 17
17
30. In the recent judgment in Ramesh Chilwal alias
Bambayya vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 11 SCC 629, this
Court held:
“4. Since this Court issued notice only to
clarify the sentence awarded by the trial
Judge, there is no need to go into all the
factual details. We are not inclined to modify
the sentence. However, considering the
fact that the trial Judge has awarded life
sentence for an offence under Section 302, in
view of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, we make it clear that all
the sentences imposed under IPC, the Gangsters
Act
and
the
Arms
Act
are
to
run
concurrently.”
31. In view of the aforesaid discussions and decisions
rendered by this Court, we hold that the Trial Court was not
justified in imposing the sentence under Section
376(f)/302/201 IPC to run consecutively. The High court
failed to address the said issue.
32. For the reasons stated above, while we are not inclined
to interfere with the order of conviction and the sentence,
considering the fact that the accused has been awarded life
imprisonment for the offence under Section 302, we direct
that all the sentences imposed under Indian Penal Code are
to run concurrently. The judgment passed by the Session
Judge as affirmed by the High Court stands modified to the
extent above. The appeals are allowed in part with the
aforesaid observations.
Page 18
18
……………………………………………………………………………J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
……………………………………………………………………………J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014.
Page 19
19
ITEM NO.1D COURT NO.6 SECTION IIB
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2277-2278/2009
DURYODHAN ROUT Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF ORISSA Respondent(s)
Date : 01/07/2014 These appeals were called on for pronouncement
of Judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. T. N. Singh ,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Shibashish Misra ,Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya pronounced
the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra.
The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable
judgment.
Page 20
(MEENAKSHI KOHLI) (USHA SHARMA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]
Page 21
